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Chapter 1
Introduction
The main objective of this thesis is to gain insight into the process by which
innovative energy-efficient process technologies for the manufacturing industry are
developed. The underlying interest is to explore how government can stimulate the
development of such technologies. Although our interest is in the ways in which
government can intervene, we need to make a detour first in order to increase our
insight into the process by which such technologies emerge.
Human-induced climate change is the result of the extensive use of fossil fuels within
the energy system. On the one hand technology allows exploiting the fossil fuel
resources of the earth. On the other hand technological development and innovative
technology are commonly suggested as partial solutions to the problem of
greenhouse gas emissions. In Section 1.2, we concentrate on industrial energy-
efficiency improvement as one of the promising technological options for mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions. In Section 1.3, we argue that it is worth making a detour
in order to analyse in detail the development of specific industrial energy-efficient
technologies. It is suggested to draw on technology studies for deriving a framework
that can be used for analysing the empirical case studies. In Section 1.4, we state the
aim of the study, pose the research questions and present the outline of the thesis. In
Section 1.5, the choice for a case study methodology is explained and the selection of
four technology case studies is discussed.
1.1. Climate change and innovative technology
Technology and climate change
Ever since people became an established factor in the history of the earth, they have
developed and used technologies to facilitate their survival and to make life easier.
Since that time human activity and the development and use of technology have been
connected [Basalla, 1987]. In our modern society, highly integrated systems of
technology have become a fact of life. The agricultural sector, the manufacturing
industry, the medical health system, the transport system, and the energy sector
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cannot do without technology. Our daily life is strongly interwoven with the use of
technology.
The historical use of energy illustrates how technologies have become increasingly
integrated in our society and how they have contributed to human well being.
Industrialisation has shown how the increasingly intensive use of energy, especially
fossil fuels, can raise productivity in other sectors [Rosenberg, 1994]. Modern
societies have developed with the backing of fossil fuels which have provided energy
in an accessible and concentrated form. Technologies for extracting, converting and
using such fuels are well developed and widely known [Grubb, 1991; Grübler, 1998].
At present, energy systems covering both energy supply and end-use are highly
dependent on fossil fuels1.
The exploitation of fossil fuels has not only contributed to human well being, it has
also led to increasing environmental pressure on the earth. Human-induced climate
change is currently one of the most important environmental problems related to the
use of fossil fuels2. The emission of carbon dioxide (CO2), one of the most important
greenhouse gases, is a direct result of our intensive use of fossil fuels throughout
society. The emission of greenhouse gases leads to changes in the radiation
equilibrium of the earth’s atmosphere. This may induce large-scale changes in the
world’s climate.
Innovative technology as part of the solution
It is only fairly recently that anthropogenic climate change has been widely
perceived as a problem for society. The scientific community has been aware of the
issue for several decades. The historical records concerning research into the earth’s
climate system go back to the Swedish chemist Svente Arrhenius in 1895. During the
second half of the 20th century, scientific research into climate change gradually
increased. At the first World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1979, the
participating scientists recognised climate change as a serious societal problem. A
series of meetings followed. The 1985 conference in Villach was a milestone in the
climate debate because it succeeded in putting the climate issue on the international
policy agenda. After that, anthropogenic climate change figured more and more
prominently on the policy agenda. Concerns about the impact of future greenhouse
gas emissions spurred governments on to draft and sign the Framework Convention
on Climate Change in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. A series of meetings of the Conference
                                                
1
 The energy system, which comprises a sequence of conversion and transportation operations, can be
divided into an energy supply and an energy end-use system. An energy system exists to serve end-
users in fulfilling energy services [De Beer, 1998].
2
 Note that in additional to environment problems like human-induced climate change, the energy
systems also cause problems. The reliance on fossil fuels is a challenge to geo-political stability and
causes economic vulnerability since fossil fuel resources, especially oil, are located in specific regions
of the world. The concept of a sustainable energy system has a broader connotation than only reducing
environmental impacts. Sustainable energy is energy produced and used in ways that support human
development over the long-term in all its social, economic and environmental dimensions (see e.g.
[WEA, 2000]).
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of the Parties (CoP), the supreme body of the Framework Convention, was organised
after the Convention had been signed3. While these international political
negotiations are ongoing (not always very smoothly), the climate problem is being
quoted frequently as an argument for intensifying energy policy in various countries.
Discussions have intensified over the last ten to fifteen years [Farla, 2000].
Innovative technology and technological development form an important part of the
action that can be taken or stimulated by government to mitigate climate change (see
e.g. [Nacicenovic, 1993; Grubb et al., 1992; IWG, 1997; IEA, 1997b]). Innovative
technologies may facilitate the transformation of the energy system into a more
sustainable practice by reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions [WEA,
2000; Margolis and Kammen, 1999b; Hoffert et al., 1998; Kemp, 1997]. With
respect to the most important greenhouse gas, CO2, a wide variety of technology
options have been suggested: energy-efficient and material-efficient end-use
technologies, low or no carbon energy supply options (such as solar energy, wind
energy, biomass energy and nuclear energy), and carbon sequestration (see e.g.
[IPCC, 2001; WEA, 2000; Phylipsen, 2000; Blok et al., 1995; Turkenburg, 1995;
Nakicenovic et al., 1993]).
It is almost paradoxical that on the one hand the use of technology associated with
the exploitation of fossil fuels is an important contributor to human-induced climate
change, while on the other hand innovative technology is also increasing the
possibilities for remedies [Grübler, 1998; Foray and Grübler, 1997]. Some argue that
technological development and innovative technology are the decisive factors in how
cheaply countries are able to meet collective climate change objectives (see e.g.
[IEA, 1996; Grubb, 1997; Edmonds et al., 1997]). Many national governments have
focused their strategies for greenhouse gas mitigation on encouraging technological
development [IPCC, 2001]. The recent third assessment report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC4) for instance states: “Innovation
may lead to improvements in technology performance, reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions per service provided, or reduction in cost for low-greenhouse gas
technology, all of which can contribute towards green house gas mitigation” [IPCC,
2001, Ch. 5, p.10].
The hope and expectation are that in the long run technological development and
innovative technology will bring about tremendous improvements and resolve the
apparent current conflict between environment and economy [Jaffe and Stavins,
1990; Jaffe et al., 2000].
                                                
3
 For a more elaborate account on the scientific and political history of the issue of climate change, see
[Van der Sluijs, 1997; Phylipsen, 2000].
4
 The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environmental Programme
(UNEP) jointly established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988. The aim
of the IPCC is to assess the scientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant for human-
induced climate change on a regular basis.
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A role for government in accelerating technological development
Technological development and innovative technology may make an important
contribution to a more sustainable use of energy and thus to the mitigation of climate
change. The large environmental (and economic and security) benefits of
technological development and innovative technologies in the energy system are said
to legitimise a more active role for government in the stimulation of energy R&D5
(see e.g. [WEA, 2000; Margolis and Kammen, 1999b; PCAST, 1997]). Increasing
the rate of technological development is one of the major challenges of our time
[Blok, 2000]. The World Energy Assessment Council (WEA) recently wrote: “there
is the need to accelerate the energy innovation process through all effective means,
including appropriate public policies where they can be identified” [WEA, 2000, p.
429]. This raises the question of how government can contribute towards the
accelerated development of desired technology.
Grübler, who wrote an extensive textbook on technology and global change [Grübler,
1998], also concluded that stimulating technological development is an important
contingency policy in the case of uncertain issues such as climate change. However,
he stresses that there is no simple answer to the question of which policy instruments
or government intervention strategies should be used to follow such a technology
strategy [Grübler, 1998, p. 358].
There is a growing amount of literature on the effects of policy instruments on
technological change (including R&D, innovation and diffusion), although most of it
has been theoretical. Empirical analyses of the effect of policy instruments on the
rate and direction of technological development are limited in number [IPCC, 2001;
Jaffe et al., 2000]6.
1.2. Innovative industrial energy-efficient technology
In the thesis we focus on the end-use of the energy system and, more specifically, on
energy efficiency in the manufacturing industry. This is one of the important
technological options always included in studies on possible ways of reducing
                                                
5
 Over the past few years, there has been a growing interest in understanding trends in energy R&D.
Researchers have been looking for the explanations for and determinants of energy R&D expenditure
levels. This interest is related to the question of whether industrialised countries and their
governments spend enough R&D to address the threat posed by climate change and whether
government R&D support has any effect [IEA, 1997a; Dooley et al., 1998; Margolis and Kammen,
1999a; Margolis and Kammen, 1999b; PCAST, 1997].
6
 The core of such theoretical analyses is rooted in economic literature and focuses on adoption
(diffusion) rather than on technological development (see e.g. [Verhoef and Nijkamp, 1999; Fischer et
al., 1998; Jung et al., 1996; Milliman and Prince, 1989]). Empirical research as reported for instance
in Jaffe and Stavins (1995) and Kemp (1997) also focuses on technology diffusion rather than on
technological development [Jaffe et al., 2000].
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greenhouse gas emissions (see e.g. [IPCC, 2001; WEA, 2000; Blok et al., 1995;
Nakicenovic, 1993]). We have three arguments.
Long-term potential for energy-efficiency improvement
The worldwide manufacturing industry is the largest energy-consuming economic
sector. The industry accounts for over 40% of primary energy end-use and carbon
dioxide emissions (see Figure 1).
Figure 1: World primary energy end-use and carbon dioxide emissions in 1995
[IPCC, 2001].
Within the manufacturing industry, a considerable amount of energy is needed for
the production of cement, steel, pulp and paper, fertiliser, petrochemicals, glass,
aluminium and copper. The energy consumption in the iron and steel industry, the
chemical industries, petroleum refining, pulp and paper and the cement industry are
responsible for 45% of the total industrial energy consumption. The production of
such basic materials is expected to remain a major energy-consuming activity in the
future [WEC, 1995]. We concentrate on these energy-intensive manufacturing
industries.
Energy system analysis, or energy analysis, which has emerged as a scientific
discipline since 19707, has proven to be an indispensable tool for estimating the
                                                
7
 Energy system analysis studies the entire energy system, both the production of energy and the
energy end-use within the society. The scientific discipline of energy analysis has developed in direct
interaction with societal changes and trends in energy use. The origin of energy analysis is rooted in
the scarcity of fossil fuels and the energy crises during the seventies. Since the early nineties, the issue
of climate change has become the leading theme in energy analysis (see [Blok, 2000]).
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potential for energy-efficiency improvements in the manufacturing industry
[Phylipsen, 2000; Blok, 2000]. The potential for energy-efficiency improvement by
implementing available technologies has been studied extensively (see e.g. [ETSU,
1984; Jackson, 1991; Mills et al., 1991; Blok et al., 1993; De Beer et al., 1994]).
More recently, there has been increased interest in the longer term potential for
industrial energy efficiency [Blok et al., 1995; Reddy et al., 1997]. Emerging
innovative industrial energy-efficient technologies have been identified and
characterised (see e.g. [De Beer, 1998; Martin et al., 2000]). Manufacturing
industries continue to find new, more energy-efficient processes, which make this
option important for the longer term too [IPCC, 2001].
Industrial energy efficiency does more than simply save energy
Industrial energy-efficiency improvement is also seen as an attractive option for
dealing with climate change, because it is acknowledged to be a cost-effective option
for reducing CO2 emissions [Grubb, 1991; Reddy et al., 1997; IPCC, 2001]. Energy
efficiency is seen as a means of protecting the environment while promoting
economic prosperity by savings costs [Doelen, 1989]. Manufacturing firms cannot
only prevent emissions, but they can also enhance their profits by reducing energy
use. Society needs to exploit the full economic potential of energy-efficiency
improvement in order to benefit from the lower cost of providing energy services, to
reduce adverse environmental impacts and to free capital resources for other
purposes [WEA, 2000].
Governments find industrial energy efficiency an attractive R&D option
Governments consider the development of innovative energy-efficient technologies
for industry an attractive option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Whereas
spending on government energy R&D support has generally fallen off, government
R&D support for end-use energy efficiency has been increasing since the middle of
the eighties (see also Figure 2) [WEA, 2000]. In industrialised countries industrial
energy-efficiency R&D support appears to be receiving preferential treatment
compared to other end-use sectors such as buildings or transport [Luiten and Blok,
1999; IEA, 1997a; Dooley et al., 1998].
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Figure 2: Government energy R&D expenditure trends 1980 and 19958 [IEA,
1997a]. We have included the 11 countries for which data were
available for each year9.
1.3. The need of a detour: 
Taking into account actors and dynamics
Why a detour?
So far, we have seen that developing innovative industrial energy-efficient
technologies is one of the appealing options for reducing future greenhouse gas
emissions. The expectations concerned with innovative technology are large. The
effect of government intervention in developing climate friendly technologies is
however an unexplored area for empirical research.
At first sight, determining the effectiveness of government intervention is not very
problematical. The ‘input’ has to be related to the ‘output’ or ‘impact’ of the policy
instrument. The crux is what did government achieve by implementing a certain
policy instrument? What would have happened in the absence of that instrument? In
                                                
8
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) collects and reports public R&D expenditure in energy
R&D within the OECD countries [IEA, 1997a]. The IEA data are the best energy R&D available,
although it should be realised that there are difficulties in data collection and data processing (see e.g.
[Dooley et al., 1997]). The energy R&D data are at best an input measure. They say nothing about
productivity. Furthermore, it should be noted that that R&D that affects energy end-use is not the
same as ‘energy-efficiency R&D’ as distinguished in IEA statistics [Dooley, 2000]. Private sector
energy R&D data are difficult to assess accurately [PCAST, 1997; Dooley, 2000; Sagar, 2000].
9
 Countries included are Canada, Denmark, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the US. On average 85% of the reported industrial
energy-efficiency R&D is included; in the case of energy-efficiency R&D and energy R&D 87 and
89% respectively were included [IEA, 1997a].
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the case of the improvement of industrial energy efficiency this implies that the
policy instrument has to be related to the amount of energy saved due to that
instrument.
In the evaluation of policy instruments for stimulating the implementation of existing
industrial energy-efficient technologies, two important criteria are commonly used
(see e.g. [CPB, 1997; Glasbergen et al., 1997; IPCC, 2001]):
- Effectiveness - the degree to which a policy instrument contributed to achieving a
specific target, for instance, to what extent did the instrument contribute to
improved energy efficiency (indicated in joules saved)?
- Efficiency - cost/benefit ratio of the policy instrument. The efficiency is the
relation between the effectiveness and the means, which are required to achieve
that effect. With regard to industrial energy efficiency, the efficiency is
determined by the cost of the instrument per amount of energy saved.
Although the two criteria are clearly defined, assessing them empirically is a
complicated task (see e.g. [Rietbergen et al., forthcoming]). The crux is to isolate the
effect of the instrument from other factors and autonomous trends. Analysts start
from plausible assumptions or calculations about the behaviour and reactions of
actors with regard to investment in energy-efficient technologies. This is an
important step in allocating the ‘output’ in terms of energy saved to the policy
instrument evaluated10.
Isolating the effect of the policy instrument in stimulating R&D and technological
development is even more complicated because of the considerable time lag between
the moment of intervention and the final impact11. There are some important
problems in relating ‘input’ to ‘output’ [SPRU, 1996; Williams, 1993; OECD, 1997].
Some aspects can be easily measured, like financial input measures such as R&D
expenditure and intermediate outputs such as number of scientific or technical
articles, number of patents etc. However, input measures such as government R&D
support do not indicate anything about the additionality of government intervention.
Intermediate outputs may be related to government intervention but do not say
anything about the final impact, for instance in terms of energy-efficiency
improvements. The time lag between the moment of government intervention and the
final impact of an innovative technology is such that many things can happen that
may disrupt or enhance investments in R&D, technological development and
innovation. It is difficult to estimate the importance of (earlier) fundamental R&D in
                                                
10
 Regarding the investment behaviour of industrial firms in proven industrial energy-efficient
technologies, insight into firms’ behaviour and decisions is growing. This allows analysts to make
plausible assumptions about the impact of a policy instrument on the investment in energy-efficient
technologies (see for instance [Rietbergen et al., forthcoming]).
11
 There is a considerable amount of (scientific) literature on the difficulties of assessing the final
impact of R&D investment in general and of R&D expenditure supported by government (see e.g.
[CPB, 1999; SPRU, 1996; Williams, 1993; Smith, 1992; OECD, 1997]). A number of methods have
been suggested for assessing the intermediate and final impacts of R&D; these include peer review,
user surveys, cost-benefit methods, case studies, bibliometric indicators (e.g. patent analyses), generic
science and technology indicators, and econometric models.
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technological development. Spill-over effects usually occur in unpredictable ways.
Achievements in process development may also lead to activities and modifications
in fundamental R&D. Sometimes the impact of R&D activities is difficult to
measure; the effect can be to establish links among actors, provide access to
equipment, deliver advice or information, facilitate informal co-operation or lead to
some improved control of existing technologies. A final, though major complication
is that in order for R&D and technological development to come to
commercialisation more is needed than investment in R&D. In other words, in
evaluating the effect of government intervention in stimulating technological
development one encounters a problem of attribution.
There is no insight into actors’ arguments for being involved in the development of
innovative industrial energy-efficient technologies. It is neither clear how
government intervention affects actors’ R&D decisions. Why do actors initiate,
pursue or stop the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies? How
susceptible are they to government’s attempts to stimulate such developments? What
are the other factors and dynamics at stake?
It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the development of such energy-efficient
technologies in order to see what role government intervention played in the
development of energy-efficient technology in particular case studies.
Therefore, we intend to make a detour. We will not start by evaluating policy
instruments or government intervention strategies, but we will first obtain a better
understanding of the role of actors and of the dynamics in the process by which
industrial energy-efficient technologies develop. The basic idea is that the analysis of
various detailed technology case studies will help us to make some suggestions for
government intervention. Case studies let us examine the link between R&D
activities, government intervention, actors’ decisions and the actual development and
materialisation of the technology. We want to understand what influences actors’
decisions regarding technological development. We want to know how important
energy efficiency is as an argument for developing an innovative process technology.
In making this detour we draw on two scientific disciplines, energy analysis and
technology studies. As was indicated, energy analysis has greatly enhanced our
insight into both short-term and long-term improvements in industrial energy
efficiency. However, the way energy analysts perceive innovative technology and
technological development is unlikely to be sufficient for gaining insight into the
process of developing such technologies. Therefore, we suggest to take a look at the
insights generated by technology studies for obtaining guidelines for the performance
of the technology case studies.
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Energy analysis
In energy analysis, generally, a bottom-up strategy is adopted to analyse the amount
of energy needed to fulfil various energy services12. The method starts from the
demand for energy services. It is recognised that the same energy service can be
produced with different levels of energy use depending on the technologies used for
fulfilling the energy service. The specific energy consumption (SEC) is the amount
of energy required to realise the activity associated with that energy service [De
Beer, 1998]. With regard to industrial energy efficiency the activity is defined in
physical terms, e.g. tonnes of paper or steel. Improvements in industrial energy
efficiency can be translated into a reduction in the specific energy consumption.
Information is collected about all kinds of technologies that reduce the specific
energy consumption; these reductions together constitute the potential for energy-
efficiency improvement (see e.g. [Martin et al., 2000; IWG, 1997; De Beer et al.,
1994; ETSU, 1984]). Figure 3 portrays the way in which energy analysts typically
perceive technology and the long-term potential for industrial energy-efficiency
improvement.
Figure 3: The barrier model (reproduced from [IPCC, 2001, Ch.5]). A barrier
is defined as any obstacle to realising a potential that can be
overcome by a policy, a programme or a measure.
                                                
12
 Energy analysts study industrial energy efficiency. They compare and explain differences in energy
consumption per unit of activity (SEC) between countries (see e.g. [Farla, 200; Phylipsen, 2000]) and
they assess the long-term techno-economic potential for energy-efficiency improvement (see e.g. [De
Beer, 1998]).
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Figure 3 shows that what is called the physical potential for energy-efficiency
improvement in industry is ultimately limited by thermodynamic laws (see also [De
Beer, 1998; Jochem, 1991]). The technical potential is what can be achieved by
applying the best available technology to fulfil a certain energy service at a certain
moment in time. The idea contained in Figure 3 is that the current technical potential
can be increased in the direction of the physical potential by developing innovative
technologies. To enhance technological development, the barriers that hamper the
development of innovative (energy-efficient) technologies need to be broken down.
This barrier model provides energy analysts with the logic for increasing government
support of energy-efficiency R&D. The question that is usually ahead is: Do we have
the potential to reduce CO2 emissions by X% in the year Z? If the answer is ‘yes’,
the targets can be set and the barriers obstructing the potential can be analysed in
order to select policy instruments that break down these barriers. If the answer is
‘no’, a plea is made for enhanced R&D activities in order to get closer to the physical
potential [Shove, 1998]. The neo-classical economic argument of market failure is
typically quoted as a reason for enhancing public R&D activities13. The recent IPCC
report (2001) for instance suggests that: “The technical potential can be enlarged by
solving scientific and technological problems. Policies to overcome this type of
barrier must be aimed at fostering R&D” [IPCC, 2001, Ch.5, p.9].  R&D can have
separate goals depending on the barriers that have to be tackled before a technology
can be implemented. R&D can be performed to make a new technology technically
feasible, to improve the technology in order to make the cost of application
acceptable, or to explore and alleviate the barriers to the implementation of
technology [Blok et al., 1995].
Energy analysts have a particular perception of innovative technology and
technological development (based on [Rip and Kemp, 1998; Weber, 1997; Shove,
1998; Janda, 1998])14.
First of all, the way of portraying technological development is rather linear and
mechanistic. Once barriers are overcome the innovative technology flows
automatically in the direction of commercial application. There is focus on R&D and
a strong belief that R&D will provide change for the good or, for instance, the
desired as improved energy efficiency.  A typical quote is that “R&D will likely
increase the potential for energy-efficiency improvement and will reduce the costs
for innovative technology” [IWG, 2000, p. 5.20] and “If R&D is successful, and the
technologies are available and cost-effective, then the policies (to implement the
                                                
13
 The market fails in the development of high-risk innovative technologies that require extensive
R&D (propensity to under-invest in public goods). The differences between private rate of return on
R&D expenditure and social rate of return reinforce this argument. The market also fails when full
costs are not properly reflected in market prices as is the case with the negative externalities of energy
use (see e.g. [UN, 1997; Margolis and Kammen, 1999b; WEA, 2000; IWG, 2000; PCAST, 1997]).
14
 The concept of potential has a strongly normative foundation. There could be more energy
efficiency because it is technically feasible, and there should be more energy efficiency because non-
adoption implies waste [Weber, 1997].
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technologies (EL)) need far less aggressive a push” [IWG, 2000, p. 1.59]. A recent
report on emerging energy-efficient technologies recognises that “R&D offers
possibilities to reduce risks and lower capital investments costs” [Martin et al.,
2000, p. 14].
Secondly, for the purpose of their system analyses, energy analysts often restrict
innovative technology to a specific piece of hardware with certain performance
characteristics. Artefacts have clear-cut characteristics. Innovative energy-efficient
technologies are listed and characterised by a number of indicators, such as their
investment cost and the energy use compared to a reference technology. Innovative
technologies are modelled in a technical way; innovative technologies are
incorporated to show for instance how large the energy-efficiency potential is and at
what cost it can be implemented in order to solve environmental issues.
Technology studies
The above can be summarised by stating that energy analysts tend to black box both
the process of developing innovative technologies and the innovative technologies
themselves. They separate the technical from the social. This, of course, helps their
specific analyses. However, it does not provide adequate insight into the process of
developing energy-efficient technologies. Government intervention strategies do not
affect technologies or hardware, but they do affect the actors developing the
technologies. In other words, we need to open the black box. How is innovative
technology constituted and how and why do actors become involved in developing
them? We draw on technology studies, because this scientific discipline has
developed detailed knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, about what is ‘inside’
the black box.
Scholars of technology studies have a perception of innovative technology and
technological development that differs from these of energy analysts. The former
explicitly reject the linear model of technological development. It is too simplistic to
cover the interdependencies and interaction among actors in the process of
developing innovative technologies. In addition, scholars in technology studies do
not recognise an inherent logic in developing technology; it is the outcome of the
choices made by actors rather than a force in itself. They try to understand what
guides or constrains technological development. In order to do this, the evolution of
the technological and social context is explicitly linked. The match between
technologies and their social and economic context determines how actors conceive
innovative technologies, what financial resources are spent on developing them and
whether they will ultimately be adopted by actors and society.
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1.4. Objective and outline of the thesis
The aim of the thesis is to gain insight into the process by which innovative energy-
efficient process technologies for the manufacturing industry are developed. The
underlying interest is to explore how government can stimulate the development of
such technologies.
We decided that we need a detour and detailed technology case studies. Case studies
are an established research methodology used in our type of explorative research. We
are interested in the nature of a certain phenomenon rather than in the extent to which
certain phenomena occur. An important part of the thesis thus consists of detailed
empirical analyses of the networks within which four specific industrial energy-
efficient process technologies are developed. For more detailed reasons for the
choice of our case study methodology and for the selection of the four technology
case studies we refer to Section 1.5.
This research aim raises three specific research questions:
1. How can the process of developing industrial energy-efficient technologies be
characterised in terms of networks and actors, including the role of government?
2. How did four specific industrial energy-efficient process technologies develop
and what role did government play in these case studies?
3. How can government stimulate, or accelerate, the development of industrial
energy-efficient technologies?
The first two research questions form the heart of the empirical research work in the
thesis. The first question requires a framework for the empirical case study research.
This is developed in Chapter 2. We summarise the major insights resulting from the
various approaches in technology studies. We also discuss what has been written
about the effect of various policy instruments on technological development. Finally,
we arrive at a framework for analysing the process of developing industrial energy-
efficient technology in the subsequent chapters. The second research question is
answered for each empirical technology case study. In Chapters 3 to 6, the
development of the four industrial process technologies are described and analysed.
The effect of government intervention is explicitly evaluated as part of the social
shaping of the technology. In Chapters 3 and 4, we present the development of two
energy-efficient technologies in the pulp and paper industry. Chapters 5 and 6
contain two energy-efficient technologies in the iron and steel industry.
The third research question covers the more explorative and final part of the thesis.
Here, we return to our research interest in government intervention. In Chapter 7, we
explore possible ways in which government can stimulate the development of
industrial energy-efficient process technologies. We first compare and contrast the
insights gained from the four technology case studies. We also summarise some
contributions to technology studies and energy analysis. Finally, we present some
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policy-relevant conclusions and come to some recommendations for government to
stimulate the development of industrial energy-efficient process technologies. In
Chapter 8, the results of our analysis are summarised.
1.5. Case study methodology
Multiple comparative case study
We make a detour in which we analyse the process by which industrial energy-
efficient technologies emerge. In this exploration of the empirical world, we want to
understand how these innovative technologies develop. We want to understand the
nature of a certain phenomenon rather than in the precise extent to which certain
phenomena occur.
According to Yin (1989), a case study can be defined as an enquiry that investigates
a history of a past or contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident and multiple
sources of evidence are used. Case studies are suitable for increasing our
understanding of the context in which actors act and the influence the context has on
actors’ activities. In the thesis, the phenomenon studied is the process of developing
industrial energy-efficient technologies in terms of actors and networks. The role of
actors and dynamics cannot be studied in an experimental setting with controlled
conditions. The distinction between the phenomenon and the context is not very
clear. Moreover, contextual factors may directly affect the decisions that actors make
regarding their involvement. The relation between technological development and
the context in which the technology is developed is subjected to analysis. Our
research is explorative; the theory is too premature for a (quantitative) testing of pure
hypotheses. As we try to discover how industrial energy-efficient technologies
develop, we do not know beforehand the specific variables that are going to be
measured and how the different variables are connected.
In a methodology based on case studies, single and multiple case studies can be
distinguished. In a multiple case study, separate case studies can be distinguished
that provide similar information about the phenomenon studied. We choose to
perform a multiple case study so that we can learn by contrasting and comparing
specific technology case studies. Yin (1989) claims that by replicating the analysis in
various case studies the evidence generated is more robust and can thus lead to
stronger claims. Our evidence is derived from a detailed analysis of four specific
technology case studies.
The major disadvantage of research based on case studies is that the logic of
statistical generalisation does not apply. Generalisation of case study results can
therefore only be based on analytical grounds, i.e. making plausible that the findings
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can be generalised. To make it plausible that the insights gained can be valuable in
other situations, case study research has to guarantee validity. Validity refers to the
correctness or credibility of a description, conclusion, interpretation or an
explanation. There is a distinction between external validity and internal validity.
External validity refers to generalisability of the research beyond a specific
technology case study, whereas internal validity refers to the validity of the
conclusions of each separate technology case study. Researchers have to ensure that
their case studies have internal validity, so that insights are delivered that are more
widely applicable (external validity). A qualitative case study methodology can
guarantee just as much validity as quantitative research. Validity is made plausible
by the empirical evidence, not by the type of research methodology adopted. The
researcher has to rule out the threats that can lead to invalid conclusions and to
invalid generalisations. When performing a multiple comparative case study, a
researcher should try to maximise validity by [Maxwell, 1996]:
1. A proper selection of theories and concepts
2. A careful selection of case studies
3. A careful data collection and a secure data analysis
Selection of theories and concepts
Our detour lets us view technology studies as a valuable source of theoretical and
empirical information about technological development. In Chapter 2, we look at the
various approaches adopted in technology studies in order to develop a framework
that can be used to characterise and analyse the empirical material. The leading
question is what should we look for in the empirical material.
Theoretical development in technology studies is still in its infancy [Edquist and
Hommen, 1999]. However, the various approaches are a source of inspiration for
exploring the empirical material. The approaches help us to frame the empirical
analysis in terms of actors and networks. We derive case study questions that guide
us in performing and analysing the empirical case studies. In this way, we introduce
uniformity into the performance and analysis of the four technology case studies. We
refer to Chapter 2 for a more detailed elaboration on the selection of theories.
Selection of case studies
The unit of analysis in the case studies is the development of sector-specific energy-
efficient process technologies. In the selection of the four technology case studies we
strived for a balance between variety and comparability by selecting two technology
case studies from two energy-intensive manufacturing industries.
Selecting two technologies from one specific industrial sector reduces the variation
in the empirical research. Theoretically this reduces the external validity of the
research. However, it increases our insight into whether certain results are
technology-specific or sector-specific. In this way we enhance the reliability of the
conclusions for that specific industrial sector. If research findings in the two
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technology case studies of each sector are not in conflict, this makes it plausible that
the technology case studies selected are representative and that our conclusions are
not accidental. Selecting technology case studies from two different industrial sectors
increases the variation in the empirical research. Increasing the variety generates a
wider range of situations and increases the richness of the empirical material
generated.
How did we come to select the four technology case studies? First of all, we selected
two energy-intensive manufacturing industries. Secondly, we compiled a list of
typical innovative energy-efficient technologies.
Step 1
A restricted number of energy-intensive sectors account for a substantial proportion
of worldwide industrial energy end-use (see also Figure 1). These sectors are
typically included in techno-economic studies (see e.g. [Phylipsen, 1998; De Beer,
1998; Worrell et al., 1997; IWG, 2000]). We concentrated on these energy-intensive
manufacturing industries.
Pavitt’s classification of innovating firms is well known in technology studies
[Pavitt, 1984]. This classification was used to divide the energy-intensive
manufacturing industries over four categories of firms. Pavitt defined these four
categories in terms of three firm characteristics: what is the origin of firms’
innovative technology; what are the requirements of users; and what are the
possibilities for firms to appropriate R&D results. Pavitt was aware of the existence
of interdependencies between the four categories and already indicated patterns of
innovation among firms and sectors. Table 1 shows which energy-intensive
manufacturing industries fall into which category of firms. Table 1 includes OECD
data on direct and indirect R&D intensity. Indirect R&D intensities include the R&D
imported in intermediate supplies. These illustrate the differences in the innovation
patterns of the various energy-intensive industries.
Table 1 permitted us to select two manufacturing industries from two categories in
order to increase variety. We selected the pulp and paper industry from the supplier-
dominated category and the iron and steel industry from the scale-intensive category.
By selecting these two manufacturing industries, the category of specialised suppliers
was automatically included. Such firms typically deliver innovative technology to
supplier-dominated firms and also to scale-intensive firms.
We had two reasons for selecting these two sectors. First, they are relatively
homogeneous compared to the other energy-intensive manufacturing industries
indicated in Table 1. Secondly, and more importantly, there is a considerable amount
of knowledge available about these sectors in energy system analysis (see e.g. [IPCC,
2001; De Beer, 1998]).
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Table 1: Classifying energy-intensive manufacturing industry according to
Pavitt’s innovation taxonomy (1984).
Innovation
type firm
Industrial manufacturing sectors
[ISIC Rev.3]1
Energy-
intensive
R&D-
intensity2
Indirect
R&D
intensity
Supplier-
dominated
- Textiles, fur and leather [17-19]
- Pulp and paper [21+22] X
0.23
0.31
0.55
0.57
Specialised
suppliers
- Machinery [29] 1.74 1.84
Scale
intensive
- Mining [10-14]
- Food and beverages [15+16]
- Basic chemical industry [241]
- Iron and steel [271+2731]
- Non-ferrous metals [272+2732]
- Non-metallic mineral products [26]
- Fabricated metal products [28]
- Motor vehicles [34]
- Other transport eq. [35]5
- Utilities [40-41]
X
X
X
X
4
-
0.34
-
0.64
0.93
0.93
0.63
3.41
1.58
-
-
0.39
-
0.46
0.64
0.51
0.72
1.03
1.45
-
Science
based
- Mineral oil industry (PR) [23]
- Chemicals and chemical products:
excl. basic chem. [24]
incl. pharm. [2423]
- Electro-technical industry:
Office & comp. eq. [30]
Electrical mach. [31]
Radio, TV & comm. eq. [32]
Scientific instruments [33]
X 0.96
3.2
10.47
11.46
2.81
8.03
5.10
0.37
0.64
0.88
2.91
1.15
1.37
1.45
1 Classification based on [Pavitt, 1984; CBS, 1998].  2 R&D intensity is the R&D expenditure divided
over the production value of the industrial sector. Weighted average for ten countries (GDP
purchasing power parities) [Hatzichronoglou, 1997].  3 An input-output analysis leads to an R&D
intensity that includes indirect R&D. The R&D investment by a supplying industry is divided over its
total production value. Via input-output analysis this R&D is attributed to the sectors which buy
certain products or goods from this supplying industry. The indirect R&D intensity thus includes the
R&D that is supplied in intermediate products or goods [Hatzichronoglou, 1997].  4 - = R&D
intensities not available [Hatzichronoglou, 1997].  5 Excludes Aerospace and Shipbuilding
[Hatzichronoglou, 1997].
Step 2
We used a variety of sources15 from the tradition of energy analysis to compile a
gross list of innovative energy-efficient technologies for the pulp and paper industry
and for the iron and steel industry. The following criteria were used for selecting four
specific industrial process technologies from that list:
- We concentrated on sector-specific energy-efficient technologies. We do not
include a case study concerning – what energy analysts call – a cross-cutting
technology, which is an energy-efficient technology that can be applied in more
than one sector (e.g. combined heat and power, energy-efficient motors, and heat
                                                
15
 [IPCC, 2001; Martin et al., 2000; IWG, 1997; Worrell et al., 1997; De Beer, 1998; Arthur D. Little,
1998; Blok et al., 1995; De Beer et al., 1994; Smit et al., 1994].
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pumps). We chose sector-specific technologies for two reasons: first of all, they
promise larger energy-efficiency improvements because they save energy in the
core of the production process; secondly, exclusion of cross-cutting technologies
is a way of maximising the comparability of technology case studies.
- The technology had to promise a step-wise reduction in the specific energy
consumption (SEC) of a production process.
- Technology case studies had to be fairly recent. It is interesting to focus on
technologies that may be of actual importance in reducing greenhouse gas
emissions. Data accessibility was another reason for selecting recent technology
case studies. Most of the technologies included in the lists of energy analysts are
current technologies. A number of them are still being developed. Technology
case studies should however have a long enough history of development to be of
interest for our empirical research.
Table 2 gives an overview of the four technology case studies selected.
Table 2: Overview of the case studies selected [De Beer, 1998; Martin et al.,
2000].
Case study Sector R&D
started
Present status
Shoe press
technology
Pulp and paper 1970 Widely implemented
Impulse
technology
Pulp and paper 1980 Claimed ready for commercial application,
status is uncertain
Strip casting
technology
Iron and steel 1985 Claimed ready for commercial application
Smelting reduction
technology
Iron and steel 1985 Claimed ready for commercial application
Data collection and data analysis
There are also threats to validity in data collection and analysis. We used two
strategies, triangulation and member checks, in order to rule out these threats.
Triangulation is testing and cross-checking data which have been collected from
various sources. A case study methodology typically combines information from
various sources. Both data collection and data use have to be handled with care. A
second strategy for ensuring validity is member checks. The researcher
systematically solicits expert feedback about his or her analysis and conclusions
[Maxwell, 1996].
We used two main sources of data: written material and interviews with experts.
Written material
All kinds of written material - scientific articles, technical articles, articles from trade
journals, conference proceedings, technical reports, patents, statistics and press
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releases - were used. Written material was typically used to make a first factual
mapping of the R&D activities and the actors involved (especially questions as who
was involved, when, what kind of equipment who did one use and what were the
performance claims). Patent databases were used to check the completeness of the
network. A preliminary list of names of experts to contact was also derived from
written material. Finally, written material provided a means of checking the data and
information gathered in expert interviews.
Interviews
An important part of the data and information was gathered in interviews. Experts
who were (or are) involved in developing the industrial energy-efficient technologies
were interviewed. Consultation with experts is an essential part of our empirical
research, because the data and information we were looking for were often not
available in written (public) material. We conducted personal interviews, had
elaborate telephone conversations, and used e-mail. The interviews were semi-
structured. The framework provided us guidelines for the performance of the
technology case studies. A list of case study questions was formulated (see Chapter
2). Consultation with experts is a valuable source of data, although the researcher
should critically deal with the reliability of statements made by experts. A written
draft of the interview was sent to the expert interviewee accompanied by a request
for his or her comments. In order to increase the reliability and to circumvent well
known pitfalls such as selective and faded memories, vested interests and secrecy,
information and statements were tested against statements made by other experts and
against written sources. We consulted a large number of experts for each case study
and tried to include representatives of all actors that were involved in the
development of the specific industrial process technology.
In case study methodology, both written and interview materials have to be carefully
processed for two reasons. First of all, both sources have intrinsic limitations.
Experts and interviewees give their interpretation of why and how things happened.
This information and these statements have to be checked. Written material can also
be biased because of the person who wrote the article. Not all data covered in articles
are neutral or value-free facts. Secondly, as a researcher you are interpreting the data
and information in written sources and the statements made and accounts given by
the interviewees. As a researcher you are structuring the information so that the
research questions can be answered. Data collection in qualitative research means
reconstructing and gaining understanding at the same time. As the researcher collects
data, he or she has to anticipate the insights that are and still will be gathered. Thus,
data collection and data analysis overlap. It is important to organise data collection
carefully. We therefore adopted the following procedure:
- We contacted most of the experts more than once. The first round provided basic
information about other actors, networks, agendas and artefacts. It also delivered
suggestions for articles and the names of other experts we could contact.
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- Written material was collected to map the first outline of a technology’s
development.
- For each of the micro-networks, a description was made of the events and
decisions that had taken place within that micro-network16. These descriptions
were used in a second round of interviews with the experts.
- The material gathered for the various micro-networks was also grouped under
separate topical headings (related to the case study questions, see Chapter 2) so
that the various micro-networks could be compared and cross-linkages could be
made. These descriptions were also used in a second round of interviews with the
experts.
- The second round of interviews took place after the researcher had made a
preliminary synthesis and analysis of the written material and the information and
statements gathered in interviews. This second round was important for acquiring
a proper understanding of the special peculiarities of the specific case. In this
way, the researcher organised feedback, first of all on the information and
insights obtained so far and secondly on his or her interpretations.
- A draft version of the chapter based on each specific technology case study was
sent to the industrial experts in order to solicit feedback and their comments and
suggestions.
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Chapter 2
Government intervention and
technology studies:
Towards a framework
2.1. Introduction
If we want to understand what guides or constrains R&D and technology so that it
develops in certain directions, if we want to understand actors’ arguments for
developing the technology, and if we want to evaluate the role of government
intervention, what should we look for in the empirical material? In this chapter we
deal with our first research question: how to characterise the process of developing a
specific industrial energy-efficient technology in terms of actors and networks,
including the role of government? A framework is developed that can be used for
analysing the empirical material in the subsequent chapters. The framework should
provide us with some guidelines for the performance of the technology case studies.
Section 2.2 specifies what is meant by the process of developing industrial energy-
efficient technology. In Section 2.3, we summarise what is known about government
intervention strategies and policy instruments in directing R&D. We also define how
the term ‘effect’ of government intervention is used in this thesis. In Section 2.4,
various approaches in technology studies are discussed. In Section 2.5, we arrive at a
framework for analysing the process of developing industrial energy-efficient
technology.
2.2. Process of technological development
We are interested in the process by which innovative energy-efficient technology
develops. What, then, do we really mean by the process of technological
development?
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A proven technology is the result of earlier invention and innovation and has become
an established technology that is widely adopted and accepted. An invention is the
initial idea, sketch, or model for a new or substantially improved device, product or
process. An innovation is accomplished only with the first commercial transaction
involving the new product, process, or device [Freeman, 1982]. Diffusion is the
widespread adoption (or implementation) of an innovative technology1. Joseph
Schumpeter (1934) was the first to distinguish diffusion from invention and
innovation2. The sequence of invention-innovation-diffusion implies a rather linear
model of innovation without interaction and feedback taking place between the
different stages. This aspect has been criticised for instance by Kline and Rosenberg
(1986), who suggested a chain-linked model of innovation instead [Rosenberg, 1982;
Kline and Rosenberg, 1986]. Rosenberg emphasised that continuing technological
improvements occur between the moment of invention and innovation and during the
diffusion of the technology. When the modifications during diffusion become
extensive the distinction between innovation and diffusion often becomes hard to
draw. Technologies are continuously adapted and improved to better fit conditions
and requirements.
Acknowledging this major criticism of Schumpeter’s distinction and starting from a
chain-linked or interactive understanding, scholars still use the concepts of invention,
innovation and diffusion to indicate in what stage they are specifically interested (see
e.g. [Rosegger, 1996; Kemp, 1997; Grübler, 1998; Ashford, 1999; Jaffe et al., 2000;
Norberg-Bohm, 1999]). In our study of the process by which energy-efficient
technologies develop, we look in detail at the R&D activities that are performed to
bring an unproven technology to the market. In our empirical research we focus on
how an innovative process technology is brought to the market, but we acknowledge
that  interactions and feedback occur between the various stages (as we will see, the
diffusion stage has a major impact on the development of energy-efficient
technologies)3. We use the two terms diffusion and implementation to indicate the
spreading of an innovative energy-efficient technology across a certain
manufacturing industry.
                                                
1
 Diffusion is very important from an economic and social point of view, because an innovative
technology only pays off economically, environmentally or socially when it is applied and replicated.
2
 Schumpeter (1883 – 1950) is not the only one who should be credited with pioneering our thinking
on technology. The economist Thornstein Veblin was the first to focus on the interactions between
humans and their artefacts in an institutional context. He saw technology as a part of social
relationships. Technology is developed and shaped by social actors and at the same time shapes social
values and behaviour. He suggested a ‘circular’ model of thinking in which the technical and the
social interact [Grübler, 1998; Van der Steen, 1999].
3
 In scientific literature, the term innovation is often used to indicate the entire process of invention,
market introduction and further diffusion and optimisation. We use innovation to indicate the first
commercially successful application of an innovative technology.
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2.3. Government intervention
In this section, a sketch is given of the variety of intervention strategies by which
government can enhance technological development. Possibilities for government
intervention have changed over time as scientific insight into technological
development has evolved and as the ways in which knowledge and R&D are
produced, exchanged and used have changed [Smits, 2000; OECD, 1992; Branscomb
and Florida, 1999; Caracostas and Mulder, 1998]. We examine various specific
policy instruments and describe whether these instruments can guide R&D and
technological development in desired directions. We also define how the term
‘effect’ of government intervention is used in this thesis.
A variety of instruments and strategies
An increasing number of policy instruments and intervention strategies
Nearly all laws, regulations and other policies in a country may affect the
development of innovative technologies4 [OECD, 1998; Cannel and Dankbaar, 1996;
Rothwell and Zegveld, 1981]. In many industrialised countries, government tries to
enhance the national capacity for producing, transferring and exploiting R&D,
knowledge and innovative technology (see e.g. [OECD, 1998; OECD, 1996]). The
number and nature of technology policy instruments and intervention strategies have
changed over time. Several authors have described various typical stages in the ways
in which government has tried to stimulate R&D and technological development (see
e.g. [Rothwell and Dodgson, 1992; Arendsen and Korsten, 1996; Caracostas and
Mulder, 1998; Schilder, 2000]). Van der Steen (1999) describes these changes in
technology policy as a policy learning process. It is useful to briefly discuss the
stages in technology policy, because these help to explain the variety of policy
instruments that are currently considered for directing technological development.
During the 1960s and 1970s, the focus for stimulating R&D and technological
development was on the supply side or ‘science push’ side. The roots of government
intervention can clearly be traced to science policies. Government intervened by
generating knowledge through the stimulation of absolute investments in R&D in
both private firms and national public research institutes for the purpose of
improving the competitiveness of industry. In a second stage that started in the early
1980s increasing R&D expenditure was no longer regarded as an adequate measure
for increasing the competitiveness of industry. The focus shifted to the under-
exploitation of the new knowledge and technologies available. The idea emerged that
generating knowledge was not enough; knowledge and innovative technologies
needed be channelled to the firms that could use them. Access to new knowledge was
                                                
4
 For example: macro-economic policy, science and education policy, policies affecting investment
climate and trading conditions.
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improved by e.g. transfer- and innovation-centres, demonstration projects, and R&D
subsidies to sector organisations. In a third stage, roughly from the early 1990s
onwards, technological development began to be seen as a highly systemic and
interactive process. Technological development implied more than science push and
diffusing knowledge. It was recognised that technological development depends on
the capacity of heterogeneous firms to develop, absorb and apply new knowledge in
constellations of networks. Firms learn within a specific socio-economic context.
Government intervention thus switched to stimulating learning and co-operation in
an innovative climate. Interaction between actors is considered to be crucial. Co-
operation spreads the risk and cost of R&D, assists in technology implementation by
extending the number of firms involved, prevents replication of R&D efforts, and
improves the return on public investments by increasing private sector involvement.
The dominant change in the philosophy of government intervention can be defined
thus: government should aim at managing or facilitating the processes of interaction
among relevant actors and creating the conditions which facilitate R&D activities
and processes of technological development [Smits, 2000]. Technological
development and innovation are seen as dynamic social processes that evolve most
successfully in networks in which there is intensive interaction [OECD, 1999;
OECD, 1998; Cannel and Dankbaar, 1996; Dodgson and Bessant, 1996; Caracostas
and Mulder, 1998].
Government intervention can thus take a number of forms. Policy instruments can
stimulate both the supply of and/or the demand for technological development and
innovation. Instruments can be more generic and thus stimulate R&D and
technological development to maintain the basic infrastructure or to enhance the
competitiveness of the national industry. Instruments can also be more specific.
Then, government tries to direct technological development. These two dimensions
create a matrix of four intervention strategies. Specific policy instruments can be
characterised along these two dimensions.
Box 1 gives an overview of the variety of policy instruments commonly used for
guiding technological development in desired directions (such as improved energy
efficiency). It shows the variety of policy instruments available and summarises what
has been learnt about the way in which these instruments affect R&D and
technological development. Each policy instrument is characterised by the two
dimensions indicated in the former paragraph.
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Box 1: Policy instruments and their effects in directing technological development
Research priorities – Matching supply and demand; generic and specific
By formulating research priorities, government articulates desired research areas. This may affect the
R&D agenda of, for instance, universities and public research institutes or may lead to thematic R&D
programmes such as improving the energy efficiency of the manufacturing industry. The effect aimed
at is directing R&D towards desired, strategically relevant research areas.
Technology-foresight exercises, Delphi studies, demand-oriented sector studies, and Technology
Assessment are examples of instruments which are used in the - often participatory - processes of
formulating R&D priorities. Experts are consulted in order to select research areas of strategic
importance for the future of industry or for solving environmental problems. The generation of R&D
and knowledge is linked with the needs for knowledge in certain areas [Arthur D. Little, 1998; Kemp,
1997; Arthur D. Little, 1996].
Technology standards – Demand; specific
By prescribing or prohibiting specific technologies, government actively seeks the elimination of
undesired technologies.
Technologies can be prescribed only if the performance is proven for the variety of firms confronted
with the regulation. A major disadvantage of this instrument is that the differences in costs of
compliance by different firms are ignored. In addition, it reduces the incentive for further R&D and
technological development [Wallace, 1995; Rosegger, 1996; Kemp, 1997].
Performance or emission standards – Demand; specific
By formulating performance or emission standards, government formulates criteria that are likely to
affect firms’ decisions to invest in (the development of innovative) technology.
Such standards have been the most common method for reducing specific emissions or exposure to
hazardous substances (though not in improving energy efficiency). Firms are flexible about how they
can meet these standards. However, uniform standards still give rise to static inefficiency in the case
of heterogeneous polluters as the cost of compliance may differ [Kemp, 1997; Rosegger, 1996;
Wallace, 1995].
Some authors argue that emission and performance standards favour diffusion rather than
technological development, because they are often based on the best available technologies [Kemp,
1997; Norberg-Bohm, 1999]. The most significant improvements in performance or reduced
emissions occur in response to stringent regulations, which give firms some time to develop or
optimise technologies. Thus, there appears to be a trade-off between quick results and more innovative
solutions [Kemp, 1997]. There are also scientists who provide evidence that regulation is the mother
of invention, provided that regulatory instruments are designed properly [Ashford, 1994; Porter and
Van der Linde, 1995; Ashford, 1999]. To conclude, as the OECD already noted in 1985, the
relationship between regulation and technological development is not a one-way relationship [OECD,
1985].
Technology-forcing standards – Demand; specific
Technology-forcing standards demand performance or emission levels that are not feasible with the
existing technology. The requirements induce firms to invest in developing innovative technologies.
It is plausible that technology-forcing standards are a better instrument for encouraging technological
development than emission or performance standards. Kemp (1997) claims that technology-forcing
standards are especially promising in the case of innovative technologies that can be commercialised
at moderate costs [Kemp, 1997].
Box 1 continued on next page
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A drawback of technology-forcing standards is the threat of strategic behaviour on the part of firms.
Firms are generally better informed about what is technologically feasible within a certain frame of
time. Policy-makers have to assume that some amount of improvement is feasible and realistic within
a certain time frame, although they are not certain how much. A complementary system of fines may
be needed [Kemp, 1997; Wallace, 1995; Jaffe et al., 2000].
Taxes, fees and tradable emission permits – Demand; specific
By raising taxes or fees or by introducing a system of tradable emission standards, government tries to
financially burden ‘undesired’ behaviour. Taxes, fees and tradable emission permits are a means of
stimulating technology to develop in desired directions by changing the structure of financial
incentives: negative externalities are taxed or positive externalities are rewarded.
Whereas the principle of market-based instruments is elegant and straightforward, there is no
consensus about the advantages of market-based instrument over standards or command-and-control
policies. Market-based policy instruments are generally advocated for their economic efficiency.
Economists argue that incentive-based instruments provide a more continuous spur to innovation than
command-and-control policies. The innovator is able to achieve an extra gain by a further reduction of
the targeted emission, at least according to economic theoretical models that assume e.g. perfect
knowledge5 [Jaffe et al., 2000; Norberg-Bohm, 1999]. Empirical material indicates that in practice the
price signals are often relatively small, so that the economics of a production process are not
fundamentally changed [Kemp, 1997; Arthur D. Little, 1998; Norberg-Bohm, 1999]. Therefore,
market-based instruments show advantages but should not be regarded as a panacea [Wallace, 1995].
R&D support or subsidies – Supply; specific (can also be generic)
By providing R&D support, government stimulates firms to invest in developing (innovative)
technologies.
Government R&D support is one of the most common instruments for stimulating R&D and
technological development, but also one of the most debated. Empirical evidence regarding the effect
of R&D support is ambiguous. R&D support seems to be expensive, violates the polluter-pays
principle, and may favour ‘second-rate’ projects [Kemp, 1997]. It is often hard to indicate the
additional value of R&D support, since it is hard to know what would have been done without
government R&D support [CPB, 1999]. Arthur D. Little (1998) claimed that R&D and demonstration
subsidies may affect specialised research institutes and small firms such as specialised suppliers. With
regard to large firms, R&D subsidies will hardly affect firms’ decisions [Arthur D. Little, 1998].
According to Kemp (1997), R&D support or subsidies should be granted to technologies with a long
time frame of development or to technologies that are easily imitated by others (there are problems in
appropriating the benefits).
Venture capital – Supply; specific (can also be generic)
A lack of risk capital may be a bottleneck impeding the introduction and subsequent use of an
innovative technology. By raising and providing venture capital, government tries to facilitate the
final, capital intensive stages in technological development.
It is claimed that a supply of venture capital allows efficient spending of resources: when proposals
are well screened, most of the loans will be paid back if the innovative technology is applied
successfully. However, large sums of money are at risk for quite some time [Arthur D. Little, 1998].
Box 1 continued on next page.
                                                
5
 There are more recent economic models with revised assumptions which are give a differentiated
view on the superiority of market-based instruments over regulatory instruments (see e.g. [Verhoef
and Nijkamp, 1999; Fischer et al., 1998]). If various market-based policy instruments are compared,
e.g. taxes and tradable permit systems, results are less consistent (see e.g. [Milliman and Prince, 1989;
Jaffe et al., 2000]).
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Voluntary (R&D) agreements – Matching supply and demand; specific
Government may try to stimulate technological development by negotiating agreements with
industries in which they commit themselves to reduce for instance environmental emissions or
improve energy efficiency within a certain time frame. A commitment to R&D and technological
development can be part of the agreement.
Voluntary agreements are attractive to industry because they give participants freedom regarding the
method and moment of compliance. The largest disadvantage of agreements is the possibility of
strategic exploitation of the agreement. Individual firms may for instance show free-rider behaviour in
a collective agreement [Kemp, 1997; Arthur D. Little, 1998]. So far, little experience has been gained
with regard to the inclusion of agreements on R&D in voluntary agreements6. Such government-
industry R&D agreements devolve greater responsibility to industry, lead to more flexibility to
innovate, and lower compliance costs. Another threat to R&D agreements is that firms are generally
more aware than government of the technological possibilities [Kemp, 1997; Wallace, 1995].
Technology procurement – Demand; specific
By guaranteeing a certain market demand, governments reduce the risks involved in bringing a
technology to the market. Governments may e.g. establish procurement requirements with regard to
energy use. This instrument is typically adopted to bring consumer products to the market. In the case
of industrial sectors, such an approach is more difficult because industrial process technologies are
less standardised and require higher investment costs than such commodity consumer products.
Initiating and stimulating networks – Matching supply and demand; specific or generic
By initiating networks and co-operation between actors such as firms and research institutes,
government tries to enhance the match between the supply and demand of R&D and the actual
exploitation of the knowledge and innovative technologies.
This instrument has been used more frequently since the early 1990s. Insisting on interaction and fine-
tuning between various actors is often a design characteristic of other policy instruments. Co-
operation is, for instance, often a condition for acquiring R&D support.
A possible drawback is that large firms do not feel the strong need for assistance in forming links and
networks with other actors such as research institutes and universities; the necessary networks are
already in place. They consider their own networks to be better developed than the ones created by
governmental intervention. The value that firms place on stimulating networks depends on the nature
of the technology concerned. When the technology is outside the core of the production process,
government intervention in building networks tends to be perceived as more valuable [Arthur D.
Little, 1998].
Box 1 first of all reconfirms what was already mentioned in Chapter 1. The effect of
government intervention in developing climate-friendly technologies is an
unexplored empirical research area. Box 1 shows that so far there are few empirical
reasons for suggesting that any specific policy instrument is better at encouraging
technological development in a desired direction than any other single policy
instrument. Secondly, it is important to note that several authors suggest that the
‘success’ of a policy instrument depends on the context in which it is used. The
intrinsic properties of a policy instrument alone cannot explain its effect in directing
or stimulating technological development [Kemp, 1997; Norberg-Bohm, 1999;
Wallace, 1995; OECD, 1985].
                                                
6
 The classic example of an agreement between US automotive industry and the US government in
developing innovative technology is the Partnership for a New Generation Vehicle (PNGV).
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Evaluating effect – taking the context into account
The context-dependency of the effect of government intervention is by now a well
accepted phenomenon in policy studies7 [Glasbergen, 1989; Bruijn and ten
Heuvelhof, 1995]. Glasbergen (1989) argues that it is always possible to find
examples of a policy instrument that is effective in one situation but not in another.
This cannot be explained only by the intrinsic characteristics of the policy
instruments; equally important are the characteristics of the context in which
government tries to intervene.
The traditional model of government intervention, as favoured by the rational policy
approach, assumed a central and controlling role by government. To put it somewhat
simplistically, government could reach its policy goals simply by selecting the proper
policy instrument. The policy network approach in policy studies stresses the
dependencies between actors, government being one of them. In order to realise
policy goals government is dependent on other actors. The idea of policy networks
was first used to explain earlier government intervention failures, but more recently it
has been suggested that policy networks also provide opportunities for government
intervention. The suggestion is that the effect of government intervention can be
increased if the characteristics of the policy networks are taken into account.
Two important levels of intervention can be distinguished. Government can try to
modulate existing networks or it can try to change the composition of the networks in
itself8 [Glasbergen, 1989; Hanf and Scharpf, 1987; Verheul, 1999].
These recent developments in policy studies further support the idea of making a
detour as suggested in Chapter 1. In our empirical research, the role of government
and the effect of government intervention are explicitly included in each case study.
Defining effect
In spite of the difficulties in measuring the effect of government intervention in
stimulating R&D and technological development (as discussed in Chapter 1 and
illustrated by Box 1), we have to be clear what we mean by ‘effect’. After all, we use
                                                
7
 The theoretical roots of policy networks are found in policy science (rational actor; bounded
rationality; process model), organisational science (rational organisation, contingency approach, inter-
organisational theory), and political science (pluralism, agenda research, political communities) (see
e.g. [Hufen and Ringeling, 1990; Klijn et al., 1993; Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997]).
8
 Strategies have been suggested by e.g. de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof  (1991), de Bruijn and ten
Heuvelhof  (1995), Klijn and Koppenjan (1997) and Verheul (1999). The strategies try to exploit
existing (business) dependencies between actors and to take into account the existing diversity
between (and within) sectors and the diversity in existing competencies and resources of actors.
Examples of strategies are: steer indirectly, steer interactively (multiplural), fine tune the instruments
to a relatively homogeneous target group, manage existing networks rather than passively apply
instruments, play a role in network building and constitution, selective activation of networks
(devoted actors), strengthen or weaken dependencies among actors, and supply or withdraw
(financial) resources.
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this term in our empirical technology case studies. We also use it in Chapter 7 when
we explore the possibilities for government intervention.
The choice for detailed technology case studies allow us to evaluate the effect of
government intervention as part of the context within which energy-efficient
technologies are developed. The detailed case studies in which we cover the dynamic
and long-term process by which specific technologies develop make it possible to
relate the ‘input’ to the ‘output’ or ‘impact’ of government intervention in a
qualitative way. By covering the entire process it is possible to see how government
intervention did actually affect the development of the technology. The effect of
government intervention is explicitly evaluated as part of the social shaping of the
technology. What was the role of a policy instrument in bringing an innovative
technology to the market? How important was government intervention in achieving
improved energy efficiency as a result of R&D and technological development? We
make a distinction between three different aspects of ‘effect’:
- Additionality: Government intervention is additional if actors would not have
started or continued R&D activities without government intervention.
Additionality indicates whether government intervention had an effect at the
moment when government intervention occurred. Additionality does not say
anything about the continued effect of government intervention.
- Acceleration: Government intervention accelerates technological development if
the progress of the development – worldwide – was faster than it would have
been without government intervention. Additionality is a pre-condition of
acceleration.
- Effectiveness: Government intervention is effective if it leads to improved
industrial energy efficiency. This is achieved only if the technology is
implemented in the end and if the firm-specific specific energy consumption is
reduced.
2.4. Opening the black box9
In this section we look in more detail at the key lessons to be learnt from technology
studies. We introduced technology studies as a scientific discipline that has produced
detailed knowledge about what is inside the black box of technological development.
Rosenberg (1982) was one of the first to use the metaphor of ‘opening the black
box’. Not only economists, but also sociologists and historians have increased the
understanding of what guides R&D and technological development go in certain
directions and occur at a certain pace. The major challenge in technology studies is
clearly to come to grips with the immense diversity of the contents of the black box
[Rosenberg, 1982; Rosenberg, 1994].
                                                
9
 This section is derived from [Luiten and Harmsen, 1999].
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The insights generated on what is inside the black box may help us to characterise
the process by which industrial energy-efficient technology develops in terms of
actors (including government) and networks.
In this section we do not intend to give a complete and fully detailed description of
the various approaches in technology studies. We limit ourselves to the basic
concepts and mechanisms. Our research aim induces us to be particularly interested
in what affects the direction of technological development and in the possible ways
in which government can influence technological development. Each of the
approaches is summarised by indicating three key-points of interest:
1. How is technological development perceived?
2. What directs technological development?
3. What are the possibilities for government intervention?
Neo-classical economic approach
Strictly speaking, this approach does not belong to the sphere of technology studies.
In fact, the rather restricted view of technology within this neo-classical approach
was one of the major factors that led to the emergence of technology studies.
However, the neo-classical approach still provides the dominant rationale for
government intervention in R&D and technological development. Therefore, it
merits some discussion.
Mainstream thinking in neo-classical economy considers technology as an exogenous
factor. Technology was falling like ‘manna from heaven’. Since the work of
Abramovitz (1956) and Solow (1957) technological development has become a
factor in neo-classical growth theories. At the macro-level, it is postulated as a
residual of the production function. In other words it is what is left to explain
economic growth after the effects of labour and capital have been accounted for.
Introduction of an innovative technology is interpreted as a shift in the production
function. The technology and also the process of developing technologies are still
‘black boxed’. Technology and technological development do not need to be
explained themselves [Van Dijk and Van Hulst, 1988; Dankbaar et al., 1991].
The central assumption in the traditional neo-classical economic view is the
existence of competitive equilibrium. Efficient allocation results in optimised
welfare. If the conditions of a perfect market are met, the invisible hand of the
market leads to efficient (re-)allocations. The organising principle is the economic
rationality of the economic agents. Each agent maximises some known objective
function. According to this neo-classical perspective technology is generic, codified,
accessible free of costs and universally applicable10 [Smith, 1995].
                                                
10
 The more recent neo-classical new growth theories include innovation and knowledge generation as
an endogenous part of their economic models. Attempts are made to attribute differences in growth
performance among countries to endogenous factors such as investment in human capital, learning by
doing, scale economics, and technical change. The contribution of externalities resulting from linked
capital and knowledge accumulation, the accumulation of human capital and a continuing growth in
the stock of productive designs are stressed as explanations for economic growth. New growth
theories follow the neo-classical tradition in its assumptions regarding optimising behaviour.
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Arrow’s classical paper (1962) identifies technology as knowledge. Knowledge has
intrinsic problems of risks, indivisibility and inappropriability which cause firms to
under-invest in R&D11. Arrow showed that in the case of R&D and technological
development the market fails [Smith, 1995]. Neo-classical economists acknowledge
that if markets fail – the assumptions of perfect competition are not met –,
government may intervene to correct this failure. Correcting for market failure is the
traditional rationale for government to stimulate R&D and technological
development [Van der Steen, 1999; Smith, 1995; Van Dijk and van Hulst, 1988;
Jaffe et al., 2000]. The neo-classical approach accords very well with the traditional
linear model of innovation (invention – innovation – diffusion, see Section 2.2)
[Smith, 1995].
Key-points: Neo-classical economic approach
1. Technological development:
- Technological development is exogenous.
- Technology is a black box.
- Technology is knowledge.
2. Directing technological development:
- Rational actors maximise the production function.
3. Government intervention:
- Corrects for under-investment (stimulates fundamental R&D, supports universities).
- Avoids spill-over e.g. by patent systems to protect accessibility of knowledge.
- Avoids market imperfection, e.g. antitrust laws.
- Avoids information asymmetries by providing information.
Evolutionary economic approach
Rosenberg’s suggestion (1982) that the inside of the black box should be inspected
was taken seriously by the school of evolutionary economists. Within this approach,
technological development is understood as a path-dependent process of variation
and selection.
This approach started to treat technological development as an endogenous factor.
The behaviour of innovative firms and the role of technology were studied. Not all
firms turned out to have the same source of knowledge, skills, experiences and
resources to actually develop or implement innovative technologies. Nelson and
Winter (1977) were opposed to the idea that the development of technologies can be
understood in terms of a cost-benefit calculation in which the expected pay-offs are
simply compared to the estimated costs. The basic tenet is that firms are confronted
                                                
11
 There are a number of econometric studies (see e.g. [Mansfeld, 1977; Mansfeld et al., 1991;
Grilgriches, 1995]), which assess the private and social rate of return of R&D. Positive and sometimes
impressively large rates of return are suggested ranging from 10 to 100%. Such econometric analyses
supports the notion that firms tend to under-invest in R&D [Jones and Williams, 1997].
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with uncertainty and this cannot be ignored; uncertainty has a large influence on
technological development. Firms do not know beforehand which technology will be
successful and they are unable to check all technological alternatives. Therefore,
their behaviour cannot be understood as maximisation in traditional economic terms.
Because of the uncertainty, different firms will disagree about whether and when to
invest in R&D [Nelson and Winter, 1977].
In order to deal with uncertainties, firms tend to innovate along certain familiar and
known paths. Accordingly, Nelson and Winter (1982) stated that firms apply
heuristic search routines. The search routines establish the dominant search
directions and guide the occurrence of technological trajectories. The generated
variation is path dependent. Technological development is therefore not generated at
random but stems from a certain cognitive frame of reference. This frame of
reference is shared among a larger number of firms e.g. firms in a specific industrial
sector. Nelson and Winter (1977) name this frame as a technological regime, Dosi
(1982) as a technological paradigm, and Sahal (1985) as a technological guidepost.
The existence of a technological paradigm and thus the occurrence of a technological
trajectory leads to the exclusion of other developments [Dosi, 1982].
Influenced by the search routines, firms produce new variations, which may or may
not succeed in a selection environment. Nelson and Winter (1977) already stressed
that the selection environment comprises not only the neo-classical market concept
(such as supply and demand, and prices), but also institutional structures (such as
regulation and geographical factors). They chose selection environment above
market to emphasise the institutions involved. Institutional structures vary
significantly among economic sectors [Nelson and Winter, 1977].
Path dependency, variation and selection are central to the process of technological
development. David (1986) and Arthur (1988) further elaborated upon the concept of
path dependency. They pointed to the occurrence of non-optimal outcomes due to
irreversibility and lock-in. Path dependency and increasing-returns-to-adoption
showed that the processes of variation and selection do not guarantee convergence to
an optimal dominant design. Variation is not generated at random. An innovative
technology is not chosen because it is the best, it becomes the best once it has been
chosen. This notion of path dependency implies that innovative technologies differ
with regard to the degree to which they fit in with the dominant path.
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Several authors have that there is a distinction between incremental and radical
innovative technologies12. Incremental technologies follow the existing path,
whereas radical innovations deviate from the dominant direction of development.
Key-points: Evolutionary economic approach
1. Technological development:
- Technological development is a path-dependent process of variation and selection.
- Technology evolves from a (firm’s) knowledge base.
2. Directing technological development:
- Bounded rationality and uncertainty: tending to innovate along known directions.
- Cognitive search heuristics: existing paradigm favours path dependency and lock-in.
3. Government intervention:
- Generates variation within an entrepreneurial climate that enhances innovation.
- Formulates selection requirements.
- Broadens the selection environment.
- Establishes feedback between variation and selection in niches or nexus.
- Avoids lock-in to undesired trajectories.
                                                
12
 The notion that there are different kinds of innovation has been an important theme in literature
since Schumpeter. Abernathy and Clark (1985) make a distinction based on two dimensions, a
competence dimension and a market/customer dimension. Innovations may conserve or disrupt the
existing technological and production competencies and the markets and customer needs. Tushman
and Nadler (1986) make a distinction between incremental changes, synthetic changes and
discontinuous changes. The first simply adds features to existing products or processes. Synthetic
changes involve a combination of existing ideas or technologies in ways that create significantly new
products or processes. Discontinuous changes involve the development of significantly new products
or processes. Tushman and Anderson (1986) make a distinction between competence-enhancing and
competence-destroying innovations based upon the existing know-how for a certain product or
process. An enhancing innovation can be more or less radical in the degree of performance
improvement. A competence-destroying innovation is so fundamentally different from previously
dominant technologies that the skills and knowledge base required for manufacturing and operating
the core technology shift. Freeman and Perez (1988) make a distinction between incremental
innovations, radical innovations, changes of the ‘technology system’, and changes in the ‘techno-
economic paradigm’. Incremental innovations occur continuously in any industry or service activity.
Incremental innovation is often not the outcome of deliberate R&D, but is the outcome of inventions
and improvements suggested by engineers or users (‘learning by doing’ and ‘learning by using’).
Radical innovations are discontinuous events and are often the result of deliberate R&D. Radical
innovations are unevenly distributed over time and over sectors. Such innovations may cause
structural changes, although they are often restricted to a specific sector. Changes of the ‘technology
system’ are far-reaching changes in technology affecting several sectors as well as giving rise to
entirely new sectors. Changes in the ‘techno-economic paradigm’ occur when changes in technology
systems are so far reaching in their effects that they have a major impact on the entire economy.
Christensen (1997) distinguishes sustaining or disrupting innovations. The distinction is based on the
value that customers attribute to the performance of products. Sustaining technologies improve the
performance of established products along the dimensions of performance that mainstream customers
have historically valued. Disruptive technologies market a new performance that becomes valued.
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Systems of innovation approach
In National Innovation Systems (NIS), technological development is regarded as an
iterative learning process, which is characterised by complex and interactive
feedback mechanisms and relationships among actors in a specific national
institutional context consisting of science, technology, production, policy and
demand.
Views in this approach exemplify a national approach as opposed to the firm-
oriented evolutionary economic theory. Freeman (1987) defined a national
innovation system (NIS) as the network of institutions in public and private sectors
whose activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new
technologies. The focus on interaction within national systems highlights the
importance of institutions and organisation beyond the market [Edquist and
Hommen, 1999; Edquist, 1997; Lundvall, 1988; Nelson. 1993].
Learning processes among actors are at the basis of technological development
[Lundvall, 1988; Nelson, 1993]. The central idea is that the return-on-investment in
knowledge generation is dependent on the way in which this process is organised and
embedded in societal and economic systems [Smits, 2000]. Technological
development is seen as a social process which evolves most successfully in networks
with an intensive interaction between the suppliers and buyers of goods, services,
technology and knowledge, including public knowledge infrastructure organisations
such as universities and semi-public research institutes [Edquist, 1997].
Originally, the national system was studied, but later the level of analysis showed
more variation [OECD, 1999]. Some investigators studied regional systems of
innovation (see [Grabher, 1993; Oerlemans, 1996]), others preferred technological
systems (see e.g. [Carlsson and Stankiewicz, 1991] or clusters of industrial activity
(see e.g. [OECD, 1999]).
Key-points: Systems of innovation approach
1. Technological development:
- Technological development is a process of interactive learning.
- Technological development includes not only R&D and knowledge production, but also the
transfer, exchange, and use of knowledge and the demand for knowledge.
2. Directing technological development:
- The direction of technological change is not studied explicitly. The aim is to optimise the use of
knowledge generation by a system of related and linked actors.
3. Government intervention:
- Maintains the institutional knowledge infrastructure of universities and research institutes.
- Stimulates interactive learning among the variety of actors present in the NIS.
- Monitors the NIS by institutional mapping in order to improve the system’s overall performance.
- Creates complementary links between public and private actors in order to optimise the use of the
knowledge produced. Creates and facilitates access to knowledge.
- Matches the supply and demand for knowledge within the system.
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Industrial network approach
Within the industrial network approach, technological development is seen as the
result of interacting (economic) actors. Technological development takes place in the
realm of economic relationships that belong to ‘neither market nor hierarchy’. A firm
never innovates in isolation. Actors are embedded in networks.
Industrial networks are seen as a special form of economic organisation between
markets and hierarchies (see e.g. [Williamson, 1985; Powell, 1988; Håkansson and
Snehota, 1995]). Networks serve as a co-ordinating mechanism. Economic actors are
bound and linked to other (economic) actors in many ways. There are informal links
between equal and partially interdependent actors. Network actors are socially
embedded through exchange relationships. An actor maintains networks in order to
create direct and indirect access to critical resources that it does not possess itself.
Although networks can be based on legal contracts, their stability is derived mainly
from the establishment of trust, reliability, reputation and customary rules with which
members of the network comply. Networks are conceptualised as an important
mechanism for creating and accessing tacit knowledge. Networks have a constraining
and enabling function to important external resources [Oerlemans, 1996]
The network literature deals in various ways with themes such as learning and
innovation (see e.g. [Håkansson, 1987; Porter, 1990; Lundgren, 1995; Håkansson
and Snehota, 1995; Oerlemans, 1996]). Håkansson (1987), for example, linked his
organisational focus on firms to an industrial network perspective. Actors possess
and use resources  - such as physical, financial and human assets - to perform certain
activities. Actors have certain knowledge about what other actors are doing and what
kind of resources other actors have at their disposal. Functional interdependence
between actors, differences in power among actors, knowledge and experience of
actors and the fact that the existing network is the result of previous investments in
relationships mean that actors operate in a network mode. The networks contribute to
the production of knowledge. Networks contribute to the co-ordination of resources
and lead to resource mobilisation. Networks are typically characterised by long-term
relationships [Håkansson, 1989]. Networks have come to be understood as important
organisational forms that co-ordinate and direct the efforts of actors engaged in
technological development.
- 40 -
Key-points: Industrial network approach
1. Technological development:
- Technological development takes place in a process of interaction between actors (most often
firms) who perform activities and have access to different (complementary) resources. Firms are
interdependent.
- Technology results from interactions between firms. Technology itself forms a new resource.
2. Directing technological development:
- Firms are related to other actors for the purpose of succeeding in technological development; they
take notice of other actors’ roles and needs in their own R&D activities and efforts in order to
pursue technological development.
- Firms are bounded by their dependence on other actors; functional interdependence, power,
knowledge, and times
- No explicit attention is given to directing technological development.
3. Government intervention:
- Builds and renews local knowledge-intensive networks.
- Stimulates co-operation.
Approaches rooted in social constructivism
Technological development is regarded as a process of social construction. Pinch and
Bijker (1984) were among the first sociologists to analyse in detail the nature of
social interactions which underlie technological development. They suggested the
social construction of technology approach (SCOT) [Pinch and Bijker, 1984].
According to the SCOT approach, technological artefacts have an interpretative
flexibility [Pinch and Bijker, 1984; Bijker, 1990]. Different actors give different
interpretations of the same artefacts and, therefore, have different problem
definitions. The interpretative flexibility remains as long as none of the
interpretations becomes dominant. The idea is that closure of the various
interpretations, i.e. the different meanings stabilise around one interpretation, leads to
innovation. All kinds of processes like negotiation, rhetoric and enrolment play a role
in this process. Although a particular frame can become dominant, not all actors or
constellations of actors need to be equally involved in this frame. There may be
different degrees of inclusion. Actors with a high inclusion will focus on solving
problems by incremental improvements, whereas actors with a low inclusion in a
technological frame are more often the ones who introduce radically different
solutions.
According to the actor-network approach every form of change, including
technological development, is a change in actor-networks [Callon, 1987]. Actor-
networks comprise heterogeneous entities in which the technical is not clearly
separated from the social, the cultural or the economic. There is no a priori difference
between human and non-human social actors. Actors enrol and translate other actors,
values, and interests in such a way that links between different actors are established,
strengthened or broken [Callon and Law, 1982]. The translator or prime mover is the
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dominant actor causing the dynamics in the actor-network. Through mobilisation of
other entities in the actor-network this translator tries to solve a specific problem.
The selection of a specific solution is the result of the consensus among the relevant
actors with regard to problems and solutions. A certain configuration results. The
robustness of this configuration can be explained by a detailed description of the
mechanisms by which it was constructed.
In Callon's recent work on techno-economic networks (TEN), the emergence,
patterns and dynamics of networks are the central issue [Callon et al., 1992].
Whereas Callon focused earlier on the elementary interaction between actors, he now
assigns a central role to materialised descriptions. These materialised descriptions or
intermediaries such as certain statements, acts and artefacts can be ‘read’ by other
actors. Other actors interpret these intermediaries. Their interpretation makes them
act or respond in a certain way. TENs are about circulating intermediaries that align
and aggregate actors in their activities. A TEN is defined as a co-ordinated set of
heterogeneous actors. The actors are organised by three main poles: the scientific, the
technical and the market pole. Callon distinguishes three characteristics that
constitute the strength and orientation of the techno-economic network, i.e. its
completeness, its integration and its length. Technological development is highly
contingent. De Laat (1996) used Callon’s approach to develop a socio-technical
management tool that research agencies can use to explore several scripts for the
future.
Key-points: Approaches rooted in social constructivism
1. Technological development:
- Technological development is a social process of contingent enrolment and negotiation.
Heterogeneous actors are translated.
- Technology has a flexible meaning. Intermediaries of technology align other actors.
2. Directing technological development:
- Visions (and stakes) of the interest groups / actors.
- Structure of the techno-economic network
3. Government intervention:
- Articulates a specific meaning in the process of negotiation.
- Changes the existing network into a ‘desired’ network; constructs networks, makes them evolve
and ensures that they function in a satisfactory manner.
- Network information can be used as an indicator for mapping the status of a technology; changes
in networks reflect changes in the status of the technology and can be used for monitoring
technological development.
Quasi-evolutionary approach
In this approach technological development is seen as a co-evolving process of actors
and technology within a certain regime. Regimes are outcomes of earlier changes and
they pre-structure subsequent technological developments.
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The quasi-evolutionary approach is a sociological version of evolutionary economic
theory. Key concepts such as variation and selection formed the starting point,
although their meaning was gradually refined. Authors like Belt and Rip (1987)
started by stressing the social context in which economic agents are embedded. The
agents generate variations. In doing this they anticipate to the expected selection
environment. This linkage of variation and selection occurs e.g. in a nexus, an
institution or department which carries and shapes the interaction between societal
and market requirements and technological opportunities. Actors with a vested
interest, and often also with a high reputation in a technological field may protect
their interest by actively participating in certain developments [Belt and Rip, 1987;
Schot, 1991]. Actors operate strategically in aligning the technology within the
context in which it is being developed and applied [Rip, 1995].
In quasi-evolutionary theories, the influence of the context in which technological
development occurs is conceptualised as the technological regime. The regime
comprises not only the cognitive aspects of the problem-solving activities of
engineers (the set of search heuristics), but also the wider economic and other social
conditions, like the existing technological infrastructures, the rules of the market in
which actors operate, existing networks of business relations, and economic factors
[Rip and Kemp, 1998; Van der Poel, 1998]. A technological regime contains rules
that facilitate and constrain actors’ activities. They guide actors in the decisions they
take. The rules guide - but do not fix - the direction of technological development
[Kemp et al., 1998]. The rules are shared resulting in certain patterns of
technological development. Innovative technologies are always introduced against
the backdrop of existing regimes. Micro-level actors have to discover whether the
innovative technology fits in with the existing regime [Rip and Kemp, 1998].
Van Lente (1993) introduced the idea of promises and expectations as one of
orienting elements in technological development [Lente, 1993]. When expectations
are shared by many actors, they will dominate the agenda of activities and set the rate
and direction of technological development [Schaeffer, 1998; Lente, 1993]. Promises
and expectations legitimate choices in R&D activities, they mobilise attention and
financial support and they finally reduce the uncertainty inherent in technological
development. Actors therefore use expectations in their R&D activities, and in their
turn, promises and expectations guide actors in their decision-making processes.
Expectations contain a script for the future that guides R&D activities13 [van Lente,
1993].
The quasi-evolutionary approach recognises the occurrence of inter-linked processes
at the micro, meso and macro level [Rip and Kemp, 1998; Lente, 1993]. The concept
of regime understands cumulative and patterned nature of technological
development. It explains why technological development is to a certain extent non-
malleable and why it is difficult to orient technological development [Rip and Kemp,
                                                
13
 A well-known example of a promise operating as a script is Moore’s Law. Moore’s Law has
become a self-fulfilling prophecy. All micro-processor firms tune their R&D activities to obey this
law because they know their competitors also do. The prophecy of the law is that actors start acting
accordingly.
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1998]. One of the intervention options that may help to orient technological
development is strategic niche management [Kemp et al., 1998]. The idea is to create
temporary protected spaces – market or technological niches –. They function as a
local breeding space through which social learning among actors occurs. Niches
protect variations (and the expectations linked to it) against too rapid and harsh
selection.
Key-points: Quasi-evolutionary approach
1. Technological development:
- Technological development is a process of co-evolution at different levels of analysis (micro,
meso, macro).
- Technology is an object in a co-evolutionary learning process. The result may be a technology
that fits in with the existing regime or that gives rise to a new regime.
2. Directing technological development:
- The technological regime: rules guide – but do not fix - actors’ R&D activities.
- Shared promised and expectations.
3. Government intervention:
- Changes the rules in a regime.
- Facilitates learning processes among actors.
- Establishes niches of protected learning (link variation and selection).
- Develops socio-technical scenarios for the future.
Large Technical Systems
In this approach, technological development is regarded as the transformation of
technical systems. The study of the unique evolution and transformation of large
technical systems such as energy supply, telecommunications or transport from a
historical perspective has shown that technological interdependencies and
momentum can be both strong determinants of and constraints on future
technological pathways.
The historical approaches are inspired to a large extent by the work of Hughes
[Hughes, 1983; Hughes, 1987]. His system approach considers technological
development as the development and growth of a system of heterogeneous
(technical, social, juridical, geographical) components. These heterogeneous
components are so closely interlinked that it is often hard to make a distinction
between them. The components constitute a seamless web. The nature of the
technical systems goes beyond the interrelated physical artefacts.
There is an inherent logic in the technical system that sets the direction for
technological development; the entire system is expanded so that the entire system is
used optimally. The expansion of a system is not regular. Components which hinder
the growth of the whole system are called reverse salients. These reverse salients can
rise due to internal (inside the boundaries of the system) or external (outside the
boundaries of the system) factors. The reverse salients are the essence of the creative
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process. System builders, leaders or promoters of the system, who are typically
technical professionals with excellent entrepreneurial competencies, translate these
reverse salients into critical problems. Above a certain size, a socio-technical system
acquires its own dynamic, its own momentum. As it is growing a system develops
more and more momentum, which makes it appear as if it is developing
autonomously. The other side of the coin is that this so-called momentum may result
in system inertia. The technical system is strongly entrenched as a result of the
investments in capital, the way actors involved are organised and the knowledge
practices which commonly operate within that system.
Key-points: Large Technical Systems
1. Technological development:
- Process of solving critical problems to optimise performance of a technical system.
- Technology is part of an (expanding) technical system.
2. Directing technological development:
- Inherent in the technical system; reverse salients - critical problems - occur. They have to be
solved to expand the entire technical system.
3. Government intervention:
- Causes or strengthens existing and slumbering reverse salients.
- Reinforces the capacities or possibilities of system builders.
2.5. Towards a framework
Triangle of technological development
At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that the process by which a specific
industrial energy-efficient technology develops could be characterised in terms of
actors, networks, and the role of government. The various approaches used in
technology studies provide us with valuable insights and with suggestions about what
to look for in the empirical research. Instead of opting for one specific approach we
select aspects of several approaches since they are largely complementary. Whereas
there are clear differences between the approaches in their specific theoretical focus
(and in the terminology used), the approaches converge, enabling us to obtain a
broad and realistic understanding of technology and technological development [Rip
and Kemp, 1998]. We are interested in obtaining some guidelines for the
performance of the technology case studies.
Common to all the approaches is the idea that technological development can be
conceptualised as a social process in which ‘Artefacts’, ‘Actors’ and ‘Agenda’ are
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constructed and interact. These triple As are summarised as the triangle of
technological development (see Figure 1) [Van Lente, 1993; Schaeffer, 1998].
Figure 1: The triangle of technological development.
The triangle provides us with a heuristic tool for summarising how scholars engaged
in technology studies understand technological development. All approaches frame
their analyses in terms of actors and in terms of interactions and networks. The actors
interact on the basis of their specific resources and capacities. They make statements
and claims, apply for patents, produce and communicate R&D results, prototypes,
and other types of artefacts. This social process in which technologies are shaped is
guided by elements that orient actors by giving priority and direction to their R&D
activities [Kingdom, 1984; Van Lente, 1993].
With this heuristic tool in mind we elaborate upon the three key-points that we used
to summarise each of the approaches in Section 2.4. The discussion below gives a
more detailed sketch of how technology studies interpret technological development
in terms of actors, artefacts and agenda. This leads to a preliminary list of questions
and remarks that can prove useful to arrive at a framework for empirical research.
Technological development and innovative technology
All approaches share the view that innovative technology cannot be described in
technical terms solely. They reject the linear and sequential model of technological
development and refute the suggestion that the technologically optimal solution will
result automatically. Technology does not exist as independent artefact with fixed
characteristics which enters the economy at a precise point in time. Instead,
technology involves economic, technical and social elements, all of which are highly
intertwined. Technology is seen as a ‘configuration that works’; it comprehends the
technical hardware and its underlying principles (as e.g. skills, knowledge,
experience and routines) necessary to install and operate the hardware and to use it
Artefacts Agenda
Actors
Ideas and guidelines that
orient actors in R&D and other
decisions
Devices, prototypes, patents,
systems and other results
of R&D
Firms, research institutes, 
governments,…
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productively in a certain context (derived from [Rip and Kemp, 1998]). Every piece
of technology is thus embedded in a specific context that is constituted by other
technologies and a constellation of actors who know how to exploit these
technologies. In technology studies, scholars are very wary about separating the
technical side (the artefact), from the social side (the actors and the way actors and
artefacts are embedded). Scholars prefer to use terms such as socio-technical changes
or socio-technical outcomes.
Technological development is thus seen as a process of a social nature. No results are
achieved unless actors are willing to invest in or undertake R&D activities. Actors
are the vehicles that bring about technological development and innovation. Actors
are interdependent. Networks have become the key-concept that links actors. Actors
have a certain stake in new developments, and have certain capacities or resources.
They perform R&D activities, interact and co-operate, try to mobilise other actors,
and articulate performance claims and expectations with regard to their R&D
activities. Through network interactions tacit knowledge14 and experience are
exchanged, the opportunities and needs for improved technologies are matched, and
promises and expectations are articulated.
In short, innovative technology is seen as the outcome of a social process. In our
search to obtain guidelines for the performance of the technology case studies, the
following questions can be listed:
- Which actors are involved in developing an innovative technology? What kind of
actors are they (firms, universities or research institutes)?
- What are the actors’ interests or stakes for being involved? What task or role do
they have in developing the energy-efficient technology?
- How are actors embedded in the socio-technical networks of a manufacturing
industry and what is their reputation?
- What are actors’ resources and capacities? Do they have adequate finance,
equipment and research facilities, and experience in conducting R&D?
- In what countries are the actors operating? How many different R&D efforts can
be distinguished?
- Do actors co-operate? Who interacts with whom? And why? How important is
co-operation in delivering R&D results?
- Is there any other kind of exchange and communication between actors? What do
they exchange? In what way? Why?
- Are some actors more dominant than other actors during the development of an
innovative technology?
- What steps are taken in developing an innovative technology? How long does it
take to develop the technology? What explains this time-frame?
                                                
14
 Tacit knowledge is considered to be a crucial aspect of technological development. Polanyi (1966),
who claimed that the only way to transfer tacit knowledge is through social interaction, suggested the
concept. Dosi et al. (1988) suggested that “Tacitness refers to those elements of knowledge, insight
and so on, that individuals have which are ill-defined, uncodified and unpublished, which they
themselves cannot fully express and which differ form person to person, but which may to some
significant degree be shared by collaborators and colleagues who have a common experience” [Dosi
et al., 1988, p. 1126].
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- What results from R&D activities? What kind of claims and expectations are
articulated?
Guiding and directing technological development
Technology does not develop in a random manner. Actors are guided in their R&D
activities and decisions by the context in which they operate. Frames or regimes
direct acting. The frames are typically shared by a larger number of actors. This
contextual structure brings regularity into technological development. It pre-
structures the ideas and notions about where to look for further technological
development and problem-solving activities. Processes of technological development
are embedded in what is believed to be a fruitful direction for progress. The frames
make technological development cumulative and non-malleable and make
technological development difficult to orient. If a large number of actors are looking
in the same direction and if there are strict rules which make these actors look in that
direction, it is not very easy to change the direction of technological development. A
certain path dependency occurs. Note that such structuring regimes or frames are,
however, an outcome of earlier social activities. This illustrates that the distinction
between ‘structure’ and ‘action’, as often made in classical (sociological)
discussions, may be considered as two sides of the same coin. Structure is produced
by action, but at the same time it organises action [Rip and Kemp, 1998; Schaeffer,
1998; Van der Poel, 1998; Van Lente, 1993].
In our search on how to characterise the process by which specific industrial energy-
efficient technology develop, we come up with the following questions:
- What are actors’ arguments for being interested in the innovative technology?
Why do actors attach importance to these arguments?
- What are the most promising performance characteristics of the innovative
technology? What implications does an innovative technology have for a
manufacturing industry?
- What influences actors’ decisions with regards to R&D? What guides actors to
prefer certain directions of technological development?
- Why do actors continue R&D activities? And, possibly, why do they terminate
these activities?
- Why does an innovative technology emerge at a certain moment in time? How
does the technology relate to the context in which it is to be applied?
Government intervention
Government intervention is part of the ‘black box’ that has to be studied in itself
[Van der Steen, 1999; Rip and Kemp, 1998]. Government is one of the actors that
may induce other actors to undertake R&D activities. The various approaches
adopted in technology studies give rise to a new perception of the role and
possibilities of government in stimulating R&D activities and directing technological
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development15. Technological development is seen as a learning process of
interacting actors. Government should take into account the dynamics in existing
networks. Table 1 illustrates the consequences of technology studies for government
intervention16.
Table 1: Role of government in stimulating technological development
Dimensions Traditional way of looking at
government intervention in
technological development
System or network way of
looking at government
intervention
Scope of analysis Relation government - firm Networks of firms
Perspective on
role government
Central steering role of
government – static
Government is an actor among
actors – dynamic
Type of relations Hierarchic Interdependent
Perception of
steering
Implementing policy
instruments for achieving goals
Facilitating the learning
processes
Focus Push –  linear model Push and pull – systemic model
Selection
instrument
Independent from steering
context / network
Depending on steering context /
network
Government cannot control the outcome of the social process of technological
development. The role of government needs to be evaluated as part of the network
and compared with the role of other incentives, decisions and dynamics. We require
answers to the following questions:
- Did government play a role in developing an energy-efficient technology? If yes,
in what way?
- Did government affect the R&D decisions taken by the other actors? If yes, in
what way? If not, why not?
- What would have happened had there been no government intervention taking
into account information about the role of actors and dynamics in technological
development?
                                                
15
 See also  Section 2.3.
16
 The traditional (neo-classical) rationale for government intervention is to correct market failure. In
this set-up the basic policy task is to encourage discovery-oriented activities, and then to protect the
use of the results. The approaches adopted in technology studies suggest a broader rationale for
government intervention in R&D and technological development. The insights have induced a so-
called ‘rationale of systemic imperfection’ [OECD, 1999; OECD, 1998; Van der Steen, 1999].
Government intervention should focus on preventing imperfections in the systems or in the networks
of technological development and innovation. It can do this by establishing interaction among actors
where it is missing, by providing information, by increasing access to knowledge, by matching need
for knowledge with knowledge supply, creating demanding customers, and by organising
participatory decision making processes about strategic areas of R&D and technological development
and by creating future images of society. The role of government is increasingly portrayed as that of a
facilitator, broker, game-manager, cluster, network-builder or niche-manager [Edquist and Hommen,
1999; OECD, 1999; Rip and Kemp, 1998].
- 49 -
A network-oriented framework
Networks of actors are the key feature of our framework; we therefore also refer to a
network-oriented framework. In the development of the energy-efficient technology
not all actors have an equally close relationship. Therefore, we distinguish a micro-
level of activities – the micro-networks –, and a meso-level which includes the entire
constellation of actors active in developing a specific technology. This total set of
micro-networks we define as the technology network. A micro-network consists of
one actor or a small group of actors who co-operate in developing a specific
industrial energy-efficient technology. They co-operate on the basis of specific skills
or financial resources, they perform R&D activities, test materials and build
prototypes, etc. The actors in the micro-networks learn from their own R&D results,
learn from each others’ experience, but they commonly also look at what other
micro-networks are doing. The innovative technology, or a specific version of the
innovative technology, materialises within the micro-networks. The actors are
embedded in a context, also called the innovation background, which influences
actors’ ideas and perceptions of what is believed to be an interesting direction for
progress. It guides actors’ R&D agendas. Elements in the innovation background are
for instance the market in which the firms operate, existing business relationships
within and between industrial sectors, sector developments, and the existing
production process for manufacturing steel or paper.
Figure 2 shows the framework of micro-networks, the technology network and the
innovation background.
Figure 2: The network-oriented framework to analyse the development of
industrial energy-efficient process technologies.
Innovation
background
Micro-networks
Technology network
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Note that the three elements distinguished in the triangle of technological
development are all present in this network-oriented framework. The framework
provides us with a structure for understanding who is involved and who interacts
with whom – Actors –; for realising what guides R&D and technological
development by understanding actors’ arguments for developing a specific
technology – Agenda –; and for mapping what results from all these R&D activities
and showing how these affect further technological development – Artefacts –.
Now we come to the case study questions that guide us in performing and analysing
the empirical case studies. We formulate questions about the technology network, the
micro-networks and the materialisation of the technology. Government is one of the
actors that may play a role in developing the technology. As indicated before, in each
of the case studies government’s role is evaluated as part of the specific case study.
The effect of government intervention is analysed explicitly. Table 2 gives an
overview of the questions.
Table 2: Case study questions.
Research foci Triangle Underlying questions
Technology
Network
How does the
collective network
of the micro-
networks
develop?
1. What is the composition of the technology network?
How many micro-networks can be distinguished? What
is their geographic distribution?
2. What are the links between micro-networks? To what
extent and how often do micro-networks exchange
knowledge/information?
3. Are there dominant micro-networks in the technology
network?
Micro-
Network
Who are the
actors involved
and what is their
agenda?
1. How are the various micro-networks made up? Who and
what type of actors are involved?
2. What motivates actors to start and / or stop R&D
activities?
3. How much money is spent and by whom?
4. What important decisions are made with regard to the
direction of the technological development?
Materialisation
of the
technology
What are the
results of the
R&D activities
undertaken?
1. What is the rate of development and what steps in up-
scaling can be distinguished?
2. What are the perceived performance characteristics of
the technology (including the technological
interrelatedness with the existing technological system)?
Government What was the
effect of
government
intervention?
On the basis of the description and analysis of the technology
case study, the role and effect of government intervention can
be evaluated specifically with regard to:
- additionality
- acceleration
- effectiveness
We do not pose explicit questions about the innovation background, because it is
reflected in the considerations and decisions taken by actors within the various
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micro-networks. If we want to understand actors’ arguments we need to include how
actors are embedded in a particular context.
The materialisation of the technology is explicitly considered by focusing on the
steps take to up-scale the R&D equipment and by asking for the perceived
performance characteristics of the innovative technology. We have three reasons for
explicitly looking at artefacts. First of all, it increases our understanding of why
things happened as they did. Artefacts such as research equipment or patents are an
important resource for actors. Steps in up-scaling are often occasions for contacting
other actors in order to establish co-operation or mobilise financial resources.
Secondly, actors involved in developing the specific technology use statements about
a technology’s perceived performance for mobilising R&D resources and external
R&D support. Explicit consideration of such claims about the technology’s
performance and a proper understanding of the role of such data in the social process
of technological development are important indicators with regard to the possible
role that government can play. And thirdly, the materialisation of the technology
captures the characteristics in which energy analysts are traditionally interested. By
discussing these characteristics separately we can study how important these other
indicators are in order to understand the process of technological development.
The network-oriented framework and the set of questions are generic and open in
nature. We use them as a checklist for data gathering and in organising data analysis
(see also Section 1.6). They are not directed towards the testing of a (theory-driven)
hypothesis. The framework and questions are meant to force the analyst to look at all
the elements of technological development that are relevant for the central research
question and to compile a comprehensive and coherent history of each specific
technology case study. However, a standard recipe for success is not provided.
Carrying out the technology case studies requires thorough research, critical
questioning, careful data analysis and a mind-set involving ‘understanding-by-
performing’.
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Chapter 3
Shoe press technology
Abstract
Shoe press technology is a paper-making technology that improves dewatering of the
board or paper sheet in the wet pressing section and, therefore, reduces the need for
evaporating drying. In this case study, we evaluate the importance of internal factors
- actor characteristics - and external factors - the way in which these actors are
embedded in a specific context - on the development and diffusion of shoe press
technology.
Developing the technology took about 13 years (1967-1980). The technology network
consisted of one micro-network and for a long time even of one firm. Although the
idea for extending pressing time was acknowledged by others, only the people at the
US machine supplier Beloit continued to believe that such a major new press design
could be engineered. A fabric supplier was involved to suggest a suitable belt at the
moment that the first commercial shoe press for a board machine had already been
sold. The fabric supplier succeeded in time. Without the belt, innovation (1980)
would have been delayed. Only by then, three other machine suppliers started R&D
activities. They developed improved shoe press designs with a ‘closed’ belt.
The major argument for developing shoe press technology was to increase the
machine capacity of existing board machines and to reduce the capital intensity of
new board machines. During the early eighties, machine suppliers claimed
advantages for other paper grades too. Only when conventional wet presses limited a
further increase of machine speeds the shoe press became a proven technology in
paper machines too (from 1994 onwards).
A first conclusion is that actor characteristics were decisive for the successful
development of shoe press technology. Note that Beloit’s success did not occur in a
vacuum. There was a wider acknowledgement of the importance of extending time in
wet pressing. Furthermore, Beloit had a ‘proven’ reputation as one of the world-
wide major machine suppliers. A second conclusion is that external factors were
decisive for ongoing improvements from 1980 onwards. Further R&D activities were
driven by the market success of shoe press technology.
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3.1. Introduction
Ongoing development of innovative technology can be regarded as an important way
of reducing emissions that give rise to the enhanced greenhouse effect [IPCC, 1996;
UN, 1997]. In this regard, energy-efficiency improvements in the manufacturing
industry have been indicated as an interesting field for government to stimulate the
development of innovative technologies (see e.g. [De Beer, 1998; Blok et al., 1995]).
If governments want to stimulate technological development effectively, they must
have a thorough understanding of what drives the development of energy-efficient
technology. In this chapter, we analyse the process by which a successfully
introduced energy-efficient technology developed. We want to understand which
factors drove the development of a specific energy-efficient technology.
Research performed in the interdisciplinary field of technology studies claims that
technological development needs to be understood in terms of networks. Firms
hardly ever innovate in isolation [Edquist and Hommen, 1999; Rip and Kemp, 1998].
Authors of network-oriented studies try to understand technological development by
making a distinction between the characteristics of the actors, ‘internal factors’, and
the way in which these actors are linked to each other and embedded in a specific
context, ‘external factors’.
As a case study we selected shoe press technology, which is considered to be a
successfully introduced energy-efficient process technology (see e.g. [De Beer et al.,
1994; Martin et al., 2000]). Since its introduction in 1980, this technology has
improved the energy efficiency of the pulp and paper industry. Shoe press
technology has been one of the major innovations in paper making in the 20th century
[Mirsberger, 1992b; Wedel, 1993; Lockie, 1998]. With regard to this case study we
address two questions:
1. What was the balance between internal and external factors, which drove the
development of shoe press technology?
2. What is the balance between internal and external factors, which has driven the
further improvement of shoe press technology since the moment of innovation?
In Section 3.2, we briefly introduce the pulp and paper industry, the paper production
process and shoe press technology. In Section 3.3, the historical development of shoe
press technology is mapped up to the moment when the first shoe press was installed.
In Section 3.4, we map the R&D developments that have taken place since the
moment of innovation. In mapping the history of shoe press technology we present
elements that return in our analysis of the case study in Section 3.5. A short
discussion of the validity of the analysis is given in Section 3.6. The chapter closes
with some conclusions.
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3.2. The sector, the production process and shoe press
technology
Pulp and paper industry
The pulp and paper industry is a capital-intensive industry that manufactures
commodity products. The competition in the sector is based on price and on
economics of scale. The added value of the majority of the products is low. The
demand for paper increases slowly and steadily (with some temporary setbacks), still
the paper industry is faced with cyclical fluctuations in the prices of their products.
This clyclicality is caused by the supply of new paper machine capacity at times
aggravated by the sensitivity of the paper industry for general business cycles. The
price elasticity of paper is low. Over-capacity and sudden increases in paper capacity
put pressure on market prices. The industry is increasingly consolidating. Mergers
and acquisitions are expected to continue. All in all, a continuous operation of the
paper machine is what keeps a paper firm in business. The industry is focused on
proven technology that can increase paper machines’ production capacity. Since
paper making has become a continuous operation, the history of technological
development has been one of solving critical bottlenecks in the paper machine for
making them wider and faster [Luiten, 1997].
Making paper or board
Making paper or board1 involves three clusters of activities; furnish preparation, the
paper machine and finishing operations. In the preparation of furnish, pulped wood
and/or waste paper is processed and mixed with water, some chemicals and other
additives. This mixture is called furnish. The percentage of dry solids in the furnish,
also called the dryness of the paper sheet, is about 1%. Then, the furnish is fed into
the paper or board machine. Water is removed in three sections; dryness increases as
the paper sheet moves along the paper machine:
- Forming section: forming the paper sheet while draining and suctioning (1% to
20% dryness)
- Pressing section: mechanical dewatering by passing the paper sheet through a
number of press nips (20% to 45% dryness)
- Drying section: evaporative drying of paper sheet (45% to 90-95% dryness)
                                                
1
 Paper is generally used to indicate all the different grades produced by the pulp and paper industry.
In this chapter we make a distinction between printing paper and board. To clarify this distinction we
use the term paper machine to indicate a machine that produces printing paper and the term board
machine to indicate a machine that produces board grades. Printing paper is a collective term for all
printable (coated or uncoated) mechanical pulped or wood free papers. It serves as the medium for
printed information. It is generally lighter than 150 g/m2. Board is used to indicate thick and stiff
paper, often consisting of several plies. Board is generally used for packaging purposes. It is normally
heavier than 150 g/m2. Packaging paper is a collective term for papers or boards of different pulp
compositions and properties sharing only the application [CEPI, 2000].
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Finally, finishing operations as e.g. calendaring, winding and cutting are needed to
deliver the final product.
The paper machine’s drying section requires the largest amount of energy per
kilogram water removed. Improvements in the specific energy consumption of a ton
of paper are therefore typically directed at reducing the energy requirement of the
drying section (see e.g. [De Beer, 1998; Martin et al., 2000]). This can be achieved
by improving drying technologies. A second route is to increase the amount of water
removed in the pressing section.
Shoe press technology
Shoe press technology is an exemplary technology of the second category; it
improves the dewatering capacity of the conventional pressing section by extending
the time that the paper sheet remains in the press nip. This time is also called the nip
residence time. The amount of water removed in the pressing section is proportional
to the magnitude and the duration of the pressure applied to the paper sheet. The
product of pressure and nip residence time is called the ‘press impulse’ [MacGregor,
1989; Pikulik, 1999].
In conventional roll presses both the pressure applied and the nip residence time were
constrained. Pressure could not be increased unlimited, because the paper sheet
would be damaged (especially at higher machine speeds). Nip residence time
decreased with increasing machine speeds. The constrained press impulse of
conventional roll presses was overcome by shoe press technology (see Table 1 and
Figure 1).
Table 1: Design parameters of a conventional roll press and a shoe press
(based on [Wahlstrom, 1991; Wedel, 1993]).
Design parameters Roll press Shoe press
Length of press or nip width (cm) 4 – 7 25 – 30
Linear load (kN/m) 150 – 450 1,000 – 1,500
Press impulse (kN*s/m2)1 3.0 – 5.0 15 – 21
1
 Press impulse depends on the speed of the paper or board machine, the length of the press nip and
the linear load applied. The data reported in the table are indicative.
The nip of a shoe press consists of a stationary shoe, which is loaded against a press
roll (see Figure 2). A stationary, concave shoe press replaces the conventional
bottom roll. Felts are required for transporting the water from the press. A belt or
sleeve forms the shell that runs between the mechanical press and the bottom felt. Oil
is supplied on the inside of the belt to act as a load transfer medium and to provide
lubrication between the stationary shoe and the moving belt.
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Figure 1: Difference between the pressure profile of a conventional roll press
and that of a shoe press. The areas under the curves are the press
impulse (1 psi = 6.9 kN/m2).
Figure 2: Cross-section of a conventional roll press nip and various shoe press
designs. The shoe press on the far left has an open loop belt (Beloit’s
ENP-O). The other three designs have a closed belt or sleeve (derived
from [Schiel, 1992]).
The major advantage of the shoe press is the higher dryness achieved at the exit of
the pressing section. Depending on the grade produced, the increase is about 5 to
10% compared to conventional pressing. This results in a better runnability2 [Wedel,
1993]. The higher dryness leads to an increased production capacity (about 10 to
20%), when a shoe press is put on an existing (dryer limited) paper or board machine.
When a shoe press is implemented on a new paper machine, the drying section can
be shortened thus reducing capital expenditure.
A second advantage is the reduced demand for steam in the drying section. This may
lead to an improvement in energy efficiency in spite of the increased electricity
consumption. Additional driving capacity and increased pumping capacity for
                                                
2
 Runnability is defined as how smoothly paper runs through a paper or board machine or printing
press without breaking the sheet [CEPI, 2000].
Roll press nip Shoe press nips
Roll
Shoe press
Paper sheet Felt
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cleaning the felts are needed. If increased electricity consumption is not taken into
account, a shoe press may save 0.5 GJ
 
to 2.0 GJ
 
per ton paper3. Savings in energy
costs are of the order of 1 to 5 $ per ton paper. Energy cost savings make up 60 to
80% of the payback generated if the machine’s speed is not increased. If a paper
machine’s production speed is increased, energy cost savings make up 10 to 20% of
the payback per ton paper4 [Sirrine, 1982; Anonymous, 2000].
A third advantage is improved product characteristics. The pressing section is
important for paper properties because most physical and surface characteristics are
in some way related to the density of the sheet. Pressing causes densification [Lange,
1996; Mirsberger, 1992a]. The effect of a shoe press on paper properties differs
among the grades produced. Installing a shoe press on a board machine induces a
favourable increase in strength properties. This permits savings in refining, the use of
fewer strength additives, and the application of cheaper furnishes. The installation of
a shoe press on a paper machine leads to a higher dryness without reducing the
thickness of the sheet [Wahlstrom, 1991; Mirsberger, 1992a]. This results in cost
savings by reducing the amount of fibre needed [Lange, 1996].
3.3. Historical development of shoe press technology –
before 1980
Early developments in roll press technology
At the beginning of the 20th century, a woollen felt carried a paper sheet through the
pressing section which consisted of two rolls (see Figure 2). The use of two roll
presses remained the dominant design until the introduction of the shoe press in
1980.
The original press rolls were solid. The first improvement, which increased the
dewatering capacity of the pressing section, was introduced in 1925. By making the
bottom roll of the press hollow and providing it with a perforated shell, water could
be extracted into this roll by means of a vacuum. This roll press, the suction press,
became widely used. When the widths and speeds of paper machines increased, the
disadvantages of the suction press became more evident. The vacuum equipment was
                                                
3
 De Beer (1998) reports that the specific energy consumption of a ton paper ranges between 9 and 17
GJ / ton (depending on paper grade). Primary energy savings depend on machine-specific factors such
as the amount of steam needed to evaporate the water, the increase in dryness realised after the
pressing section and the steam generating efficiency. A small survey among Dutch paper firms having
a shoe press on one of their machines, made it clear that the payback generated by energy savings is
too low to fulfil paper manufacturers’ investment criteria. In all cases the investment was justified by
the increased production capacity. In one case, steam savings in the dryer section were cancelled out
by an increase in electricity use [Anonymous, 2000].
4
 Crucial assumptions have to be made about steam savings, other savings especially in raw materials,
energy prices, production increase and the net gross margin on a ton of paper sold.
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costly, the power consumption was high and the costs of maintenance such as
cleaning the holes in the roll were substantial [Håkanson, 1974].
Researchers at Beloit, a US paper machine supplier, undertook R&D activities in
order to reduce the costs of the suction press and to further improve the dewatering
capacity [Justus and Cronin, 1964; Justus and Cronin, 1981]. The result was the
vented roll press, which had grooves in one of the rolls so that the pressure in the
press nip could be increased without crushing the paper5. The first vented nip press
was installed in the US in 1963. The vented nip press allowed a further increase in
pressures applied, so that the dryness at the exit of the pressing section was gradually
increased (see e.g. [Håkanson, 1974; Schmitt, 1973; Justus and Cronin, 1964; Lord,
1982]).
The development of the suction press and the vented roll press, as well as the
continuing improvements in areas such as press roll covers and press felts, improved
water removal in the pressing section. However, nip pressures could not be increased
indefinitely. Crushing of the paper, short felt life and short roll cover life limited the
potential for increased water removal [Schmitt, 1973; Justus and Cronin, 1981;
Wicks, 1983; Cronin et al., 1985].
New directions in wet pressing R&D – ‘press impulse’
Research into wet pressing seriously took off in the sixties. The first studies that
provided a fundamental understanding of wet pressing were presented in 1960.
Against this background of growing research interest in wet pressing, the idea
emerged that optimising dewatering in the pressing section was not simply a matter
of pressure, but involved nip residence time as well [Daane, 1973; MacGregor,
1989]. Some illustrative evidence for this can be found.
Wahlstrom and Schiel, for instance, independently suggested the concept of the
‘press impulse’ at an international wet pressing conference in 1968. Wahlstrom and
Schiel, who were both working for firms supplying paper machines, introduced this
theoretical concept in connection with optimising water removal for a specific paper
sheet in a conventional pressing section [Wahlstrom, 1969; Schiel, 1969; Daane,
1973; Busker and Cronin, 1984; MacGregor, 1989; Schiel et al., 2000]. For reasons
of completeness, we mention that Campbell (1947) seems to have been the first
reference suggesting that water removal is dependent on press impulse. Campbell’s
paper was the first paper to cover some fundamental concepts of water removal in
the pressing section, though it is largely under-cited in wet pressing R&D
[MacGregor, 1989].
A second illustrative example is the research activity of Jahn and Kretzschmar at
Pama, an East-German machine supplier. Not much is known about their R&D
                                                
5
 Upon entering press nip, the paper sheet may get crushed when the pressure increases rapidly (this
problem becomes more acute at higher machine speeds). Crushing is the localised disruption of the
fibres and fillers in the paper sheet due to the flow resistance to the water in the sheet and the rate and
pressure at which the water is expelled from the sheet.
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activities; only that a patent was issued in 19716. The patent clarifies that they tried
to modulate the form of the pressure profile. Some claim that this patent is the first
shoe press patent. Others claim that the patent ‘only’ covers a method to prevent
rewetting. However, the main point is that several people were aware of the
importance of the press impulse and the form of the pressure profile in wet pressing.
The development of Beloit’s shoe press – the extended nip press
Busker, who worked at Beloit’s Rockton lab, also noticed the importance of time in
wet pressing [Busker and Cronin, 1984; MacGregor, 1989]. Beloit was a US machine
supplier. In December 1967, Busker started research activities that would eventually
lead to the development of Beloit’s shoe press, the extended nip press (ENP). He
developed a mathematical pressing simulation model [Busker, 2000; Cronin et al.,
1985]. Justus, manager of Beloit’s Rockton lab, stimulated Busker to start research in
this direction. Wet pressing was seen as an important machine component, which
thus had to be included in Beloit’s research programme. No one had any specific
ideas about product developments at that time [Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000].
During the summer of 1968, the pressing simulation model showed clearly that
optimising water removal was both a pressure-dependent and time-dependent
process. Excitement grew when Busker and others at Beloit started to perceive
possible ways of substantially increasing the amount of water removed by
‘extending’ the nip residence time. Beloit’s primary interest was to increase sheet
dryness, because this would allow existing (dryer limited) board machines to
increase production and new machines to reduce the length of the drying section
[Bergström, 2000; Lange, 2000].
Figure 3: Several sketches of a proposed ‘extended period pressing’ device
(research journal October 1968) [Busker, 2000].
                                                
6
 Schiel (Voith) did not find out until 2000 that Jahn and Kretzschmar had at their disposal a pilot
machine with a press nip in which they could vary the form of the pressure profile [Schiel et al.,
2000].
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Because very little data were available, a project started in February 1969 to
investigate empirically how much water could be removed by extending the length of
the press nip. The project was called ‘Extended period pressing’. What was needed
was a lab scale press, which could provide longer nip times. It was clear longer nip
times could not be achieved with a conventional roll press [MacGregor, 1989].
Several suggestions were made (see Figure 3).
The so-called ‘tensioned belt wrapped roll’ was built (see Figure 4). The 2 metres
high device consisted of a tensioned belt along three rolls with a variable angle to
achieve different nip lengths [Busker, 1971]. Empirical data collected in early 1970
proved that significant dryness increases could be achieved [Busker, 2000].
Figure 4: The first lab scale equipment that was built at Beloit’s Rockton lab
(used in 1969-1970) [Busker, 2000].
At that moment Beloit had to take the first major decision, because the lab scale
press was too large to be hidden from visitors to Beloit’s Rockton lab. Should Beloit
publish the idea or should they wait until they had developed a technology that could
be built [Busker, 2000]? There was a considerable debate whether it was better to
present the idea and claim the credits or to wait until hardware was developed. One
decided to present the idea of extended nip pressing to the capital-intensive paper
industry in order to develop industry interest. A paper was presented at the TAPPI
Engineering Conference in October 1970 and later published in TAPPI Journal (see
[Busker, 1971]). To protect Beloit’s position patent protection was secured [Lange,
2000; Busker, 2000]. Different designs of shoe presses were identified and a large
number of patents were issued7. At that time it was not at all clear precisely what
type of press could be engineered.
Through the early 1970s, Beloit studied the feasibility of lab scale press (see Figure
4). It was easy to obtain moderate press pressures, but after numerous tests and
failures of the belts, it was apparent that press was not viable due to the weakness of
the belt material [Busker, 2000]. The decision was made to build a new laboratory
                                                
7
 See e.g. [Mohr and Francik, 1974; Busker et al., 1974; Hoff, 1974; Justus, 1974].
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press. The new design had two opposing hydrostatic loaded stationary shoes. The
paper sheet was sandwiched between the two shoes, two belts and two felts. The
belts were needed to separate the lubrication system from the paper sheet. It was
recognised that the stationary shoes were difficult to apply in a continuous paper
machine, but the lab device was simple to build and it allowed R&D to proceed
[Daane, 1973]. A fluid medium was needed for lubrication. Water was preferred to
oil. Spilling water on the paper sheet would not harm the product, whereas spillage
of oil would. The sandwich-like press was operated during 1972 and 1973 with quite
good results [Busker, 2000].
The decision was made to build a prototype shoe press, first to be used for
experimentation and later to be installed in a commercial machine [Daane, 1973]. At
some time during 1973, engineers from the US paper-making firm Weyerhaeuser
came in contact with the research undertaken at Beloit. Weyerhaeuser had a strong
interest in new technology during the 1970s [Woo, 2000; Vance, 2000]. The energy
crises had made them more sensitive in taking energy conservation into account.
Though, energy efficiency was only one of the considerations [Busker, 2000; Vance,
2000]. Engineers from Weyerhaeuser reviewed the ‘extended period pressing’
project. An agreement was made with Weyerhaeuser to install the prototype shoe
press in one of the machines at the White Pigeon Mill (Michigan). When samples
from the mill were tested, it was clear that Beloit was not yet ready to apply the
technology on a commercial scale [Daane, 1973; Busker, 2000].
The difficulties encountered in identifying a design for the extended nip caused the
project to lose momentum during 1973 and in early 1974 [Ritter, 2000; Busker,
2000]. There was also a growing divergence among Beloit’s R&D management
concerning the direction and organisation of Beloit’s R&D. One did not agree about
the degree to which the Research group should operate as a purely research-oriented
unit8. Daane, who was involved in the ENP project, left Beloit. Jan Bergström
became head of the Rockton lab in 1974. Justus was Bergström’s boss. Bergström
was enthusiastic about the potential of the extended nip and encouraged Busker to
continue R&D.
In October 1974, a project was started to determine the relation between pressure and
time. A small roll press was used at very low speeds. Many different furnishes were
studied. The collection of data during 1975 again showed the value of the longer nip
residence times. A press nip having a nip length of 50 cm would give a step increase
in the dryness: sheet dryness would be 7 to 10 points higher than with conventional
roll presses [Busker, 2000]. Data on product characteristics were also collected. With
improved water removal came improved strength properties [Bergström, 2000].
Encouraged by these results, Bergström established a team of engineers, who
critically reviewed seven different potential designs [Busker, 1976]. Bergström
deliberately included people from the Development group and the engineering
department. Until then the project had been of a strictly research nature [Bergström,
                                                
8
 In those days the Rockton lab was divided into a Research group and a Development group.
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2000]. The team had to select the best design for the commercial application of an
ENP in linerboard [Busker, 1976].
One of the seven designs studied was the ‘Figure 8 press’; the press consisted of two
25 cm shoe presses (see Figure 5). This design was patented when Beloit announced
the idea of extended nip pressing way back in 19719 [Busker, 1976]. An important
change to the original design was Bergström’s suggestion that the bearing of the shoe
should be lubricated with oil instead of water. The team preferred the Figure 8 press
to other designs for two reasons. First of all, two shoe press nips promised larger
water removal than one nip. Secondly, the double shoe press allowed symmetry in
the forces applied to the beams supporting the press [Bergström, 2000]. Gradually,
the team reached a consensus that a press in a Figure 8 design could be engineered
and built. Plans were made to build a pilot press10 [Busker, 1976]. The activities of
the team generated new momentum in the ENP project [Busker, 2000].
Figure 5: Sketch of the ‘Figure 8 Press’. The paper sheet is guided through a
double shoe press. Two times 25 cm press nips are located on the left
and right of the load system. The belt separates the paper sheet from
the oil lubrication [Busker, 2000].
Justus suggested that the hydrodynamic bearing and oil lubrication system of the
shoe press should also be tested in an existing stand-alone pilot press. Such a ‘single’
shoe press allowed an easier first test of the technical systems. This single shoe press
unit became known as the X-l unit [Bergström, 2000; Busker, 2000].
In September 1977, formal approval was obtained for the plan to supply the existing
pilot paper machine with a Figure 8 press. Justus and Bergström made a 10 minute
presentation in front of Mr. Neese, the president and main owner of Beloit. He
wanted to have the press ready in 6 months. Bergström estimated that the time
                                                
9
 See [Busker et al., 1974], US patent 3,808,096. See also [Mohr et al., 1980] and [Cronin, 1983],
respectively US patent 4,201,624 and 4,398, 997.
10
 Based on US patents 4,201,624 and 4,398, 997, [Mohr et al., 1980] and [Cronin, 1983] respectively.
- 68 -
needed was 12 months. They agreed upon 9 months. The Figure 8 press became
known as the X-8 unit [Bergström, 2000; Busker, 2000].
The construction of the X-1 unit and the X-8 unit proceeded in parallel. Dennis
Cronin from the Development group was in charge of the development effort in both
units. Cronin had been involved in the commercialisation of the vented nip press and
the controlled crown roll11. His experience and his background in engineering made
him very suitable to take responsibility for the development of the two pilot units
[Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000]. The X-1 unit started up in January 1978. The 25
cm shoe press proved successful almost immediately. Imagined fears regarding oil
containment quickly disappeared [Busker, 2000]. The X-1 unit was supplied with
felts and further studies were conducted into dewatering and product characteristics
such as the strength of different furnishes [Bergström, 2000].
Exactly nine months after the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine had been
approved, Bergström asked to see Mr. Neese in June 1978. The X-8 unit was running
on the pilot paper machine [Bergström, 2000]. Sheet trials were carried out during
the autumn of 1978. It became clear that the two 25 cm shoe presses did not perform
much more efficiently than the single 25 cm shoe of the X-1 unit. It was obviously
simpler to construct a single 25 cm shoe press [Bergström, 2000]. The single 25 cm
shoe could achieve an increased dryness of 5 to 7% compared to a conventional roll
press [Busker, 2000].
Innovation at Weyerhaeuser’s Springfield mill
The time had come for Beloit to find a customer who was willing to take the risk of
investing in the first mill application of a shoe press. Beloit wanted to commercialise
the first extended nip press (ENP) on an existing linerboard machine, because of the
possibility to increase the machine’s production capacity [Lange, 2000].
Beloit approached International Paper, the largest paper maker in the US and a big
customer of Beloit. They were not interested. Then Weyerhaeuser, the second largest
paper maker in the US and also a major Beloit customer, was approached
[Bergström, 2000; Woo, 2000]. Weyerhaeuser had continued their interest in the
ENP since their first contact with Beloit regarding extended nip pressing in 1973
[Busker, 2000]. Still, Beloit had to convince people at least at five different levels
within Weyerhaeuser’s organisation; the increase in production capacity and the
improved strength properties were of convincing interest [Busker, 2000; Bergström,
2000; Ritter, 2000].
Weyerhaeuser became involved late in 1978. In January 1979, extensive trials were
performed using Weyerhaeuser’s linerboard furnish. This resulted in the placing of
an order for the first commercial ENP unit in June 1979 based on the X-1 design.
                                                
11
 Cronin was the principle developer of the vented nip press in the 1960s. Justus was the inventor of
the crown controlled roll. This later roll press is technologically related to the shoe press. The roll also
has an oil lubricated shoe, though it is operated from the inside of a roll press [Lange, 2000;
Bergström, 2000].
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Investments costs are estimated to have been around 10 to 12 million US$ (based on
data in [Sirrine, 1980] and [Ritter, 2000]).
The blueprints for the commercial design of the first ENP were released in January
1980. The ENP was an open belt shoe press (ENP-O). This means that the side-ends
of the shoe press were not closed; the oil lubricating the shoe and the inside of the
belt was not totally separated from the paper running on the outside of the belt (see
also Figure 2). It was decided to assemble the ENP at Beloit’s Blackhawk plant for
some preliminary trials. In October 1980, Cronin started up the first ENP. Only
minor changes were needed to make the ENP run very well. Then, the unit was
transported to the Springfield mill. In December of 1980, the ENP was started up. As
soon as a polyurethane coated belt was installed (see next section), the results were
impressive [Busker, 2000].
The agreement between Weyerhaeuser and Beloit allowed Weyerhaeuser to purchase
the first five ENP presses. Weyerhaeuser exercised a large portion of this option;
Weyerhaeuser bought four of the five shoe presses. The second ENP was installed in
July 1982 [Ritter, 2000]. Sale of additional ENP units followed rapidly. The
technology became quickly proven in board applications [Wicks, 1983].
Last-minute belt development
Albany is a US fabric supplier to the pulp and paper industry. They supplied the belt
that was needed as a ‘shell’ for running the paper sheet over the press and that was
crucial for making the innovation a success.
In 1977 when it was decided to build the X-1 and X-8 units, belts were needed for
operating these units; without a belt there was no roll shell. Beloit Manhattan, a
daughter company of Beloit, was asked to supply rubber belts. Because of Beloit’s
earlier experiences with rubber belts, one was not very surprised that the rubber belts
did not satisfy. The forces in the shoe press caused delamination of the belt.
However, they could be used for testing the mechanical system and running some
pilot tests.
There was still no suitable belt available when Weyerhaeuser decided to invest in the
first ENP in June 1979. During the trials early in 1979, Beloit’s and Weyerhaeuser’s
engineers were aware that the belt was a weak link, though they were confident that
the belt problem would be overcome [Woo, 200; Vance, 2000; Ritter, 2000; Lange,
2000; Busker, 2000].
Early in 1980, Beloit contacted Albany. An Albany delegation visited the Rockton
lab [Bergström, 2000; Ritter, 2000; Dutt, 2000]. Albany perceived the shoe press as
an important innovative technology that could advance the nature of dewatering in
the pressing section. They felt it was desirable to be involved [Dutt, 2000]. Dutt, one
of the people in the Albany delegation, thought that a polyurethane coated fabric
might be a solution. Early in the 1970s, Albany had acquired Globe Belting, a small
firm that manufactured polyurethane coated belts [Ritter, 2000; Dutt, 2000]. Samples
of the polyurethane coated fabric were shown to Beloit. The material looked
promising. However, the size of the product made by Globe Belting did not conform
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to the size needed for a commercial shoe press. Albany took on the job of developing
and manufacturing a polyurethane coated belt for the ENP12 [Dutt, 2000; Bergström,
2000].
The first properly sized belt was supplied to Weyerhaeuser free of charge as an R&D
trial [Dutt, 2000]. It did not arrive in time in time for the start up of the ENP. A
Beloit Manhatten rubber belt was used instead. This delaminated [Bergström, 2000;
Hamby, 2000]. As soon as the Albany belt was installed, the ENP ran successfully.
Without the belt, innovation would have been delayed [Vance, 2000; Busker, 2000;
Dutt, 2000; Bergström, 2000].
A role for DOE in supporting innovation?
Weyerhaeuser and Beloit were aware that the US Department of Energy (DOE) had
funds for supporting development work that might lead to energy conservation. DOE
was informed about the ENP during 1979. Beloit indicated how much energy could
be saved if the project was successful and if a certain share of the US board machines
were to install these innovative presses. DOE was interested and was prepared to
cover the risk of installing the first commercial ENP. Innovation involved major
capital expenditure with a high risk factor, therefore Beloit was not adverse to
minimise the risk by seeking DOE’s support [Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000].
However, the waiting time for DOE support turned out to be too long. Beloit wanted
to introduce the ENP as quickly as possible. Beloit did not have time to wait for
DOE. Even when the first ENP at Springfield was running, Beloit had not received a
concrete response from DOE. Beloit reduced the risk for both Weyerhaeuser and
Beloit by covering the start-up risk with an insurance and supplying a back-up
conventional roll press [Busker, 2000; Lange, 2000; Bergström, 2000]. The back-up
roll press was never used [Hamby, 2000; Vance, 2000; Busker, 2000].
3.4. Further development of shoe press technology – after
1980
The successful innovation of the shoe press led to the emergence of a new market for
machine and fabric suppliers. Table 2 gives an overview when Beloit’s competitors,
Voith (Germany), Escher Wyss (Germany), and Valmet (Finland) succeeded in
realising their first shoe press. Figure 6 illustrates the diffusion of the shoe press.
In this section we describe how Beloit’s competitors caught up and how the
application of shoe press technology spread to printing paper machines too. The
primary purpose of this section is to illustrate the role played by further R&D in
catching up and in diffusion.
                                                
12
 The result was covered in US patent 5,238,537 [Dutt, 1993]. The original version of this patent was
issued in 1981.
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Table 2: First shoe presses delivered by competing suppliers.
Year Supplier Press Paper firm
1980 Beloit (US) ENP-O Weyerhaeuser, Springfield, US
1984 Voith
(Germany)
Flexonip Nettingsdorfer Papierfabrik,
Nettingsdorf, Austria
1986 Escher Wyss
(Germany)
Intensa-S Model AG, Weinfelden,
Switzerland
1990 Valmet
(Finland)
Symbelt Billerud Paper, Gruvön, Sweden
Figure 6: Diffusion of shoe press technology. Cumulative number of shoe
presses sold by Beloit, Voith (including Escher Wyss) and Valmet
[Schuwerk, 2000; Kilian, 2000; Ilmarinen, 2000]. It is estimated that
10 to 15% of the annual worldwide paper production is produced on a
machine equipped with a shoe press. About 25 – 35% of the shoe
presses are installed on new paper or board machines.
The R&D activities of major machine suppliers
Voith
Voith had done some wet pressing R&D during the late sixties. Schiel was one of the
people, who had suggested press impulse as an important concept in 1968 [Schiel et
al., 2000; Schiel, 1969]. He did not continue his R&D activities in this direction,
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because management ordered him to develop a twin wire former13 [Schiel et al.
2000].
Between 1974 and 1978, some wet pressing R&D was started. Nip residence time
was again found to be the limiting factor. Again, a management decision stopped
R&D: it was doubted whether using flexible materials as a shell (instead of steel)
would ever work [Schuwerk, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000].
In 1980, rumours reached Voith that Beloit was close to realising its first ENP. When
the success of the first shoe press became apparent, Voith’s management wanted a
shoe press of their own. Schiel led Voith’s R&D activities. In 1982, the existing pilot
paper machine in Heidenheim was rebuilt incorporating a shoe press.
Schiel suggested a major improvement to the design of the shoe press. He wanted to
separate the oil lubrication system and the paper sheet by closing the side-end’s of
the shoe press. This reduced the risk of oil spillage and created higher design
flexibility. Therefore, Voith needed a narrower belt, called a sleeve, than the belts
supplied by Albany. Bayer (Leverkusen), a manufacturer of polyurethane, came up
with a brand-new casting process for manufacturing the sleeves. Voith and
Oberdorfer, a German fabric supplier and ‘neighbour’ of Voith in Heidenheim,
formed a joint-venture for producing the sleeves.
The first Flexonip was installed in 1984 in Austria, the second in 1985 in the US
[Schiel et al, 2000]. Beloit accused Voith on infringing 4 of Beloit’s patents. Just
prior to court action one accusation concerning the pressure profile was dropped. The
judge found that Voith had not infringed Beloit’s patents14 [Schiel et al., 2000;
Lange, 2000; Schuwerk, 2000].
Voith continued its R&D activities in both machine development and fabric
development. This latter thing is surprising for a machine supplier. Schiel’s
suggestion to develop an improved sleeve coincided with Voith’s decision to widen
its focus and supply fabrics too [Schiel et al., 2000]. Schiel wanted to extend the
lifetime of the sleeves and to improve dewatering by venting the sleeve. The grooved
press rolls which were developed during the sixties had already shown the
advantages of venting [Dutt, 2000; Wedel, 1993; Miller, 1999]. The first ‘blind-
drilled’ Qualiflex sleeve was used in 1991 [Schiel et al., 2000].
                                                
13
 Experts at Voith claim that Mr. Schiel presented the initial idea for developing shoe presses at the
2nd International Symposium on Water Removal in Mont Gabriel (1968, Canada). Schiel suggested
the use the product of pressure and time for optimising water removal in existing wet pressing
sections. He also noted that the form of the pressure profile of a conventional roll press was not
optimal [Schuwerk, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000]. There are people who indicate Jahn and Kretzschmar’s
patent  (Pama, East-Germany) as the first patent publication on shoe pressing [Schuwerk, 2000].
14
 This court case illustrates that: 1) earlier patents (see [Jahn and Kretzschamer, 1971]) had already
weakened Beloit’s patent protection; 2) small differences in the precise formulation can make or break
the validity of a patent; 3) a patent leaves often room for manoeuvre regarding the concrete design and
the technological concept. A patent litigation in case of such process technologies is a matter of
arguing and convincing and not simply a matter of presenting technical details [Busker, 2000; Lange,
2000; Schiel et al., 2000].
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Escher Wyss
Compared to the other machine suppliers, Escher Wyss was a relatively small
machine supplier. Its R&D activities gradually expanded during the seventies. In
1979, wet pressing R&D was the newest part of the paper production process
covered. The activities were not specifically directed towards shoe presses. The aim
was to increase dryness and to improve paper properties.
The introduction of the ENP induced Escher Wyss to reinforce its wet pressing R&D
in the direction of shoe press technology. In 1982, it was decided to install a shoe
press unit in the pilot paper machine in Ravensburg. Escher Wyss started with an
open belt design. They realised the disadvantages of an open belt, but sleeves were
not available. Activities were continued because Escher Wyss wanted to test the
mechanical design, the loading system and the lubrication system. Rupturing of the
belt and the risk of oil spillage caused a loss of momentum late in 1983. The
Japanese fabric supplier Yamauchi contacted Escher Wyss a year later. Yamauchi
delivered a suitable sleeve and activities were restarted. The first Intensa-S press was
installed in 1986 [Mirsberger, 2000].
In 1994, Voith and Escher Wyss merged15. The best features of the Intensa-S press
and the Flexonip press were integrated. The first NipcoFlex was installed in 1996
[Schuwerk, 2000].
Tampella, KMW and Valmet
Tampella, a Finnish board machine supplier, started shoe press R&D during the late
seventies16. KMW, a Swedish board machine manufacturer, started R&D in 1985.
Both firms were bought by a third Scandinavian machine supplier, Valmet.
The Finnish Valmet started its first shoe press tests in 1983, whereas they had been
doing some R&D in this direction before. At that time Valmet did not sell board
machines, but the shoe press was seen as an important new development. The aim
was to make shoe press technology an operational technology for printing paper
machines. However, the open shoe press was unsuitable for printing paper machine,
due to the higher machine speeds. Activities slowed down [Ilmarinen, 2000].
By buying Tampella and KMW, Valmet acquired a position in the board machine
market. Tampella’s and KMW’s R&D experience in this area also became available
to Valmet. As a result, shoe press R&D activities gained a new impulse in 1987.
R&D was moved to Valmet-Karlstad (formerly KMW) in Sweden. Valmet also
preferred a closed belt. In 1990, the first Symbelt was installed. By then, suitable
sleeves were available on the market. After 1990, the character of the research
                                                
15
 Escher Wyss had already merged with Sulzer. The new firm was called Sulzer Escher Wyss. When
Sulzer Escher Wyss and Voith merged in 1994, the new firm was called Voith Sulzer Paper
Technology. By now, the firm is called Voith Paper Technology. In this chapter we refer to the firm as
Voith.
16
 Patents indicate some activity (see [Seppo et al., 1979]).
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changed. Expansion of the shoe press to other paper grades and paper quality aspects
became important topics [Ilmarinen, 2000].
Beloit
Strengthened by the experience of applying ENP’s at commercial board machines,
R&D at Beloit centred on the use of alternative furnishes and the application of the
ENP to other grades such as printing papers [Busker, 2000; Lange 2000; Wicks,
1983]. One of the important improvements that Beloit aimed at was the development
of vented belts. Beloit’s vented nip press, which was introduced in the early 60s, had
improved dewatering capacity according to the same principle17 [Håkanson, 1974;
Busker; 2000; Bergström, 2000; Dutt, 2000]. During the late seventies, Beloit had
already tried to make grooves in the belts used in the X-1 and X-8 units. However,
this was going too far too quickly; a satisfactory smooth belt was not yet available
[Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000]. After the introduction of the shoe press, the idea of
venting was taken up again. Successful experiments were performed in 1982.
Various fabric suppliers were invited to develop the manufacturing process for the
grooved belt [Lange, 2000]. The Japanese Yamauchi succeeded in the middle of the
eighties [Bergström, 2000].
Whereas Beloit’s ENP was a success, Beloit lost out to its competitors, who all
developed a closed shoe press design as a response to Beloit’s ENP-O. Beloit started
the development of a closed ENP (ENP-C) in 1985, but the activities were shelved
between 1988 and 1990. The ENP-O market share was excellent and it was believed
that the introduction of the ENP-C would hurt sales. Furthermore, it was feared that a
closed belt would reduce the lifetime of belts [Busker, 2000; Lange, 2000;
Bergström, 2000]. When machine speeds increased, the risk of oil spillage became a
major issue. There was nothing left for Beloit than to have a closed shoe press too
[Grant, 1993; Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000]. Further development had to be
undertaken before the ENP-C could be launched on the market [Lange, 2000]. The
first ENP-C was installed in the mid 1990s [Ritter, 2000].
R&D activities at Beloit on shoe press technology were stopped when Beloit’s parent
company filed for bankruptcy in the summer of 199918.
Diffusion to printing grades
Machine suppliers continued R&D expenditure in order to extend the application of
shoe press technology to printing paper grades. The first shoe press in a printing
paper machine became available in 1994. It was installed by Voith [Moser, 1995]. It
is only very recently that the first shoe press began to be used for sanitary paper
production, also introduced by Voith (see Figure 7).
                                                
17
 Cronin had been involved in the development of the Vented nip press [Justus and Cronin, 1964;
Bergström, 2000; Lange, 2000].
18
 Beloit’s mother company Harnischfegger Industries filed for bankruptcy. The downfall of Beloit
had nothing to do with the market share in shoe press technology [Busker, 2000].
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Figure 7: The cumulative number of shoe presses started-up (only Voith and
Valmet); a distinction is made between board machines, printing
paper machines and tissue machines [Schuwerk, 2000; Kilian, 2000].
Pressing of printing paper is not comparable to wet pressing of board grades.
Pressing sections of printing paper machines are for instance typically single felted to
prevent rewetting, but they also run at considerably higher machine speeds
[Wahlstrom, 1991; Mirsberger, 1992a; Pikulik, 1999; Lange, 1997]. Some
improvements were found to be advantageous for applying shoe presses to printing
paper machines. First of all, the closed shoe press design was better suited to the
higher machine speeds. Secondly, the grooved belts improved dewatering so that
application in a single felted mode became viable. The lifetime of the belts was
extended which was also important in connection with the higher machine speeds
[Schuwerk, 1997; Dutt, 2000]. Thirdly, ceramic roll covers developed by machine
suppliers were valuable for making single felted operation possible [Lange, 1997;
Grant, 1993; Pikulik, 1999]19. Fourthly, felt performance and lifetime improved as a
result of the introduction of laminated structures [Ow Yang, 1996; Wahlstrom, 1991;
Ilmarinen, 2000]. A last but very important development was the altered
configuration of the shoe press in the pressing section. The main reason for changing
the configuration was to improve runnability and increase paper machine speeds.
Changes and optimisation of the configuration were beneficial for both board
                                                
19
 These ceramic roll cover materials were not developed specifically for use in shoe presses. Machine
suppliers are interested in such covers for other reasons as well (see e.g. [Wahlstrom, 1991]).
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machines and the higher-speed printing paper machines20 [Schiel et al., 2000;
Breiten, 1998; Mirsberger, 1992b].
All these improvements made it technically possible to apply shoe press technology
to printing paper machines. However, accomplishing this was not a matter of R&D
only. When the shoe press was introduced for the first time in 1980, the advantages
of installing a shoe press were less apparent for printing grades; it was feared that
important product characteristics might be lost [Mirsberger, 1992a; Lange,1996]. It
took time to overcome the inertia of printing grade manufacturers and to convince
them of the advantages [Lange, 2000; Dutt, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000; Mirsberger,
2000; Bergström, 2000; Ilmarinen, 2000; Busker, 2000]. But even more important
was the fact that it took time before the press impulse of conventional roll press
configuration became the major impediment to achieving dryness at printing paper
machines. Only during the early nineties did the ongoing increase in machine speeds
lead to a reduced press impulse. The need for the shoe press in printing paper grades
developed [Ilmarinen, 2000; Mirsberger, 2000; Schuwerk, 1997; Meadows, 1998;
James, 1999]. The rise of the shoe press in printing grades has been impressive (see
Figure 7) [Lange, 1996; Moser, 1995].
3.5. Analysing the development
In mapping the historical development of shoe press technology we presented
elements, which come back in this section in which we analyse the development of
shoe press technology. First we tackle the questions formulated on the subject of the
technology network, then we focus on the various micro-networks and subsequently
we discuss the materialisation of the R&D activities.
Technology network
What is the composition of the technology network?
There was one micro-network that undertook R&D activities to develop shoe press
technology and that brought the innovative technology to the market (see Figure 8).
Beloit’s micro-network (US) developed the shoe press between 1967 and 1980.
During the late sixties, it became widely recognised that the time-factor in the press
nip limited the dewatering capacity of conventional roll presses (see Pama and Voith
in Figure 8). However, only Beloit dared to engage in a prolonged effort that resulted
in innovation in 1980.
Other micro-networks emerged only after the innovative technology had been
introduced. Three well-known major machine suppliers (in Germany and Finland)
started or reinforced their R&D activities in the direction of shoe press technology
                                                
20
 The latest vogue is a shoe press in a tandem configuration. Valmet was the first to apply this tandem
configuration to a printing paper machine in 1998 [Shaw, 1998; James, 1999; Lockie, 1998].
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(see Figure 8). Smaller machine suppliers did not develop their own shoe press. By
the year 2000, only two micro-networks are left: Voith and Escher Wyss merged;
Beloit’s mother company was filed for bankruptcy. Only Valmet (Finland) and Voith
(Germany) sell shoe press technology.
From the mid-eighties onwards, fabric suppliers also started R&D activities [Lange,
2000; Dutt, 2000].
Figure 8: Technology network of shoe press technology. Actors in normal letters
are paper or board manufacturers. Actors in italics are machine or
fabric suppliers.
To what extent and how often do micro-networks exchange knowledge/information?
During the seventies, Beloit had no contacts with other machine suppliers. Beloit’s
presentation of some preliminary empirical results in 1970 at an international
conference did not induce any of Beloit’s competitors to develop a competing design.
Apart from in-house presentations to customers and patent applications, nothing was
published until the first ENP was running [Lange, 2000; Busker, 2000].
After innovation, there has been little or no contact either. Whereas some
information was obtained for instance by visits to paper manufacturers with shoe
presses, the competitive relationship between the firms inhibited any exchange
between the micro-networks. Competing micro-networks did try to obtain
information about the most recent achievements. Patents are the most important
source [Schiel et al., 2000; Ilmarinen, 2000; Mirsberger, 2000]. Licences of patents is
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probably the most important channel for the ‘exchange’ of knowledge among
competing machine suppliers [Lange, 2000].
Are there dominant micro-networks in the technology network?
In this case study, there was merely one actor, who had a continuing decisive
influence on the development of shoe press technology. Beloit lost its dominant
position after competing machine suppliers managed to develop a closed shoe press.
Voith took the lead in suggesting such a closed shoe press.
Micro-networks
How are the various micro-networks made up?
Figure 8 shows what types of actors were involved in the four micro-networks.
Machine suppliers were the driving actors in each of the four ‘micro-networks’.
Paper and board manufacturers became involved only when the technology was
ready to be applied on a commercial scale21. Research institutes or universities were
not involved. Belt and sleeve suppliers were important for the success of three micro-
networks; Albany’s belt was crucial; Yamauchi helped Escher Wyss back on track;
and Voith closely co-operated with Oberdorfer.
We will now comment briefly on the contribution of the actors in Beloit’s micro-
network.
For almost 10 years, the development of the shoe press at Beloit was an entirely in-
house affair. Although, many people contributed to the project, there were four key
persons: Justus, Busker, Bergström and Cronin. Busker initiated the research that
identified the process and its potential. His dedication and belief in the project were
needed when the value of the project was questioned, which happened several times.
Bergström brought new momentum on the project and suggested that oil should be
used instead of water for the lubrication system. As R&D manager, Justus was in a
position to terminate the project at any time, but he did not do so. He also conceived
the single shoe press unit that was eventually commercialised (X-1 unit). Cronin’s
engineering expertise was important in the final phase of the project [Busker, 2000;
Bergström, 2000; Lange, 2000]. The dedication of these four persons guaranteed
continuity in Beloit’s ENP project.
Only late in 1978 and early in 1980, did Weyerhaeuser and Albany become involved.
Beloit had a good business relationship with both Albany and Weyerhaeuser. Both
firms brought good technologists to the micro-network. There were open working
                                                
21
 The pulp and paper industry’s R&D intensity is low. However, indirect R&D, i.e. R&D embodied
in intermediate supplies and materials, is the highest among all manufacturing industries [Philips,
2000; Hatzichronoglou, 1997]. Dutch innovation statistics show that 85% of the total innovation
expenditure of the pulp and paper industry goes on the purchase of equipment; only 8% is spent on
R&D activities [CBS, 1998].
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relationships [Busker, 2000; Lange, 2000]. Weyerhaeuser’s contribution to the
trouble-free introduction of the ENP-O was primarily their willingness to take the
risk of being the first [Woo, 2000; Vance, 200; Busker, 2000]. Albany’s contribution
was to solve the belt ‘problem’ even at the very last moment. Fortunately, Albany
had a daughter firm delivering a product that could be used as a belt. Without
Albany, the introduction of the shoe press would certainly have been delayed [Dutt,
2000].
What motivates actors to start and / or stop R&D activities?
For Beloit, increased dryness was the main driving force. Busker wanted to achieve a
‘step increase’ in dryness by extending nip residence time [Lange, 2000; Busker,
2000]. By including the role of time in wet pressing, the historic trend of continually
increasing pressure was broken. Whereas energy considerations were present (and
one was aware of the energy crises), they were not a factor in determining Beloit’s
R&D expenditure for developing the shoe press [Dutt, 2000; Bergström, 2000;
Busker, 2000; Lange, 2000].
Albany perceived the shoe press as an important new technology which could change
the pressing section substantially. They simply wanted to be involved [Dutt, 2000].
Weyerhaeuser was interested in Beloit’s ENP in 1973. Weyerhaeuser was eager for
new technology. At that time, one of the factors taken into account was energy
conservation [Vance, 2000; Lange, 2000]. The shoe press was not ready for
commercial application. Late in 1978, Weyerhaeuser became involved again. The
force that drove Weyerhaeuser to invest in the first ENP was increased dryness and
thus increased production of drying-limited board machines. Strength properties
were also important [Busker, 2000; Vance, 2000; Woo, 2000; Hamby, 2000]. Energy
conservation and reduced energy costs only played a very minor role [Lange, 1997;
Lockie, 1998].
Why did none of the other major machine suppliers undertake R&D activities to
develop a shoe press? All three competitors had plausible arguments for ‘waiting’.
Valmet had no real business interest in the board machine market at the time
[Ilmarinen, 2000]. Escher Wyss was a relatively small supplier and did not cover all
machine areas in their R&D portfolio [Mirsberger, 2000]. At Voith, management
halted wet pressing R&D twice. In 1968, other innovative technologies had the
priority. In 1978, it was not believed that a flexible shell would be an alternative for
the conventional steel roll press and that it would be accepted by the manufacturers
[Schiel et al., 2000].
Though, the most important argument why Beloit’s competitors waited might have
been that Beloit had taken a major step from an engineering point of view. It was
widely known that time limited dewatering in the press nip, but nobody could think
of a design to overcome this limitation. Or as Ilmarinen (Valmet) put it: “Maybe
nobody believed that it was possible to find real operating solutions” [Ilmarinen,
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2000]. At Beloit, they continued to believe in using belts as a shell for extending nip
residence time [Schiel et al., 2000].
Shortly upon its introduction, shoe press technology became a ‘proven technology’
for board grades. The success of the technology forced machine suppliers and fabric
suppliers to catch-up. Suppliers invested in R&D to improve the performance of shoe
press technology for board grades and to extend the application of shoe presses to
printing grades.
How much money is spent and by whom?
Table 3 gives an overview of R&D expenditure by the major machine suppliers.
Table 3: R&D expenditure.
Machine supplier Time frame Total expenditure (million US$)
1967 – 1980 5
0.35 - 0.4
total expenditure (excluding innovation)
annual budget
Beloit1
1980 – 1999 8
0.4
total expenditure
annual budget
1980 – 1984 0.7 total expenditureVoith2
1984 – now 8 shoe presses on pilot paper machines. No
estimates about labour costs.
1979 – 1986 0.7
0.1 - 0.15
total expenditure
annual budget
Escher Wyss3
1986 – 1994 continued at the same level (annual budget)
1983 – 1990 No estimates available. Normal development
work; no special efforts needed.
Valmet4
1990 – now R&D expenditure continued at the same level
(annual budget).
1
 US dollars were converted to 1995 US dollars. Busker (2000) supplied ‘really rough estimate of
ENP research & development costs’. Between 1968-1977, annual costs were estimated to have been
80,000 US$ (two man-years). Between 1977-1980, costs were roughly 1.5 million US$ (construction
of pilot presses). Costs of patents are not included. Beloit spent about 6.5 million US$ between 1980
and 1999 [Busker, 2000; Lange, 2000].  2 The estimation (1980-1984) is based on the rebuild of the
pilot paper machine and two times 3 fte’s. German marks were converted to 1995 US dollars (using
PPP) [Schiel et al., 2000; Schuwerk, 2000].  3 [Mirsberger, 2000].  4 [Ilmarinen, 2000].
The four machine suppliers spent in total less than 10 million US$ in bringing their
first shoe presses to market. This is a modest sum compared to the annual R&D
budget of each of the machine suppliers, i.e. between 40 to 75 million US$ annually
(typically 3-4% of the turnover) [Luiten, 1997]. It is not very surprisingly that the
absolute R&D investments in shoe press technology after 1980 increased
considerably compared to the annual expenditure between 1967-1980; there were
more actors investing in shoe press R&D and one had to invest in pilot paper
machine equipment. Machine suppliers continued to spend roughly the same amount
annually on shoe press R&D (see Table 3).
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R&D development of shoe press technology did not receive any financial support
from government. There was some contact between Beloit and the US Department of
Energy (DOE) with regard to covering part of the risk of innovation at
Weyerhaeuser. However, the additionality of government R&D support would have
been very limited, because innovation also took place without DOE’s R&D support
[Bergström, 2000; Lange, 2000].
What important decisions are made with regard to the direction of technological
development?
Beloit and Albany made important design choices. They constructed the model that
‘broke’ with the conventional roll press design. Others could start their developments
from this model [Ilmarinen, 2000].
The case study illustrates that apparently simple decisions can have a crucial impact
on the final design and, also, on final (business) success. These illustrations make
clear that decisions are taken in bounded rationality.
From 1975 to 1978, the people at Beloit were convinced that a double shoe press (X-
8 unit) was needed to reach a substantial increase in dryness [Busker, 2000]. A stand-
alone X-1 unit was build in addition to the X-8 unit merely to do some quick
mechanical testing [Bergström, 2000; Busker, 1976]. However, the X-1 unit became
the final design model [Bergström, 2000].
A second illustration is that Bergström insisted on using oil instead of water in 1977.
For about 4 to 5 years water was preferred; one simply feared spillage of oil. The use
of oil turned out to be important for the feasibility of the technology.
Beloit designed an open shoe press (ENP-O). The belt was easier to manufacture and
it had been difficult enough to develop it in the first place [Mirsberger, 2000; Schiel
et al., 2000]. Or as Busker said: “We needed to walk before we could run” [Busker,
2000]. Additional R&D would have been needed to transform the ENP-O into a
closed design and Beloit wanted to get the technology introduced as quickly as
possible [Bergström, 2000].
A fourth illustration is that Beloit started to develop a closed design in 1985, but the
decision was made to shelve the project. Beloit failed to recognise the merits of a
closed design compared to their – at that time – very successful open shoe press
design. It was a matter of time (and of increasing machine speeds), before the
advantage of the closed shoe press design became visible.
Materialisation
What is the rate of development and what steps in up-scaling can be distinguished?
Whereas the idea of ‘press impulse’ (and the importance of time) was rooted in wet
pressing R&D, we consider Beloit’s R&D activities as the start of the development
of the shoe press. It took Beloit about 13 years to introduce the shoe press to the
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market (see Figure 8). It took Voith 4 years to develop their closed shoe press (1984).
Escher Wyss needed 6 years and Valmet 7 years. Shoe press technology was first
applied to board machines. It took till 1994 before the ‘first’ shoe press was applied
to a printing paper machine (see Figure 7).
Beloit’s R&D activities can be divided roughly into two phases. The first phase
(1967-1976) covered laboratory activities. Whereas the basic idea to extend the nip
residence time had been clear since the very first year, the researchers at Beloit were
looking for a way to build the press. Different designs were explored and patented
(see also Figure 3 - Figure 5) [Busker, 2000]. In 1973, an attempt to arrive at a
commercial prototype failed. After that R&D activities slowed down (see also Figure
7). In the second phase (1977-1980), the ENP project regained momentum.
Commercialisation resulted within 3 years [Lange, 2000; Busker, 2000; Bergström,
2000].
After 1980, all competing machine suppliers started working on their existing pilot
paper machines. Escher Wyss needed 2 years more than Voith to bring its first shoe
press to the market. Escher Wyss ‘waited’ for a fabric supplier to deliver a
belt/sleeve for the closed shoe press, whereas Voith developed a sleeve in co-
operation with a fabric supplier [Schiel et al., 2000; Mirsberger, 2000]. Valmet
introduced their shoe press only in 1990. Their R&D activities persisted only when
Valmet gained an interest in the board machine market by buying KMW and
Tampella [Ilmarinen, 2000].
A large number of patents resulted from the development of shoe press technology22.
Beloit had tried to secure the best possible patent protection in 1971, although
experts discussed (and even doubted) the value of patents in the machinery area. It is
often relatively easy to circumvent patents, especially if the patents are becoming
more and more detailed. It is also often hard to prove that your patent has been
infringed. A prior patent can often be found (as e.g. in this case the East-German
patent). Furthermore, minor differences in formulations can make or break the
validity of a patent as happened also in this case: Voith’s second shoe press was built
in the US [Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000; Mirsberger, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000].
The largest value of filing a patent might be that an inventor has to rethink his design
very systematically when he is writing the patent application. Patents end up as
‘trading material’ between firms (‘you can use my patents if I can use yours’)
[Busker, 2000; Bergström, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000].
What are the perceived performance characteristics of the technology?
It was clear from the moment that development started that increased dryness was the
major advantage of the shoe press [Lockie, 1997; Shaw, 1998; Lange, 1997].
Improved strength properties and increased dryness (read: increased production)
                                                
22
 We estimate that there are 50 to 100 patents on shoe press technology.
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explain the successful diffusion of the shoe press in board grades [Woo, 2000;
Busker, 2000; Mirsberger, 2000; Woo, 2000].
Extensive technical improvements in shoe press technology itself, the configuration
and the felts were suggested by machine suppliers to convince printing paper
manufacturers of the value of shoe press technology for paper grades. Paper
manufacturers were however not convinced of the value of the shoe press. It took
time to overcome their inertia. Technical improvements alone were not enough. As
time went on and machines speeds increased, the reduced press impulse became a
major impediment to achieving a high dryness at the exit of the pressing section.
Only by then, printing paper manufacturers were willing to apply shoe press
technology too [Mirsberger, 2000; Schiel et al., 2000; Lange, 1997].
3.6. Robustness of analysis
Data gathering was based on two sources; the written material and consultation of
experts. We collected all the articles and papers written about shoe press technology.
Pulp & Paper magazines, (scientific) journals and conference proceedings were
searched. We also searched patent databases. Patent databases contain information
on a tremendous amount of patents related to shoe press technology. We estimate
that there are 50 to 100 patents. Most patents only cover details. A substantial
number of these patents were never used commercially.
Not all the topics we are interested in are covered in written material. We consulted
experts for gaining a better understanding of the role of actors, networks and actors’
arguments. This source of information introduces a dependency on the willingness
and the capability (‘what do they know themselves and what do they remember?’) of
experts. Their response may also be biased by their perception of the development
history. Secrecy is less of a problem in this case study; the development is historical.
Experts from firms who played an important role within the various micro-networks
were consulted (Beloit, Albany, Weyerhaeuser, Voith, Escher Wyss and Valmet).
The persons spoken to had all been deeply involved in R&D directed towards shoe
press technology. Interviewing these experts was an iterative process; after each
interview other experts were asked new questions that enabled us to get feedback on
specific topics. It enabled us to unravel differences of opinions about certain topics
and to obtain information on points that had been forgotten.
We are thus convinced that the mapping of the technology’s history is robust. The
analysis is thorough and soundly based on written and interview material. We have
detailed and complete information about the micro-networks.
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3.7. Conclusion
Shoe press technology, one of the major innovations in the paper and board industry
in the 20th century, is considered to be an ‘energy-efficient technology’. Our aim was
to investigate the balance between internal factors – characteristics of the actors –
and external factors – network linkages between actors and actors’ embeddedness in
a specific industrial context – in both the R&D development (1.) and in the further
improvement of shoe press technology since the moment of innovation (2.).
1. Although external factors – like a broader understanding of the importance of the
factor time in wet pressing R&D; that Beloit’s R&D activities were based on a
thorough knowledge of the needs of their customers; and that Beloit was one of
the most respected major machine suppliers –, internal factors were decisive for
the development of shoe press technology.
With the important exceptions mentioned, we can say that on the whole external
factors played only a minor role in the R&D development:
- The R&D activities were not undertaken in direct response to the wishes of
customers.
- Technological development at Beloit was not driven by a sudden increase in the
price of energy or raw materials, which affect the competitiveness of Beloit’s
customers. The higher energy prices during the seventies did not affect R&D
expenditure at Beloit.
- Government did not play any role in forcing or stimulating role these activities.
- There were no sudden disruptions or changes in the pulp and paper industry that
stimulated efforts to extend the nip residence time.
- Researchers and engineers at Beloit were not influenced by interaction within a
technology network.
Beloit succeeded in developing a press design that broke with the model of the
conventional roll press. From an engineering point of view, shoe press technology
was a ‘major’ step to take; a flexible roll shell was used instead of steel, so that the
nip residence time could be extended. Other researchers were aware that ‘press
impulse’ was important for optimising wet pressing performance, however, only
Beloit undertook continued R&D activities. In spite of some delay caused by the
trouble in finding a press design that worked, the technology that resulted was both
successful and innovative. Certain characteristics of Beloit (or of the people pushing
the development of the shoe press at Beloit) were important for the successful
development of the shoe press:
- Beloit allowed its workers to start R&D in a direction that was thought to be
good for the customer, even though there were no plans for a concrete product.
- Previous R&D and engineering experience turned out to be of crucial importance
in bringing the technology towards the market.
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- Researchers and management showed courage and continuing dedication to
develop the technology; Beloit ‘believed’ in something that other machine
suppliers did not yet see.
And finally, at certain moments the right elements simply came together, think for
instance of the development of the belt. Success needed some coincidence too.
2. Whereas internal factors explained part of the success of further improvements
during diffusion, external factors primarily led to the further improvement of
shoe press technology. R&D activities and improvements were driven by the
market success of shoe press in board grades and the emerging need for an
increased press impulse in printing paper machines.
The most important external factors that have triggered improvements since 1980
are:
- The shoe press performance fitted in with the needs of board manufacturers:
higher machine speeds, improved strength properties and reduced raw material
costs were appreciated. Once the technology became proven, an interesting
market emerged. To capture a market share, competing machine suppliers, felt
suppliers, and belt/sleeve suppliers had to develop a position in the technology
network.
- The emerging technology network led to a fruitful spill-over among actors,
especially between belt/sleeves suppliers and machine suppliers.
- Board manufacturers’ requirements (better runnability and increasing machine
speeds) drove important technical improvements in the configuration of shoe
press within the pressing section.
- Continually increasing machine speeds of printing paper machines was an
important factor in overcoming the inertia of printing paper manufacturers. This
led eventually to the need for shoe presses in printing grades; the press impulse
of conventional roll presses became a major impediment.
These external factors made it easier for other machine suppliers to follow Beloit.
However, internal factors were important in determining the course of events in the
development of the technology network:
- Voith was the only machine supplier that developed considerable R&D expertise
in the sleeve area because they wanted to improve Beloit’s original design. This
explains why they were able to catch up with Beloit in only 4 years and explains
part of their later market success.
- Actors’ strategic decisions (concerning matters like developing a new area of
knowledge e.g. belt or not; stopping R&D because the technology was unsuitable
for the main market segment covered; restarting R&D due to the acquisition of
other machine suppliers; or continuing to believe in the open press design that
was originally developed) impacted on the further development of the technology
network.
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A final question is whether shoe press technology can be regarded as an innovative
energy-efficient technology? Although shoe press technology – most often –
improves the specific energy consumption in manufacturing paper or board, energy
efficiency was not a decisive argument in the development of shoe press technology.
It is neither a decisive argument for paper manufacturers to invest in the
implementation of shoe press technology.
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Chapter 4
Impulse technology1
Abstract
Impulse technology is a paper-making technology that increases dewatering and
therefore reduces the need for evaporating drying. In this chapter, we evaluate the
effect of government R&D support on the development of impulse technology by
looking at the networks within which the technology is developed.
Douglas Wahren, the inventor of impulse technology, anchored impulse R&D
activities at the US national pulp and paper research institute 10 years after his first
idea of impulse technology. A first micro-network emerged when the US machine
supplier Beloit and the Canadian national pulp and paper research institute also
initiated R&D activities. Both research institutes claimed an increased energy
efficiency to obtain government R&D support. A second micro-network emerged in
Sweden from 1990 onwards. A Swedish government representative offered the
national pulp and paper research institute financial R&D support in order to start
the development of this energy-efficient technology. After six to seven years of
planning, talking and negotiating, a major R&D programme was started. Only the
Swedish micro-network is still active.
The major argument for developing impulse technology was an increased machine
capacity in existing paper and board machines and a reduced capital intensity in
new paper and board machines. Wahren’s original claim dewatering claims became
less strong over time. Actors’ arguments for investing in impulse technology, thus,
also changed. Paper properties were increasingly stressed. However, more than 25
years of R&D activities – and 15 years of government R&D support – have not yet
resulted in a proven technology. In fact, its prospects are unclear; its energy-
efficiency improvements are uncertain; its feasibility is being debated.
A first conclusion is that the government R&D support undoubtedly accelerated the
development of impulse technology. A second conclusion is that the strategy and
decisions of national pulp and paper research institutes were decisive in the
acquisition and utilisation of government R&D support. R&D activities drove
government R&D support instead of the other way around.
                                                
1
 A preliminary version of this chapter was earlier published (see [Luiten and Blok, 1998]).
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4.1. Introduction
Improving the energy efficiency of the energy-intensive manufacturing industry is
seen as one of the most important options for reducing the emissions of gases which
contribute to anthropologically-induced climate change (see e.g. [IPCC, 1996; UN,
1997]). In addition to the techno-economic potential of commercially available
energy-efficient technologies (see e.g. [De Beer et al., 1994; WEC, 1995; IWG,
1997]), analysts are increasingly interested in the long-term potential of innovative
energy-efficient technologies. Such technologies may lead to a continuous
improvement in energy efficiency in the manufacturing industry (see e.g. [De Beer,
1998; Martin et al., 2000a; IPCC, 2001]). A considerable long-term potential is
claimed but what can government do to stimulate the development of such
innovative industrial energy-efficient technologies? It is often suggested that
government R&D support is as an important policy instrument for accelerating the
development of such technologies (see e.g. [Blok et al., 1995; De Beer, 1998; Elliot
and Pye, 1998]). However, little is known about the actual effect of government
R&D support on the development of industrial energy-efficient technology.
In this chapter we explore the development of a specific industrial energy-efficient
technology to which government has contributed substantially by financing R&D
activities. We want to increase our insight into how government R&D support plays
a role in developing energy-efficient technologies. For this purpose, we go beyond an
evaluation in financial terms. We want to know who were involved in developing the
technology and what were their arguments were. We must discover how important
government R&D support was for these actors.
In this chapter we examine the effect of government R&D support on the
development of a specific energy-efficient technology. For this purpose we make a
detailed investigation of the networks in which impulse technology is developed.
Impulse technology is a wet pressing technology for the paper industry, which is one
of the energy-intensive manufacturing industries [WEC, 1995]. Impulse technology
is frequently mentioned in overview studies regarding emerging energy-efficient
technologies and is, therefore, an interesting case study (see e.g. [Arthur D. Little,
1998; IWG, 1997; De Beer, 1998; Martin et al., 2000a; Martin et al., 2000b; IPCC,
2001]).
In the Section 4.2, we briefly introduce the paper production process and impulse
technology. Subsequently in Section 4.3, the historical development of impulse
technology is mapped. In this description we focus on the issues that are of interest
for our analysis in Section 4.4. In Section 4.4, we structure our analysis of the case
study by answering questions about the technology network, the two micro-networks
and the materialisation of the technology (so far). In Section 4.5 we discuss the effect
of government R&D support on the development of impulse technology. After a
short discussion of the validity of the analysis (Section 4.6), the chapter closes with
brief conclusions (Section 4.7).
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4.2. Making paper and impulse technology
Making paper
The basic principles of paper-making have not changed since the process became
mechanised during the first half of the 19th century. Making paper in a conventional
non-integrated paper mill generally consists of three clusters of activities: furnish
preparation, paper machine and finishing operations.
In the furnish preparation, pulped wood and/or waste paper are screened and
prepared. The fibres are mixed with water, some chemicals and other additives. This
mixture is called furnish. The percentage of dry solids in the furnish, also called the
dryness of the paper sheet, is about 1%. The furnish is fed to the paper machine. The
machine itself can be divided into three sections in which the water is removed from
the paper sheet. Dryness increases as the paper sheet moves along the paper machine
(see also Figure 1). The three sections are as follows:
1. Forming section: forming the paper sheet while draining and suctioning
2. Pressing section: mechanical dewatering by passing the paper sheet through a
number of press nips
3. Drying section: evaporative drying of paper sheet
Finally, finishing operations such as calendaring, winding and cutting are needed to
deliver the final product.
Figure 1: Conventional paper machine. DS = percentage of dry solids in the
furnish, also called the dryness of the paper sheet.
The drying section of the paper machine requires the largest amount of energy per
unit water removed because the water has to be evaporated. Improvements in the
energy efficiency of a paper machine are therefore typically directed at reducing the
energy requirement of drying (see e.g. [de Beer, 1998; Martin et al., 2000b]). The
specific energy consumption can be reduced by improving drying technologies or by
increasing water removal in the pressing section.
Impulse technology
Impulse technology increases the sheet dryness at the exit of the wet pressing section
and therefore reduces the need for evaporative drying. An impulse press nip is
Forming section Pressing section Drying section
30-100 cylinders
ds. 20-25% ds. 90-95%
Finishing
ds. 40-45%ds. 1%
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inserted between the conventional pressing section and the drying section (see Figure
2).
Figure 2: Typical paper machine with one impulse press nip. DS = percentage
of dry solids in the furnish, also called the dryness of the paper sheet.
In a conventional paper machine, two different types of presses are used. The first
and oldest type has two counter-rotating rolls (compare Figure 1). The second type of
press is the shoe press, which was introduced in 1980. Impulse technology is one of
the most recent ideas for improving wet pressing. Impulse technology requires a shoe
press nip.
In an impulse press nip, the paper sheet is fed between a felted shoe press and a
(coated) roll. The roll is heated (most often using induction-heating equipment) to a
temperature between 200ºC and 350ºC. The heated press roll transfers heat to the
paper sheet and simultaneously pressure is exerted by the shoe press (2-8 MPa).
Pressure and temperature are the driving forces behind dewatering in impulse
technology.
Impulse technology has several advantages. First of all, it may reduce the amount of
energy needed to produce paper by reducing the amount of steam needed for
evaporation. Although additional energy is needed in the pressing section (electricity
is commonly used), this increased energy use is likely to be offset by the reduced
demand for steam.
Secondly, an improved water removal process means that either the production
capacity of an existing paper machine can be increased (most paper machines run
‘dryer limited’, meaning that the production capacity cannot be increased due to the
limited drying rate of the drying section), or it means that the investment costs for a
new paper machine can be decreased (capital expenditure on drying cylinders will
decrease because fewer drying cylinders are needed).
Finally, impulse technology may improve paper properties. There is no doubt that the
increase in temperature and pressure affect the physical properties of the paper,
although the ultimate impact on paper properties has not yet been ascertained.
For a better understanding of the development history of impulse technology, one
needs to be aware of two phenomena.
First of all, impulse technology is claimed to have a ‘special’ dewatering mechanism;
it is not normal wet pressing, neither is it evaporation. The original idea is that the
Forming section Pressing section Drying section
e.g. 20-50 cylinders
ds. 20-25% ds. 90-95%
Finishing
ds. 40-45% ds. 60-65%
Roll heater
Impulse
press nip
ds. 1%
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heat flux generates a steam gradient in the paper sheet, which displaces liquid water
from the sheet into the receiving felt. The hypothesis of a vapour front displacing
liquid water was suggested by the inventor of the technology to explain the increase
in water removal (see [Wahren, 1982; Arenander and Wahren, 1983]). The theory of
steam formation has not been confirmed yet. Steam is formed, although it is not
certain whether this occurs in the nip. Secondly, delamination has been a major
bottleneck. Delamination occurs when the paper sheet strength cannot withstand the
vapour pressure in the paper sheet. When the paper sheet emerges from the press nip,
the external consolidating pressure is removed and the water in the sheet flashes into
steam. If the internal vapour pressure is too high the paper sheet cannot hold together
and the sheet delaminates. The paper sheet is destroyed. It is claimed that different
paper grades differ in their susceptibility to delamination. It is therefore useful to
make a distinction between heavier-weight grades (typically packaging- and board-
grades such as linerboard) and light-weight grades (typically printing paper grades
such as newsprint and light-weight coated paper).
4.3. Historical development of impulse technology
In this section the historical development of impulse technology will be mapped.
After describing Douglas Wahren’s R&D efforts in Sweden (1970-1978) and early
R&D activities in the US (1978-1987), we document the failed attempt to
commercialise impulse technology (1987-1989). We then describe the Canadian
R&D activities (1983-1994). Subsequently we comment further on the US attempts
to solve the problem of delamination. We make a distinction between the early
attempts (1988-1995) and the more recent attempts (1995-1999). Then the
emergence of R&D in Europe is outlined. We describe the attempts to engage in pre-
competitive co-operative R&D activities within the International Energy Agency’s
pulp and paper Implementing Agreement. Finally, we briefly mention the R&D
activities of two other major machine suppliers. In mapping the history of impulse
technology, we emphasis elements which are taken up again in our later analysis of
the technology’s development in Section 4.4.
In our description, we make a distinction between laboratory platen presses,
laboratory roll presses and pilot paper machines. A laboratory platen press consists of
two platens, which are simply pressed against each other with a piece of paper sheet
between them. A laboratory roll press can process a continuous paper sheet between
two press rolls and bears a greater resemblance to commercial paper machines than
platen presses [MacGregor, 1989]. The laboratory roll press is a stand-alone unit.
Typical speeds  range from 50 to 300 m/minute. The width of a roll press is typically
less than a metre. A pilot paper machine is often a complete paper machine but has a
limited width (up to 1 metre, often smaller). It runs at commercial machine speeds,
i.e. 1,000 – 2,000 m/minute.
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1970-1978: R&D in Sweden – the idea for impulse technology
Douglas Wahren is generally acknowledged to be the inventor of impulse
technology. In the early seventies he was working at the Swedish Skogsindustrins
Tekniska Forskningsinstitut (STFI)2 and the Kungliga Tekniska Högskolan (KTH)
both in Stockholm. Because of the huge capital required for the drying section of
paper machines, Wahren asked himself: how fast can paper be dried? He considered
heat transfer to be the key to the problem: by pressing harder and simultaneously
increasing temperature, it should be possible to transfer heat very rapidly to the paper
sheet. Wahren performed a crude experiment with a laboratory platen press. Only
milliseconds were needed to transfer the heat needed to dewater the sheet. Due to
lack of time and resources for hiring a suitable person, the idea was shelved
[Wahren, 1998].
In 1973, Wahren moved to KMW to become vice president of research3. KMW was
a Swedish machine supplier to the paper industry. Wet pressing was one of KMW’s
R&D priority areas. In 1976, there was an opportunity to start an entirely new project
in wet pressing. Wahren told Zotterman, who was hired to perform the wet pressing
R&D, about his idea concerning rapid dewatering at both high pressure and high
temperature. Wahren speculated that the formation of steam induced a pressure
gradient that ‘pressed’ liquid water out of the paper sheet into the felt. Wahren and
Zotterman evaluated not only impulse technology but also various other ways of
‘intense pressing/drying’, e.g. drying between a hot and a cold surface4. Since KMW
was a relatively small machine supplier, KMW could not pursue both the impulse
and the hot/cold sandwich projects. Wahren chose impulse technology, which had
the best potential for making a compact (and thus capital extensive) paper machine
[Wahren, 1998].
By 1978, a heated impulse press nip (using two rolls) was running on KMW’s pilot
paper machine. The pilot paper machine was run at a slow speed to achieve the nip
residence time required, i.e. 600 m/min. In 1978, Wahren applied for a patent to
protect KMW’s interests [Wahren, 1978]. However, the idea was again shelved; the
product properties – ‘hard, stiff and strong’ - were not suitable for KMW’s main
market at that time which were tissue machines. At the end of 1978, Wahren decided
to leave KMW [Wahren, 1998].
                                                
2
 The Swedish national pulp and paper research institute (STFI) is a national specialised pulp and
paper research institute that is primarily financed by the national pulp and paper industry. Each
member firm pays an annual membership fee and gets research results in return. Such a national pulp
and paper research institute exists in almost all countries where pulp and paper manufacturing is an
important manufacturing sector, e.g. IPC / IPST in the US, Paprican in Canada, and KCL in Finland.
In the mid-1990s, some of these national pulp and paper research institutes allowed supplying firms to
become members of the research institute. Beloit became a member of IPST in 1995. Valmet-Karlstad
became a member of STFI in 1995.
3
 KMW became a part of Valmet-Karlstad in 1986. Valmet-Karlstad is part of Valmet, a Finnish
machine supplier. Carl Zotterman is now vice-president of research at Valmet.
4
 The idea of drying between a hot and cold band is comparable to the Condebelt dryer, which was
developed by Tampella, another Finnish machine supplier. Valmet also bought Tampella.
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1979-1987: R&D in the US – IPC and Beloit
Wahren moved to the Institute of Paper Chemistry (IPC) in Appleton in February
1979. IPC was the US national pulp and paper research institute, similar to STFI for
the Swedish paper industry. In 1979, IPC took on new staff in order to re-organise
the institute. Wahren was hired as head of the research and had to rebuild R&D
which had deteriorated considerably.
Posner, IPC’s vice-president, was aware of Wahren’s idea about wet pressing under
intense heat and pressure. He was excited and suggested the term ‘impulse drying’5.
Wahren’s plans to develop expertise in (modelling of) heat and energy transfer
processes were supported by IPC’s board. Within a year he succeeded in getting
people on board with expertise in this area. Zotterman was one of the persons hired.
This preliminary research was financed by IPC’s membership dues [Wahren, 1998].
Some first results were presented in 1981 at IPC’s annual member conference
[Ahrens, 1981]. In 1983, a first article was published: extremely high drying rates up
to 30,000 kg H2O/hr m2 were reported and it was claimed that one press nip could
achieve a dryness increase of 20%6. In the article, Arenander and Wahren attributed
the high dewatering rates to the special dewatering mechanism: “Transport of
interstitial water out of the sheet (occurs) by means of the steam generated pressure
gradient or steam flow through the sheet” [Arenander and Wahren, 1983, p.124].
Wahren contacted Beloit, a US paper machine supplier. Wahren’s first industrial job
was at Beloit. He knew Jan Bergström, who was the manager of the Beloit’s Rockton
lab, quite well and appreciated Beloit’s competence. In March 1981, representatives
of Beloit (amongst others Bergström) visited IPC. Wahren offered Beloit ‘full co-
operation’ [Wahren, 1998; Wahren, 2000; Bergström, 2000; Orloff, 2000; Busker,
2000].
Beloit started its own research activities in 1981. The suggested mechanism behind
impulse technology was new and intriguing. Beloit’s main interest was the potential
reduction in size of the capital-intensive drying section in new paper machines and
the increased production capacity of existing dryer limited machines [Bergström,
2000; Busker, 2000]. The researchers at Beloit suggested that a shoe press had to be
used instead of a roll press. For Beloit, impulse technology was a logical and
                                                
5
 There have been a lot of names for what we in this article indicate as ‘impulse technology’. Each
actor had his own favourite. IPST coined the name ‘impulse drying’. Albany wanted to call ‘impulse
drying’, ‘impulse pressing’. Beloit referred to it as High Temperature Pressing (HTP). Later when
Beloit designed the induction-heated press for the No. 2 pilot paper machine we titled it High
Efficiency Drying, but no one at Beloit liked the shortened version HED. STFI coined the name
‘impulse technology’. In using the term impulse technology we do not for favour any naming of any
of the actors. We use the term technology in other case studies towards the development of industrial
energy efficient technologies.
6
 The drying rate is the water removal minus the water removal rate in pressing at room temperature.
This should be evaluated a drying rate of 15-30 kg H2O / m2 hr in drying cylinders. The drying rate is
compared to the drying rate of drying cylinders, because Wahren and Arenander suggest impulse
technology as a replacement of drying cylinders (dryness at the entry of the impulse press nip in the
range of 40 to 60% dryness) [Arenander and Wahren, 1983].
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interesting step after Beloit’s successful development and introduction of the shoe
press7. There was continued contact between Beloit and IPC staff, though no formal
co-operation [Crouse, 1998; Bergström, 2000; Wahren, 2000]. Beloit used a
laboratory roll press [Crouse et al., 1989]. Fairly soon Beloit realised that a new type
of felt was needed to resist the extreme wet pressing conditions. Beloit contacted
different felt suppliers, one being Albany [Bergström, 2000; Crouse, 2000].
After the preliminary laboratory experiments, IPC wanted to continue its R&D
activities on impulse technology. Therefore, Wahren and Sprague contacted
Sobczynski in 1984. Sobczynski was the programme manager for the pulp and paper
industry at the US Department of Energy (DOE). DOE was asked for financial
support. Sobczynski considered impulse technology as a promising technology: it
was a high risk R&D project but promised to improve energy efficiency and the
competitiveness of US paper and board industry. There was no specific programme
for the pulp and paper industry, but Sobczynski managed to supply IPC with a
subsidy to evaluate three innovative pressing/drying technologies in 1985. IPC used
a laboratory platen press8. The final report to DOE claimed that impulse technology
was the most radical and the most energy efficient of the three technologies
considered (see [Sprague, 1985]).
Sprague prepared an unsolicited proposal for continuing impulse R&D at IPC.
Following the review by pulp and paper industry’s experts, DOE continued to
support IPC [Orloff, 1997; Sobczynski, 1998]. IPC’s member dues were used as an
additional source of finance [Fleischman, 2000]. A new lab platen press was built in
1986. The aim was to use the platen press for creating a database on product
properties and energy requirements for different paper grades. Promising results were
reported in the annual report which was delivered to DOE at the end of the first year
support (see [Lavery, 1987a]).
Additional DOE support was acquired. A 1.5 million US$ subsidy for a period of 4
years was granted for the construction of a laboratory roll press with two press nips.
The second press nip was needed to minimise differences between the two sides of
the paper sheet of light-weight grades [Lavery, 1988]. The construction of the first
press nip started late in 1986. A second press nip was added late in 1987 [Lavery,
1987b; Orloff, 1989].
The laboratory roll press was never used intensively. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th annual
reports, which were written annually to supply DOE with an overview of how
government financial support was spent, announced extensive plans for using the lab
roll press to evaluate the product properties of a variety of commercially important
paper grades. However, these plans were never executed. Only the 3rd annual report
presented some empirical results using the laboratory roll press. In the 4th annual
                                                
7
 Beloit had developed the shoe press between 1967 and 1980 (see Chapter 3).
8
 The evaluation considered: drying at elevated temperature and mechanical pressure (also called press
drying); thermal/vacuum drying (based on Lehtinen's idea for Condebelt drying) and impulse
technology. Criteria used were: potential for cost reduction; potential for energy cost reduction;
favourable influence on paper properties; extent of applicability; and ease of implementation [Sprague
1985].
- 97 -
report of May 1989 only empirical data based on platen press measurements were
presented. This report indicated that problems with delaminating the sheet might
hinder the development of impulse technology. IPC’s optimism about the potential
and commercial application of impulse technology, which was widely articulated
during the late eighties, – “Commercial application can be expected in the next few
years” [Sprague and Lavery, 1988, p. B221] – proved ill-founded.
1987-1989: Commercialisation?
Beloit, IPC and the US paper manufacturer Weyerhaeuser made a joint research
effort from April 1987 till March 1988. The aim was to determine if and how
impulse technology could improve the production output and product quality of an
existing linerboard machine [Crouse et al., 1989]. Beloit and Weyerhaeuser had co-
operated before in the successful innovation of the shoe press at Weyerhaeuser’s
Springfield mill in December 1980.
Sam Huston, Weyerhaeuser’s vice president of container-board, who was involved in
the introduction of the shoe press, served on IPC’s research committee [Woo, 2000].
He was greatly interested in IPC’s research on impulse technology and aware of
Beloit’s private R&D activities regarding impulse technology. His management
position within Weyerhaeuser allowed him to get Weyerhaeuser involved in a joint
impulse technology research effort. Huston was a big supporter of this effort
[Bergström, 2000; Vance, 2000]. The three actors agreed to ‘jump-start’ impulse
technology; it was thought to be relatively easy to feed a shoe press with heat
[Orloff, 2000; Crouse, 2000; Woo, 2000].
In 1987, Beloit added an induction heater to the existing shoe press on Beloit’s No. 2
pilot paper machine. Felt supplier Albany was involved in running felt trials [Crouse,
2000]. A complete series of trials was planned. However at the beginning of the
trials, it became evident that the paper sheet delaminated. Whereas ‘blistering of the
paper sheet’ had already been noticed by Wahren and Arenander back in 1983, it
took these pilot machine experiments to show that this was a ‘stumbling block’
[Crouse et al., 1989]. The only thing to be done was to determine the temperature
above which delamination occurred, also called the critical temperature. The article
closed with the statement that: “When delamination was avoided by operating with
surface temperatures of 150°C or lower, true impulse drying (transport of water
driven by a steam gradient (EL)) must have been precluded. Under such operating
conditions the benefits were not significantly different from those obtainable by
conventional pressing using elevated sheet temperatures. Hence, to realise the
potential of impulse drying, it will be necessary to alleviate delamination” [Crouse
et al., 1989, p.215].
DOE was not aware of the joint venture between Beloit, IPC and Weyerhaeuser, until
failure became apparent9 [Sobczynski, 1998]. Weyerhaeuser lost interest in impulse
technology, partly because of delamination but primarily because of the realisation
                                                
9
 According to Crouse (Beloit), the US Department of Energy was aware of IPC’s impulse technology
R&D activities with Beloit and Weyerhaeuser [Crouse, 2000].
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that sheet strength did not increase substantially. The expected savings in raw
materials were not achieved [Woo, 2001]. IPC and Beloit continued R&D activities,
but independently.
1983-1994: R&D at Paprican – light-weight grades
In 1983, the Canadian national pulp and paper research institute Paprican started
impulse technology R&D. The research was initiated by Paprican’s president
[Pikulik, 2000]. Impulse technology was seen as an important innovative technology
that could increase sheet dryness and thus promised shorter drying sections,
increased machine output and significant energy savings [Sparkes and Poirier,
1990a]. First a platen press was used. In 1985, a laboratory roll press was
commissioned [Sparkes and Poirier, 1990b]. Paprican’s activities focused on
newsprint, a light-weight printing paper grade. Newsprint is an important grade in
Canadian paper production10. The lab-scale research efforts were partly funded by
the Canadian Electricity Association. Additional resources were generated by
member dues [Pikulik, 1998].
Because of the dominance of newsprint production in Canada, the researchers at
Paprican wanted to evaluate impulse technology for newsprint at commercial speeds.
The tendency for heavier weight-grade to delaminate strengthened Paprican’s
preference for light-weight newsprint grades still further [Sparkes and Poirier,
1990a]. Paprican’s existing pilot paper machine had to be rebuilt [Sparkes and
Poirier, 1990b; Poirier and Sparkes, 1991].
Paprican applied to the Canadian government for financial support11. The Canadian
government supported 45% of the costs for the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine
on condition that a paper machine supplier and paper manufacturers were involved in
the project. A further condition was that if the technology turned out to be successful,
it should be implemented in Canada [CETC, 1999].
Beloit became involved as a machine supplier. The co-operation between Paprican
and Beloit was initiated at a TAPPI Engineering conference in the middle of the
1980s. Busker (Beloit’s Rockton lab) met Pikulik (Paprican) and suggested they
should co-operate on light-weight grades rather than pursue R&D on these grades
independently. When Paprican was looking for a machine supplier to be involved in
the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine, Paprican approached Beloit. Beloit Canada
supplied the equipment (making no profit) [Crouse, 2000; Pikulik, 2000].
It was interesting for Beloit’s Rockton lab to co-operate with Paprican. Beloit did not
have a pilot paper machine with two heated (shoe) press nips, which is important in
                                                
10
 36% of the Canadian production is newsprint. There are 150 newsprint machines [CETC, 1999].
11
 Paprican applied to National Resources Canada. Financial support was granted under the Industry
Energy Research and Development (IERD) programme, which is administered by CANMET Energy
Technology Centre. IERD programme encourages and supports industry proposals for the
development and application of leading edge, energy-efficient and environmentally responsible
processes, products, systems and equipment. To encourage the widest possible application of the
technologies developed the IERD programme strives to link technology developers and users,
encourages the formation of research consortia and supports technology transfer [CETC, 1999].
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order prevent two-sidedness of the light-weight sheets. Beloit’s Rockton lab did not
have the budget to install a second heated (shoe) press nip on one of its own pilot
paper machines [Crouse, 2000; Orloff, 2000]. Albany was also involved [Pikulik,
1998; CETC, 1999].
R&D at Paprican finished in 1994. Most of Paprican’s results were not published.
Beloit and Paprican claimed to be ready to apply impulse technology to a
commercial paper machine; delamination was not a critical problem for light-weight
grades when the pilot machine was run under suitable process conditions [Pikulik et
al., 1996].
Beloit used the experimental results to search for a newsprint manufacturer willing to
commercialise impulse technology. They first asked Canadian newsprint
manufacturers and then newsprint manufacturers around the world [MacGregor,
2000]. Commercialisation, however, never occurred. Lack of interest on the part of
Canadian newsprint manufacturers was explained by the collapsed newsprint market
situation in Canada; more important, however, was the general lack of experience
with shoe press technology of newsprint manufacturers12 [Pikulik, 1998; Crouse,
1998].
1989-1995: R&D at IPST – solving delamination for board grades. Part I
In 1989, the Institute of Paper Chemistry (IPC) moved to Atlanta. The institute was
renamed the Institute of Paper Science and Technology (IPST). The move to Atlanta
caused some researchers who had contributed substantially to impulse technology to
leave the institute. David Orloff became principal investigator13. DOE continued to
support IPST’s impulse technology research. Orloff convinced Sobczynski that if
delamination could be overcome it would not be very difficult to implement impulse
technology on linerboard-machines; shoe presses were already widely used, ‘only’ a
heater had to be added. [Orloff, 2000]. With Orloff guiding the impulse technology
R&D the results of research were covered by patents [Orloff, 1997].
Orloff restricted the research to solving the delamination problem for linerboard.
There were three reasons for looking at linerboard. First of all, Beloit had an
agreement with Paprican to look at light-weight grades (< 80 g/m2). IPST would look
at heavier-weight grades (> 80 g/m2) [Orloff, 1200; Pikulik, 2000]. Secondly,
linerboard is an important grade in the US and the introduction of the shoe press for
this grade was a success. Finally, impulse technology was likely to enhance the
strength properties of linerboard [Lavery, 1988; Orloff, 2000]. The laboratory platen
press was heavily used again. It was easier to use and generated many more data in a
shorter time than the laboratory roll press [Orloff, 2000].
                                                
12
 The first single shoe press was installed on a newsprint machine in 1994. Impulse technology
required not one but two heated shoe press nips. This was too big a step to take. Note that Paprican’s
pilot paper machine had only one shoe press nip. The second press nip was a large roll press. Beloit
did not have a pilot paper machine with two shoe press nips.
13
 With Orloff leading the impulse technology R&D a series of IPST patents can be found regarding
impulse technology (see [Orloff et al., 1992] till [Orloff et al., 1998]).
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Researchers at IPST proposed that controlling the sheet temperature prior to opening
the press nip could suppress delamination [Orloff, 1997]. A reduced sheet
temperature would reduce the amount of water that flashes to vapour during nip
opening. The heat transfer to the paper sheet needed to be controlled to prevent
delamination. Research focused primarily on alternative roll surface materials, such
as zirconium oxide coatings, which had a low thermal mass. Such ‘cermet’ coatings
reduced heat transfer to the sheet, while maintaining high surface temperatures.
Furnish variables such as the specific surface were also found to play a role in
delamination [Orloff and Sobczynski, 1993; Orloff, 1994; Orloff, 1997]. Lab press
experiments showed that a cermet coated roll made it possible to increase
temperature during wet pressing and prevent sheet delamination [Orloff, 1992a;
Orloff, 1992b]. IPST co-operated with a firm that was specialised in such coatings,
Fisher-Barton [Orloff, 1989]. In 1991, the laboratory roll press was used for studies
of roll coating durability [Orloff et al., 1995; Orloff, 2000].
Between 1988 and 1992, Beloit and IPC formally did not co-operate regarding
impulse technology R&D. Contacts at the management level were minimised. In
spite of this, Orloff continued to visit Beloit now and then [Orloff, 1997; Crouse,
1998]. Beloit’s private activities focused primarily on light-weight grades. Beloit’s
activities in linerboard, however, were never stopped completely [Crouse, 1998;
Orloff, 2000].
During 1992, IPST and Beloit started to work together again [Orloff and Lindsay,
1993]. During 1993, Beloit’s heated shoe press on the No. 2 pilot paper machine was
used for experiments with the cermet coated rolls. In 1993, Beloit started to co-
operate with Fisher-Barton (just as IPST) to test different coating materials [Orloff,
2000].
During 1992, IPST announced their ‘plan for the commercialisation of impulse
technology’. IPST felt ready to prove the potential of impulse technology on a pilot
paper machine. This step had to be made in order to interest paper manufacturers in
applying impulse technology on a commercial scale (see [Orloff, 1992c; Orloff and
Sobczynski, 1993; Orloff and Lindsay, 1993]). DOE was again asked for support.
DOE was willing to support the commercialisation of impulse technology on
condition that both a machine supplier and a paper company were involved
[Sobczynski, 1998; Orloff, 1997]. In December 1993, Orloff and Sobczynski
together announced that commercialisation of the technology would be undertaken
by a consortium composed of IPST, its member companies, a machine supplier and
DOE. At that moment innovation was expected in 1997-98 [Orloff and Sobczynski,
1993].
High level representatives of IPST’s member companies were invited to a meeting at
IPST. Different member companies had different machine suppliers; some had Beloit
machines, some had Voith machines, and others had Escher Wyss machines.
Therefore, IPST was asked to contact all major machine suppliers to see who was
willing to commercialise impulse technology. Only Beloit responded. The
achievements that IPST had made in controlling delamination for heavy- weight
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grades were a good reason for Beloit to look at heavier-weight grades again [Crouse,
1998; Orloff, 1997]. Beloit’s Larry Chance, who had become vice-president of the
Rockton lab after Bergström left in 1984, attended the meetings [Orloff, 2000]. A
series of monthly meetings was organised for over half a year. Total
commercialisation costs were estimated to be 20 million US$ [Orloff, 1997]. Only
Union Camp expressed interest. Weyerhaeuser showed very little interest; their
former experience had made them shy. There were serious negotiations between
Beloit and IPST and Union Camp and Beloit. IPST would receive royalties for the
patents they licensed to Beloit. Union Camp also wanted royalties on future sales to
compensate them for running the risk of being the first in the field. Beloit agreed to
the IPST royalty agreement but Beloit and Union Camp could not come to terms
[Orloff, 2000; Robinson, 1998].
When it turned out that none of the US linerboard manufacturers was willing to join,
DOE agreed to support a consortium of Beloit and IPST. DOE really wanted the
technology to become a success [Pikulik, 1998; Crouse, 1998; Orloff, 2000]. Or in
Sobczynski’s own words: “Most important to him (Sobczynski) and DOE was that
the US industry would benefit first from the new technology and would be able to get
options at reduced costs, based on the heavy subsidies by DOE. If IPST would have
continued co-operation with a foreign machine supplier, Sobczynski would also have
tried to warrant R&D support for the pilot machine R&D activities” [Sobczynski,
1998]. The aim of the joint effort was to build an impulse press nip on Beloit’s newly
built No. 4 pilot paper machines and to show its viability. The new pilot paper
machine No. 4 was a light-weight paper machine, although it could be used to
produce linerboard. However, making the pilot paper machine appropriate for
impulse technology was not the major reason why the pilot paper machine was built
in the first place. Crouse had to make sure that any equipment changes made for
impulse technology would not negatively impact on the primary mission of the new
pilot paper machine: attracting customers to improve Beloit’s bad business situation
at the time. Before the agreement between Beloit, IPST and DOE was signed, there
were obstacles within Beloit that had to be overcome. The most important was to
show that the cermet coated rolls were also suitable for low temperature wet
pressing. Without such rolls on the pilot paper machine, it would have been almost
impossible to get machine time for impulse technology trials [Orloff, 2000]. IPST's
patents were licensed to Beloit. Late in 1995, when the implementation of the
impulse press nip started the project was expected to end in June 1997 [Orloff, 1997;
Sobczynski, 1998].
Meanwhile, Beloit continued to use the laboratory heated roll press for running
impulse tests at the request of Beloit’s customers. The sheet was made at Beloit’s
No. 3 pilot paper machine and then impulse dried on the lab roll press. Such trials
kept industry’s interest high [Crouse, 2000].
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1995-1999: R&D at IPST – solving delamination for board grades. PartII
During the winter of 1993/94, Orloff had access to Beloit’s No.2 pilot paper machine
to do some testing. He became increasingly aware that ‘post-nip’ modifications were
required to control delamination of linerboard [Orloff, 2000; Orloff et al., 1995].
Improvements ‘in’ the press nip (like e.g. the cermet coatings) were not the entire
answer. From 1994 onwards, researchers at IPST focused on ‘post-nip’ modifications
[Orloff, 1997].
Babinski and Mumford, who were doing some impulse technology R&D at the R&D
lab of International Paper14, hypothesised that delamination could be reduced by
exposing the paper sheet to a pressurised steam environment at its exit from the
impulse press nip. Orloff followed this idea and suggested a ‘gas chamber’ instead.
The external gas pressure balances the pressure inside the paper sheet and holds the
sheet together while the internal pressure decays [Orloff et al., 1997d; Orloff and
Crouse, 1999]. The old laboratory platen press was converted and experiments were
done. IPST’s membership finances were spent on these experiments so that the
results could be kept secret. Until the moment IPST filed the first patent in May
1995, nobody was told the details of these developments [Sobczynski, 1998; Orloff,
2000]. Later, an external mechanical force to guarantee counter pressure that
prevented the flashing to steam was patented [Orloff et al., 1997e]. In 1997, the first
laboratory results of post-nip control of delamination were presented at the TAPPI
Engineering Conference (see [Orloff et al, 1997a; Orloff et al, 1997b; Orloff et al.
1997c]).
IPST’s patents were again licensed to Beloit. Beloit paid to get international patent
protection [Orloff, 1997]. To show that the concept was not just a laboratory
curiosity, the equipment to control decompression and thus delamination during nip
opening was implemented on Beloit’s No. 2 pilot paper machine in 1997.
Experiments were done during the summer of 1997 and winter of 1998 [Orloff and
Crouse, 1999]. Early in 1998, Beloit’s new No. 4 pilot paper machine was also
supplied with the additional post-nip equipment. The first impulse experiments using
the No. 4 pilot paper machine were run during the summer of 1998. For the first
time, impulse pressed paper was formed, pressed, dried and reeled in one continuous
operation [James, 1999]. A number of container-board manufacturers were contacted
in order to find one who was willing to convert impulse dried linerboard into
corrugated boxes. It took time but eventually Stone Container was interested [Orloff,
1998]. Quality measurements were performed (see [Orloff et al., 1999b]).
The results were presented at the TAPPI Engineering Conference in 1999 (see
[Orloff et al., 1999a; Orloff et al., 1999b]). Impulse technology increased paper sheet
dryness by 3.3 to 4%. Strength property improved 15 to 20%. Energy costs, however,
                                                
14
 International Paper is a large US paper manufacturer and was not a member of IPST. International
Paper is one of the US paper manufacturers with a large and established R&D department.
International Paper performed some impulse technology R&D to explore the advantages of impulse
technology on paper properties (see e.g. [Babinski and Mumford, 1995]). The R&D was stopped
because Condebelt was considered to have greater potential and International Paper’s R&D strategy
moved more towards product-oriented R&D than process-oriented R&D [Orloff, 2000].
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increased due to the use of electricity [Orloff et al., 1999a]. Tests with the boxes
showed that impulse technology can be used to reduce fibre usage by about 10%
while maintaining strength properties [James, 1999].
Since then, IPST and Beloit have been sharing their research data with linerboard
manufacturers. They hoped to identify an appropriate candidate for the first
commercial installation of impulse drying [Orloff, 1997; James, 1999].
In 1998, Orloff gave a presentation at the annual member conference about four of
IPST’s major R&D projects. Impulse technology was one of them. Orloff’s message
was that there was no role left for IPST in these R&D projects [Sobczynski, 1998;
Orloff, 2000]. Impulse technology R&D at IPST was stopped in 1999. IPST had
committed themselves to showing the feasibility of impulse technology via a pilot
paper machine. This plan was supported by the member companies and was actually
realised. By then, impulse technology had become the task of the machine supplier15
[Orloff, 2000].
Beloit’s attempt to commercialise impulse technology came to an abrupt end when
Beloit’s mother company filed for bankruptcy in 1999. The Rockton lab was closed
in 2000. The Finnish machine supplier Valmet bought the rights to Beloit’s patents
and Beloit’s new pilot paper machine No. 4 was shipped to Finland16 [Crouse, 2000;
Orloff, 2000]
Late eighties – now: R&D in Europe
During the late 1980s, interest in impulse technology arose in Europe due to the
research results presented by IPC and Paprican [Talja, 2000; Boström, 2000]. By that
time, the shoe press had become a proven technology and it was clear that impulse
technology would benefit from the longer nip residence time in a shoe press nip
[Backström, 2000; Hollmark, 2000].
In 1988, the Finnish machine supplier Valmet started R&D. High dryness and
improved paper properties were the arguments put forward for exploring impulse
technology. Valmet was also involved in a co-operative project with the Finnish
national pulp and paper research institute KCL and Tamfelt, a Finnish felt supplier.
This project was supported by the Technology Development Centre of Finland
(TEKES) [Paulapuro, 1991; Talja, 2000]. In 1990, the results induced Valmet to
conclude that uncertainties were still too high to seriously pursue further
development [Talja et al., 1991]. R&D was put on hold. The further development of
impulse technology was monitored by publications and patents [Talja, 2000].
                                                
15
 As a spin-off of the development of impulse technology for wet pressing, commercialisation of
impulse technology for paper sludge drying is being pursued collaboratively by Ashbrook Corporation
and IPST [Orloff, 1997; Mahmood et al., 1998].
16
 Talja (Valmet) is not willing to comment on this topic [Talja, 2000].
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The former head of Beloit’s Rockton lab, Bergström, was working at the Swedish
national pulp and paper research institute STFI. He was the first to make plans to
equip STFI’s pilot paper machine with two impulse press nips in 1986/87. STFI was
not willing to invest; other projects had priority [Bergström, 2000].
Fastmark, who worked at the Swedish Organisation for Technological Development
(NUTEK), had become aware that impulse technology was a high-risk energy-
efficient technology [Norman, 2000; Fastmark, 2000]. He was familiar with impulse
R&D activities in the US and Canada because of his contacts within the International
Energy Agency’s Implementing Agreement on pulp and paper17. In 1988, Fastmark
contacted the researchers at STFI and KTH to interest them in starting impulse
technology R&D in Sweden [Norman, 2000; Bäckström, 200; Fastmark, 2000].
Commissioned by NUTEK, Lund University (LTH) made a literature review of
innovative pressing and drying technologies, one of them being impulse technology
[Stenström, 1989]. In January 1990, Fastmark had a meeting with representatives of
the Swedish pulp and paper research institutes. His message was that if a proposal on
impulse technology R&D using STFI’s pilot paper machine were to be submitted,
NUTEK would seriously consider supporting it from the Energy budget18 [Fastmark,
2000; Norman, 2000].
In 1991, NUTEK supported a feasibility study at STFI [Bergström, 2000; Fastmark,
2000]. In 1992, NUTEK agreed to designate a budget for impulse technology R&D.
However, the budget was too small to rebuild STFI’s pilot paper machine. The plans
to start R&D on impulse technology were delayed [Fastmark, 2000; Hollmark,
2000].
It took STFI until 1996 to submit a definitive proposal. Time was needed to gather
additional external financial resources for rebuilding the pilot paper machine.
NUTEK had promised a contribution of roughly 40% and the Swedish paper
manufacturers were reluctant to invest in a rebuild [Backström, 2000; Hollmark,
2000]. STFI continued to strive for impulse technology R&D because NUTEK’s
offer of financial support propitiously coincided with STFI’s wish to modernise the
wet pressing section of the pilot paper machine [MacGregor, 2000; Norman, 2000;
Bergström, 2000]. Furthermore, STFI was engaged in a re-organisation to reinforce
its position as a leading pulp and paper research institute: impulse technology R&D
was a large and visible ‘high risk’ project [Bergström, 2000; MacGregor, 2000;
                                                
17
 The International Energy Agency (IEA) stimulates the development and use of new and improved
energy technologies in order to achieve energy security, environmental protection and economic and
social development. The IEA's R&D collaboration programme facilitates R&D co-operation among
IEA member and non-member countries. The idea behind the R&D collaboration programme is that
national energy R&D should become more effective and efficient when incorporated into the larger
context of international R&D activities. Co-operative activities regarding specific themes are set up
under ‘Implementing Agreements’. There is an Implementing Agreement on efficient energy use in
the pulp and paper industry (1981). Members of this Implementing Agreement co-operate in pre-
competitive R&D on specific technologies or concepts.
18
 The Swedish government had allocated a substantial budget to the Energy Programme in order to
phase out nuclear energy. Improving the energy efficiency of energy intensive industries was one of
the areas of attention. Research institutes and other actors could seek support from the Energy budget
for both R&D and equipment building [Fastmark, 2000].
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Wahren, 2000]. The idea of starting a ‘high-risk’ R&D programme attracted external
support for the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine [Norman, 2000; Bäckström,
2000; Fastmark, 2000; Hollmark, 2000]. Both Hollmark, group leader of STFI’s
paper process group, and Alsholm, STFI’s president, played a crucial role in bringing
the plan to fruition19 [MacGregor, 2000; Backström, 2000; Norman, 2000; Wahren,
2000].
In 1995, the major machine suppliers were asked to quote a price. Voith showed no
interest. Beloit did not respond. Valmet’s offer was best. By that time Valmet had
also become a member of STFI (1995) [Hollmark, 2000; MacGregor, 2000]. During
1995, STFI and Valmet developed concrete plans to rebuild the pilot paper machine
[Talja, 2000]. STFI’s pilot paper machine was inaugurated in October 1997 by the
King of Sweden. A 3-year research programme was launched as one of STFI’s
’major R&D programmes’ [STFI, 1998]. A second 3-year research programme
started in 2000 [Bäckström, 2000]. NUTEK supported 40% of the programme
[Fastmark, 2000; Bäckström, 2000]. The additional 60% is being financed by a
limited number of member firms such as Valmet-Karlstad, Albany Nordiskafelt, and
some paper manufacturers [Boström, 1997]. Valmet-Karlstad contributes man hours
in machine construction and design issues [Talja, 2000]. The research results are
only available to these member firms [STFI, 2000].
In addition to its major R&D programme, STFI initiated a Joule project which
focuses on more fundamental aspects of impulse technology20 [Backström, 2000;
Norman, 2000]. STFI co-operates closely with Swedish universities like KTH and
LTH [Bäckström, 2000; Stenström, 2000; Bergström, 2000]. Whereas STFI stated
recently that there might be a dewatering mechanism involving steam-assisted water
removal, a recent thesis at LTH cast doubts on the water removal mechanism
claimed by Wahren (see [Rigdahl et al., 1999; Larsson, 1999]).
                                                
19
 Hollmark left STFI for SCA soon after that the research programme had started. Patents reveal that
he is involved in impulse technology related activities at the research lab of the Swedish hygienic
paper manufacturer SCA (see e.g. [Billgren et al., 2000; Kaveh et al., 2000]). SCA was a member of
STFI till 2000. They supported STFI’s impulse programme between 1997 and 2000. SCA performed
private R&D activities using STFI’s pilot paper machine [Orloff, 2000; MacGregor, 2000; Bäckström,
2000].
20
 The Joule programme is part of the Framework Programme of the European Commission. One of
the priority areas within Joule is the rational use of energy in industry. The title of STFI’s project:
High temperature pressing of fibrous materials (JOU3-970078 / January 1998 - December 2000).
Actors involved: STFI, LTH, KTH, Valmet-Karlstad, Albany Nordiskafelt, University of Porto and
the French National Polytechnic of Grenoble (EFPG). A large number of these actors, STFI, LTH,
KTH and EFPG, were also involved in an earlier JOULE project. Title of project: Establishing the
scientific base for energy efficiency in emerging pressing and drying technologies (JOU2-20041 /
January 19993 – December 1995).  The work in this project was oriented mainly towards wet pressing
[Vincent, 1997].
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There is some additional impulse R&D going on in Europe. STFI co-operated with
TNO in the Netherlands on modelling impulse technology [Riepen, 1998]. The
Dutch Novem also supported a project to summarise the state of the art (see [Van
Lieshout, 1998]). Helsinki University of Technology (HUT) started a small project
on impulse technology in October 1996 in which HUT co-operated with IPST. The
entire project was supported by the Technological Development Centre of Finland
(TEKES) [Paltakari, 2000].
IEA Implementing agreement on the pulp and paper industry
At a meeting in 1995, the representatives of Finland and Sweden suggested impulse
technology as an Annex to the IEA Implementing Agreement. By 1997, the details of
this Annex had still not been finished and the R&D tasks had still not been defined
[Boström, 1997]. In 1998, Vikram Kaul (STFI) was given the mandate to negotiate
with the key players (being Paprican, IPST, Beloit and STFI) on pre-competitive co-
operative R&D tasks. No consensus could be reached, because of the proprietary
character of impulse technology R&D [Orloff, 1997; Boström, 2000; Riepen, 1998].
The Implementing Agreement did completely abandon impulse technology; the focus
was expanded to ‘advanced dewatering technologies’. The competitive atmosphere
relaxed, some tasks were identified, although financial resources are still lacking
[Boström, 2000; Orloff, 2000].
The other major machine suppliers
Two other major machine suppliers, the German firms Escher Wyss and Voith,
performed some laboratory experiments regarding impulse technology. Escher Wyss
stopped these activities in 1993 because there were too many critical problems to be
solved. The investment required both financially and in man-years was too large
[Mirsberger, 2000]. Voith did not see a clear future for the technology because
impulse technology severely damaged the paper sheet. The potential advantages of
impulse technology were too small to justify the R&D effort that was needed to
overcome these problems [Schiel et al., 2000]. When Voith and Escher Wyss merged
in 1994, impulse technology was discussed when the R&D facilities were merged
and priorities in research were integrated and redefined. Researchers from both firms
agreed on the problems they had faced in earlier research activities and it was
decided not to spend money on impulse technology but to wait and see what would
result from the ongoing R&D activities [Mirsberger, 2000].
4.4. Analysing the development
In this section we will analyse the technological development of impulse technology
using a set of questions that focus on the technology network, the various micro-
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networks and the materialisation of the technology. We first deal with the questions
relating to the ‘technology network’. A technology network usually consists of a
number of smaller micro-networks in which a few actors co-operate. We
subsequently focus on some questions concerning the micro-networks. Finally we
explicitly comment on the materialisation of the technology so far and the role of
performance characteristics in guiding actors’ activities. The role and arguments of
government will be discussed separately in Section 4.5.
Technology network
What is the composition of the technology network?
Figure 3 gives a summary of the development of impulse technology since 1970.
Figure 3: Technology network of impulse technology. The size of the R&D
equipment used – laboratory platen press, laboratory roll press, pilot
paper machine – indicates the up-scaling of the technology. Actors in
ordinary letters are paper manufacturers. Actors in italics are
machine or felt suppliers. Actors with underlining are research
institutes. IPC/IPST, Paprican, KCL and STFI are four national pulp
and paper research institutes which are partly supported by national
paper and board manufacturers.
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= Lab - Roll or  Shoe press
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Karlstad)
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TNO
STFI
Wahren contacts Beloit
Escher Wyss
= Commercialisation / Weyerhaeuser
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= Commercialisation attempt newsprint
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Stop
Stop
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The development of the technology network can be divided into three stages (see
Figure 3). From 1970 to 1980, R&D activities were performed by one man, the
inventor of the technology. Wahren shelved his idea twice before he succeeded in
anchoring and extending R&D activities at the US national pulp and paper research
institute. Between 1980 and 1990, a North American micro-network emerged. From
1990 onwards, R&D activities were initiated in Europe. Just one micro-network
resulted, STFI’s. Voith and Escher Wyss did not continue. In the year 2000, only
STFI’s micro-network was still active.
Although it is a simplification we make a distinction between two micro-networks:
the North American micro-network and STFI’s micro-network. Within the North
American micro-network IPST and Paprican did not co-operate closely. They were
aware of each other’s activities and they agreed to focus on different grades, but
Beloit is the only connection between these two actors. The R&D activities in
Europe are headed by STFI’s micro-network because since 1997 STFI has been the
pivot in the European R&D activities [Talja, 2000].
Figure 3 shows that the development of impulse technology is an international
activity, although actual research activities are undertaken at a restricted number of
places. The technology network shows the names of four (by now two) major
machine suppliers and the names of established national pulp and paper research
institutes [Eriksson, 1997]. The technology network consists mainly of the
traditionally known and important actors that perform R&D for the benefit of the
paper industry.
To what extent and how often do micro-networks exchange knowledge/information?
Contacts within micro-networks have been more frequent and more intense than
contacts between micro-networks. This is not surprising. First of all, Beloit and
Valmet were competitors. Secondly, the various national pulp and paper research
institutes are tied to their member companies. They are also competitors [Wahren,
1998; Talja, 2000]. This is highly visible in the North American micro-network;
IPST and Paprican did not co-operate [Orloff, 2000; Pikulik, 1998]. Whereas
representatives of these national pulp and paper research institutes visited each other
and ‘talked to each other’ (see e.g. [Vomhoff, 1995]), they all behaved according to
the unwritten but well understood rules of confidentiality [Pikulik, 2000]. There have
been co-operative R&D activities ‘across’ the North Atlantic although not between
two national pulp and paper research institutes; IPST co-operated with a Finnish
University (HUT) and someone from a Swedish university (LTH) visited IPST.
Patents are generally used as a source of information to monitor what other
competing actors are doing [Orloff, 2000; Crouse, 1998; Talja, 2000].
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Are there dominant micro-networks in the technology network?
In the technology network, neither of the two micro-networks had a continuing
decisive influence on the development of the technology. However, there have more
‘dominant’ actors in the course of time.
The inventor of the technology dominated during the first 10 years. Wahren took the
idea with him. He did not talk about it until he ran pilot paper machine trials and
protected his idea with a patent [Wahren, 1998]. From 1985 till the demise of the
North American micro-network (1999), Beloit was generally regarded as the
dominant actor; during those days that firm was the only actor that had a lot of
(unpublished) pilot paper machine data at its disposal. Because Beloit’s activity came
to a halt, another micro-network came to the fore. STFI (with Valmet at the
background) is the only actor left who seriously invests in the development impulse
technology. Valmet is not performing private R&D, but they acquired Beloit’s assets
in impulse technology (patents and pilot paper machinery).
Micro-networks
How are the various micro-networks made up?
Figure 3 shows what types of actors played a role in the two micro-networks. The
two micro-networks show large similarities. First of all, national pulp and paper
research institutes played an initiating role and they performed a substantial part of
the R&D activities.
Secondly, machine suppliers were involved in both micro-networks. Whereas Beloit
performed substantial private R&D activities, Valmet is not performing private R&D
itself. Valmet is involved as a member of STFI’s R&D programme, although the
technology is still considered to be too uncertain to develop it privately [Talja, 2000;
Talja, 1991].
Thirdly, in both micro-networks paper manufacturers were passively present (as
members of the national pulp and paper research institutes). Paper manufacturers
showed up actively when innovation appeared to be just around the corner (see
Figure 3, [C1] and [C3]). This role of paper manufacturers is rather ‘typical’ in the
development of process technologies [Philips, 2000]. However, there were some
exceptions to this stereotyped role. Orloff was inspired by a suggestion of Babinski
and Mumford, who worked at International Paper [Orloff, 2000]. Hollmark (who
played a role in initiating the impulse R&D programme at STFI) performed R&D at
SCA in Sweden [Bäckström, 2000; Hollmark, 2000]. Furthermore, one should not
forget that machine suppliers are in contact with customers during the development
of a new technology. At Beloit, the ongoing interest of paper manufacturers in
running laboratory experiments stimulated the continuation of impulse technology
R&D at Beloit [Crouse, 2000].
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Specific individuals and contacts among persons at different firms or research
institutes have been important in initiating and continuing R&D activities within
micro-networks [Orloff, 1997; Sobczynski, 1998; Crouse, 1998; Backström, 2000;
MacGregor, 2000].
What motivates actors to start and / or stop R&D activities?
Table 1 gives an overview of actors’ arguments for starting R&D activities.
Table 1: Arguments for starting the development of impulse technology.
Actor Time
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H
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Paper
 prop
erties
 (surfa
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a
nd m
ech
a
nical
 prop
erties)
Wahren (STFI / KTH) early 1970s •Wahren
Wahren (KMW) 1976 •
IPC / IPST early 1980s • • • •
Paprican 1983 • • •
Research
institute
STFI 1997 • • • • •
Beloit 1981 • •
1989 • •Valmet
19971 • • •
Escher Wyss ~ 1990 • • •
Machine
supplier
Voith ~ 1990 • • •
Weyerhaeuser [C1] 1987 • •Paper
maker Union Camp [C3] 1994 • •
US Department of Energy 1985 • •
National Resources Canada 1988 • •
Govt.
R&D
support NUTEK 1989 / 1996 • •
1
 Valmet is involved in STFI’s major R&D programme on impulse technology (member dues). After
R&D programme is finished, Valmet can reconsider its role in developing impulse technology.
Table 1 illustrates that the new dewatering mechanisms impulse technology appealed
to both machine suppliers and national pulp and paper research institutes. Although
the research institutes stated explicitly that energy efficiency was a major argument
for engaging in impulse R&D, the decisive arguments were in fact the increased
machine speed and reduced capital intensity that would result from the new
technology. As time went on, paper properties were increasingly mentioned as the
most attractive characteristic of impulse technology.
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Table 2 gives an overview of actors’ arguments for ceasing to play an active role in
developing impulse technology. Table 2 also includes the reasons why the four
attempts for commercialising impulse technology had failed (so far).
Table 2: Arguments for stopping the development of impulse technology.
Actor Time
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Wahren (STFI / KTH) 1973 •Wahren
Wahren (KMW) 1978 •
IPC / IPST 1999 •
Paprican 1994 •
Research
institute
STFI still active
Beloit 1999 •
1990 •Valmet
still active
Escher Wyss ~ 1990 •
Machine
supplier
Voith ~ 1990 •
Weyerhaeuser [C1] 1989    • 1
Newsprint [C2] 1994 • •
Union Camp [C3] 1995 •
Paper
maker
Board [C4] 1999    • 2
1
 Weyerhaeuser lost interest because there was no improvement in the strength of heavy-weight.
Delamination hampered further commercialisation [Woo, 2001].  2 Beloit and Union Camp did not
agree on the financial terms to cover Union Camp’s risk in the 3-partite attempt to achieve
commercialisation. DOE had granted support for commercialisation.
In the early 1990s, the uncertainties (and thus business risks) were too high for three
of the four major machine suppliers to continue private R&D (see Table 2). Only
Beloit continued its R&D activities. There was scepticism within Beloit regarding
the feasibility of impulse technology, especially after the failed commercialisation
attempt in 1987-89 (with Weyerhaeuser, [C1]) and 1994 (after ending R&D activities
with Paprican [C2]). However, management permitted Jere Crouse to continue R&D
as a high-risk project for a relatively small investment [Crouse, 2000; Orloff, 2000;
Busker, 2000; Sobzcynski, 1998]. Beloit’s R&D activities came to an end when its
mother firm filed for bankruptcy.
Table 2 indicates that two of the three national pulp and paper research institutes
finished their R&D activities when they succeeded in bringing the technology to the
stage to which they had committed themselves (and they were supported to by their
member firms). In both cases, other R&D projects took priority [Pikulik, 1998;
Orloff, 2000].
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How much money is spent and by whom?
Table 3 summarises the expenditure on impulse technology R&D by the two micro-
networks (figures based on available data).
Table 3: R&D expenditure and government R&D support.
MN Actor Period Total
[M US$]
Gov.
support
[M US$]
% Government R&D support
granted by:
IPC/IPST 1984 –1996
1996 –1999
15.8
21.3 - 1.5
13.3
10.6
10.9
60
10
60-70
US Department of Energy
Electrical Power Research
Institute and US paper
association AF&PA
US Department of Energy
Paprican 1983 –1988
1988 –1994
n.a.
38.0
n.a.
3.6 45
Partly funded by Canadian
Electricity Association
National Resources Canada
N
or
th
 
A
m
er
ic
an
Beloit 1981 –1996
1996 –1999
4several
millions
11.5
-
11.0
-
66 US Department of Energy
STFI Rebuild
PPM
1997-2002?
54.8
5
~ 10
n.a.
51.8
2.4
5
~4
n.a.
37.5
50
40
n.a
NUTEK
Wallenberg Foundation (and
Elforsk)
NUTEK
Joule / European Commission
Valmet 6n.a. - -
LTH 7< 0.5 n.a. n.a. Partly supported through
NUTEK and Joule / European
Commission
ST
FI KTH 8 0.2 0.1 ~50 Partly supported through Joule /
European Commission
KCL 1990/91 n.a. n.a. n.a. Technology Development
Centre Finland TEKES
HUT 1996/97 90.035 0.035 100 Technology Development
Centre Finland TEKES
Total
 32 14
3
Government R&D support
Other external support
Total estimate 35-40 15
3
40 - 45
5 – 10
Government R&D support
Other external support
1
 [Robinson, 1998; Fleischman, 2000].  2 Estimate based on [Fleischman, 2000; Orloff, 1997]. IPST’s
member dues spent on impulse technology: 2.5 to 3.0 million US$ [Orloff, 2000].  3 [CETC, 1999].  4
Only rough expenditure available for entire time period [Crouse, 1998].  5 The finance relating to
impulse technology R&D for 2002 is not clear yet [Fastmark, 2000; Bäckström, 2000].  6 Not willing
to give an estimate [Talja, 2000].  7 Own estimate.  8 [Norman, 2000].  9 [Paltakari, 2000].
Table 3 shows that most of the total expenditure goes on research and development
work at three national pulp and paper research institutes (80 to 90%) and at Beloit (5
to 10%). Government contribution is 40 to 45% of the total expenditure. Other
external supporters are responsible for 5 to 10% of the total expenditure.
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It is interesting to note that in the US, Canada and Sweden, the research institutes of
the electricity utilities made a contribution to the development of impulse technology
because it will increase the use of electricity in paper-making.
The data in Table 3 give an indication of the differences in the cost of laboratory
presses and pilot paper machines. The cost ratio is 1 to 20-30. We estimate that a
commercial impulse press nip is 2 to 3 times more expensive than the nip in the pilot
paper machine.
What important decisions are made with regard to the direction of technological
development?
Various national pulp and paper research institutes focused their R&D activities on
various paper grades. In North America, the major reason for preferring a specific
grade was the commercial importance of that grade in the institute’s country. There
was also an agreement to spread the R&D activities over different grades [Pikulik,
2000; Orloff, 2000].
Materialisation
What is the rate of development and what steps in up-scaling can be distinguished?
It took more than 25 years for impulse technology to reach the stage it has reached
today. Figure 3 shows that laboratory presses are still being used in addition to pilot
paper machines. Figure 3 shows that Wahren started to use a pilot paper machine in
1978 [Wahren, 1998]; Beloit in 1987 (No. 2) and 1995 (No. 4); Paprican in 1989 and
STFI in 1997. They all rebuilt existing pilot paper machines. IPST did not have a
pilot paper machine at its disposal and thus depended on other actors for R&D
activities on the pilot scale [Sobczynski, 1998; Crouse, 1998; Orloff, 2000].
Wahren, Beloit and Paprican needed 5 to 6 years to start pilot paper machine testing
(see Figure 3). STFI skipped the laboratory scale R&D activities; but the Swedish
universities LTH and KTH are closely co-operating with STFI. STFI did not
inaugurate their pilot paper machine until 1997, because impulse technology R&D
took off in Europe only after the first results were presented in North America. In
addition, the shoe press had become a proven technology by then. Finally, it took
STFI time to arrange external support for rebuilding the pilot paper machine [Talja,
2000; Hollmark, 2000; Backström, 2000; Norman, 2000; Fastmark, 2000].
Delamination is the major bottleneck that affected the materialisation of impulse
technology. Although signs of delamination of the paper sheets were noticed during
IPC/IPST’s laboratory scale experiments (see e.g. [Arenander and Wahren, 1983]),
the full impact of delamination first became apparent in Beloit’s No. 2 pilot paper
machine ([C1] in Figure 3). Delamination led to a continuous interest in laboratory
presses (both platen presses and roll presses) as a relatively cheap and easy route to
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perform experiments [Pikulik, 1998; Crouse, 2000; Orloff, 2000]. Many methods
have been suggested for controlling delamination (see Table 4).
Table 4: Methods for preventing delamination [Larsson and Stenström, 1998;
Orloff, 1997].
Year Source Actor Method
1989 [Crouse et al., 1989] Beloit and
IPST
Use low basis weight
1990 [Stenström, 1990; Pulkowski et al.,
1989; Pulkowski et al., 1992]
LTH
Beloit
Vapour flow should be made
possible during contact in the
press nip
1992-94 [Orloff, 1992a; Orloff, 1992b] IPST Decrease the heat flux
1992-94 [Boerner and Orloff, 1994; Orloff and
Lindsay, 1992; Orloff, 1994]
IPST Increase the permeability of
the paper sheet
1993-98 [Orloff and Phelan, 1993; Larsson and
Stenström, 1998; Orloff, 1997c]
IPST
Lund
Optimise pressure profile of
shoe press
1998 [Larsson and Stenström, 1998] Lund Use peak pressure below the
critical pressure
1994-99 [Orloff et al., 1997a; Orloff et al.,
1997b; Orloff et al., 1997c; Orloff et
al., 1999a]
IPST Controlled depressurisation
after leaving press nip (post-
nip developments)
2000 [Nilsson and Norman, 2000] KTH Use a heated metal band
A new way of tackling the delamination problem with heavy-weight grades was
suggested by Orloff; post-nip developments were supposed to be needed to solve
delamination for heavy-weight grades. So far STFI had not pursued this route. There
is still no agreement on the best method for preventing delamination for different
paper grades. Research results are even contradictory.
In addition to these R&D activities, one should bear in mind that the development of
impulse technology did not occur in a vacuum. The introduction of the shoe press (in
1980 for heavy-weight grades and in 1994 for light-weight grades), the availability of
new roll cover materials and the development of temperature resisting felts have all
been important in the continued development of impulse technology [Crouse, 2000;
Orloff, 2000].
Beloit’s and Weyerhaeuser’s success with the innovation of the shoe press made
them eager to explore the commercial possibilities of impulse technology in 1987
(see [C1] in Figure 3). Their attempt failed due to delamination. Later attempts to
commercialise impulse technology also failed; but this time it was because light-
weight paper manufacturers were not yet familiar with shoe press technology (see
[C2] in Figure 3).
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What are the perceived performance characteristics of the technology?
The majority of the publicly available R&D results are based on laboratory-scale
equipment, especially platen presses (see Table 4 and Table 5). The results of pilot
machine experiments remain unpublished because of their proprietary nature.
Before discussing the changes in impulse technology’s performance characteristics,
we want to stress that it is difficult to extrapolate the research results from laboratory
platen presses to a paper machine [Pikulik, 1998; Orloff, 1997]. Laboratory platen
presses, laboratory roll presses and pilot paper machines differ in their geometry,
which causes variation in stress distributions over the paper sheet [MacGregor,
1989]. A recent paper (see [Orloff and Larsson, 2000]) compares some laboratory
platen measurements with the results based on pilot paper machine experiments.
Whereas the trends in lab-scale experiments are generally observed in pilot scale
experiments, the differences in actual measurements are considerable [Orloff and
Larsson, 2000]. One should be aware of the uncertainties in such data when they are
used to prove the future potential of the technology or when they are used in, for
instance, bottom-up energy-efficiency studies (see e.g. [De Beer, 1998]).
The promise of impulse technology’s dewatering capacity reported by Arenander and
Wahren in 1983 was extraordinary. However, it appears that this promising
performance characteristic gradually decreased as time passed [Orloff, 2000; Talja,
2000]. Table 5 and Table 6 give an overview of R&D results on dryness and energy
use.
Table 5 clearly shows that the dryness decreases over time: the experimental results
of Beloit’s pilot paper machine (No. 4) are modest when compared to Wahren’s
original suggestions. Table 6 shows the wide ranges in the energy consumption data
reported. The ranges show that the potential for improving ‘industrial energy
efficiency’ during the development of impulse technology has been a constructed
advantage rather than a proven fact. Now that induction heating systems are being
used in the impulse press nip, energy savings have become questionable [Orloff,
2000; Crouse, 2000; MacGregor, 2000].
Both tables illustrate that Wahren’s original hypothesis that impulse technology’s
dewatering capacity (and thus improved energy efficiency) could be attributed to a
vapour front displacing liquid water is still controversial and is still being debated
[Larsson, 1999; Rigdahl et al., 2000; Orloff, 2000; Talja, 2000].
Actors’ arguments for investing in the development of impulse technology changed
over time. Whereas Wahren emphasised the dewatering potential of impulse
technology, the current focus trend is to stress that impulse technology’s
breakthrough will be motivated by improvements in paper properties instead of and
increased dewatering capacity [MacGregor, 2000; Orloff, 2000; Crouse, 2000;
Bäckström, 2000]. It is interesting to note that these are arguments that are likely to
persuade government to support the development of impulse technology.
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Table 5: Improvements in dryness at the exit of the press nip1.
Source Actor Equip-
ment
Grade
[gr/m2]
Increase in
dryness2
[Arenander and Wahren, 1983] IPC/IPST Lab 45 10 – 20
[Lavery, 1988] IPC/IPST Lab 125 - 205 10 – 20
[Sparkes and Poirier, 1990a] Paprican Lab 45 8
[Orloff, 1992c] IPST Lab 205 2 – 6
[Orloff et al., 1995] IPST Lab 205 3 – 8
[Orloff and Crouse, 1999] IPST and Beloit Pilot 126 4 – 13
[Orloff et al., 1999a] IPST and Beloit Pilot 160 3 – 4
[Rigdahl et al., 2000] STFI Pilot n.a. No data reported
1
 Various actors experimented with different paper grades. The increase in dryness differs between
grades. In light-weight grades the increase in dryness is usually larger [Norman, 2000].  2 In this
column, we compare the increase in dryness with a reference pressing technology. The exact reference
pressing technology differs among different sources. Sometimes ‘conventional pressing technology’ is
taken as a reference, sometimes single felted or double felted wet pressing experiments on the
equipment also used for impulse technology experiments are used as a reference.
Table 6: Energy use per kg water removed in the impulse press nip. An impulse
press nip will be inserted at the end of the wet pressing section to
increase the dryness of the paper sheet at the entrance to the drying
section. We thus compare the specific energy use in the impulse nip
with the energy needed for evaporating a kg water in a modern drying
section (about 3.000 – 3.500 kJ/kg H2O) [Larsson, 1999; Van
Lieshout, 1998].
Source Actor Equipment Energy use1
[kJ/ kg H2O]
[Lavery, 1987b] IPC/IPST Lab 1600 – 2300
[Sprague, 1987] IPC/IPST Lab 550 – 1400
[Macklem and Pulkowski, 1988] Beloit Lab 600 – 2000
[Lavery, 1988] IPC/IPST Lab 500 – 2300
[Sprague, 1989] IPC/IPST Lab 100 – 1500
[Sparkes and Poirier, 1990a] Paprican Lab 1500
[Orloff and Sobzcynski, 1993] IPST Lab 115 – 160
[Phelan et al, 1996]2 IPST Lab 200 – 800
[Orloff et al, 1999a]3 IPST and
Beloit
Pilot (No. 4) 1600 – 2000
[Larsson, 1999]4 LTH (STFI) Pilot 1300 – 3000
[Norman, 2000] KTH Lab 1300 – 2200
1
 Reported energy data are not given in primary energy units. Most laboratory-scale experiments do
not include heat losses. Currently electrically heated systems are used. It is technologically feasible to
use natural gas based heating systems, though induction based systems are preferred due to their high
energy fluxes (see e.g. [Sparkes and Poirier, 1990a; Van Lieshout, 2000; Hollmark, 2000].  2 Taken
from [Larsson, 1999].  3 Data derived from [Orloff et al., 1999a]. Beloit and IPST report that an
‘energy penalty’ is expected. The increase in strength improvements (and the reduced raw material
costs) must outweigh the increase in costs of the electricity needed. Energy use per ton paper will
increase when electricity is used to heat the shoe press: 170 kWh / ton paper (= 600 MJe) is needed to
heat the shoe press. Increased dryness (4%) will lead to steam savings of roughly 450-600 MJsteam /
ton paper [Orloff et al., 1999a].  4 Data including heat losses in experimental testing [Larsson, 1999].
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Beloit’s state-of-the-art pilot paper machine No. 4 did not generate results that were
convincing enough to persuade heavy-weight grade manufacturers to invest in the
first commercial impulse press nip; the improvements in strength were not exciting
enough to outweigh the energy penalty that was projected. Beloit and IPST did not
find any customers interested in applying impulse technology on a commercial scale
([C4] in Figure 3) [Orloff, 2000; Crouse, 2000].
Some people are of the opinion that the current results should be valued at this
moment in time21; it is generally agreed that further research is needed before
impulse technology can be declared a complete success. The current pilot paper
machines are considered to be the ‘first generation’ impulse presses only.
Suggestions have yet been made with regard to ‘second generation’ impulse presses.
The development of a ‘super-elongated’ nip should make it possible to control the
pressure profile for a longer time; this should prevent delamination, increase dryness
and improving paper properties such as strength (see e.g. [Larsson, 1999; Orloff and
Larsson, 2000; Orloff, 2000]).
This task is primarily in the hands of STFI; their R&D programme is likely to
continue till 2002. Valmet will co-operate and wait to see whether STFI’s results are
convincing enough to bring the technology to the market [Talja, 2000; Backström,
2000].
4.5. The effect of government R&D support
Now that we have analysed the historical development of impulse technology, we
can focus our attention on the effect of government R&D support.
Table 3 shows that the financial R&D support given by government to IPST,
Paprican and STFI (but also to other research institutes) has been substantial. The US
Department of Energy (DOE) financed 60 to 65% of the total expenditure on impulse
technology R&D activities in the US (not taking into account Beloit’s expenditure
between 1981 and 1995). The Canadian government supported 45% of impulse
technology research at Paprican. The Swedish NUTEK supported STFI’s impulse
technology research activities substantially; paying 37.5% and 40% of the costs of
rebuilding the pilot paper machine and the R&D programme, respectively.
All government support – from US, Canada, Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and
the European Commission – comes from budgets for industrial energy efficiency.
                                                
21
 Orloff claims that if the introduction of the cermet roll at Beloit’s No. 4 pilot paper machine had
gone more smoothly and if a 20 inch shoe press had been installed instead of a 12 inch shoe press,
results would have been more promising that they are now. Or in Crouse’s words (Beloit): “The
closed extended nip press (or shoe press) limited the length of the shoe so that a 40 ms nip could not
be built. Therefore we could not build a 20 inch shoe that could achieve the high strengths everyone
was looking for” [Crouse, 2000].
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Government support was generally justified on the grounds that impulse technology
is a ‘high-risk energy-efficient technology’ [Robinson, 1998; Sobczynski, 1998;
Pikulik, 1998; Fleischman, 1998; Fastmark, 2000; CETC, 1999; Paltakari, 2000;
Orloff, 1997]. The interest in impulse technology within the IEA is also explained by
the technology’s claimed energy efficiency [Boström, 1997].
Our first conclusion is that the availability of government R&D support was
important in bringing impulse technology to the state it has reached today.
The case study generates convincing evidence for this:
- DOE R&D support facilitated the anchoring of early impulse technology R&D
activities at IPC; without DOE’s support it would have been more difficult for
IPC to start impulse technology R&D.
- Without the DOE’s support of IPC/IPST, research would have progressed far
more slowly. It is also highly likely that the impulse project would have been
stopped at an earlier stage. The continuous stream of support meant that the
research activities were not fragmented [Orloff, 2000].
- After commercialisation failed in 1989, DOE continued to support IPST. This
allowed the continuation of research into finding a solution for the delamination
problem in heavy-weight grades (1988-1992). This provided a necessary
background for Beloit to renew its co-operation pick up working with IPST and
to reinforce working again on these grades in 1992/93 [Fleischman, 1998; Orloff,
2000; Crouse, 1998].
- DOE supported Beloit by supplying an impulse press for the new pilot paper
machine. Without DOE’s support the impulse press might never have been
installed. It would have been very difficult at that time to convince management
to invest another million US$ in an impulse press. IPST’s knowledge about
cermet coated rolls was critical in convincing Beloit’s R&D management that
such rolls were also suitable for use in regular (low temperature) pilot machine
testing. Without these rolls, it would have been almost impossible to get machine
time for impulse technology trials at the pilot paper machine [Crouse, 1998;
Orloff, 2000].
- In the absence of government support, Paprican would have had to scale down its
efforts and limited its activities to laboratory scale equipment. This would have
produced less valuable results [Pikulik, 1998].
- Paprican’s activities were closely related to Beloit’s private R&D activities. It
was in Beloit’s interest to be involved closely with Paprican for two reasons; first
of all Beloit did not have a pilot paper machine with two press nips (required for
light-weight grades); secondly, Beloit’s Rockton lab did not have the budget to
install an extra press nip in Beloit’s existing pilot paper machine [Crouse, 2000;
Orloff, 2000].
- The research activities at the US and Canadian national pulp and paper research
institutes served as an important support role for Crouse who was the main
champion of impulse technology at Beloit [Orloff, 1997; Sobczynski, 1998].
Particularly after the delamination issue had been identified as a stumbling block,
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the development of impulse technology did not have a high priority at Beloit
[Orloff, 2000; Busker, 2000]. The co-operative efforts with IPST and Paprican
and the results achieved helped Crouse to convince others (within Beloit) to
continue research activities in that area [Orloff, 2000]. There were sceptics within
Beloit, but as a result of the co-operation with Paprican and IPST there was
always enough interest and funding for work to continue. Paprican and IPST
could bring life to the project with some more research-oriented work, while
Beloit could pursue the development work [Crouse, 2000].
- Beloit co-operated with Paprican on light-weight grades and with IPST on heavy-
weight grades. Attending to research funding and solving the delamination
problem were the two key issues during the development of impulse technology.
Co-operation with IPST and Paprican was a way of dealing with both issues
[Crouse, 2000].
- STFI would not have started the impulse technology R&D programme without
NUTEK’s R&D support. NUTEK’s support also facilitated the acquisition of
additional financial resources to finance the rebuilding of the pilot paper machine
[Bergström, 2000; Bäckström, 2000; Norman, 2000; MacGregor, 2000;
Hollmark, 2000; Wahren, 2000; Fastmark, 2000]. External support for rebuilding
the pilot paper machine was decisive for initiating a major R&D programme
regarding impulse technology.
- We doubt whether Valmet would have re-started impulse technology R&D
activities without STFI. However, there is no hard proof for this [Talja, 2000].
In concluding that the availability of government R&D support has been important,
we must add two important comments.
First of all, the availability of this support certainly influenced the rate of
development though it is not yet certain whether impulse technology will lead to
improved energy efficiency in paper production. Clearly, this was governments’
ultimate stake.
Secondly, the continued effect of R&D support was dependent on the existing
relationships and co-operation between the actors in the micro-networks. Actors’
resources, equipment and capacities were complementary. People knew each other
very well. Without these close interactions, the effect of government R&D support
would have been far less effective.
Our second conclusion regarding the effect of government R&D support is that in the
impulse technology case the strategy and decisions of the national pulp and paper
research institutes were instrumental in the acquisition and utilisation of government
R&D support. The national pulp and paper research institutes strongly influenced the
decisions that were made regarding the development of impulse technology.
There is evidence that governments played a rather dependent role:
- IPC/IPST continued to stress the advantages of impulse technology and
continued to forecast that impulse technology would be commercialised within a
few years. The institute was careful to remain secretive about things they did not
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want to talk about (for instance development of the cermet rolls and the post-nip
developments). DOE continued its support for 14 years; it wanted impulse
technology to become a success22 [Crouse, 1998; Pikulik, 1998; Wahren, 2000;
Orloff, 2000].
- In Canada, one of the conditions of government R&D support to Paprican was
that if the research project was successful, the technology would be implemented
on a commercial newsprint machine in Canada. The Canadian government could
not force Paprican or Beloit or any of the Canadian newsprint manufacturers to
comply with this condition.
- NUTEK showed patience; the idea for impulse technology R&D in Sweden was
launched in 1988; a proposal was not submitted until 1996. NUTEK’s interest in
impulse technology, STFI’s wish to rebuild the pilot paper machine and reinforce
its position as a leading pulp and paper research institute, additional external
financial support needed for rebuilding the pilot paper machine and Valmet’s
membership of STFI all happened to coincide [Norman, 2000; MacGregor, 2000;
Orloff, 1997; Bergström, 2000; Wahren, 2000; Hollmark, 2000].
- The intended co-operation within the IEA was doomed to failure because of the
ties between national pulp and paper research institutes and member firms and
suppliers. The R&D being done was beyond the pre-competitive level. Whereas
international co-operation is often suggested as a way of improving the
effectiveness of national energy R&D and demonstration programmes, the actual
success of co-operation is highly dependent on the stakes of the actors in the
technology network.
We are not suggesting that government’s dependency on research institutes is a
problem. Such research institutes are generally better informed than government
about the potential of a technology and better aware of the needs of their member
firms. But undesirable situations may arise, because the research institutes depend on
government’s R&D support for continuing their research effort. There is a danger
that the R&D activities drive the government R&D support instead of the other way
around23. The paper technology case clearly illustrates that national pulp and paper
research institutes interests have more reasons than government for introducing a
high-tech energy-efficient technology:
                                                
22
 Very recently, Orloff (2000) wondered whether IPST’s R&D activities regarding impulse
technology should have continued for so long. The major lesson that IPST learned from the impulse
technology project is that a thorough analysis of the economic consequences of the technology on a
full-scale commercial paper machine should be made during an earlier phase of an R&D project
[Orloff, 2000].
23
 Some of the experts who commented on the draft version of the article had fundamental critics on
government R&D support in developing impulse technology. If the technology cannot prove its
commercial viability itself, the legitimacy of government support can be questioned.  People should
develop innovative technology for profit, not in order to get funding for something that is not viable.
This comment clearly summarises the main difficulty in granting R&D support. Sometimes, it can be
legitimate to support an innovative idea that is not taken up directly by industry.  But there is a risk
involved in supporting so-called second rate projects, which will never be commercialised because
profits turn out to be too low.
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- Impulse technology was generally presented to government as an energy saver.
The experts all agree that energy efficiency alone would never justify R&D
expenditure on impulse technology and that paper manufacturers would never
invest in such a technology (even if proven successful) solely on the grounds of
energy efficiency. We are not implying that researchers have been misleading
governments when calculating potential energy-efficiency improvements, but we
know that researchers are inclined to stress the parameters of the innovative
technology that appeal to the actors addressed. When speaking to government,
they stress energy savings; when speaking to paper or board manufacturers they
stress paper properties or increased dryness [Orloff, 1997; Sobczynski, 1998;
Pikulik, 1998; Wahren, 1998; Fastmark, 2000; MacGregor, 2000; Backström,
2000].
- Clearly, the value of upgrading pilot paper machines goes well beyond one
specific R&D effort only. Institutes realise that pilot paper machines are an
important way in which they can supply services to member companies and thus
generate income. Renewal of pilot paper machines is of strategic importance
[Pikulik, 1998; Orloff, 2000; Fastmark, 2000; Hollmark, 2000].
Government showed itself rather patient and persistent in stimulating impulse
technology R&D. Some argue that government was too patient and that government
should have been more circumspect in evaluating the potential of the technology.
Others argue that further R&D is still needed. However, the case study illustrates the
risk that government can run. Government should be rather careful about long-term
R&D support to specific technologies (which is in itself required in specific cases). If
support is continued for a long time, government has to be sufficiently critical in
evaluating the potential of the technology; some technologies may turn out to be
neither economically feasible nor energy-efficient.
4.6. Discussion
We collected the majority, more than 90%, of the articles and reports written on
impulse technology by consulting magazines, journals and conference proceedings.
IPST’s library (Atlanta, US) was visited. Written information had some limitations.
First of all, the majority of the articles came from IPST; hardly any from Paprican;
none from STFI or Valmet. Secondly, they generally cover ‘yesterday’s state-of-the-
art’ and do not give any competitive information; R&D results using pilot paper
machines are all secret and recent R&D results were kept secret until patents were
filed. A patent search was carried out to check the completeness of the technology
network. Sometimes the patents mention actors who are not mentioned in articles,
such as machine supplier Voith and paper manufacturer SCA. It is difficult to assess
the technological relevance of patents in view of the large number of patents issued
in connection with impulse technology.
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Besides consulting the written sources of information, we approached all the major
actors and questioned experts who were involved in impulse technology R&D.
Firms’ and research institutes’ stakes regarding impulse technology R&D were and
are still high. This not only limits the data available in written form, but it also
reduces the possibilities for gathering data via interviews with experts. Experts are
not always willing to give complete and frank responses. We were even warned that
‘The post-mortem is usually carried out when the projects are completed
(successfully or otherwise) and the people are free to discuss the subject” [Pikulik,
1998]. To circumvent this problem, this chapter was written in two stages. A
preliminary version of this chapter was written early in 1998 (see [Luiten and Blok,
1998]). In the second half of 2000, an update of the technology network was made by
consulting experts once more. Over these two years, the technology network had
changed considerably. We were able to collect more accurate data and reconfirm
insights that had been very speculative in 1998. This resulted in a robust analysis of
the network and a robust evaluation of the effect of government R&D support.
4.7. Conclusion
Impulse technology is considered to be an emerging innovative energy-efficient
technology. The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the effect of government R&D
support on the development of a specific energy-efficient technology.
More than 25 years of R&D and 15 years of government R&D support have not yet
resulted in an economically viable technology. Impulse technology has still not been
introduced on a commercial scale. After 10 years Douglas Wahren anchored R&D
activities at the US national pulp and paper research institute. From 1980 onwards, a
North American micro-network emerged. The US paper machine supplier Beloit
became interested and started R&D. Government support made it possible to
continue R&D at the US national pulp and paper research institute and to start R&D
at the Canadian national pulp and paper research institute. After the first laboratory
results were presented during the late 1980s and the shoe press became established
technology, R&D activities also took off in Europe. The Swedish national pulp and
paper research institute is currently the pivot of a micro-network in which the paper
machine supplier Valmet also plays a role.
Our first conclusion is that the availability of government R&D support was
important in bringing impulse technology to the state it has reached today. The
continued effect of government R&D support was dependent on the relationships
between the actors in micro-networks. Actors’ resources, equipment and capacities
were complementary. Government R&D support cannot be evaluated in terms of
energy saved, because the claimed energy-efficiency improvement is still being
debated.
Our second conclusion is that the strategy and decisions of national pulp and paper
research institutes were decisive in the acquisition and utilisation of government
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R&D support. Government was dependent on the research institutes, which led the
development of impulse technology. The research institutes in their turn depended on
government R&D support for continuing R&D activities. Government’s dependency
on sector research institutes is not necessarily a problem. These actors are generally
better at assessing the potential of innovative technologies and the needs of paper
manufacturers. However, undesirable situations may arise if government supports a
specific technology for too long a period without checking critically on progress and
potential performance characteristics. There is a danger that the R&D activities drive
the government R&D support instead of the other way around.
So far, government R&D support has not resulted in a technology that generates a
cost advantage and that makes paper manufacturers willing to run the risk of being
the first in the field. In fact its energy-efficiency potential is still under debate, the
original dewatering mechanism is still not proven, and improvements in paper
properties – which are currently believed to be the key to proving the technology’s
feasibility  – are not convincing.
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Chapter 5
Strip casting technology
Abstract
Strip casting technology is the most recent innovative steel casting technology that
integrates casting and rolling; thus, re-heating the steel is avoided. In this case
study, we evaluate the effect of government R&D support on the development of strip
casting technology.
The original roots of strip casting technology go back to the 19th century. Bessemer,
one of the classical inventors of the steel industry, applied for a patent in 1857. After
renewed interest in strip casting technology arose between 1980 and 1985, a robust
and large technology network emerged. The eleven micro-networks were remarkably
homogeneous, a large steel-maker and a machine supplier or engineer. The steel
manufacturers took the lead. Six of the eleven micro-networks are still active. Three
of them operate strip casting technology on an industrial scale. They needed about
fifteen years to achieve this state.
The major argument for developing strip casting technology has been the need to
reduce the capital intensity of hot rolling. This is especially attractive for small-
capacity facilities such as mini-mills and stainless steel facilities. Bessemer was
already aware of the huge advantages of direct casting. The introduction of
conventional continuous casting (1952), maturing of this conventional technology,
the steel crises in the seventies, and the rise of stainless steel and mini-mills had to
occur before strip casting technology became the centre of casting R&D activities.
Between 1975 and 1985, technologists started looking for more compact casting
technologies.
Various national governments and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
contributed 5 to 10% of the total expenditure. In three micro-networks, R&D support
was more than 40%. These micro-networks stopped R&D activities or deliberately
continued on a pilot scale. The three micro-networks that are ahead in developing
strip casting technology did not obtain any external R&D support.
The major conclusion of this chapter is that the effect of government R&D support
on the development of strip casting technology has been minimal. The development
proved to have a strong momentum of its own. Strip casting affects the core of steel
business; its development was loosely influenced by energy-efficiency improvements
or by government R&D support.
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5.1. Introduction
Improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing industries is seen as one of the
important options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions [IPCC, 1996; UN, 1997].
As a major consumer of energy, the iron and steel industry is always mentioned as a
sector where energy efficiency needs to be encouraged. Many steel technologies
have been investigated with regard to their techno-economic potential for bringing
about energy-efficiency improvement [De Beer et al., 1994; WEC, 1995; IWG,
1997]. There is an increasing interest in the long-term potential of innovative energy-
efficient technologies. De Beer (1998) has performed work in this area. He identified
several innovative energy-efficient technologies for the iron and steel industry. Long-
term savings of 35 to 60% should be achievable [De Beer, 1998]. Financial R&D
support for the development of such innovative energy-efficient technologies is often
suggested as an attractive strategy for government to reduce CO2 emissions (see e.g.
[Blok et al., 1996; De Beer, 1998]). However, very little is known about the effect of
R&D support on the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies.
The aim of this chapter is to evaluate the effect of R&D support on the development
of an energy-efficient technology. For this purpose, we make a detailed investigation
of the networks within which strip casting technology, the most recent innovative
casting technology for the steel industry, is developed. Strip casting technology is an
interesting case study because both energy-analysts and policy makers consider strip
casting technology as one of the major innovative energy-efficient technologies for
the iron and steel industry.
In Section 5.2, we briefly introduce the steel industry, the steel production process
and strip casting technology. Subsequently, the historical development of strip
casting technology is mapped. Section 5.3 sketches the early days of the
technology’s development up till 1985. In Section 5.4, we describe the more recent
R&D history of strip casting technology. In mapping this history we present
elements, which are of interest to our analysis of the case study. This analysis is
worked out in more detail in Section 5.5. A short discussion of the validity of the
analysis is included in Section 5.6. Section 5.7 zooms in on the role of government
R&D support. The chapter closes with conclusions about the effect of R&D support
in stimulating the development of strip casting technology.
5.2. The sector, the production process and strip casting
technology
Iron and steel industry
The production of iron and steel increased substantially after the Second World War.
In 1945 worldwide steel production was about 100 millions tons; in 1997 more than
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790 millions tons crude steel were produced [IISI, 1998b]. Large integrated steel
mills that produced up to 5 million tons steel/year met the huge demand for steel.
From 1970 onwards, prospects deteriorated. World steel prices were forced
downwards. Over-capacity, the oil crises during the seventies, the privatisation of
former national steel companies, and the growing competition from other materials,
forced the steel market to change from a supplier’s market to one that was dominated
more and more by demand [Holschuh, 1995; Berg, 1996; Vrieling, 1998].
Restructuring was needed and the key-words became efficiency, just-in-time-
management, and competitiveness. Quality and flexibility became more important
[Birat, 1992; Hamels, 1995; Berg, 1996; IISI, 1998a; Abbel, 1999].
The changed market situation affected R&D within the steel industry. On the one
hand process R&D continued; more compact technologies with a lower capital
requirement were required. On the other hand product R&D became more important.
Co-operative developments with customers (and suppliers) were undertaken [Berg,
1996; Holschuh, 1995; Hamels, 1995; Abbel, 1999; Birat, 1999b].
Steel firms spend about 2.5 billion US dollars annually on R&D [OECD, 1997]. On
average, this represents roughly 1% of sales. Integrated steel-makers in industrialised
countries often spend more than 1% of their sales on R&D. Small firms spend less.
Firm’s operating mini-mills undertake almost no R&D1 [Holschuh, 1995].
Making steel
There is a wide variety of grades of steel. For the purpose of this chapter, we make a
distinction between carbon steel and stainless steel. Carbon steel is steel that relies on
the carbon content for its structure and properties. Most of the steel produced is
carbon steel. Stainless steel2, one of the specialty steels, contains more than 10.5%
chromium and sometimes other elements. Stainless steel resists corrosion and
maintains its strength at high temperatures. Worldwide stainless steel production is
about 2% of the world wide crude steel production, which was 776 million tons in
1998 [IISI, 1998b].
The production process for all these grades is to a large extent the same. Differences
occur in the last two stages of the steel production process. In total there are four
stages:
1. Production of iron
2. Crude steel production
3. Casting into semi-finished products (blooms, billets and slabs)
                                                
1
 Mini-mills are small-scale steel mills that melt scrap, using electric arc furnaces, to produce
commodity products. Mini-mills differ from integrated steel mills with regard to their minimum
annual output, labour relations, product markets, and management style [AISI, 2000]. In 1997, over
33% of the annual steel production was manufactured in mini-mills [IISI, 1998b].
2
 Stainless steel production has increased rapidly in the last decades of the 20th century: over 16
million tons of finished stainless steel were produced in 1997, compared to 13 million tons in 1988, an
increase of more than 23 per cent. The largest stainless steel-producing countries are Japan (nearly 4
million tons), the United States (2 million tons), and Germany, Republic of Korea, Italy and France,
each of which produced over 1 million tons of finished stainless steel in 1997 [IISI, 1998b].
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4. Rolling and shaping final products – hot rolling, cold rolling and finishing
operations
The production process is energy intensive due to the chemical reaction energy
required in the production of iron, the need for high temperatures and for several re-
heating and cooling steps. Such heating and cooling steps can be avoided by using
technologies that combine two or three processes. Such technologies can
substantially reduce the energy required to produce one ton of steel [De Beer, 1998;
IISI, 1998a].
Strip casting technology
This chapter focuses on strip casting technology. Strip casting does away with the
need for re-heating that is still required nowadays when the cast slabs (stage 3) are
further processed to final products (stage 4). Strip casting technology permits the
production of hot strips, also referred to as hot rolled coiled steel, directly from the
liquid crude steel. Casting and rolling are linked into one continuous operation.
Strip casting technology is the most recent innovative casting technology and (thus
far) the last technology in realising direct casting. We use the generic term direct
casting to denote casting in sizes that are as close as possible to final products. In this
chapter, we show that direct casting has been realised in a step-wise fashion: the
thickness of the sheet or strip cast has been reduced by three innovative technologies,
conventional continuous casting, thin slab casting and strip casting technology (see
Figure 1).
Figure 1: Technological development in the casting and rolling stages of the
steel production process: ingot casting, conventional continuous
casting, thin slab casting and strip casting technology.
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Before 1960 all liquid crude steel was cast in ingots. After cooling the ingots were
reheated and processed into semi-finished products such as slabs, blooms and billets.
Continuous casting technology allowed liquid steel to solidify directly into these
semi-finished products. A continuous process replaced the traditional batch process
of pouring ingots first. Continuous casting avoided large capital expenditure on
soaking pits and breakdown mills.
The introduction of thin slab casting (1989) let the liquid steel be cast in thinner slabs
(see Figure 1). Blooms and billets cannot be produced with a thin slab caster. Thin
slab casting technology integrates casting and the finishing operations in the hot
rolling section of a steel plant. The cast slabs are charged directly into a reheater and
subsequently fed into the hot rolling mill. The reheating capacity for hot rolling the
slabs is thus reduced.
Strip casting technology makes it possible to cast the liquid steel in sizes that are
even closer to final products. Note that this limits the range of final products that can
be produced [Schors, 1996].
In a strip caster, a ladle is filled with liquid crude steel. The crude steel flows into the
tundish, in which the steel is buffered and the temperature is controlled. The tundish
feeds the liquid steel through a nozzle to the mould. The mould, which has a capacity
of about one hundred litres, is composed of one or two casting rolls. The rolls are
water-cooled. To achieve high productivity, high casting speeds are required (see
Figure 1).
There are three technical difficulties in developing strip casting technology, namely
edge containment, liquid steel feeding to the mould and properties of the rolls.
The first difficulty is related to the edges or the lateral sides of the mould. These
should form a perfect seal with the rotating rolls to prevent leakage. Premature
solidification at the edges should be avoided. This causes a poor quality at the edges
of the strip (leading to yield losses) and inhibit continuous casting.
A second difficulty is that the liquid steel should be fed to the mould in such a way
that the level of steel in the mould remains constant. A perfectly even level has to be
maintained to prevent surface defects and irregularities in the thickness of the strip.
Thirdly, the rolls that form the mould need specific attention. On the one hand they
are extreme heat exchangers (8-15 MW/m2) that should be able to handle enormous
temperature differences (200-300 ºC/cm). On the other hand they need to produce
crack-free strips that vary in thickness by less than 30 µm.
The major advantage of strip casting technology is that the capital expenditure for
producing hot rolled coils will be considerably lower than for a conventional casting
and rolling mill: the capital-intensive hot strip mill is no longer needed3. Total capital
expenditure will be a factor 4 to 10 lower [Birat et al., 1995; Hendricks, 1995;
Lindorfer et al., 1993; Schors, 1996]. The capital costs per ton steel are estimated to
                                                
3
 Flemming et al. (1988) indicate that in the case of conventional continuous casting about 70% of the
capital expenditure is spent on the hot rolling mill.
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be about 40% lower than for conventional casting and rolling operations [Hendricks,
1995; Schors, 1996]. Experts indicate that the operating costs per ton steel are subject
to a larger uncertainty primarily due to uncertainties in material costs due to
requirements to the roll materials and the problems in edge containment [Lindorfer et
al., 1993]; Birat et al., 1995].
Energy costs will decrease. Strip casting technology considerably reduces the energy
needed to cast one ton of steel4. Because energy costs are only a small part of the
operating costs of the casting and rolling stages (see also [Schors, 1996]), the energy
cost saving is modest [Senk, 2000; Cramb, 2000]. We estimate that the energy cost
saving is an order of magnitude lower than total cost saving5.
Strip casting technology leads to considerable strategic advantages for relatively
small steel firms, i.e. 0.5 million ton steel / year. Most stainless steel firms are
relatively small. Such firms do not have a hot rolling mill at their sites: the capital
costs per ton steel are too high to be competitive. The lower capital expenditure of
strip casting allow such firms to process the cast steel into final products themselves.
Outsourcing is no longer required. Storage facilities are no longer needed. Semi-
finished products do not have to be transported to a hot rolling mill. Throughput
times and costs for planning and transport are considerably reduced. Strip casting
technology also opens up the cold rolled market for mini-mills [Millbank, 1995;
Hendricks, 1995; Birat, 1992].
Finally, some people argue that strip casting technology creates opportunities for the
development of new products [Senk, 2000; Robson and Thompson, 1995; Millbank,
1995; Anonymous, 1994].
                                                
4
 IISI (1998a) estimates the reference primary energy consumption in the casting and rolling stages
(using a conventional continuous caster, a re-heater and a rolling mill) to be 2.3 GJp/ton steel [IISI,
1998a, pp. 74, 100-102]. De Beer (1998) estimates that the primary energy needed for casting and
rolling is 2.4–2.7 GJp/ton steel. This is roughly 15% of the total primary energy requirement of an
integrated mill, i.e. 19 GJp/ton [De Beer, 1998, p. 150]. IISI (1998a) estimates that thin slab casting
technology consumes roughly 1.0 GJp / ton and that strip casting technology may consume 100 MJp /
ton [IISI, 1998a, pp. 196-197]. Thus, applying strip casting technology saves about 900 MJp per ton
steel compared to the thin slab casting route (based on [IISI, 1998a]). About 60 kWh less electricity is
needed. No fuel is required for reheating the furnaces, which is about 350 MJp / ton [IISI, 1998a].
Applying a strip saves about 2.0-2.5 GJ
 p per ton steel compared to conventional continuous casting
(based on [IISI, 1998a]). Recent performance data from the Krefeld caster indicate that strip casting
technology requires about 400 MJp per ton steel. At the Krefeld site, the reference energy for
conventional casting and rolling is 3.2 GJp [Walter et al., 2000].
5
 It is difficult to make a precise calculation of the savings in energy costs as a percentage of total cost
savings. First of all, there are differences in the cost structure of carbon steel and stainless steel.
Secondly, there are differences in cost structure of steel manufactured in an integrated mill or in a
mini-mill. Sources indicate that the total cost savings achieved when a strip caster is introduced at a
stainless steel site are 2 to 5 times higher than when a strip caster is introduced at a carbon site
[Bagsarian, 1998]. The costs of producing one ton of carbon steel vary between 225-325 US$ / ton
(see e.g. [Hamels, 1995; Schors, 1996; Faurre, 1993; Daniels and Moll, 1998]). Variation is explained
by differences in the route to produce steel (integrated or mini-mill) and differences among
geographic regions [Faurre, 1993; Schors, 1996]. We estimate that casting and rolling in an integrated
mill cost around 100 US$ per ton steel [Schors, 1996; Lindorfer et al., 1993]. Casting and rolling in a
mini-mill is estimated to cost 50 to 60 US$ per ton. Around 40% of the costs are capital costs [Schors,
1996; Lindorfer et al., 1993]. Energy costs for casting and rolling in a mini-mill are less than 10% of
the operational costs [Schors, 1996].
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5.3. Historical development of strip casting technology
In this section, the historical development of strip casting technology is mapped up
till 1985. We start at the moment when none of the known forms of direct casting -
conventional continuous casting, thin slab casting, and strip casting technology – had
yet been applied commercially. The history is described in three steps: the history up
till 1940; the introduction of conventional continuous casting technology (1940-
1975); and the renewed R&D interest in casting technologies (from 1975 onwards).
Development of strip casting technology up till 1940
The idea of using a twin roll caster for casting strips directly from liquid steel
without any reheating attracted Sir Henry Bessemer’s attention as long ago as 1846
[Bessemer, 1891]. Bessemer was one of the important inventors in the steel industry
who made the production of cheap steel possible by the invention of the steel
converter [Jewkes et al., 1960]. With respect to strip casting technology, he started
from an existing patent describing twin roll casting of tin foil and lead. After doing
some experiments, he was so impressed with the importance of his invention, that he
immediately applied for a patent in 1857 [Bessemer, 1891]. Because Bessemer’s
invention of the steel converter was at that time judged as “ … an absolute failure.
One need not, therefore, be greatly surprised that the production of continuous
sheets direct from fluid iron did not excite a great amount of enthusiasm in the minds
of tin plate manufacturers of that day; in fact, the whole scheme was simply pooh-
poohed and laid aside, without any serious consideration of its merits” [Bessemer,
1891, p. 27]. Bessemer noted that there were difficulties in feeding the liquid steel to
the mould, with edge containment and properties of the cast strip. Since he felt his
idea was before its time and he was being pressed to make his steel converter work,
he did not continue with the development of strip casting technology [Cramb, 1989].
A sketch of Bessemer’s twin roll caster is shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Bessemer’s twin roll strip caster.
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Bessemer was aware of the activities of the American Edwin Norton. Norton had
sent him a parcel containing a small sample of a steel sheet that he claimed had been
cast in accordance with Bessemer’s idea [Bessemer, 1891]. In 1890, Norton
conducted experiments on twin roll casting using a pilot machine producing 3-5 mm
thick sheets [Cramb, 1989; Norton, 1940]. A fire in Norton’s factory and the
mechanical difficulties he encountered made Norton decide that further development
which required substantial investment was not justified [Norton, 1940].
It was not until the 1920s that any new research was done on Bessemer’s idea
[Hazelett, 1966]. Only a few projects are described in literature; of these Hazelett’s
activities were the most conspicuous6 [Cramb, 1989]. Hazelett picked up the idea and
successfully built a number of twin roll casters for the production of lead, aluminium
and brass strips [Hazelett, 1966; Cramb, 1989; Wolf, 1992]. Hazelett also produced
some cast steel, although problems with properties of the cast strip and with the roll
materials forced him to redesign his twin roll caster [Lippert, 1940; Hazelett, 1966;
Cramb, 1989]. First he tried to overcome these problems by switching to a single roll
caster [Lippert, 1940]. Again he encountered problems, like variability in strip
thickness, properties and edge containment. As a result Hazelett abandoned roll
casting processes in the 1940s. He concluded that a mould consisting of two moving
belts was the preferred casting method. Such a caster is nowadays known as the
Hazelett caster and is commercially for all kinds of metals but not steel [Hazelett,
1966].
1940-1975: Development of continuous casting
By 1940, all R&D activities on casting using a mould with rotating rolls were
terminated [Cramb, 1989]. By that time, the casting R&D efforts were focused on the
conventional continuous caster as suggested by Siegfried Junghans in 19277 [Jewkes
et al., 1960; Lippert, 1940; Wolf, 1992]. Junghans used a stationary mould for direct
casting, not rotating rolls as in a strip caster. The technology was first applied to a
brass plant in 1937. In 1952, Mannesman, a German machinery supplier, installed
the first continuous caster for steel. For a number of years continuous casting was
confined to small steel plants due to technical limitations. Only from 1970 onwards,
continuous casting was started to be used in integrated steel mills casting slabs
[Nasbeth and Ray, 1974; Nilles and Etienne, 1991]. With continuous casting it
became possible to cast semi-finished products directly. Substantial savings in both
capital and energy costs and a considerable increase in product yield were achieved
[Wolf, 1992].
From 1975 onwards: Renewed R&D interest beyond continuous casting
“Continuous casting (was) a strong paradigm of process innovation in the steel
industry from the 1950s to the 1980s” [Birat, 1999b, p. 1389]. However, from 1975
                                                
6
 In the same time as Hazelett’s work, a strip casting effort was underway in the USSR [Cramb, 1989].
7
 For an extensive description of the history of conventional continuous casting see [Wolf, 1992].
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onwards R&D activities concentrated on casting liquid steel in sizes that are even
closer to final products [Wolf, 1992; Birat, 1999b]. Steel-makers started to look for
innovative technologies that could extend the advantages of continuous casting. They
investigated many different moulds that would allow thinner casting. Not only
Hazelett belt casters, but also Bessemer’s suggestion of two rotating rolls were
picked up again. At least a hundred R&D efforts were started in the period 1975 –
1985 [Kubel, 1988; Tony, 1990; Birat et al., 1995; Cramb, 2000; Birat, 2000].
The Hazelett belt caster was a favourite mould among many steel firms8 [Senk, 2000;
Cramb, 2000]. This caster was already used in R&D during the 1960s [Cramb,
1989]. The technical problems that hampered the R&D activities in the 1960s were
not inherent to caster and renewed R&D efforts were initiated. However, again no
commercially viable technology emerged because machine suppliers succeeded in
developing and commercialising thin slab casting technology [Birat, 1999b]. The
German supplier SMS was the first to install a thin slab caster in 1989 at Nucor, an
American mini-mill operator. The funnel-shaped mould was new, the rest of the
design was basically the same as that of the conventional continuous caster [Cramb,
1989; Birat et al., 1995]. It was only a matter of time before other suppliers
commercialised their thin slab casters9. Steel firms stopped their R&D activities on
Hazelett casters; the Hazelett casters promised casting in the same thickness range
[Birat et al., 1995; Thompson, 2000; Senk, 2000].
The success of thin slab casting did not stop steel-makers from searching for
technologies realising even thinner casting. The R&D efforts that focused on
Bessemer’s strip casting technology were continued [Anonymous, 1993].
5.4. Recent development of strip casting technology
In this section, we sketch the more recent development of strip casting technology by
focusing in detail on the eleven micro-networks that can be distinguished since 1985.
The majority the strip casting R&D efforts that started between 1980 and 1985 were
terminated.
We use the terms hot model, pilot caster and industrial scale caster to denote the
different scales of the equipment used. A hot model denotes a small pilot plant.
Liquid supply is only a few hundred kilograms; strip width is typically 10–25 cm.
The term pilot caster is used to denote a caster with restricted liquid supply, but a
                                                
8
 Krupp Stahl (Germany), Mannesman (Germany) , British Steel (UK), Bethlehem Steel and US Steel
(US), Nucor (US), Nippon Steel Corporation and Mitsubishi, Kawasaki Steel, Kobe Steel, Sumitomo
Metals, and Hitachi Zosen (all Japan) (see e.g. [Kubel, 1988; Evans et al., 1988; Cramb, 1989; Tony,
1990; Birat and Steffen, 1991; Birat et al., 1995]).
9
 Mannesman (Germany), Voest Alpine Industrieanlagebau (Austria), Danieli (Italy) and Sumitomo
Heavy Industries (Japan) [Steffen and Tacke, 1999]. The introduction of thin slab casting facilitated
the increase of steel manufacturing in mini-mills, first in the US and later also in other countries [Birat
et al., 1995].
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larger strip width, i.e. 80-160 cm. An industrial scale caster has both a large liquid
supply, larger than 60 ton, and a larger strip width 80-160 cm.
Allegheny Ludlum (US) and Voest Alpine Industrieanlagebau (Austria)
During the early 1980s, the US steel-maker Allegheny Ludlum started to develop a
single roll caster for speciality steels. The major arguments were to do away with
expensive hot strip mills and to produce new grades of steel10 [McManus and Berry,
1993; Hess, 1991; McAloon, 1991; Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1988]. Allegheny
preferred a single roll caster, because of earlier R&D experience with rapid
solidification [Birat et al., 1995]. In 1984, Allegheny Ludlum surprised the steel
industry by claiming that they had been successful in strip casting. Allegheny’s claim
placed strip casting technology on the agenda of many boards of directors of steel-
making firms [Birat et al., 1995; Thompson, 2000; Cramb, 2000; Birat, 2000].
Voest Alpine Industrieanlagebau, an Austrian machine supplier, had been involved
in the development of thin both slab casting and strip casting technology since the
mid-1980s. The argument for developing both innovative technologies was the
potential capital savings [IISI, 1993]. Thin slab casting was not seen as the ultimate
direct casting technology and therefore Voest also performed single and twin roll
casting experiments [Hohenbichler, 2000]. Twin roll casting was found to be more
difficult than single roll casting. R&D activities focused on carbon steel [Birat and
Steffen, 1991; Kubel, 1988].
For continuing R&D activities, Allegheny needed a machine supplier that could
build a pilot caster. Voest was approached. Allegheny and Voest signed an
agreement in 1988. Voest’s experience with casting carbon steel complemented
Allegheny’s activities in the field of stainless steel. Aim of the joint effort was to
bring strip casting technology towards commercialisation. In 1988, the firms
expected that the process could be commercialised in the mid-1990s for stainless
steel [Ritt, 1998; McAloon, 1991; Lindorfer et al., 1993; Hess, 1993]. In 1990, a
decision was made to build a pilot caster at Allegheny’s Lockport site. The pilot
caster was called Coilcast [McAloon, 1991]. The firms claimed that capital costs and
operating costs could be reduced by 75% compared to the costs of conventional
casting and rolling [Hess, 1991; Lindorfer et al., 1993].
Coilcast had been tested for two years before it was suddenly shut down in 1994
[Schriefer, 1997]. Allegheny dropped all its R&D activities without any public
statement. There was no longer confidence that steel could be cast successfully. The
development had already taken more than 13 years [Williams, 1999; Schriefer, 1997;
Birat, 2000; Cramb, 2000].
                                                
10
 Allegheny Ludlum was driven by competition with Allied Signal. Allied Signal has a commercial
twin roll caster at its disposal (see [McManus, 1997]). Allied Signal aimed at producing a product that
could compete with a market that was served by Allegheny [Cramb, 2000].
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Armco (US)
In 1983, the US Department of Energy (DOE) decided to support feasibility studies
on strip casting technology. Allegheny Ludlum brought the technology to the
attention of DOE. DOE’s was interested, because of the substantial energy savings
expected. Allegheny Ludlum was not interested in government support. Their R&D
activities were beyond the stage of a feasibility study [Williams, 1999; Cramb,
1989]. Four teams did acquire R&D support for performing such a feasibility study.
One team consisted of Westinghouse, a producer of electronic consumer products,
and the US steel-maker US Steel. Westinghouse studied a single roll caster. In 1984,
Westinghouse was selected for a second phase study. DOE preferred this project
because it was targeted at carbon steels that promised the largest energy savings
potential. US Steel withdrew their contribution when they decided to invest in the
development of thin slab casting (also supported by DOE)11 [Kubel, 1988; Hess,
1991; Cramb, 1989]. Westinghouse approached Armco. Armco had attempted
casting R&D using a Hazelett caster and was interested to pursue the development of
a single roll caster [Cramb, 1989]. The contract was extended to a third (1988) and a
fourth contract (1991). Armco became the prime contractor [Isenberg-O’Loughlin,
1988]. DOE contributed around 12 million US$, 70% of the total expenditure.
Westinghouse and Armco retained the right to patent their findings [Willimas, 1999;
Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1994].
In late 1993, when Armco was half-way through the fourth contract, it suddenly
terminated its participation. The triggering event was that Armco’s carbon steel-
making division was sold. Armco became a firm producing specialty steels
[Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1994; Ritt, 1998; Sheridan, 1997]. Furthermore, R&D results
from other micro-networks made Armco believe that a twin roll caster was the
preferred solution [Cramb, 2000; Williams, 1999; Ritt, 1998].
Other R&D activities in the US
Not only Allegheny and Armco, but also other US steel firms explored strip casting
technology during the early eighties. Bethlehem Steel, for instance, started twin roll
casting R&D in 1981. Around 1986, they formed a partnership with Armco, as well
as with Weirton, and Inland Steel. Argonne National Laboratory financed by DOE
was involved in this effort to deal with the edge containment problem [Cramb, 1989;
Hess, 1991; Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1994; Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1988]. The effort
ended because they could not find a solution for this difficulty and could not cast
reproducible grades of steel [Birat et al., 1995; Kuster, 1996]. By the year 1994, all
strip casting R&D activities in the US were terminated.
In April 1998, US strip casting R&D was ‘restarted’. Carnegie Mellon University
(CMU) and the American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI) has started a 3-year multi-
                                                
11
 In 1984, DOE awarded US Steel and Bethlehem Steel a 30 million US$ grant to develop a thin slab
caster using a Hazelett caster [Kubel, 1988; Cramb, 1989; Hess, 1991].
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partner R&D project within the Industries of the Future Initiative of the US
Department of Energy. Research institutes, steel-manufacturers and machine
suppliers are involved12.  Aim of the project is to analyse the properties of strip cast
steel in order to assess the possibilities of producing new grades of steel and other
advantages of strip casting technology to the US steel industry [Cramb, 1998].
Usinor Sacilor (France) and Thyssen (Germany)
The French integrated steel-maker Usinor Sacilor started experimenting with strip
casting in the mid-80s [Grosjean et al., 1993]. Both single and twin roll casters were
investigated. After some numerical simulations and design concepts, Usinor decided
to build a hot model at the research institute IRSID in 198613. A twin roll caster was
found to be more promising [Birat and Steffen, 1991]. Between 1986 and 1990,
IRSID received some R&D support, 10 to 15%, via the research programme of the
European Community on Steel and Coal (ECSC) [Birat, 2000].
The German integrated steel-maker Thyssen started research on strip casting
technology around the same time as Usinor. Thyssen worked together with the
Institut für Bildsame Formgebung (RWTH) in Aachen. A hot model was available in
1988 [Grosjean et al., 1993]. Experiments were done on twin and single roll casters.
Thyssen also considered twin roll casting more promising [Simon et al., 1997].
Thyssen received some support by the German Bundesländer. Several projects were
supported by the ECSC though they did not specifically focus on strip casting, but
were also valuable for thin slab casting technology [Senk, 2000].
Thyssen and Usinor had co-operated in R&D before and in 1989 it was decided to
merge their R&D activities in strip casting technology14 [Grosjean et al., 1993;
Hendricks, 1995]. The argument was to share the investment costs of the pilot caster
[Birat, 1999a; Senk, 2000]. The joint venture is known as Myosotis. The pilot caster
was located at Isbergues, a stainless steel site of Usinor. The plant was built by the
French machine-builder Clecim. After a planning and construction period of 20
months, the first experiments started in June 1991 at a ladle capacity of 10 tons. The
ladle capacity was gradually increased. In October 1995, a complete ladle of 92 tons
was cast. The main interest was in the casting of stainless steel, but carbon and
silicon steel casting experiments were also performed.
During 1997 several articles on the results of the Myosotis project were published
(see e.g. [Legrand et al., 1997a; Legrand et al., 1997b; Simon et al., 1997]). By then,
the researchers were convinced that it was no longer the question whether the
                                                
12
 R&D institutes: CMU (US), Max Planck Institute (Germany). Associate organisation: AISI. Steel-
makers: AK Steel Corporation (US), British Steel R&D lab (UK), Dofasco (Canada), LTV Steel
Company (US), National Steel Corporation (US), US Steel / US X (US). Suppliers: SMS Steel (US),
Kvaerner Metals (US) [Cramb, 1998].
13
 IRSID used to be the R&D institute of the French national steel firms. It became Usinor’s corporate
R&D lab in 1988 [Birat, 1999a].
14
 Thyssen and Usinor also co-operated in the area of thin slab casting technology. Together with
SMS, a German machine supplier, they developed the Casting-Pressing-Rolling process [Birat et al.,
1995; IISI, 1998a].
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technology would have an industrial future, but only when it would become
operational [Legrand et al., 1997b].
Centro Sviluppo Materiali and Acciai Speciali Terni (Italy)
The steel research institute Centro Sviluppo Materiali15 (CSM) and the Italian steel-
maker Acciai Speciali Terni (AST) started strip casting R&D in 1985 [IISI, 1993;
CSM, 2000]. First, the feasibility of the process was studied. In a second phase
(1987-1988) a hot model was designed and constructed in Rome. There was then a
third phase in which a pilot caster was designed and built at AST’s steelworks in
Terni in 1989 [Shin, 1990; Birat and Steffen, 1991; Macci and Mollo, 1995]. The
Italian engineering firm INNSE was involved in constructing the pilot caster. In
1993, industrial operation was foreseen by the end of 1996 [IISI, 1993]. Some results
of the pilot caster were reported in 1995. However, surface quality did not meet the
requirements of its conventional equivalent [Macci and Mollo, 1995]. Until 1995,
AST and INNSE paid for the research done by CSM. The research at CSM was
partly supported by the ECSC, i.e. 20 to 30% of the budget [CSM, 2000].
In 1995, the Austrian machine-builder Voest Alpine joined the CSM/AST micro-
network as an equal partner. Voest became involved in upgrading the Terni facility
to the size of an industrial scale caster. Voest’s R&D experience in the former
partnership with Allegheny made them an attractive partner for CSM/AST [CSM,
2000; Hohenbichler, 2000]. During the summer of 1997, the Terni plant was supplied
with two new 30 ton ladles [Bagsarian, 1998]. Expenditure between 1995 and 1997
was considerably higher than in the period 1985 to 1995. In this phase, no further
application was made for ECSC support [CSM, 2000]. One did obtain financial
support by the European Commission (EC) for building a new industrial scale caster
at Terni in September 1996. Improving energy efficiency was the main rationale
behind the EC’s decision to support the demonstration facility16.
Krupp Stahl (Germany) and Nippon Metal Industry (Japan)
The Japanese Nippon Metal Industry had been developing strip casting since 1980.
Joint R&D activities between the German steel-making firm Krupp Stahl and Nippon
Metal Industry started in 1986. The activities focused on a mould using rolls of
unequal diameter [Shin, 1990]. In 1990, two pilot casters were operational, one in
Germany and one in Japan. Krupp acquired support by the ECSC and the German
Bundesländer [Pfeifer et al., 1993; Birat and Steffen, 1991]. After the merger of
Krupp with Hoesch in 1992, changes in the organisation of Krupp and the idea that
considerable extra R&D was still needed made Krupp decide to stop [Millbank,
                                                
15
 Up till 1994, CSM was the national research institute of the Italian steel industry. In 2000, CSM is a
privatised research institute in the field of steel and metallurgy. CSM has different shareholders. The
stainless steel firm Acciai Speciali Terni (AST) owns 15%.
16
 THERMIE programme / 4th FWP / IN/00124/96. Title: Abatement of energy consumption in the
steel hot strip production through a near net shape casting process. Prime contractor: AST, Terni.
Duration: September 1996-November 1999 [Cordis, 2000].
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1995; Cramb, 2000; Senk, 2000]. Nippon Metal stopped its strip casting activities as
well [Birat et al., 1995].
Eurostrip: Merged micro-networks
In 1994 the Italian steel firm AST was taken over by the German steel-maker Krupp.
CSM and AST continued their strip casting R&D activities. In 1997, Thyssen
merged with Krupp. The newly formed Thyssen Krupp Steel had a stake in the
Italian micro-network and the French – German Myosotis project. The activities in
these two micro-networks were formerly merged in 1999. Experienced researchers
and engineers from AST and CSM, Voest, Thyssen Krupp Steel, and Usinor and
IRSID were brought together.
Due to the merger, stainless steel producer Krupp Thyssen Nirosta (KTN) became a
sister company of the Italian AST. Whereas, KTN had some strip casting R&D
experience, they carried out two ECSC projects between 1991 and 1995, they were
rather sceptical about the possibilities of strip casting technology. After KTN visited
the Terni caster, interest in the Italian strip caster grew. In December 1998, it was
decided to build an industrial caster at KTN’s Krefeld site instead of at AST’s Terni
site. The Krefeld site was particularly advantageous because it did not have a hot
rolling mill [Walter et al., 2000]. The European Commission permitted the financial
support to be used to build an industrial scale caster in Krefeld instead of in Terni
[CSM, 2000; Senk, 2000]. In September 1999, Thyssen Krupp Steel, Usinor and
Voest formed a firm called Eurostrip. Voest is the exclusive supplier of Eurostrip
strip casting technology. In December 1999, the first stainless steel was cast. The
Krefeld caster’s annual capacity will be enlarged from 100,000 tons/year to around
400,000 tons/year within 2 or 3 years [Anonymous, 1999; Thyssen Krupp Steel,
1999]. The Myosotis project was formerly stopped in 1998. R&D activities in Terni
are continued for developing carbon steel strip catsing. The Eurostrip partners are
involved in ECSC supported co-operative multi-partner projects on carbon steel.
Europstrip partners expect that the carbon steel market for the exploitation of strip
casting will develop rapidly from 2001 [Hohenbichler et al., 2000].
Nippon Steel Corporation and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan)
The consortium of Nippon Steel Corporation (not to be confused with Nippon Metal
mentioned earlier) and the machine-builder Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was formed
in 1985 [IISI, 1993; Millbank, 1995]. They concentrated on stainless steel.
Mitsubishi and Nippon Steel were financially equal partners [Tacke, 1999; Birat,
1999a; Cramb, 2000]. Their first hot model was built in 1986. In 1988, they extended
this model to a pilot caster at Hikari. In 1993, some promising results were reported.
Nippon Steel and MHI announced that the focus would shift towards studying the
economic feasibility of the technology and the building of an industrial scale caster
[IISI, 1993]. In September 1997 it was reported that the industrial scale caster had
reached the design capacity of 400,000 ton/year. In October 1998, Nippon Steel was
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selling strip cast stainless steel. Nippon Steel reported that the greatest advantage of
the strip caster was that the production time was reduced to less than an hour.
Casting and finishing operations were linked by the strip caster and thus transport
was no longer required [Furukawa, 1997; Furukawa, 1998].
Broken Hill Proprietary Company (Australia) and Ishikawajima-Harima
Heavy Industries (Japan)
The Australian Broken Hill Proprietary Company (BHP) and the Japanese machine-
builder Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) had an established business
relationship, when they started co-operative R&D activities relating to strip casting
in 1985. In 1990, a pilot caster at Unanderra was realised [Furukawa, 1994]. At first,
BHP investigated casting stainless steel, like most of the other micro-networks.
Focus shifted to carbon steel when the project moved on towards the realisation of an
industrial scale caster [Opalka, 1998]. In December 1994, the industrial scale caster,
called Project M, was constructed at Port Kembla. The main purposes of the plant
were to proof the durability of the rolls, the consistency of product quality and
improve the accuracy of process control [Furukawa, 1994]. BHP achieved its
breakthrough in December 1997 with the production of its first saleable carbon steel.
Up till November 1998, BHP and IHI were secretive about Project M [Opalka, 1998;
Birat et al., 1995]. Then, they announced that Project M was very close to
commercialisation [Abbel and Moonen, 1998]. They claimed that the advantage of
Project M is that the strip caster shortens the production process, both physically and
in time, and integrates casting with rolling operations. BHP was determined to
exploit this advantage in new mini-mills in the East-Asian region [BHP, 1998;
MacLeay, 1998; Millbank, 1995]. Confronted with the Asia crises, however, BHP
decided not to build mini-mills. Early in 2000 it was announced that Nucor, the US
mini-mill steel firm that was also the first to build a thin slab caster, had signed a
letter of intent with BHP and IHI for the establishment of a joint venture for the
worldwide licensing of BHP’s strip casting technology. Start-up of the first
commercial facility is expected in 2001 [Anonymous, 2000; Nucor, 2000; BHP,
1999].
Hitachi Zosen and Pacific Metals (Japan)
Hitachi Zosen, a Japanese machine-builder, experimented with twin roll casting
between 1981 and 1985 on an irregular basis. More serious activities started in 1985.
As a result, Hitachi wanted to build a pilot caster in 1987. The firm started looking
for a steel partner. Pacific Metals, a relatively small stainless steel company (and
subsidiary of Nippon Steel), joined [Birat et al., 1995]. The pilot caster, called
Hachinoe, became operational in 1990 [Freuhan, 1994; Parodi, 1993; Shin et al.,
1995]. Around 1994, the US steel-maker Inland Steel became involved [Anonymous,
1994]. Inland had developed an electro-magnetic edge containment system during
the 1980s. Inland Steel had obtained some experience with the technology in their
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partnership with Bethlehem Steel, Armco and Weirton (1986) [Cramb, 1989;
Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1994]. An agreement was signed with Hitachi Zosen to
determine the feasibility of the edge dam on Hitachi’s pilot caster [Isenberg-
O’Loughlin, 1994]. The agreement however did not result in any adaptations to the
pilot caster. Hitachi and Pacific’s current intentions remain unclear.
British Steel (UK)
British Steel started research in 1986 at its Teeside Technology Centre. A small hot
model was used for casting carbon and stainless steel. In parallel with this
investigation, a marketing study identified target markets for the technology [IISI,
1993]. In 1990, the existing hot model was scaled up to a larger one. Davy, a UK
engineering firm, built the machine. British Steel experimented with some innovative
technologies which were all abandoned [Birat et al., 1995; Kuster, 1996].
British Steel Stainless was interested in the possibilities of strip casting, because they
wanted to integrate casting with cold rolling. At that moment hot rolling was out-
sourced. When British Steel Stainless merged with Avesta Sheffield, a Swedish
stainless steel manufacturer in 1992, a hot rolling facility was provided and there was
less need for strip casting technology [Wilkinson, 1998].
British Steel however continued their R&D. Their objective changed: they merely
wanted to maintain their expertise. British Steel’s wants to be an ‘educated
customer’, so that it can act as an informed buyer once strip casting technology
becomes available [Thompson, 1999; Wilkinson, 1998; Millbank, 1995].
Most of the strip casting R&D carried out at British Steel was funded by the ECSC.
British Steel was involved in three individual projects. It has also been involved in
two ECSC supported multi-partner projects, together with the Eurostrip partners, on
strip casting carbon steel [Birat and Steffen, 1991; Millbank, 1995; Thompson,
2000].
Project Bessemer and the Industrial Materials Institute (Canada)
Between 1986 and 1989 the Canadian steel industry identified strip casting as an
interesting technology for co-operative research. In a thorough survey of world-wide
casting R&D activities, the enormous potential for capital and operating cost
reductions by strip casting technology was highlighted [IISI, 1993]. The Canadian
Industrial Materials Institute (IMI) had already started strip casting R&D in 1987
driven by the feeling that there was strong interest among Canadian steel-makers
[Hamel, 1999]. And indeed, a consortium of six Canadian steel firms was formed in
198917. The consortium is called “Project Bessemer”. The consortium asked IMI to
carry out R&D on strip casting carbon steels [IISI, 1993; Birat et al., 1995]. The
Canadian steel firms preferred a twin roll caster because of its potential for good strip
surface quality. Furthermore, carbon steel was chosen as the main grade, simply
because none of the steel firms produced stainless steel. A hot model was installed
                                                
17
 Dofasco, Stelco, Ipsco, Ivaco, Ispat-Sidbec and Algoma (80% of the Canadian steel production).
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during the summer of 1992 by Hatch et Associés, a Canadian engineering firm [IISI,
1993; Hamel, 1999].
Between 1989 and 1992, the consortium developed a research programme, that was
financially supported by the Canadian National Research Council. Goal of the
programme was to develop a strip casting process that could produce low cost, high
quality carbon steel. In January 1997, an agreement was signed with Hatch et
Associés. They got the right to design future strip casting plants [Project Bessemer,
1997; Hamel, 1999]. However, the research programme was stopped in 1998
[Steffen and Tacke, 1999]. There are no signs that any of the firms in the Bessemer
Consortium is engaged in taking the next step. This may be due to a number of
factors: BHP’s progressed in casting carbon steel; three of the Canadian steel-makers
invested in thin slab casters; there is no machine-builder involved; and finally
substantial financial resources are required. Investments in an industrial caster would
require an additional 65 million US$ [Bagsarian, 1998; Hamel, 1999; Millbank,
1995].
The major argument for the steel-makers to start the co-operative R&D programme
in the first place was to keep abreast of strip casting technology. The steel-making
firms are pleased with the dividends that the programme has paid to date. Each firm
has spent a fairly restricted amount of resources and the knowledge coming back to
them has been considerable [Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1994; Millbank, 1995; Hamel,
1999].
Pohang Iron and Steel Company (South Korea)
The Korean Pohang Iron and Steel Company (POSCO) and the Research Institute of
Industrial Science & Technology (RIST) started work on strip casting in 198918
[Shin et al., 1995]. POSCO’s efforts in strip casting have started relatively late,
because it is only since 1987 that POSCO has pursued an active R&D strategy. After
a period in which POSCO concentrated on expanding its steel production capacities,
POSCO wanted to reinforce its competitiveness by strengthening its R&D activities.
One of the long-term projects started was a strip casting project [Kang, 2000].
POSCO’s aim is to develop an industrial scale strip caster, that is less capital
intensive than conventional casting and rolling [Shin et al., 1995; Kang, 2000]. The
focus is primarily on stainless steel. Davy International, a British engineering firm,
was responsible for the design of the hot model [Anonymous, 1993]. In 1994, a pilot
caster was constructed [Millbank, 1995]. At the moment no steps have been taken
towards the design and construction of an industrial scale caster. Sources at RIST
state that the technical problems have been solved on the pilot scale, however, the
uncertainties about the techno-economic performance make POSCO refrain from
investing in an industrial scale caster [Kang, 2000]. Others speculate that the crises in
Asia are discouraging POSCO from engaging in large capital expenditure [Birat,
1999a; Cramb, 2000].
                                                
18
 POSCO established RIST in 1987. RIST is a legally independent R&D institute. POSCO supplies
60 to 70% of RIST’s total budget [Kang, 2000].
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5.5. Analysing the development
In mapping this history of strip casting technology we presented elements, which are
of interest to our analysis of the case study. First we address the questions formulated
about the technology network, then we focus on the various micro-networks and
subsequently we discuss the results of the R&D activities.
Technology network
What is the composition of the technology network?
Before 1975, localised R&D activities were performed by certain individuals the
three main ones being Bessemer, Norton and Hazelett. Between 1975 and 1985 a
large number of R&D efforts were launched which all tried to extend the advantages
of conventional continuous casting to even thinner casting. Different types of casting
moulds were explored. There were also a growing number of efforts weighing up the
pros and cons of single or twin roll strip casting. By 1985, strip casting R&D efforts
were announced in almost each major steel-making country [Cramb, 1989; Cramb,
2000]. By 1990, the strip casting technology network had acquired a clear status. The
majority of the R&D efforts were stopped when the decision had to be made to
continue R&D and thus to invest in a hot model. The efforts that continued were
veiled in secrecy because of the strategic importance of the R&D activities [Senk,
2000]. The eleven micro-networks described in Section 5.4 resulted.
Figure 3 gives the technology network of strip casting technology from 1982
onwards. Six of the eleven micro-networks are still active. Four of the eleven micro-
networks stopped their activities. Two micro-networks merged their R&D activities.
Eurostrip resulted. Three of the six active micro-networks are operating an industrial
scale caster and claim to be ready to launch the innovative process technology.
The eleven micro-networks cover a wide geographic area. Steel firms from the US,
Canada, Western Europe, South-Korea and Australia are involved. In four of the
eleven micro-networks, co-operating actors within a micro-network come from
different countries. The three most advanced micro-networks are located in Japan,
Western Europe and Australia.
Japanese and US steel firms were the first to start strip casting R&D efforts during
the late seventies [Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1988; Kubel, 1988; Senk, 2000]. Although
Japanese firms are still active in various micro-networks, a substantial number of
early Japanese efforts were stopped [Birat et al., 1995; Anonymous, 1993]. They
passed the job on to Nippon Steel Corporation, which is by far the largest steel firm
in Japan [Cramb, 2000; Birat, 2000]. The US lost its original leading position. Only
recently US actors have become active again. A co-operative R&D programme was
started by Carnegie Mellon University [Cramb, 1998]. In 2000, the US mini-mill
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steel firm Nucor formed a joint venture with the BHP and IHI to commercialise BHP
/ IHI’s strip casting technology.
Figure 3: Technology network of strip casting technology. The size of the R&D
equipment used – hot model, pilot caster, and industrial scale caster –
is included. A preliminary stage and a commercial stage (the steel
cast is sold) have been added. The R&D activities of Allegheny and
Voest and the co-operation of Thyssen and Usinor are each counted
as one micro-network. Actors in normal letters are steel-making firms.
Actors in italics are machine suppliers or engineering firms. Actors
with underlining are R&D institutes. Asterisks (*) indicate the driving
actors within micro-networks.
To what extent and how often do micro-networks exchange knowledge/information?
In spite of the fact that R&D activities were strategic, there has been exchange and
communication between the various micro-networks. In addition to the exchanges at
international conferences and meetings there have been more intensive contacts.
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Clearly, technical details were generally not disclosed. However, the exchange of
knowledge and R&D experience have played a role in the continuation of R&D
activities within the various micro-networks [Thompson, 2000; Senk, 2000; Birat,
2000; Cramb, 2000]. It is important to know whether others have succeeded in
solving technical difficulties. Then you do not need the details to do the work itself.
Furthermore, it is important to know the position of a firm’s micro-network among
the competing micro-networks for instance to create firm-internal support for
continuing R&D activities.
Are there dominant micro-networks in the technology network?
None of the micro-networks had a continuing decisive influence on the development
of strip casting technology. There was some early leadership by Allegheny. Their
claim of success in 1984 was instrumental in drawing the attention of other steel
firms (and their boards of directors) [Birat et al., 1995; Cramb, 2000; Thompson,
2000; Senk, 2000]. For a long time, Allegheny was considered to be the most
advanced micro-network (see e.g. [Kubel, 1988; Hess, 1991; Robson and Thompson,
1995]). By the early 1990s, it had become clear that a number of steel firms had
invested seriously in developing strip casting technology, although none of them was
dominant. In the last two years, it has become clear that there are three front-running
micro-networks, Eurostrip, Nippon Steel and Mitsubishi, and BHP and IHI. These
three micro-networks may prove the feasibility and advantages of strip casting
technology in the coming two or three years. The other micro-networks and the steel
industry in general are waiting to see how their casters will perform [Tacke, 1999;
Bagsarian, 1998; Cramb, 2000; Senk, 2000].
Micro-networks
How are the various micro-networks made up?
Figure 3 shows the type of actors that have been involved in the eleven micro-
networks. It also denotes who took the initiative in the separate micro-networks.
A first observation is that steel-making firms generally took the lead [Birat et al.,
1995]. The machine suppliers, Hitachi, Voest and Mitsubishi, are exceptions. In eight
of the eleven micro-networks, a machine-builder or engineering firm became
involved in later stages of the R&D activities. In the early eighties it was clear to
most actors that it would take time for strip casting technology to be developed and
that considerable steel-making expertise was required. This explains why machine
suppliers were not pressing for the development of this technology in the way they
had pressed for the development of thin slab casting technology [Birat, 1999b].
In developing strip casting technology, control in the various micro-networks is
typically exerted by the steel manufacturers. Machine suppliers or engineers were
involved when steel manufacturers had the plan to build a pilot or industrial scale
caster. However, steel firms own the crucial patents. The suppliers involved are thus
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dependent on the steel firms for selling strip casting technology [Birat, 2000;
Thompson, 2000; Senk, 2000].
A second observation is that there are no universities in the technology network. The
role of research institutes that are financed with public money is also limited; the
only ones are the German RWTH and the Canadian IMI. The Italian CSM is a
specialised private research firm.
What motivates actors to start and / or stop R&D activities?
Steel firms are interested in strip casting technology mainly because they want to
reduce the capital intensity of the steel plant. They want to lower the costs of
converting liquid steel to the coiler (see also Figure 1) [Cramb, 1989; Birat et al.,
1995; Tacke, 1999; Senk, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Cramb, 2000]. This advantage had
been clear to Bessemer. Still, it took more than a century before the technology
network emerged.
It took time for steel-makers to recognise the possibilities and advantages of direct
casting. This recognition became possible because the industry evolved itself. The
steel industry today is not comparable to the steel industry in Bessemer’s days.
Conventional continuous casting was then not possible. Mini-mills and grades such
as stainless steel did not yet exist. When conventional continuous casting matured
during the seventies19, the advantages of skipping even more steps in casting and
rolling became apparent, especially to relatively small firms, e.g. stainless steel firms
and mini-mills.
Between 1975 and 1985, the search for innovative casting technologies emerged.
Technologists and researchers agreed internationally that this was an interesting
route [Birat, 1999b]. A process emerged in which the possibilities of such casting
technologies were explored. Expectations were confirmed and articulated. The
number of R&D efforts increased during the 1980s. A number of factors induced this
process: the established need for more compact technologies [Herbertson et al., 1992;
Birat 1992]; the availability of research money within steel firms [Birat, 1999b;
Cramb, 2000; Senk, 2000], some government R&D support in the US and Europe;
and last but not least Allegheny’s claim of success in 1984 [Birat et al., 1995]. The
production of new grades of steel based on R&D experience in rapid solidification
was also feeding the interest in strip casting [McManus and Berry, 1993; Senk,
2000].
                                                
19
 Experts indicate that the improvement of conventional continuous casting is continuing. The R&D
activities between 1950 and 1980 were so numerous that a wealth of ideas are still available that can
improve the costs or quality of conventionally cast steel [ Birat, 1999b; Cramb, 2000; Senk, 2000].
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Table 1: Current status of the eleven micro-networks.
Steel firm Machine
supplier or
engineer
Scale
achieved
Status Comments
Armco - n.a. Stop 1991 Armco stopped its single roll caster
R&D, because it altered it business
policy: carbon steel division was sold.
Allegheny Voest Pilot Stop 1995 Coilcast was not successful enough to
justify continued R&D activities. It
had taken too long and had proved too
expensive.
Usinor /
Thyssen
Clecim Industrial
scale
Continuation
→ Eurostrip
After Thyssen’s merger with Krupp
(1997), the Myosotis project and the
Italian micro-network were merged.
Eurostrip was formed to achieve
industrial maturity and
commercialisation.
CSM / AST Voest Industrial
scale
Continuation
→ Eurostrip
The industrial scale caster at Terni is
used by Eurostrip partners for carbon
steel strip casting.
Krupp /
Nippon Metal
- Pilot Stop 1992 After Krupp’s merger with Hoesch
and problems with the low
productivity of the caster and with the
quality of the product R&D activities
were ceased.
Nippon Steel
Corporation
Mitsubishi Industrial
scale
Continuation Current status of R&D is veiled in
secrecy. Nippon Steel seem to intend
to apply the technology themselves
and not to sell/license the technology.
Clarity is expected within a year.
BHP IHI Industrial
scale
Continuation BHP aimed at building mini-mills in
South-East Asia. Early in 2000, BHP
announced a joint venture with Nucor,
a US mini-mill operator, and IHI for
further commercialisation.
Pacific
Metals
Hitachi
Zosen
Pilot Continuation Problems with edge containment.
R&D continues on pilot scale. Future
plans are unclear. Some say efforts
have ceased.
British Steel British Steel
engineering
Hot model Continuation After merger with Avesta, arguments
for R&D changed. British steel wants
to be an “educated customer”.
Bessemer
Consortium /
IMI
Hatch et
Associes
Hot model Stop 1998 None of the firms wanted to invest at
the level needed for up-scaling. Three
Canadian firms invested in thin slab;
and BHP is successful in carbon steel
strip casting.
POSCO /
RIST
Davy Pilot Continuation The Korean economy collapsed; it
had become difficult to finance
further up-scaling. Uncertainties about
the performance make POSCO
refraining from investments in an
industrial scale caster.
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This combination of mutually reinforcing factors added momentum to the trend and
strengthened internal support in steel firms to perform explorative R&D. Integrated
steel-firms with a stainless steel division20 or major independent stainless steel
manufacturers21 continued R&D activities using hot models. As indicated before, a
large number of these early strip casting efforts were stopped. The technology
network resulted [Birat et al., 1995; Thompson, 2000; Senk, 2000].
In spite of the promising advantages of strip casting a lot of efforts were stopped.
The three early explorers of strip casting technology stopped. Most of the efforts that
were started in the early eighties and four of the eleven micro-networks ended their
strip casting R&D activities. We comment briefly on the arguments for stopping
R&D activities.
Bessemer’s concluded that his idea was before its time. He also foresaw serious
technical difficulties. Both Norton and Hazelett stopped or changed their focus in
R&D due to technical problems.
The abandonment of R&D efforts that were started during early eighties is directly
related to decision for investing in a hot model. Most firms could not or were not
willing to spend the money needed for taking this step [Senk, 2000; Birat, 2000;
Cramb, 2000; Thompson, 2000]. Some additional arguments were heard as e.g. we
cannot solve technical problems, we are waiting for others to develop, the quality of
the steel was uncertain, and finally we stop because others are also stopping [Tacke,
1999; Cramb, 2000]. However, the bottom line was that firms did not want to spend
the financial resources required.
Table 1 summarises the status of the eleven micro-networks. It shows that there are
two main arguments why actors stopped or slowed down R&D activities. First of all,
the budget needed to continue R&D on a larger scale explains why actors lost
interest. Secondly, R&D activities were overruled by all sorts of strategic decisions
that have nothing to do with the development of the technology as such. However,
continuation of R&D activities did become superfluous when for instance divisions
or firms were sold, bought or merged.
How much money is spent and by whom?
Table 2 summarises the expenditure on strip casting R&D by the eleven micro-
networks as far as relevant data are available. Due to the large differences in the
degree of technical complexity of the R&D equipment used it is impossible to give a
standard indication of the ratio of the cost of a hot model and the cost of an industrial
scale caster. According to rough estimates, an industrial scale caster is 10 to 20 times
more expensive than a hot model.
                                                
20
 E.g. Nippon Steel Corporation, Usinor, British Steel, Thyssen.
21
 E.g. Allegheny, Nippon Metal, Pacific Metals, AST.
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Table 2: Expenditure on R&D and government R&D support.
Micro-
network
Scale Total
expenditure
[M US$]
Of which
govt. support
[M US$]
% Government support
granted by:
Armco1 Pilot 17 12 70 US Department of Energy
Allegheny2 Pilot 10-15 - -
CMU3 - 1 0.7 70 US Department of Energy
Usinor /
Thyssen4
Pilot
Industrial
 about 10
100
1.4
limited
10-15 ECSC (see Table 3).
Limited support German
Bundesländ.
French government.
CSM / AST5
Voest
Pilot
Industrial
15-20
n.a.
4.1
5
20-30 ECSC (see Table 3).
European Commission
Krupp Stahl6 /
Nippon Metal
Pilot n.a. 0.6 ECSC (see Table 3).
Limited support German
Bundesländ.
Eurostrip7 Industrial 50 - -
Nippon Steel
/ Mitsubishi8
Industrial 110 - -
BHP / IHI9 Industrial 200 n.a. n.a.
Pacific Metals
/ Hitachi
Pilot n.a. - -
British Steel10 Hot model 4 1.7 40 ECSC (see Table 3)
Bessemer C /
IMI11
Hot model 26 13 50 National Resources
Canada
POSCO/
RIST12
Pilot 20 - -
Total 570 40
Total estimate 500 – 700
1
 Data concerning Armco’s private investment in twin roll casting is unknown.  2 In an interview in
1988 Ludlum’s chairman said that “of the order of 10 to 15 million US$ worth of investment was
paying off in a new process” [Isenberg-O’Loughlin, 1988]. Long running projects like Coilcast
involve of tens of million US$ [Hohenbichler, 2000].  3 CMU = Carneggie Mellon University [Cramb,
1998; Cramb, 2000].  4 [Birat, 1999a; Birat, 2000; Senk, 2000].  5 Derived from [CSM, 2000; Cordis,
2000].  6 [Pfeifer et al., 1993].  7 [Thyssen Krupp Stahl, 1999].  8 Only costs of the industrial scale
caster [Furukawa, 1997].  9 [MacLeah, 1998]. 10 Derived from [Thompson, 2000; Cordis, 2000].  11
[Bagsarian, 1998].  12 Only pilot caster. Total expenditure is higher but is not made public [Millbank,
1995; Kang, 2000].
Table 2 clearly indicates that micro-networks having an industrial scale caster
invested the most. Strip casting experts estimate that expenditure on industrial scale
casters is of the order of magnitude of 100 to 200 million US$ (see e.g. [Cramb,
1998; Bagsarian, 1998]). In most of the micro-networks, machine-builders did not
make substantial investments, up to 10% [Birat, 1999a]. Only Mitsubishi and Voest
were equal partners.
We estimate that worldwide about 500-700 M US$ was spent, which is 35 to 50
million US$ per year. When this is compared to the annual R&D expenditure by the
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iron and steel industry, we conclude that roughly 1 to 2% of the industry’s annual
R&D expenditure goes to strip casting technology22.
What important decisions are made with regard to the direction of technological
development?
Each of the eleven micro-networks in Figure 3 had to take two important decisions:
the grade of steel and whether to use a single or twin roll mould.
Almost all micro-networks studied strip casting of stainless steel. Only two of the
eleven micro-networks focused seriously on carbon steel. Some argued that strip
casting of carbon steel was technically more difficult, although it had been primarily
an economic incentive that determined the preference for strip casting stainless steel.
The relatively small stainless steel firms have the highest capital cost advantage. In
addition, the productivity of strip casters (annual output) for large carbon steel
manufacturers was too low [Schors, 1996].
When the strip casting technology network emerged during the eighties, the single
roll caster was the first and the most seriously studied technology by the two micro-
networks in the US. This preference for the single roll caster had to do with earlier
experience of rapid solidification research and the wish to develop new steel grades
[Cramb, 1989; Birat et al., 1995]. Most of the other micro-networks evaluated both
single roll and twin roll casters. The single roll caster lost ground to the twin roll
caster. Eight micro-networks preferred twin roll casters, because of their higher
productivity and of the possibility to cast steel with symmetric properties [Senk,
2000; Cramb, 2000].
Materialisation
What is the rate of development and what steps in up-scaling can be distinguished?
Roughly 140 years ago, Bessemer suggested that two rolls could be used as a mould
for casting liquid steel. Whereas Bessemer, Norton and Hazelett all had some hot
model scale equipment at their disposal, conventional continuous casting and thin
slab casting technology were commercialised, before three micro-networks
succeeded in bringing strip casting technology almost to the point of innovation.
Thin slab casting and strip casting technology both benefited from the renewed
interest in casting R&D between 1975 and 1985. When thin slab casting technology
was introduced (1989), R&D activities on Hazelett casters was stopped. Strip casting
                                                
22
 The iron and steel industry in the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and the EU spent roughly 2.5 billion
US$ / year on R&D (1985 – 1994 average) [OECD, 1997]. Note that the budget of the micro-
networks working on an industrial caster scale is not supplied by the R&D budget only. It is
interesting to compare annual spending on strip casting technology with the budget the governments
of IEA/OECD countries spent on industrial energy-efficiency R&D. Over the last 15 years,
IEA/OECD countries have spent 220 million US$ per year on industrial energy-efficiency R&D.
Average annual expenditure on strip casting is as much as 15 to 25% of the annual government budget
on industrial energy-efficiency R&D [IEA, 1997].
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technology remained as the sole option to realise direct casting of even thinner slabs.
There has been a spurt in developing strip casting technology in the last 15 to 20
years. Figure 3 indicates the steps that various micro-network took in up-scaling strip
casting technology. It should be noticed that hot models continue to be used if larger
equipment is available. Figure 4 gives the scale of the most advanced equipment
used in the eleven micro-networks.
Figure 4: Cross-section of the development in 1999: showing the state-of-the-art
equipment. Three micro-networks operate on near commercial scale:
BHP and IHI, Nippon Steel and MHI, and Eurostrip (CSM, AST and
Usinor and Thyssen). Firms between brackets indicate micro-
networks that stopped R&D activities.
Figure 3 illustrates that the three most advanced micro-networks all needed 15 to 17
years to reach industrial scale operation. There is some variation in the length of the
different stages, though each stage took roughly three to seven years.
Both the Hitachi/Pacific micro-network and the POSCO micro-network continued
their R&D activities on a pilot scale for more than six years. British Steel and the
Bessemer Consortium have a longer hot model stage; both micro-networks had
defensive arguments for investing in strip casting R&D.
What are the perceived performance characteristics of the technology?
Bessemer recognised the capital advantages of his idea [Bessemer, 1891]. An
interesting question is whether strip casting could have emerged earlier? On the one
hand one can argue that the proven performance of conventional continuous casting
and the introduction of thin slab casting (which induced the growth of mini-mills)
triggered the need for casting strips of even thinner thickness ranges at even lower
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capital costs [Herbertson, 1992]. Strip casting technology became ‘the next step to
take’ since the search routine was to cast as close to final requirements as possible.
On the other hand one can say that the existing ‘paradigm’ of conventional
continuous casting may have kept strip casting from taking off earlier.
One should however take into account the fact that two things changed during the
last decades of the 20th century. First of all, the industry itself changed considerably:
stagnation in world steel output, rapid rise of mini-mills and the introduction of new
grades such as stainless steel. Secondly, knowledge became available that could be
used to solve the major technical problems, i.e. the liquid steel feeding, edge
containment and roll material requirements [Thyssen Krupp Steel, 1999; Birat 2000].
Without the advances in material knowledge (e.g. regarding ceramics and copper
alloys) and the availability of computers and process control, it would have been
much more difficult to make strip casting an engineering reality [Senk, 2000; Cramb,
2000; Thompson, 2000; Birat, 2000].
The eleven micro-networks did not publish very much about the performance
characteristics of strip casting technology. It is clear to all actors that strip casting
will lead to lower capital costs and will open the market for cold rolled steel for
mini-mills. It is also certain that strip casting reduces the amount of energy needed
per ton steel, although this advantage did not drive technological development. The
precise cost advantages of strip casting technology are still hidden away among
unpublished data 23.
5.6. Discussion
For data gathering we were dependent on the information publicly available and on
the willingness of experts involved. We tried to acquire a complete collection of
written material on strip casting technology and consulted both magazines, journals
and conference proceedings. The Corus Library in Ijmuiden was visited.
There are intrinsic shortcomings in the written documentation. First of all, the
attention paid to the various micro-networks was not equal. Some micro-networks
have been more intensively described in literature. Secondly, the secrecy that
surrounds micro-networks make it theoretically possible that micro-networks remain
unnoticed in public articles for a long time. An example is that BHP’s R&D activities
concerned with strip casting became known in 1994, whereas they started in 1985.
Thirdly, the information given is sometimes confusing or contradictory. For example
the terms used to denote the type of equipment are not uniform, nor are they
unambiguous. Fourthly, the issues we are interested are not included in information
                                                
23
 The available data on cost performance should be used with care. They reflect what the researchers
want the technology to be; crucial estimations had to be made e.g. regarding the costs and life time of
refractory materials [Cramb, 2000; Birat et al., 1995].
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available to the public. This necessitated personal communication with experts
involved.
By interviewing experts we were able to gain a better understanding of the status of
the technology network. There are some drawback in interviewing experts like for
instance a dependency on experts’ willingness (time) and capability (what do they
know themselves). Their response is clearly biased by their perception of the
development history. Furthermore, experts can only tell what they are allowed to tell.
In four micro-networks, personal communication turned out to be impossible.
Experts did not respond or were not willing to respond.
However we are convinced that our analysis is robust. We have identified all major
micro-networks and have obtained insight into the current leading micro-networks,
the actors involved in the eleven micro-networks, their arguments for investing and
into the expenditure done.
5.7. The effect of government R&D support
Now that we have analysed the historical development of strip casting technology,
we focus our attention on the effect of government R&D support. Table 2 showed the
financial contribution that government made to various micro-networks. R&D
support was granted in the US, Canada and in Europe. In Japan, however, there was
no government support. Two-thirds of the European support was channelled via the
research programme of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). It should
be realised that the R&D budget of the ECSC is raised by a levy on steel prices in
Europe and as such cannot be regarded as pure government R&D support.
In this section, we characterise the role and the effect of government R&D support in
the US, in Canada and in Europe.
US
We estimate that financial support by the US Department of Energy (DOE) made up
30 to 60% of the total expenditure there24. Government R&D support did not
accelerate the technology’s development.
The role played by DOE R&D support in the development of strip casting
technology can be summarised thus:
- DOE was passive in identifying strip casting technology. Allegheny brought the
technology to DOE’s attention.
- Allegheny was not interested in obtaining support from DOE because Allegheny
was further ahead.
- DOE had a preference for the micro-network of Armco. This effort was focused
on carbon steel (bulk grade) and thus promised larger energy savings. DOE felt
justified in granting R&D support on the grounds of improving energy efficiency.
                                                
24
 Armco micro-network, Allegheny micro-network and the recent CMU project.
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- Argonne National Laboratory, financed by DOE, became involved in a
consortium of amongst others Weirton and Bethlehem Steel. Argonne had
expertise in electromagnetic casting. R&D activities did not materialise.
- During the 1980s DOE supported US Steel first of all in strip casting technology
(see Armco micro-network). Having abandoned this effort, US Steel did again
succeed in acquiring DOE support, now for developing a Hazelett caster.
- Armco’s major argument for abandoning their strip casting project was that all
carbon steel divisions had been sold. Therefore, DOE’s R&D support did not
have any chance of materialising the technology.
- In 1998, Carnegie Mellon University started a multi-partner R&D programme on
strip casting technology supported by DOE. The R&D activities permit the actors
to become familiar with recent insights in strip casting R&D and the possibilities
for application in the US.
Canada
The Canadian National Research Council supported 50% of the total costs of the
multi-year research programme initiated by the Bessemer Consortium and IMI.
Government R&D support did lead to additional R&D activities although it did not
accelerate the technology’s development. The Canadian steel firms aimed at
acquiring an understanding of the technology.
Europe
We estimate that R&D support from the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC), the European Commission (EC) and some national governments made up
less than 10% of the total expenditure on strip casting R&D in Europe25. A recent
overview of the research areas covered in the ECSC research programme (1986-
1999) and a list of funded strip casting projects [Ball, 2000] allowed us to make a
more detailed evaluation of the effect of ECSC support on the R&D activities of the
European strip casting micro-networks26.
Strip casting and other casting technologies have been on the agenda of the ECSC
since a working group was established in 1985. The Commission and the European
steel industry agreed that both conventional continuous casting and new casting
technologies were areas of R&D which were important for the modernisation of the
European steel industry [Evans et al., 1988; Birat and Steffen, 1991]. Figure 5 gives
an overview of the budget spent on casting R&D between 1986 and 1999.
                                                
25
 CSM / AST micro-network, Usinor / Thyssen micro-network, Krupp / Nippon micro-network,
Eurostrip, and the British Steel micro-network.
26
 A telephonic survey was conducted among the actors involved in ECSC projects (Table 5). The aim
was to gain insight into the effect of ECSC R&D support. Claustahl was not consulted because their
strip casting projects are not linked to any of the micro-networks. Five actors were consulted. One
actor did not want to co-operate. In one case, it was impossible to get in contact with the person’s
involved in the ECSC projects.
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Figure 5: ECSC support for strip casting, thin slab casting and other casting
(mainly conventional continuous casting) in three time-periods. More
specific information regarding the ECSC supported strip casting
projects is given in the three boxes [Ball, 2000].
In the period 1986-1999, roughly 2% of the ECSC budget was spent on projects
earmarked as ‘strip casting R&D’; 20% of the ECSC’s casting R&D budget was
spent on strip casting technology. The ECSC’s strip casting expenditure was about
18 million US$.
Figure 5 indicates that in the last time-period (1996-1999), there was a considerable
decrease in the number of strip casting projects. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the
European Commission has fostered multi-national multi-partner projects in order to
fulfil the requirements of subsidiarity [Ball, 2000]. As a result both the number of
partners in strip casting project and the average funding per project increased. These
recent multi-national projects are all devoted to carbon steel strip casting. This is
explained by the simple fact that the steel firms are less willing to co-operate in
competitive R&D on stainless steel.
Table 3 shows that ECSC support allowed European research institutes such as
Claustahl University and the Max Planck Institute (MPI) to perform strip casting
R&D. ECSC support was granted to the UK micro-network of British Steel, the
Italian micro-network, and the German / French micro-network in which Thyssen
and Usinor co-operated.
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Strip casting 1986-1990:
- # projects: 15
- # contractors: 21
-  support/project: 500 kEuro
Strip casting 1981-1995:
- # projects: 13
- # contractors: 21
-  support/project: 550 kEuro
Strip casting 1996-1999:
- # projects: 3
- # contractors: 10
-  support/project: 1,150 kEuro
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Table 3: Overview of ECSC support (based on [Ball, 2000; Cordis, 2000])27.
Firm /
R&D institute
1# Total
budget
[M US$]2
ECSC
support
[M US$]
Time-frame Remarks
TU Clausthal 2 0.9 0.5 1991 – 1995
MPI 3 1.2 0.7 1989 – 2000
VDeH 1 0.8 0.5 1994 – 1997 Co-ordinator multi-partner
carbon steel project
British Steel 5 4.0 1.7 1986 – 2000 Involved in 2 multi-partner
carbon steel projects
Thyssen 2 1.1 0.6 1994 – 2000 Multi-partner carbon steel
projects
IRSID (Usinor) 3
2
3.8
0.6
1.4
0.3
1986 – 1990
 1994 – 2000 Multi-partner carbon steel
projects
CSM 7 11.5 4.1 1987 – 1997 EC 4th framework project NOT
included
Krupp
KTN (Krefeld)
31
2
1.4
1.5
0.6
0.7
1985 – 1987
1991 – 1995
Total 27.0 11.6
1
 Number of projects in which the firm or research institute was involved.  2 Assuming 1 US$ ≅ 1
Euro.  3 One project was carried out by Krupp Stahl AG (1985-1887), during Krupp’s co-operation
with Nippon Metal Industry (Japan). Two projects were performed by Krupp Thyssen Nirosta (KTN)
(1991-1995), a sister company of AST. Some people involved in the Krupp / Nippon micro-network
were also involved in the activities at KTN.
The R&D activities at Claustahl and MPI were not related to any of the R&D
activities in the three European micro-networks. There are no signs that knowledge
from Claustahl and MPI has been of major importance for these micro-networks. The
Verein Deutsche Eisenhutteleute (VDEh) co-ordinated one of the multi-partner
carbon steel projects [Steffen, 2000].
The other actors mentioned in Table 3 were already mentioned in Section 5.4. The
Italian micro-network, CSM, received the largest contribution from the ECSC. CSM
lost interest in ECSC support when R&D activities moved towards the pilot scale. A
similar pattern occurred in the French / German micro-network. There was support
for Usinor’s IRSID in the early days of the development (until 1990). When the
R&D co-operation with Thyssen was started, ECSC support was no longer acquired.
British Steel received ECSC support from the start of their efforts up till today.
ECSC funds formed a considerable part of the total strip casting budget of British
                                                
27
 The ECSC support for the projects in Table 3 is lower than the ECSC support for strip casting
mentioned in Figure 5. This is because projects focused on casting in a range of 10 to 40 mm are
excluded in Table 3. In Table 3 only two multi-partner projects are included. A third, even more
recent multi partner project is not included. Thyssen, IRSID, CSM and British Steel participate in this
project which was started in 1998. This project is also for carbon steels. Budget as specified in the
contract is 1.7 M US$ of which ECSC support is 1.0 M US$ [Thompson, 2000; Senk, 2000].
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Steel, 40% (see Table 2). Without ECSC support, they would have stopped earlier
[Thompson, 2000].
We conclude that:
- In the majority of the ECSC R&D projects on strip casting, additionality has been
limited. We estimate that 60% of the projects would have been performed
anyway.
- Furthermore, the projects that are supported by the ECSC are generally only
loosely related to the core of private R&D expenditure on strip casting. ECSC-
supported projects cover ‘side-lines’ of R&D activities. There is a minor chance
that spill-over will occur to the core R&D activities.
- For one micro-network, British Steel, it is highly probable that the projects would
not have been performed without ECSC support. Activities would also have
stopped earlier.
- Steel firms apply for ECSC support in early stages of a technology’s
development. The steel firms become less interested in ECSC support when
development moves towards a larger scale. They then decide to refrain from
ECSC support.
- Taking into account the operating procedures of the ECSC research programme
and the fact that steel firms determine what kind of R&D projects are supported,
we conclude that the majority of the ECSC casting R&D resources are used to
optimise conventional continuous casting technologies.
- It is highly likely that the EC demonstration project (Krefeld caster) would have
been realised even without EC support of 5 million US$.
- The ECSC supported two multi-partner projects on carbon steel, in which all the
major European steel firms involved in strip casting technology micro-networks
co-operated. The major gain is that experienced researchers co-operate and have
the possibility to learn from each other and share expertise in a pre-competitive
area of R&D.
5.8. Conclusion
Strip casting technology is at the threshold of becoming a commercialised
technology. In this chapter we evaluated the effect of government R&D support on
the development of strip casting technology by making a detailed analysis of the
networks involved.
Government has supported 5 to 10% of the total expenditure by eleven micro-
networks since 1980. Total expenditure by all actors is estimated to be about 500 -
700 million US$. Six of the eleven micro-networks received government R&D
support. In three micro-networks R&D support was substantial, more than 40% of
total expenditure within that micro-network. Two of these micro-networks stopped
R&D activities. The third micro-network continued R&D although intentionally at a
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modest scale. Three micro-networks may prove the commercial feasibility of strip
casting technology within the next two or three years. These three micro-networks
did not receive (or only very minor) government R&D support.
All in all, the effect of government R&D support on the development of strip casting
has been minimal. The technology did not become available any earlier as a result of
R&D support. Government R&D support did not influence the direction of
technological development.
The case study generated convincing evidence for this conclusion. First, R&D
support has been minimal or absent in micro-networks that are ahead in developing
the technology. R&D support has been the largest in micro-networks that were not
operating at the frontier of developing the technology. Steel firms became less
interested in government R&D support when activities reached a stage that was more
sensitive to competition. Secondly, an analysis of ECSC support to strip casting
R&D indicated that about 60% of the projects would have been carried out without
that support. Thirdly, government supported R&D projects that addressed ‘side lines’
or that covered pre-competitive co-operative R&D. These were, thus, only loosely
related to the core R&D activities. Finally, R&D support did not have a decisive
effect in directing technological development to improved energy efficiency. From
an energy efficiency point of view, government should have supported the
development of carbon steel strip casting technology because of much larger
production volumes. Only three micro-networks studied carbon steel intensively.
Two of these micro-networks received government R&D support. However, both
these micro-networks ceased their R&D activities.
The effect of government R&D support has been minimal mainly because the
development of the technology proved to have a strong momentum of its own. After
renewed interest in strip casting technology developed between 1980 and 1985, a
large number of R&D efforts were started. Strip casting technology promised to
extend the advantages of conventional continuous casting. A process emerged in
which the possibilities of the technology were explored in a large number of efforts.
Expectations were confirmed and articulated. Government R&D support was one of
the factors in this process, though it was not decisive. Eleven micro-networks
continued their R&D activities. A robust technology network emerged. All micro-
networks were initiated and controlled by steel manufacturers. The contribution of
public research institutes was very limited. All the steel firms and machine suppliers
involved considered strip casting technology as a key-technology for future
steelmaking. Strip casting technology affects the core of the steel production process.
The dominant advantage, especially for stainless steel producers, is that the
technology should make it possible to further reduce the capital investment in hot
rolling facilities. Engaging or not engaging in its development is, thus, only loosely
related to energy-efficiency improvements or government R&D support.
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In our analysis we included not only technical, cost and energy performance
characteristics, but we broadened our analysis to include networks of actors. As a
result, we could evaluate the effect of R&D support quite accurately. It allowed us to
weigh up the effect of R&D support against other incentives that influenced steel
firms and machine suppliers to be involved, or to continue or stop. By studying the
networks of actors, we were able to sense what might have happened without
government R&D support.
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Chapter 6
Smelting reduction technology
Abstract
Smelting reduction technology is the only recent serious contender to replace the
conventional energy-intensive blast furnace that has been the dominant ironmaking
technology for centuries. In this chapter we evaluate the effect of government
intervention on the development of smelting reduction technology.
The theory underlying smelting reduction technology has been known since the
1930s. Only from 1975 did a technology network emerge. By then, other innovative
ironmaking technologies had proved disappointing and there was a threat that
obsolete coke ovens might have to be replaced at great expense. From 1975
onwards, R&D efforts were undertaken. Only one of these early efforts achieved
commercial application, the Corex process. Some efforts evolved into micro-
networks that studied ‘second generation’ processes. The technology network,
consisting of nine micro-networks, was heterogeneous. Various types of actors had
various technical preferences due to earlier (R&D) experiences. Three micro-
networks stopped their R&D activities; these were all initiated by integrated steel
manufacturers. They lost interest because the existing capital stock was being
continuously improved and they did not need additional ironmaking capacity.
Smelting reduction technology was ‘locked out’. However, the future of smelting
reduction technology is still undecided. Mining firms and steel mini-mills are still
interested. The changes in the technology network reflect the dynamics in the
development of smelting reduction technology.
If we look at the role of government, we find that environmental regulations were not
decisive in initiating R&D efforts. The major arguments for R&D were the lower
capital costs and the possibility of processing cheaper coals. Reducing
environmental emissions and energy-efficiency improvements were only additional
reasons for integrated steel firms to be interested. Another conclusion is that
financial R&D support enlarged the technology network by supporting processes
that were likely to be energy-efficient. However, R&D support did not accelerate the
technology development (so far). The case study illustrates that in steelmaking
existing capital stock tends to constrain technological development in steelmaking;
this considerably limited the effect of government intervention and R&D support.
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6.1. Introduction
Improving the energy efficiency of manufacturing industries is considered to be one
of the ways to attain a more sustainable use of energy in modern society.
Breakthroughs in industrial energy efficiency are appealing to both government and
industry; both greenhouse gas emissions and energy costs for making these energy-
intensive products are reduced. In the scientific literature on energy efficiency in
industry we find detailed overviews of innovative energy-efficient technologies (see
e.g. [Martin et al., 2000; De Beer, 1998]). Although these analyses serve the purpose
of estimating the long-term potential of energy-efficiency improvement in the
industry, they are not sufficient to answer the important question of how the
development of such industrial innovative energy-efficient technologies can be
enhanced by government. Their strength lies in a detailed bottom-up assessment of
relevant characteristics such as energy-efficiency improvement and investment costs.
If one wants to enhance the development of such technologies, one needs insight into
the actual processes by which such technologies develop. Understanding
technological development in terms of networks allows us to assess the importance
of government intervention in orienting technological development.
In this chapter we evaluate the effect of government intervention on the development
of an energy-efficient technology. For this purpose we make a detailed investigation
of the networks in which the energy-efficient technology is developed.
As a case study we selected smelting reduction technology, an innovative technology
for the production of iron. The iron and steel industry is a major consumer of energy
and is therefore always mentioned as a sector where energy efficiency needs to be
encouraged. Both scientific researchers in energy-efficiency analysis and policy
makers consider smelting reduction technology to be one of the most important
innovative energy-efficient technologies (see e.g. [IWG, 2000; Arthur D. Little,
1998; Martin et al., 2000; De Beer, 1998; IPCC, 2001; AISI, 1998; IISI, 1998]).
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 6.2, we briefly introduce the two
conventional routes for the production of steel. We locate the production of iron as
the first and major energy-intensive step in the production of steel and introduce
smelting reduction technology as an innovative alternative. In Section 6.3, the
technology case study is analysed using a set of questions relating to the networks in
which the technology was developed and the materialisation of the technology. This
section closes with a short resumé of the current status of the technology network.
Section 6.4 analyses in more detail the role of government intervention. The chapter
closes with some conclusions about the effect of government intervention in
stimulating the development of smelting reduction technology (Section 6.5).
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6.2. Conventional iron and steel production and smelting
reduction technology
The conventional production routes
The production of iron is the first step in the production process of steel. It is also the
most energy-intensive step [Fruehan, 1999; De Beer, 1998; IISI, 1998]. The iron ore
is reduced at a high temperature. The iron is subsequently converted into crude steel,
cast into semi-finished products (blooms, billets and slabs), and rolled and shaped
into final products. There are two major conventional routes for producing final steel
products (see Figure 1). Both steel production routes play a role in the development
of smelting reduction technology and it is therefore interesting to look briefly at the
differences.
Figure 1: The two major routes for producing iron and steel: Integrated steel
mills and mini-mills.
The first route is the integrated mill (upper half of Figure 1). Iron ore is reduced in a
blast furnace. Coke, agglomerated ore and limestone are charged into the top of the
blast furnace. The coke is gasified at the bottom, providing both the reductant
(carbon monoxide) and the heat needed for the chemical reactions in the blast
furnace. Coke has better physical characteristics for operating the blast furnace and is
therefore preferred to coal. One of the major – and for this chapter relevant –
improvements in the operation of blast furnaces is that coal is injected directly into
the blast furnace, so that less coke is needed for producing hot metal. Both the coke
and the agglomerated ore are produced in separate facilities (see Figure 1). The blast
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furnace delivers hot metal, which is most often transported to a basic oxygen furnace
to produce crude steel. In an integrated mill, high quality steel products can be
produced. The annual output of such a mill typically ranges from 2 to 3 million ton
steel per year. The specific energy consumption for the most efficient integrated mill
is 19 GJ primary energy per ton of crude steel1. 85% of this energy is needed for
operating the blast furnace (including agglomeration and coke production) [De Beer,
1998]. Cost of coal and other energy sources make up 25 to 30% of the cost of
producing one ton of hot metal2.
The second route is known as a mini-mill (see lower half of Figure 1). In most mini-
mills, recycled steel, scrap, is melted in electric arc furnaces and further processed
into final products. The mini-mill route has no iron production step and is therefore
also considerably less energy-intensive than the traditional integrated mill. The best
practice SEC value for a mini-mill is 5 GJ / ton crude steel. Mini-mills generally
deliver lower quality steel products. Not all kinds of final products can be made. Its
annual output typically ranges from 0.5 to 1.0 million tons steel per year, so mini-
mills are considerably smaller than integrated steel mills.
Smelting reduction technology is an alternative technology to the conventional blast
furnace. The blast furnace has been the dominant technology for iron production for
centuries. Its operation has been improved and optimised continually; this has
resulted in very efficient large-scale operating facilities3. In addition to smelting
reduction technology, direct reduction technology is a second alternative technology
to the conventional blast furnace route. Direct reduction technology was explored as
a possible replacement for the dominant blast furnace before R&D interest in
smelting reduction technology emerged4.
                                                
1
 The specific energy consumption in integrated mills varies between 19 to 40 GJ per ton crude steel
[WEC, 1995].
2
 Literature estimates of the cost price of a ton of hot metal range between 120 to 180 US$.
Amortisation makes up 30 to 35% of the costs. Costs for iron ore represent 25 to 30% of the cost price
of a ton of hot metal. Energy costs represent 25 to 30 % [Astier, 1991; De Beer, 1998]. The energy
costs for producing a ton of steel are about 10% lower that the energy costs for producing a ton of hot
metal [Faure, 1993]. The cost price of a ton of steel ranges between 200 to 300 US$. The hot metal
costs make up a considerable part of the total cost price, 60 to 70%. Mini-mills typically produce
crude steel for around 200 US$ per ton [Faure, 1993; Abildgaard et al., 1997; Schors, 1996].
3
 The design of the blast furnace has remained essentially the same since the Stuckoven was
introduced in 1300. Charcoal was used as fuel and reductant. Its physical properties limited the
capacity of the blast furnace. The physical properties of coke permit larger capacity operation. From
1718 onwards, charcoal was replaced by coke. For a more elaborate description of the improvements
in blast furnace technology, see [De Beer, 1998; Chatterjee, 1994].
4
 Whereas the first direct reduction facility was already operational in 1952, it is only recently that
direct reduction technology has began to be used on a wider scale. Direct reduced iron (DRI or sponge
iron) is increasingly processed in mini-mills, primarily in developing countries where cheap natural
gas is available [IISI, 1998; Chatterjee, 1994; Astier, 1991]. Direct reduction facilities are usually not
built at the site of mini-mills. They are built at locations were natural gas is cheap. In 1990 about 3.5%
of the world-wide iron production was based on direct reduction technology. In 1999, this share has
increased to 6.7%. If DRI is used in mini-mills the energy needed for manufacturing steel increases to
roughly the same level as in an integrated mill, i.e. 18.5 GJ / ton crude steel (assuming 100% DRI)
[De Beer, 1998].
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Smelting reduction technology
Smelting reduction technology is a coal-based ironmaking process and thus different
from the conventional coke-based conventional blast furnace. The production of coke
is avoided. Most smelting reduction processes also avoid the agglomeration of iron
ore (see Figure 1). Smelting reduction technology, as the name clearly suggests,
involves both solid-state reduction and smelting. Smelting is melting involving
chemical reduction reactions. Smelting reduction technology exploits the principle
that coal can be gasified in a bath of molten iron. Figure 2 gives a schematic lay-out
of smelting reduction technology.
Figure 2: Schematic lay-out of smelting reduction technology.
Smelting reduction technology consists of two vessels or two zones, a pre-reduction
unit and a smelting reduction vessel (see Figure 2). Smelting reduction technology,
however, does not necessarily require two separate vessels. The coal is fed into the
smelting reduction vessel where it is gasified. This delivers heat and hot gas
containing carbon monoxide. The heat is used for melting the iron in the smelting
reduction vessel. The hot gas is transported to the pre-reduction unit and used for
pre-reducing the iron oxides (in a solid state), which are fed directly into the pre-
reduction unit. The pre-reduced iron is subsequently transported to the smelting
reduction vessel, where final reduction takes place.
The hot gas produced in the smelting reduction vessel has a high chemical energy
content due to the presence of carbon monoxide. This can be exploited in two ways.
Fssirst of all, the carbon monoxide can be used for the reduction of iron oxides in the
pre-reduction unit. The hot gas generated in the smelting reduction vessel is
transported directly to the pre-reduction unit. Secondly, the carbon monoxide can be
oxidised in the smelting reduction vessel, which then delivers more heat. This can be
used for smelting the iron. This is called post-combustion. After post-combustion,
the hot gas is transported to the pre-reduction unit and the remaining carbon
monoxide is used for pre-reducing the iron oxides.
The richness of carbon monoxide in the hot gas determines the degree of pre-
reduction in the pre-reduction unit. As post-combustion decreases the reduction
potential of the hot gas, compromises have to be made between the degree of post-
combustion and the degree of pre-reduction. If the degree of post-combustion is low,
Pre-reduction unit Smelting reduction
vessel
Coal
Oxygen / air
Iron ore /
pellets 
Hot reduction gas
HOT METAL
Off gas
Coal gasification
Final reduction
Melting
Post-combustion
Pre-reduction
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higher pre-reduction degrees are achieved in the pre-reduction unit. The product
delivered to the smelting reduction vessel is quite similar to the reduced iron that is
produced in direct reduction technology, namely direct reduced iron (DRI). More
coal is needed in the smelting reduction vessel to melt the iron. Processes operating
at such a high level of pre-reduction are referred to as first generation processes. The
Corex process is the best known first generation process.
If the degree of post-combustion is high, lower degrees of pre-reduction are
achieved. Less coal is needed, because extra heat is generated and used to melt the
pre-reduced iron (provided heat exchange is optimised). Processes operating under
such a regime are referred to as second generation processes [Tomellini, 1994; Poos,
1993].
As will become clear throughout this chapter, smelting reduction technology is not a
homogeneous technology. There is a variety of smelting reduction processes. In this
chapter we discuss the development of ten smelting reduction processes.
6.3. Analysing the development
In this analysis, we focus on ten smelting reduction processes which were developed
in nine micro-networks. We start by giving a short historical description of the
technology in order to illustrate the background against which the technology
network emerged. We subsequently focus on the technology network. The
technology network is the collection of all the actors who are active in developing a
specific technology. A technology network usually consists of a number of smaller
micro-networks in which a few actors co-operate. Before we continue with a more
detailed analysis of the micro-networks, we look at the materialisation of the
technology. We close with a short resumé of the current status of smelting reduction
technology.
The early days
The technology network of smelting reduction technology grew seriously from 1980
onwards, although, the principle of gasifying coal in a molten bath is much older. It
was conceived in the late 1930s5 [Chatterjee, 1994]. In the late 1950 and 1960s, steel
manufacturers were interested in developing a technology that could convert iron ore
into crude steel in just one step. The principle of gasifying coal in a molten bath was
also popular at that time [Smith, 2000; Feinman, 1999; Poos, 1993]. However,
attempts to develop direct steel making technology were stopped, on the one hand by
                                                
5
 Martin Wiberg in Sweden (1938) injected a mixture of iron ore and coal into an open hearth furnace
(steelmaking furnace). The Engell brothers in Denmark (1938-1939) studied a process in which iron
ore and coal powder were sprinkled into a moving high carbon bath. The generated carbon monoxide
was burned (post-combusted) above the bath [Chatterjee, 1994; Smith, 2000].
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the fact that not all technical problems could be solved and on the other hand by the
trend in ironmaking towards giant high capacity blast furnaces. The steel industry
expanded rapidly. There was a huge demand for higher quality steel products and
with the introduction of the basic oxygen furnace for converting hot metal into crude
steel (1952), there was a tremendous demand for cheap hot metal. The cheapest way
to meet this requirement was to operate large scale blast furnaces [Smith, 2000;
Feinman, 1999; Poos, 1993; Smith and Corbett, 1987].
This dominant trend created the opportunity for the development of ironmaking
processes, which were economic on a smaller scale. A first contender was gas-based
direct reduction technology which gradually emerged from the mid-1960s onwards
[Papst, 1987; Smith, 1992; Poos, 1993]. In those days, direct reduction technology
was projected as the best possible alternative to the dominant iron production route.
However, direct reduction technology did not break through as a serious alternative.
Several inherent drawbacks namely the high reactivity of the solid-state direct
reduced iron and the high price of natural gas, forced actors to look for alternative
coal-based iron production routes [Papst, 1987; Chatterjee, 1994; IISI, 1998].
Technology network
What is the composition of the technology network?
From 1975 onwards, a new contender appeared on the scene: smelting reduction
technology [Smith, 1992; Chatterjee, 1994; Feinman, 1999; Smith, 2000]. R&D
activities were undertaken to develop a coal-based ironmaking process producing
liquid iron (or hot metal). The idea was to smelt pre-reduced iron. Between 1975 and
1985 a considerable number of efforts were initiated namely between 15 to 20. The
efforts differed primarily in the type of smelting reduction vessel employed for
(s)melting a direct reduced iron-like product [Smith, 1992; Smith and Corbett, 1987;
Papst, 1987].
Most of the efforts were limited to pilot scale activities and the generation of
engineering concepts for industrial scale facilities. There was one exception [Smith,
1992; Feinman, 1999; Scott, 1994]. The German engineer Deutsche Voest6 and the
Austrian machine supplier Voest commercialised the Corex process. A South-
African steel maker ordered the first facility in 1985. After two false starts, the
facility was handed over definitively to the South African steel firm in 19897. The
Corex micro-network is one of the smelting reduction processes included in our
analysis (see Figure 3).
                                                
6
 When the R&D activities started, Deutsche Voest was known as Korf Engineering.
7
 The Corex process still requires agglomerated ore. Corex is a first generation process. It has a high
degree of pre-reduction. The solid state DRI-like pre-reduced iron is melted in the smelting reduction
vessel. Since most of the reduction is done in the solid state, Corex is a slower process than the other
smelting reduction processes [Fruehan, 1999]. Due to the Asian crisis, which had a negative impact on
hot metal prices in South Africa, the South-African steelmaker Iscor decided to shut down the Corex
facility temporarily in 1998 [VAI, 2000].
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Three of these early efforts evolved into R&D activities in which actors tried to
achieve higher post-combustion levels. The processes with higher post-combustion
levels are referred to as second generation smelting reduction processes. As a result
the following three micro-networks can be distinguished (see also Figure 3). Some
Japanese integrated steel firms continued earlier private R&D activities in the DIOS
micro-network [Fruehan and Cramb, 1990; Chatterjee, 1994]. The UK British Steel
and the Dutch Hoogovens continued their earlier experiences with smelting reduction
in the CCF micro-network in 1989 [Robson, 2000; Meijer, 2000]. The Australian
mining company CRA approached the German steelmaker Klöckner Werke, who had
already gained experience in smelting reduction processes. The HIsmelt micro-
network resulted [Smith and Corbett, 1987; Innes, 2001; Brotzmann, 1992].
In Figure 3, we distinguish five additional micro-networks which developed a
smelting reduction process that also involved a high degree of post-combustion
[Sarma and Fruehan, 1998; Anonymous, 1996a]. Figure 3 gives a general overview
of the technology network from 1980 onwards.
Figure 3: Technology network of smelting reduction technology. Nine micro-
networks developed ten smelting reduction processes. The capacity of
equipment is used to denote up-scaling of the technology. For reasons
of clarity we did not include all actors in Figure 3, nor did we indicate
when certain actors stopped their active R&D.
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Figure 3 shows that the Austrian machine supplier Voest has continued the
development of the process after the first Corex facility was realised. Voest and a
Korean steelmaker joined forces to develop a variety of the Corex process which
could use fine iron ores rather than agglomerated ore. We regard the Corex process
and the so-called Finex process as having been developed within one micro-
network8.
Figure 3 illustrates that the nine micro-networks are widely distributed across the
world. Two of the micro-networks are based in Australia, one in the former USSR,
one in Japan, one in the US, one in Brazil and three in Europe.
Six of the nine micro-networks are still active, one of them being the Austrian
machine supplier Voest. In two of these six micro-networks, after a period in which
R&D activities were stopped, interest by external actors induced renewed (R&D)
activity. This happened in the Romelt and HIsmelt micro-networks [SAIL, 2000;
Kemp, 2000; HIsmelt, 2000; Anonymous, 2000a]. In the Tecnored micro-network
there is a plan to build a pilot facility in 2001 [Anonymous, 2000b; Ritt, 2000]. In the
DIOS micro-network and the AusIron micro-networks, actors intend to develop the
process further9.
Three micro-networks stopped their activities. Integrated steel manufacturers
initiated these three micro-networks. None of the micro-networks merged. Only the
CCF micro-network branched in 1992, from then onwards the Dutch and the Italians
continued the development of the same process separately10.
                                                
8
 The argument for regarding the Finex process and the Corex process as one-micro-network is that
the developments are very closely related. Whereas POSCO had started R&D activities towards
smelting reduction technology in 1989, they could not have undertaken the development of Finex
without Voest. POSCO started R&D activities relating to smelting reduction technology as one of the
long-term R&D projects that began when POSCO decided to expand its R&D capacity in order to
improve the firm’s competitive operation [Shin, 2000]. The Austrian machine supplier Voest had
already filed some patents in the area of pre-reducing iron ore fines instead of agglomerated ore
[Eberle et al., 1996; Delport, 1991]. The Korean steelmaker POSCO bought the second Corex facility.
Its capacity was twice the capacity of the first Corex facility in South-Africa. Voest installed three
more Corex C-2000 facilities, two in India and one in South-Africa.
9
 In the DIOS micro-network, the Japanese integrated steel manufacturer NKK is trying to
commercialise DIOS technology independently. NKK wants to exploit its expertise and tacit
knowledge in designing and operating the DIOS process. NKK wants to transfer the technology to
other firms. A first DIOS facility of 4,500 thm/day is expected for mini-mills in a few years
[Kitagawa, 2000]. A facility of 40 thm/day recently became available in the AusIron micro-network.
The SASE joint venture regularly states that they plan to build a 7,000 thm/day facility. Note that
Ausmelt Ltd., the engineering firm in the SASE joint venture, has experience in commercialising the
technology for non-ferrous metals [Arthur and Floyd, 1999; Arthur and Hamilton, 1996; Sherrington,
2001].
10
 Note that we regard the CCF micro-network as being no longer active. The Italians however are still
working on the development of the cyclone. They changed the name of the CCF process to
CleanSMelt [Anonymous, 1997b; Malgarini et al., 1996]. The Italians were not willing to co-operate
in our research for reasons of confidentiality.
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To what extent and how often do micro-networks exchange knowledge?
In the development of smelting reduction technology, the various micro-networks
performed R&D activities on their own, although each of the micro-networks closely
monitored the developments within the entire technology network. In several cases,
results of other micro-networks influenced decisions and R&D activities [Meijer,
2000; Fruehan, 2000; Burrow, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 2000]. The most far-
reaching example in this regard is the Dutch Hoogovens decision in 1992 to restrict
R&D to the pre-reduction unit only. After reviewing worldwide ongoing smelting
reduction efforts, Hoogovens concluded that the cyclone was unique. It was decided
to use all financial resources for building a pilot scale cyclone. If the cyclone proved
satisfactory, Hoogovens would start looking for a partner to ‘complement’ the
process [Meijer, 2000; Moors, 2000b].
The major arguments for exchanging knowledge are to learn from the solutions
suggested by others and to avoid repeating their mistakes and re-inventing the wheel
[Burrow, 2000; Robson, 2000; Meijer, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 2000; Floyd,
2000]. Usually articles, conference visits and patents are a first source. If R&D
activities seemed of to be real interest for a firm’s R&D activities, personal contacts
were established and site visits were organised. There was for instance regular
contact between the North-American Steel association AISI and its Japanese
counterpart JISF for the development of DSM and DIOS [Kavanagh and Obenchain,
2000; Kitagawa, 2000]. People from the Dutch Hoogovens and AISI visited the
Russian Moscow Institute of Steel and Alloys (MISA), which developed the Romelt
process. Hoogovens also visited JISF once [Furukawa, 1994]. JISF held several
technology exchange meetings, and also met representatives from the Jupiter process
[Kitagawa, 2000; Badra, 1995]. The Australian mining firm developing the HIsmelt
process also had personal contacts with other micro-networks [Burrow, 2000].
Are there dominant micro-networks in the technology network?
In the development of smelting reduction technology, none of the nine micro-
networks had a decisive influence on the entire technology network. None of the
micro-networks set the rate and direction of the technology development. Although
the Corex process is the first smelting reduction process that became commercially
available, its general applicability was limited. To avoid this, the later second
generation processes tried to achieve higher levels of post-combustion [Lassat de
Pressigny, 2000; Sarma and Fruehan, 1998; Chatterjee, 1994; Astier, 1991].
The lack of dominance is due partly to the variety in the types of pre-reduction units
and smelting reduction vessels, the different ways chosen to optimise either post-
combustion or pre-reduction, and the variety of vessels used in various smelting
reduction processes. Smelting reduction technology is not a homogeneous
technology.
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Materialisation
What is the rate of development and what steps in up-scaling can be distinguished?
In this section we focus on the materialisation of the technology in order to see how
many years were needed to develop smelting reduction technology. Figure 3
indicated the number of years that micro-networks actors were active. Figure 4 gives
a more detailed account of the capacity of the equipment used in R&D.
If we glance at Figure 4, it becomes clear that most of the processes are operational
on a relatively modest scale. In some micro-networks there are plans for taking the
next step, although such plans do not give any guarantee. The plan to build a HIsmelt
facility on the site of a US mini-mill steel manufacturer has recently been postponed
till at least 2003.
Figure 4 indicates that steps in up-scaling the technology differ among the various
micro-networks. We can only give a rough indication of the difference in scale that is
a factor 5 to 10 between the subsequent steps.
Figure 4 also demonstrates that it is difficult to generalise about the time frame
needed for developing smelting reduction processes, primarily because nine of the
ten processes are not yet operational on a near-commercial or demonstration scale.
At the moment only the Corex process is commercially available. Roughly ten years
were needed to make the first Corex facility run satisfactorily on a scale of 1,000
thm/day. More than fifteen years were needed to make it operational at 2,000
thm/day11. Figure 4 indicates that two processes might become operational on a
demonstration scale in the near future. In both these cases, at least 20 years were
needed to reach the status of materialisation.
A final interesting observation was made in the CCF micro-network; historic
decisions on the materialisation of the CCF process likely affected its later
development. Hoogovens and the Italian integrated steelmaker Ilva have separately
continued R&D since 1992 (see Figure 4). The major reason was that the firms could
not agree on where to build a new pilot research facility. Meijer (2000) speculates
that if the firms would have continued co-operation and if they would have built a
complete smelting reduction process – including both the pre-reduction unit and the
smelting reduction vessel –, the course of events might have taken a more positive
direction. Such a complete facility might have delivered results that would have
enhanced the decision to build a demonstration facility between 1995 and 1999. As
shown Figure 4 and as will be discussed in a later section, the demonstration facility
was not built.
If we look at the up-scaling of the processes (Figure 4) and at the time frames of
active R&D (Figure 3), we conclude that it takes at least 10 to 20 years to perform
the necessary steps. In this estimate, we did not take into account the delay caused by
the shelving of some of the processes.
                                                
11
 The C-3000 with a capacity of 3,500 – 4,000 thm /day is currently up for ssale [VAI, 2000].
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Figure 4: The steps taken in up-scaling the ten smelting reduction processes12.
                                                
12
 The scale of equipment or facilities is usually expressed in tons of hot metal per day (thm/day).
There is however no uniform standard regarding what is a near-commercial scale or demonstration
facility, a pilot facility or a lab scale facility. Whereas Hoogovens considered a 1,400-2,000 thm/day
facility as a demonstration facility, the Corex facility in South Africa is seen as the first commercial
facility, i.e. 1,000 thm/day. On the other hand, the recent AusIron facility of 40 thm/day is referred to
as a demonstration facility. We make a distinction between lab / bench scale facilities, which are <100
thm/day; pilot scale facilities, which are >100 and <750 thm/day; and demonstration or near-
commercial scale facilities, which are > 750 thm/day.
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What are the perceived performance characteristics of the technology?
Smelting reduction technology overcomes some major disadvantages of the
conventional blast furnace route for iron production. This causes that the cost price
of a ton of hot metal is likely to be reduced [Smith, 2000; Kitagawa, 2000]. This is
the most important characteristic of smelting reduction technology.
Lower capital investment (avoiding coke ovens and agglomeration plants and
replacing the capital intensive blast furnaces) and the use of coal instead of expensive
metallurgical coals are two major factors in this cost price reduction. Smelting
reduction technology is cost competitive even on a relatively small scale in that it
increases operational flexibility. Smelting reduction processes also show a larger
flexibility in the type of raw materials that can be processed. Finally, smelting
reduction technology has clear-cut environmental advantages over the conventional
blast furnace route [Pollock, 1995; Millbank, 1995; Fruehan, 1999; De Beer, 1998;
IISI, 1998].
Whereas some performance data can be found in the literature, these merely affirm
what was formulated in more general terms in the former paragraph. Only the Corex
data are backed up by industrial operation. The other performance data found
represent targets for pilot or demonstration facilities under construction but are not
an elaborate account on what was actually measured in R&D. The ranges reflected in
e.g. cost price data found are largely due to differences between smelting reduction
processes13.
The performance data reported for smelting reduction technology are promising – in
fact they form the core arguments used by actors to legitimise their investments in
developing smelting reduction technology –. However, it is difficult for the
technology to compete with the conventional increasingly optimised and very
efficient blast furnace route. Most often the performance data quoted in the literature
do not reflect the competitive position very accurately. By now, most of the smelting
reduction processes seem to have lost ground to the incrementally improved
conventional route for producing iron. For a more elaborate discussion of these
changing circumstances we refer to the next section in which we discuss some
arguments put forward for stopping the development of smelting reduction
technology in various micro-networks.
                                                
13
 In literature we found that estimates of a cost price reduction varied from +10 to -25 US$ per ton
hot metal (after off gas-creditation) [Anonymous, 1996b; Meijer et al., 1994; Furukawa, 1994]. In
literature the cost price of a ton hot metal in a smelting reduction ranges from to 80 to 160 US$
[Weston and Thompson, 1996; MacCauley and Price, 1999; Dry et al., 1999; Meijer et al., 1996;
Abildgaard et al., 1997].
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Micro-networks
How are the various micro-networks made up?
Table 1 gives an overview of the composition of the nine micro-networks. Table 1
clearly illustrates that a wide variety of actors played a role in the nine micro-
networks. A variety of types of actors also initiated the R&D activities.
In four of the nine micro-networks, integrated steel manufacturers took the lead. In
the North American DSM micro-network an association of steel companies played
an important role in initiating R&D activities (AISI). Machine suppliers or
engineering companies initiated three micro-networks, mining firms initiated two
micro-networks and research institutes initiated one micro-network. Note that the
micro-network that was initiated by a research institute operated in the former USSR
planned economy [Pokhvisnev, 2000].
It is interesting to compare this variety with the composition of the micro-networks
developing strip casting technology. In the development of strip casting technology,
another important innovative energy-efficient technology, steel manufacturers
generally took the lead and controlled the R&D activities. Steel manufacturers
initiated ten of the eleven micro-networks (see Chapter 5). The larger variety of
actors involved in developing smelting reduction technology clearly has to do with
the position of the technology in the steelmaking process. Production of hot metal is
also interesting for mining firms or for engineering companies who have an existing
technology that can also be used for smelting iron. Only in one micro-network a
well-known machine supplier to the iron and steel industry initiated the R&D
activities, i.e. the Austrian machine supplier Voest.
Table 1 makes a distinction between the role of integrated steel manufacturers
(column 3) and the role of the so-called mini-mill operators (column 2). In three of
the five micro-networks in which integrated steel manufacturers did not take the lead,
mini-mill operators became involved when the technology was claimed to be ready
for operation on an industrial scale (see also Figure 3).
The second column of Table 1 gives a detailed overview of which actors played a
role in developing smelting reduction processes. With the exception of Romelt’s
micro-network14, in all the micro-networks various actors co-operated in developing
smelting reduction technology.
                                                
14
 The Russian steel firm Novolipetski Metallurgical Kombinat (NLMK) was appointed by the USSR
government as host for the pilot facility (450 th/day) and a commercial facility (2,500 thm/day). After
the fall of the former USSR regime, the Russian economy collapsed and there was no need for
additional ironmaking capacity. The commercial facility was never built [Valavin and Pohvisnev,
2000; Thompson, 2000].
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Table 1: Overview of all the actors in the technology network. ♦= Actor that
initiated R&D activities; • = Other actors.
Process Actors Country
Supplier
 /
 engin
eer
M
ini
-m
ill steelm
ak
er
Integrated
 steelm
ak
er
R
esea
rch in
stitute
G
o
v
ern
m
ent
M
ining
 co
m
p
a
ny
Steel asso
ciation
Corex
Finex
Deutsche Voest
Voest
Iscor (1984-1989)
POSCO + RIST (1992-now)
Germany
Austria
South-Africa
Korea
♦
♦
•
•
Romelt MISA
USSR government
NLMK
ICF Kaiser (licence 1995)
Nippon Steel Corp. (licence 1995)
NMDC (licence 2000 / via RSIL)
Russia
Russia
Russia
US
Japan
India
•
•
•
♦
♦
•
HIsmelt CRA
Klöckner Werke (1981-1987)
Midrex Corporation (1989-1994)
CSIRO (early 1990s)
Nucor (1999-now)
Australia
Germany
US
Australia
US
•
•
•
•
♦
DIOS Japanese steel firms (1988-1996)
JISF (1988-1996)
NKK (1997-now)
Japan
Japan
Japan
♦
•
•
CCF
CleanSMelt
British Steel (1989-1992)
Hoogovens (1989-1999)
CSM (1989-now)
German research institutes (94-97)
UK
Netherlands
Italy
Germany
♦
♦
♦
•
DSM1 Canadian, US and Mexican steel
firms (1988-1995)
AISI (1988-1995)
Research institutes and universities
Canada, US,
Mexico
US
US
♦
♦
•
♦
Jupiter Usinor
Lurgi
Thyssen (1993 – 1994)
France
Germany
Germany
•
♦
•
AusIron Ausmelt Ltd.
AuIron Energy
Ministry for Mines and Energy
Krakatau Steel (1997-now)
Australian universities
Australia
Australia
Australia
Indonesia
Australia
♦
•
•
•
♦
Tecnored Tecnologos
North Star (1998-now)
Brazil
US
♦
•
Initiators (counted per micro-network) 3 - 4 1 1 2 1
Total number of actors involved (counted per micro-network) 6 3 8 5 2 3 2
1
 The US government had a role in preparing the legal framework through which a co-operative R&D
programme could be established between public and private actors. The so-called Steel Initiative
through which government aimed at promoting long-term R&D in the steel industry paved the way for
the development of the DSM process in a co-operative R&D programme [Kavanagh and Obenchain,
2000; Sharkey, 1998; Badra, 1995].
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In seven of the eight micro-networks co-operation was established right from the
start. In the four micro-networks which were initiated by integrated steel
manufacturers ‘competing’ steel firms co-operated. In two of these micro-networks,
the North-American DSM micro-network and the Japanese DIOS micro-network, a
larger number of integrated steel manufacturers co-operated (with substantial R&D
support from the government) in developing smelting reduction technology.
We asked the experts what the actors’ arguments were for co-operating in the micro-
networks. They gave two major arguments: sharing the R&D expenditure and
creating access to specific knowledge or earlier R&D experience [Burrow, 2000;
Kitagawa, 2000; Fruehan, 2000; Meijer, 2000; Robson, 2000; Kavanagh and
Obenchain, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 2000; Birat, 2000; Floyd, 2000; Freydorfer,
2001].
What motivates actors to start and / or stop R&D activities?
To supplement the knowledge gained from articles, conference papers and journal
articles, we asked the experts why actors became actively involved in developing
smelting reduction technology. By discussing these arguments with the experts it was
possible to get a better idea of what really got them moving. Table 2 gives an
overview of each of the actor’s arguments for initiating or becoming involved in the
development of smelting reduction technology.
Table 2 shows that actors’ arguments differ per ‘type’ or ‘category’ of actor. Mining
firms are interested primarily in exploiting existing deposits. Smelting reduction
technology allows them to give added value to their raw materials or waste products.
Table 2 illustrates that mini-mill steel makers showed interest in smelting reduction
processes at a moment when the processes could be applied on a scale suitable for
electric arc furnaces. Whereas the South-African Iscor was interested in applying the
first Corex facility because of their limited access to metallurgical coals in South-
Africa, the major argument why mini-mill operators were interested in smelting
reduction technology was that it guaranteed a fixed priced supply of high quality hot
metal. Feeding a mini-mill with hot metal increases the productivity and also opens
up possibilities for the production of higher quality products. Table 2 shows that it
was primarily the wish to reduce the cost of producing a ton of hot metal which
caused the integrated steel manufacturers to be interested. Avoiding capital
expenditure on new coke ovens (and also blast furnaces) and the possibility of using
relatively cheap coals (instead of scarce and expensive metallurgical coals) were the
two major factors in this cost price reduction. The threat of environmental
regulations and the necessity to invest in order to comply with these requirements
delivered an additional cost advantage.
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Table 2: Actors’ arguments for being involved.
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Klöckner1 HIsmelt 1981 •
Japanese firms2 DIOS 1988 • • • •
NKK3 DIOS 1997 • • • • • • •
Nippon Steel licence Romelt 95 • •
British Steel4 CCF 1989 • • •
Hoogovens5 CCF 1989 • • • •
Ilva/CSM6 CCF 1989 • • •
North-American
Firms7
DSM 1988 • • • •
Stelco8 DSM 1994 • •
Usinor9 Jupiter 1989 • •
Inte-
grated
steel-
maker
POSCO + RIST10 Corex/Finex 1992 • • • •
Iscor11 Corex 1984 • • •
Nucor12 HIsmelt 2000 • •
Mini-
mill
steelmaker North Star13 Tecnored 1998 • •
D Voest + Voest14 Corex 1989 • •
ICF Kaiser15 licence Romelt 95 •
Midrex16 HIsmelt 1989 • • •
Lurgi Jupiter 1989 • • •
Ausmelt Ltd.17 AusIron 1986 • • •
Machine
supplier or
engineer
Tecnologos18 Tecnored 1990 • •
Research
institute
MISA19 Romelt 1980 • •
NMDC20 licence Romelt 00 • •
CRA21 HIsmelt 1981 • • • • •
Mining
firm
AuIron Energy22 AusIron 1995 • •
1 [Burrow, 2000].  2 [Kitagawa, 2000; Furukawa, 1994].  3 [Takahashi et al., 1990; Kitagawa, 2000].  4
[Robson, 2000].  5 [Meijer, 2000; Moors, 2000a; Boom, 1998; Dekker and Knol, 1996].  6 [Malgarini
et al., 1991].  7 [Badra, 1995; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Fruehan, 2000].  8
[Ritt, 1998a; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Thompson, 2000].  9 Usinor’s major aim was to develop
competence [Lassat de Pressigny, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 1993].  10 [Shin, 2000; Lee et al., 1999;
Schenk et al., 1998].  11 [Merwe et al., 1989; Millbank, 1995; Eberle et al., 1996; Freydorfer, 2001].  12
[Anonymous, 2000a; Kemp, 2000].  13 [Ritt, 2000; Anonymous, 1997c; Ritt, 1997].  14 [Freydorfer,
2001; Smith and Corbett, 1987; Delport, 1991].  15 [Thompson, 2000].  16 [Burrow, 2000].  17 [Floyd,
2000].  18 [Pokhvisnev, 2000; Valavin and Pokhvisnev, 2000; Vildanov et al., 1998].  19 [Poos, 1993].
20 The Romelt facility is aimed at processing iron ore slimes, a waste product of mining activity. There
is an agreement with the state government to use off gases for electricity generation [Pokhvisnev,
2000; SAIL, 2000].  21 CRA agreed with the Australian government to establish added value economic
activity [Innes, 2001; Burrow, 2000; Dry et al., 1999; Prideaux, 1996; Innes, 1995].  22 [Floyd, 2000].
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It is interesting to take a closer look at British Steel’s and Hoogovens’ arguments for
becoming involved in smelting reduction technology. First of all, their arguments are
fairly typical for the other integrated steel manufacturers. The promising reduction in
the costs of producing a ton of hot metal made these firms go into action in 1986.
The need to reduce costs guided R&D decisions. Secondly, it is almost paradoxical
that the circumstances that allowed the start-up of the CCF development in 1989 later
caused the CCF process to be shelved (in 1999).
In 1986, British Steel and Hoogovens started to develop the CBF process, a
predecessor of the CCF process (see also Figure 3). Both firms were interested in
developing this coal-based CBF process so that they could move away from reliance
on coke ovens and avoid huge capital investments and the use of expensive
metallurgical coals. Reducing the cost of a ton of hot metal was the major driving
force. In 1989, R&D activities concentrated on CCF. The major argument for this
change was that the cost advantage of the CBF process over the conventional route
turned out to be modest. On the hand this was caused by the technology itself;
agglomeration was still needed. But the improvements in the existing iron production
route had also improved the coke situation in both firms. So in 1989 there was time
left to switch R&D to a more explorative new process that promised even larger
reductions in the cost price of hot metal by avoiding agglomeration of the ore.
However, ongoing improvements in the existing coke ovens and blast furnaces in
both firms eventually led to the shelving of the CCF process [Robson, 2000; Meijer,
2000; Boom, 1998; Dekker and Knol, 1996; Moors, 2000a].
The circumstances that permitted the switch from the CBF process to the CCF
process in 1989 – in a way Hoogovens’ and British Steel’s ‘escaped to the future’ –
turned out to be the major reason why integrated steel manufacturers lost interest in
smelting reduction technology.
Table 3 gives an overview of the actors who ceased being active role in developing
smelting reduction technology. If we compare Table 2 and Table 3 we conclude that
it was primarily integrated steel producers who ended their involvement. The major
argument was that they no longer had the need to replace obsolete conventional coke
ovens (and possibly blast furnaces) early 21st century. And secondly, the integrated
steel manufacturers, all of whom operated in industrialised countries, did not need
additional ironmaking capacity [Sexton, 2000].
It became unnecessary to replace existing coke ovens and blast furnaces due to a
number of reasons. The introduction of pulverised coal injection in the blast furnace
reduced the need for coke in hot metal production in integrated steel works. Most of
the integrated steel manufacturers invested in R&D concerned with pulverised coal
injection at the same time as they were active in developing smelting reduction
technology. This reduced the pressure on the existing coke ovens. Furthermore, the
steel firms succeeded in upgrading and improving the existing coke ovens so that
their lifetime could be extended. The possibility of importing coke from e.g. China
further relieved the pressure on coke production. Furthermore, new and cleaner coke
ovens were developed and offered for sale (and implemented). Finally, the existing
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blast furnaces were also continually improved. This resulted in a higher productivity,
longer lifetimes and a lower demand for coke for the production of hot metal. Not all
these reasons were equally important for each of the integrated steel manufacturers in
Table 3. However, all in all, the improvements in the existing capital stock and
conventional technology were so large that the cost advantage of the innovative
smelting reduction technology became smaller and smaller as time went on.
Table 3: Overview of actors’ arguments for stopping their R&D activities.
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Klöckner1 HIsmelt 1987 •
Japanese firms2 DIOS 1996 • •
British Steel3 CCF 1992 • •
Hoogovens4 CCF 1999 • • • • •
North-American
firms5
DSM 1994 • • • • •
Stelco6 DSM 1995 •
Inte-
grated
steel-
maker
Usinor 7 Jupiter 1994 • •
ICF Kaiser8 licence Romelt 99 • •Machine
supplier or
engineer
Midrex9 HIsmelt 1994 •
Research
institute
MISA10 Romelt 1980 •
1
 [Burrow, 2000].  2 [Kitagawa et al., 1999; Kitagawa, 2000, Fruehan, 2000].  3 [Smith, 2000; Robson,
2000; Meijer, 2000; Millbank, 1995; Tomellini, 1994].  4 [Meijer, 2000; Dekker and Knol, 1996;
Roggen, 2000].  5 [Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Ritt, 1998a].  6 [Meijer, 2000; Kavanagh and
Obenchain, 2000; Fruehan, 2000].  7 Both Thyssen and Usinor recently invested in new coke oven
capacity [Birat, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 2000].  8 A small subsidiariy of ICF Kaiser filed for
bankruptcy. The firm was sold in separate parts [Thompson, 2000].  9 [Burrow, 2000].  10 [Thompson,
2000].
Lassat de Pressigny (2000), who led the development of the Jupiter process stated:
“The current situation in coke oven and blast furnace operation shows that huge
investments in smelting reduction process would have been premature. Smelting
reduction was possibly studied at the wrong time”. Smith (2000), who has been well
informed about the technology network since the technology network emerged (see
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e.g. [Smith and Corbett, 1987]), phrased it like this: “To put it really simplistically15:
at the moment smelting reduction technology R&D efforts were started the
technology was expected to be needed in 10 years. This has not changed”.
One of the integrated steel manufacturers did not stop its R&D activities. The
Japanese firm NKK is still active in trying to commercialise DIOS technology.
Kitagawa (2000) stated: “Only recently we engineered a revised process using DIOS
…, which attracted the interest of several steel makers. We are having intensive and
serious discussions with them. Smelting reduction technology must be one of the
right answers for the future”.
In general, however, integrated steel manufacturers stopped their activities because
they could not foresee any opportunity for smelting reduction technology in the near
future. The expenditure needed for developing the processes was simply too high to
continue without any applications in sight [Meijer, 2000; Smith, 2000; Lassat de
Pressigny, 2000; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Fruehan, 2000; Sexton, 2000].
How much money is spent and by whom?
Table 4 (see next page) summarises the expenditure on developing smelting
reduction technology.
Table 4 does not indicate expenditure data for all micro-networks. The data available
point to roughly 550 million US$. We estimate that the total expenditure lies
somewhere between 600 and 700 million US$.
The expenditure for bringing strip casting technology towards commercialisation
(per micro-network) is of a similar order of magnitude16 (see Chapter 5).
What important decisions are made with regard to the direction of technological
development?
As was indicated before, the variety of smelting reduction processes is rather large.
There is simply no single technological origin of smelting reduction technology. The
technical roots are quite diffuse (see e.g. [Sarma and Fruehan, 1998; Anonymous,
1996a; Ritt, 1996]). Various micro-networks made rather deviant decisions regarding
their R&D activities.
                                                
15
 In the context of replacing existing blast furnaces in companies like his own (British Steel, UK).
Additional ironmaking capacity is not required.
16
 Note that over the last 15 years, the IEA/OECD countries spent on average 220 million US$ per
year on industrial energy-efficiency R&D [IEA, 1997]. Annual expenditure on developing smelting
reduction technology has been about 30 to 45 million US$ per year.
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Table 4: Expenditure on R&D and government R&D support.
Process Cap.
[thm/
day]
Total
[M US$]
Of
which:
gov.
support
[M US$]
% Government R&D support
granted by:
Corex1
Finex
1,000
150
n.a.
40
n.a.
-
n.a.
-
German Ministry of Research + Technology
Austrian Research Promotion Foundation
-
Romelt2 450 n.a. n.a. n.a. USSR government
HIsmelt3 300 200 - - tax deduction
CCF4 400 18 7 40 European Coal and Steel Community ECSC
DIOS5
NKK
500 150
26
100
-
67
-
MITI / DIOS R&D programme
-
DSM6 160 60
8
46
6
77
70
US Department of Energy / DSM
US Department of Energy / waste oxides
Jupiter7 8 > 10 0.25 < 5 European Coal and Steel Community ECSC
AusIron8 40 40 6.5 20 Australian Federal Government
South-Australian Government
Tecnored9 50 n.a. n.a. n.a. Brazilian government
Total
Estimated range
550
600 - 700
165 30
1
 n.a. = no data available. Freydorfer (2001) and Shin (2000) do not comment [Anonymous, 1997d;
Smith and Corbett, 1987].  2 Valavin and Pokhvisnev (2000) do not comment.  3 Burrow (2000) does
not comment. Estimate comes from [Badra, 1995] and [Cusack et al., 1995].  4 Total expenditure
includes the R&D activities of British Steel, Hoogovens and CSM performed in three ECSC
supported projects [Meijer, 2000; Robson, 2000; Cordis, 2000].  5 [Furukawa, 1994; Kitagawa, 2000].
6
 The DSM R&D programme evolved into a programme that used the pilot facility for testing the
reduction of waste oxides. AISI is obliged to repay DOE’s contribution from the net proceeds of
commercialisation (R&D support + 50%). If AISI refuses to commercialise the DSM process, the
patent rights are forfeited to DOE [Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000].  7 Usinor acquired ECSC support
for one project (1992-1995). This project’s budget was less than 5% of Usinor’s total expenditure
[Lassat de Pressigny, 2000; Cordis, 2000; Birat, 2000].  8 [Floyd, 2000; Sherrington, 2001].  9 [Poos,
1983].
Looking at the energy-efficiency of the various processes, we can distinguish three
categories17. The first category consists of the Corex process. Its high-degree of pre-
reduction, makes it a relatively energy-intensive process. The second category
consists of second generation processes, which consist of one vessel; these are the
processes known as Romelt, Ausmelt and Tecnored. They tend to have a high
specific energy consumption [Sarma and Fruehan, 1998; Chatterjee, 1994;
Anonymous, 1996a]. The third category includes second generation processes, which
consists of a pre-reduction unit and a smelting reduction vessel; such as HIsmelt,
DIOS, CCF and DSM18. These four ‘converter-based’ processes aim to optimise the
                                                
17
 The Jupiter process does not fit into any of these categories (see e.g. [Poos, 1993]).
18
 Note that the HIsmelt process can also operate as a one-vessel process. The productivity/economics
improve significantly by coupling it to a pre-reduction unit. Note that the CCF process consists of one
vessel. However, in the vessel a pre-reduction zone (the cyclone) and a smelting reduction zone can be
distinguished. The difference between CCF and the other one-vessel processes is that in CCF the
degree of post-combustion can be controlled.
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exchange of heat, which is generated by post-combustion, back into the smelting
reduction vessel [Scott, 1994].
The preference of various actors for the different processes can be explained by their
earlier (R&D) experiences with (parts) of the smelting reduction processes.
Both Deutsche Voest and Voest sold natural-gas-based direct reduction technology.
They were thus familiar with the ‘shaft furnace’ they adopted as a pre-reduction unit.
They were also familiar with highly pre-reduced iron. All three one- vessel
processes, Romelt, AusIorn and Tecnored, derived from an ‘existing’ smelting
technology. The actors had been involved in developing these preceding smelting
processes [Floyd, 2000; Poos, 1993; Pokhivisnev, 2000]. The four ‘converter-based’
second generation smelting reduction processes all evolved from integrated steel
manufacturers’ experiences with converter operations (e.g. the addition of coal in
steel converters to increase scrap processing) [Smith and Corbett, 1987; Brotzmann,
1992; Robson, 2000].
These converter-based second generation smelting reduction processes are the most
interesting from an energy-efficiency point of view19. To decrease coal input by
optimising heat exchange was an explicit R&D criterion in developing these
processes. However, in two of these micro-networks R&D activities were stopped.
The application of the HIsmelt process by the US mini-mill operator Nucor would
not be an energy-efficient application if hot metal is replacing scrap20. It remains to
be seen whether and where NKK succeeds in commercialising the DIOS process.
Resumé
Smelting reduction technology is not yet a proven technology. Only one of the nine
micro-networks succeeded in bringing a specific smelting reduction process to the
market, although this specific process lacks general applicability and has a high
specific energy consumption. In five of the eight additional micro-networks R&D
activities are still going on. However, the composition of the technology network has
changed over time.
Most of the integrated steel manufacturers who played an active role in various
micro-networks lost interest in smelting reduction technology. Existing blast
furnaces and coke ovens were continually improved and the lifetimes of the existing
stock was extended. The threat that obsolete coke ovens and blast furnaces would
have to be replaced did not (yet) come true. They did not need an expansion of their
iron production capacity. Smelting reduction technology was ‘locked out’ by a
                                                
19
 In 1998, IISI expected that the specific energy consumption of smelting reduction technology would
be of the same order of magnitude as an optimised blast furnace. Dispensing with coke ovens and
sinter plants makes smelting reduction technology overall more energy-efficient [IISI, 1998].
20
 If a smelting reduction unit is implemented in a mini-mill, hot metal can be supplied to an electric
arc furnace, so that the furnace’s power consumption for melting the raw material will decrease. Its
productivity will increase. It overall specific energy consumption will increase if it replaces scrap as
raw materials. If hot metal replaces direct reduced iron (DRI), specific energy consumption is likely to
decrease slightly.
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continuous, incremental improvement of the conventional production route and the
existing capital stock.
However, the future of smelting reduction technology is still undecided; actors like
mining firms continue to be interested and there is a growing interest of mini-mill
steel operators. Application of smelting reduction technology in mini-mills may be a
short-term niche for proving the feasibility of some of the smelting reduction
processes. A successful introduction of smelting reduction technology in mini-mills
may enhance the market position of the mini-mill route.
6.4. The effect of government intervention
In this section we focus on the effect of government intervention on the development
of smelting reduction technology. We analyse the effect of environmental regulation
and government R&D support. We discuss the role of stimulating co-operation in
various multi-actor micro-networks. Finally, we focus on the support that
government intended to give in connection with the building of two demonstration
facilities.
Environmental regulations
In countries like the US, Canada, Japan, Australia and in Western Europe industry is
confronted with regulations regarding environmental emissions in the production of
iron. Coke ovens and sinter plants are most affected [Hogan and Koelbe, 1994;
EIPPCB, 1999; Prabhu and Cilione, 1992]. The environmental advantage of smelting
reduction technology over the conventional route is generally articulated by all actors
involved in developing smelting reduction technology (see e.g. [Sexton, 2000;
HIsmelt, 2000; VAI, 2000; AISI, 1998; Weston and Thompson, 1996]).
We asked the experts whether the environmental emissions had been a decisive
argument for initiating or performing R&D activities. The need to comply with
environmental regulations was usually indicated as one of the factors leading to the
cost advantage of the smelting reduction technology over the conventional blast
furnace route. If smelting reduction technology were be applied, other environmental
investment would not be needed. However, this incentive would never have been
large enough to initiate huge and technologically complex R&D efforts such as the
development of smelting reduction technology21. As was indicated before, avoiding
capital expenditure and using cheaper coals were the two main factors in favour of
                                                
21
 The importance of such environmental regulations in driving R&D differs among the technologie
sunder development. Hoogovens was the first to apply Emission Optimised Sintering (EOS)
technology on a commercial scale primarily because it had to reduce environmental emissions of
sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides. Lurgi (Germany) originally developed EOS. EOS allows the re-
use of the flue gas that is released during the sintering process (agglomeration of iron ore). The
investment in the EOS facility was easily recouped through savings on energy costs [Meijer, 2000;
Moors, 2000a].
- 190 -
smelting reduction technology. The environmental advantage of smelting reduction
processes was clearly taken into account, although it was a modest part of the overall
(cost) considerations [Smith, 2000; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Kitagawa,
2000; Robson, 2000; Meijer, 2000].
Waste disposal regulations in the US are such that land-filling is increasingly taxed
[Weston and Thompson, 1996; Anonymous, 1996c; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000;
Thompson, 2000]. This tax on waste disposal makes it attractive for integrated steel
manufacturers to recycle waste material from steel sites. It is interesting to note the
following two observations from the empirical material.
First of all, the US engineering firm ICF Kaiser International tried to enter this
‘niche’ of recycling waste oxides. They wanted to offer a smelting reduction process
as a commercial product in their engineering activities. Although ICF Kaiser did not
succeed in applying the Romelt process on a commercial scale22, this example shows
that actors actively use niches created by government intervention for extending and
strengthening their business.
Secondly, these waste disposal regulations were influential in the continuation of the
co-operative R&D programme for developing the DSM process. At the end of the
R&D programme in 1994, the steel association managed to mobilise R&D support
from the government for continuing R&D activities. In view of the fact that the steel
firms were not really enthusiastic about up-scaling the DSM process, continuation of
R&D was an non-committal next step [Thompson, 2000; Ritt, 1998b; Nelko, 1994;
Fruehan, 2000]. Continuing R&D was a fruitful strategy in postponing large capital
investments.
With regard to the effect of regulations we come to the following conclusions:
- Environmental regulations were not critical in initiating the development of
smelting reduction technology, not did they affect the R&D decisions taken.
However, they provided researchers and engineers within a firm with an
additional argument for continuing R&D.
- Environmental regulations were not selective. They did not favour the
development of smelting reduction technology over the conventional technology
(nor did they prevent steel firms from investing in new coke ovens)23.
Government R&D support
We now look more closely at what effect government R&D support had on
stimulating the development of smelting reduction technology. Government
                                                
22
 ICF Kaiser acquired a licence for the Russian Romelt process in 1995. ICF tried to sell the Romelt
process by claiming it could process waste disposal and waste oxides in integrated steel plants
[Weston and Thompson, 1996]. There are a number of reasons why ICF Kaiser’s attempt failed. The
process turned out to be a ‘rough diamond’. The process required further development. ICF Kaiser did
not have the financial resources. They did not succeed in finding a partner. Furthermore, the steel
industry itself was reluctant to invest in high-risk projects [Thompson, 2000].
23
 See [Lassat de Pressigny, 2000; Birat, 2000; Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Ritt, 2000]).
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supported R&D activities financially in eight of the nine micro-networks (see second
column in Table 5). Two micro-networks received R&D support through the
Research Technology and Demonstration programme of the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC). The budget for the RTD programme comes from a levy on the
steel price, so it is not government R&D support in a strict sense. Table 4 gives a
more detailed account of government’s contribution to the total expenditure in the
separate various micro-networks. Table 4 shows that government support has been
substantial in developing the DIOS process, the CCF process and the DSM process.
For evaluating the effect of government R&D support on the development of
smelting reduction technology, we make a distinction between additionality,
acceleration and effectiveness. Additionality indicates whether R&D support led to
activities that would not have been undertaken without government R&D support.
Acceleration indicates whether R&D support led to an accelerated materialisation of
the technology within the entire technology network. Effectiveness indicates whether
the innovative smelting reduction process may lead to improvements in energy-
efficiency once the technology is applied commercially.
Table 5: Effect of external / government R&D support.
Micro-
network
Was
there
external
R&D
support?
Did R&D
support lead
to additional
R&D
activities?1
Did support
lead to an
acceleration of
the
technology’s
development?
Will the
process
improve
energy-
efficiency?
Scale of
the
process
Micro-
network
still
active?
Corex / Finex Yes No - No Innovation Yes
Romelt Yes Yes2 No No Pilot Yes
HIsmelt No - - Likely Pilot Yes
DIOS Yes Very likely Maybe Likely Pilot Yes
CCF Yes Yes3 No Likely Pilot No
DSM Yes Yes No Likely Pilot No
Jupiter Yes No3 - Likely Lab No
AusIron Yes Yes4 No No Lab Yes
Tecnored Yes n.a. n.a. No Lab No
1
 Assessment based on [Freydorfer, 2001; Burrow, 2000; Floyd, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny, 2000;
Meijer, 2000; Robson, 2000; Fruehan, 2000, Ritt, 2000; Thompson, 2000; Kitagawa, 2000; Kavanagh
and Obenchain, 2000].  2 The Romelt process was developed in the former USSR. When the USSR
collapsed, government R&D support came to an end [Valavin and Pokhvisnev, 2000; Thompson,
2000].  3 R&D support through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).  4 The South
Australian government has a direct stake in the SASE joint venture which is responsible for
developing the AusIron process. The ministry for Mines and Energy of South Australia is no longer a
partner in SASE, though the joint venture owns the rights to explore the government’s iron ore
deposits [Floyd, 2000; Meekatharra, 1998].
Additionality
The assessment of the additionality of R&D support is a first and crucial step. We
asked experts about the importance of external support in initiating and continuing
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R&D support. We tried to verify their statements by asking other experts. We were
able to understand and evaluate experts’ responses in the light of their arguments for
investing in R&D and of their drive for up-scaling the technology. The second
column in Table 5 shows our assessment.
It is plausible that in five of the eight micro-networks R&D support was additional;
in these micro-networks government R&D support has been important in initiating or
continuing R&D activities. As is indicated in Table 5, in two of these micro-networks
external support was ‘special’. The Russian Romelt process was developed in the
former USSR. In the case of the AusIron process, the South-Australian government
wanted to exploit its iron ore deposits and generate added-value economic activity in
the region.
In both the North American and Dutch micro-networks, R&D support was important
in starting and continuing the R&D activities. The US government played an active
role in establishing the legal framework which allowed co-operative R&D
programmes. The R&D programme for developing the DSM process was one of
these. The Steel Initiative of the US Department of Energy stimulated co-operative
R&D between public and private actors to support the deteriorated R&D in the steel
industry [Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Sharkey, 1998]. The financial support was
a motivating factor for the actors – AISI, the steel firms and some research institutes
– to get together and initiate R&D24 [Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000]. The ECSC
support had an additional role in the development of the CCF process. Cost sharing
by the ECSC made it easier to continue R&D at the moment when British Steel and
Hoogovens ceased the development of the CBF process and continued with the CCF
process in 1989 [Meijer, 2000; Robson, 2000].
With regard to the Japanese micro-network, it is likely that government R&D support
led to additional R&D activities. Government R&D support allowed the micro-
network of Japanese integrated steel manufacturers to continue former private R&D
activities and to build a pilot scale facility on a reasonable scale. After the co-
operative DIOS R&D programme was finished NKK continued. The comments of
NKK’s Kitagawa illustrate that it is not easy to assess additionality. Kitagawa (2000)
states that NKK ‘probably’ would not have continued R&D either. “The reason why
I write ‘probably’ is that when we carried out our own development we were in the
middle of an economic bubble. So we might have spent additional budget to
demonstrate the process” [Kitagawa, 2000].
Acceleration
We can assess whether R&D support accelerated a technology’s development by
comparing the materialisation of a specific process within the framework of the
entire technology network. Only the Corex process achieved innovation (see column
six in Table 5). Corex, however, is a first generation process.
If we leave out the Corex process, it is rather difficult to assess whether government
R&D support did actually accelerate the materialisation of the technology, because
the majority of the efforts has not reached the scale of a demonstration facility and,
                                                
24
 It took two years to develop the proposal for the R&D programme.
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more importantly, a number of efforts were stopped. The HIsmelt process and the
DIOS process are the most likely to become a near commercial facility in the next
few years (although no firm decisions have been taken yet). The HIsmelt process was
developed without any government R&D support. Because the R&D efforts in
developing the DSM process and the CCF process have both been shelved, it is only
in the case of the Japanese R&D activities that government R&D support may
possibly result in ‘accelerated’ development of the second generation processes.
Effectiveness
Finally we take a look at the effectiveness of R&D support. An evaluation in terms
of energy-efficiency is still speculative; most of the processes did not prove
operation on a near commercial scale. We conclude that government had an
additional effect on three of the five micro-networks that were developing smelting
reduction processes that were likely to be energy-efficient (if it may come to
commercial application).
With regard to the effect of government R&D support we conclude that:
- Government R&D support enlarged the technology network, but did not
accelerate technology development. Government R&D support did not play an
additional role in developing the two processes that had reached the most
advanced stage of materialisation so far.
- However, government did play an additional role in expanding the number of
micro-networks that invested in developing smelting reduction processes and that
were likely to be energy-efficient.
Stimulating co-operation
The DSM and DIOS micro-networks received substantial R&D support from the US
and Japanese government, namely 75 and 67% respectively. In both these micro-
networks a large number of actors in a competitive relationship, co-operated. The
CCF micro-network received substantial support from the European Coal and Steel
Community’s RTD programme, roughly 40%. The ECSC’s RTD programme
stimulates co-operative projects and also obliges the participants of various
supported projects to meet and exchange R&D results. Because stimulating co-
operation is widely acknowledged as an interesting way for stimulating technological
development, these ‘network’ aspects of R&D support in this case study are
commented upon briefly.
As was already indicated, the so-called Steel Initiative in the US made it possible for
the Department of Energy to stimulate co-operative R&D between public and private
actors. The philosophy was that co-operation among steel manufacturers and
research institutes would enhance the effect of the public money spent. In the case of
the DSM R&D programme, the possibility of co-operation seemed to provide an
opportunity to explore the possibilities of the technology (at a relatively low cost
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stake for each of the separate firms). The actors were not really seriously interested
in investing in the commercialisation of the technology [Freuhan, 2000; Thompson,
2000; Ritt, 1998b].
The Japanese co-operative R&D programme relating to DIOS allowed the Japanese
integrated steel manufacturers to continue their earlier private R&D activities
[Kitagawa, 2000; Meijer, 2000; Fruehan, 2000; Anonymous, 1997a]. Earlier ideas
gained from their private R&D activities and the needs of individual firms were
included in the R&D programme. NKK proposed the basic layout of the DIOS
process. NKK also hosted the pilot facility. NKK was eager to acquire know-how
concerning plant engineering and the operation of the process [Kitagawa, 2000].
Currently NKK is the only one of the eight Japanese integrated steel manufacturers
who is seriously pursuing further commercialisation of DIOS. In the words of the
engineer who is leading the activities at NKK: “The other Japanese steel firms know
how important such tacit knowledge is in constructing and operating the facility. …
DIOS will die as the people who have the knowledge hidden in their heads retire
from NKK. We thus have to commercialise the technology as early as we can. ...
Probably the other steel firms simply observe what NKK does and they may ask NKK
to transfer the technology in the end” [Kitagawa, 2000].
The example of the co-operative DIOS R&D programme illustrates that the firm
which was one of the proponents of the DIOS R&D programme is also the one who
continued activities after the co-operative R&D activities had finished. Such firms
appear to play a decisive role in the continued effect of the co-operative R&D
programme in terms of accelerating its development.
The European integrated steel manufacturers British Steel, Hoogovens and Ilva knew
each other through regular meetings of the ECSC’s RTD programme. They had also
co-operated in earlier projects that were supported by the ECSC. Experts see this set
up with meetings and exchange of views as a positive aspect of the RTD programme.
It promotes contacts with other firms because you know the people you may address.
Steel firms apply for ECSC support typically in pre-competitive stages of a process
development when it is attractive to share expertise and equipment and to learn
[Meijer, 2000; Robson, 2000].
The requirement of contacts and exchange between the firms participating in the
RTD programme make these firms decide to do without ECSC support when projects
reach a more strategic stage of development. However, the RTD programme allows
firms to meet other actors who have similar R&D interests and R&D experiences.
There is a ‘pool’ of actors who can meet and initiate explorative projects.
It is also interesting to see the role of government in the HIsmelt micro-network. The
Australian mining company who took the lead in developing the HIsmelt process had
an agreement with the Australian government. CRA’s right to develop the ore
deposits was accompanied by the obligation to consider technologies that could lead
to processing operations like the production of iron or steel. This obligation was
subject to technical and economic viability tests [Burrow, 2000; Dry et al., 1999;
Prideaux, 1996; Innes, 1995]. Whereas Innes (2001) indicates that CRA would have
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undertaken the activities towards exploring smelting reduction without this
government obligation, it did govern CRA’s thinking concerning appropriate
technologies. In the case of Hoogovens’ CCF process there was a similar sense of
commitment, this time to the Dutch government (due to the voluntary agreement on
industrial energy-efficiency improvement) [Meijer, 2000].
Apparently firms feel committed to agreements they make with government.
Naturally firms will put their own interests first when establishing such agreements,
but if they feel a certain commitment to and a positive relationship with government,
they are likely to consider the agreements seriously. Such agreements and
commitments are not easily thrown overboard.
Although the evidence from this case study is not very strong, we feel justified in
making the following suggestions about how government can stimulate networks and
co-operation and maintain relationships with firms:
- The effect of co-operative R&D programmes in terms of accelerating a
technology’s development depend strongly on actors’ intentions to participate in
such co-operative R&D programmes.
- If government stimulates network formation and knowledge exchange it is
important that firms or other actors in the target group can really learn from each
other’s experiences.
- If one-to-one agreements are made with firms, specific topics can be anchored in
a firm’s (R&D) agenda. Without harming their business stakes, firms appear to
take their relationships with government seriously.
Government support for demonstration
In two micro-networks, government intended to give support in connection with the
building of two demonstration facilities. In both micro-networks government’s
contribution was legitimised by the wish to improve the energy efficiency of iron
production [Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Meijer, 2000]. We describe briefly why
neither of these plans was ever realised and comment on the importance of ‘energy
efficiency’ as an argument for integrated steel firms to invest in these demonstration
facilities.
In North America, there was talk of building a demonstration facility at one of
Stelco’ steel sites in Canada. Stelco was interested in a demonstration facility that
could process the firm’s waste oxides [Ritt, 1998b; Anonymous, 1996d]. The
demonstration facility was to cost 160 million US$. The US Department of Energy,
the Canadian government and Stelco were to contribute 33% each [Kavangah and
Obenchain, 2000]. The US Department of Energy had to withdraw the warranted
R&D support when the US Congress became Republican in 1994. As a result the
whole demonstration facility was cancelled. Stelco could not find another firm
willing to co-invest, nor was it willing to increase its own investment. None of the
North American steel firms really felt the need to invest so much risk capital in a
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non-proven technology [Fruehan, 2000; Kavangah and Obenchain, 2000; Meijer,
2000; Thompson, 2000].
In the Netherlands since 1997 there has been talk of building a demonstration facility
at the Hoogovens’ steel site in Ijmuiden. From 1995 onwards, Hoogovens’ intention
was to realise such a demonstration facility. Hoogovens started looking for a partner
to co-invest. First, Hoogovens tried to join in with the plan for a demonstration
facility in North America after all they needed a partner who could deliver the
smelting reduction vessel to complement their CCF pre-reduction unit. They failed.
In 1997, the Dutch government announced an intensification of Dutch climate policy
in the so-called the CO2 Reduction Plan25. The large amount of financial support
made Hoogovens apply for a demonstration facility in Ijmuiden [Meijer, 2000].
Hoogovens was awarded 30 million US$, about 25% of the total expenditure
required. Hoogovens had a similar budget available. There was thus still a financial
gap of roughly 60 million US$. There were serious contacts with the actors
developing the HIsmelt process. Once again, finance turned out to be the bottleneck.
No firm wanted to increase its expenditure [Meijer, 2000; Burrow, 2000]. In March
1999, it was formally announced that the development of the CCF process had come
to a halt for reasons already discussed.
In both micro-networks government support for the demonstration facilities was
legitimised by claims on an improved energy-efficiency [Fruehan, 2000; Meijer,
2000; Moors, 2000a]. The steel firms were primarily interested in reducing the cost
of a ton of hot metal (whether using iron ores or waste oxides). Improvements in
energy-efficiency alone would never have been a big enough incentive for Stelco and
Hoogovens to invest in such a high-risk (and capital intensive) demonstration facility
[Kavanagh and Obenchain, 2000; Meijer, 2000; Moors, 2000b].
Regarding the question of whether government can successfully contribute to the
realisation of demonstration facilities we come to the following conclusions:
- The amount of government support can trigger a firm’s interest in building a
demonstration facility (even if the project is strategic).
- Government and steel firms’ arguments for investing in a demonstration facility
differed; governments interests in energy-efficiency was only part of the overall
cost considerations of the steel firms. In spite of such differences, government
involvement can be additional in building a demonstration facility.
- The empirical material shows that at this stage of technological development
when firms are hesitant steering is an appealing, though highly complex task. On
the one hand government support can be additional and - possibly - greatly
accelerate a development. On the other hand there is a substantial budget of
public money at stake. Firms were rather reluctant to commit themselves,
                                                
25
 The Dutch government set aside a major budget for concrete investment projects that would lead to
the immediate reduction of CO2 emissions. In spite of the fact the CCF process was not yet in at the
stage of a commercial scale investment project that would lead to immediate CO2 reductions
government support was granted. In the contract with the Dutch government Hoogovens committed
themselves to investment in a commercial facility if the demonstration facility was to operate
satisfactorily and if the process was to be economically feasible [Meijer, 2000].
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because large-scale investment decisions affect the daily business routine of
steelmaking operations. Many factors are beyond government control and these
may thwart the plans for demonstrating an innovative technology. In giving a
firm and a specific technology a preferential treatment government should be
well aware of the technical, economic and energetic consequences and
opportunities.
6.5. Conclusion
Smelting reduction technology is widely acknowledged as an important innovative
technology that can improve the energy efficiency of iron production. In this chapter
we have evaluated the effect of government intervention on the development of
smelting reduction technology. We investigated in detail the composition of and the
changes in the networks developing this specific energy-efficient technology. We
increased insight into actors’ arguments for being involved in the development of
this innovative technology and thus found out how government intervention affected
actors’ R&D decisions.
The network
Our network analysis has illustrated the various roles played by integrated steel
manufacturers and mini-mill steel operators. Whereas several integrated steel
manufacturers in industrialised countries were active in developing smelting
reduction technology most of them lost interest. The innovative technology was
‘locked out’ by a continuous improvement of the existing ironmaking facilities. In
addition the integrated steel manufacturers did not need to expand the existing
ironmaking capacity. Mini-mill operators typically did not invest in the development
of such core process high-risk technologies, but recently some mini-mill operators
have shown interest in smelting reduction technology. Although application of
smelting reduction technology in integrated mills has probably been postponed for at
least ten years, application of smelting reduction in mini-mills may be a first niche
application for proving the feasibility of smelting reduction technology. However if
hot metal replaces processing of scrap, the production of steel in mini-mills will
become more energy-intensive.
Government intervention
Various national governments and the European Coal and Steel Community played
an active role in stimulating the development of smelting reduction technology. We
estimate that 20 to 25% of the total expenditure needed for smelting reduction
technology was supplied by various national governments or by the ECSC. The
interesting questions are whether government support resulted in additional
activities, whether it accelerated technological development and whether it might
results in a lower consumption of energy for future production of iron.
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We conclude that government R&D support enlarged the technology network. In five
of the nine micro-networks, government R&D support definitely underpinned the
performance of additional R&D activities. Three of these five micro-networks
developed a smelting reduction process that is likely to be energy-efficient. We use
the term ‘likely’ because the micro-networks are not yet ready to commercialise the
technology. Two of these micro-networks have even shelved their efforts. Therefore,
we must conclude that whereas government R&D support was additional, so far it
has not accelerated technological development.
We have also seen that a commitment by government to support a demonstration
facility can be a factor that persuades a firm to demonstrate a technology. Steering in
this stage of a technology’s development may be an appealing, though highly
complex task. In giving a firm and a specific technology a preferential treatment
government should carefully assess whether support may accelerate technological
development (in the international technology network).
In addition to financial support, environmental regulations were not decisive in
initiating or continuing R&D efforts. Reducing environmental emissions – and also
improvements in energy efficiency – were only additional reasons for integrated steel
firms to be interested. However, they provided researchers and engineers within a
firm with an additional argument for continuing R&D.
All in all, the case study illustrates that integrated steel firms tend to constrain
technological development so that it prefers certain – more incremental – directions.
The existing capital stock was continuously improved which caused a decrease in the
cost advantage of the innovative energy-efficient technology. This mechanism
considerably limited the effect of government intervention and R&D support.
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Chapter 7
Technology networks and
government intervention
7.1. Introduction
Governments consider the development of innovative energy-efficient technologies
for industry an attractive option for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The aim of
the thesis is to gain insight into the process by which such technologies are
developed. The underlying interest is to explore how government can stimulate their
development. In Chapter 1, we argued that it is worth making a detour. Therefore we
did not start by evaluating government intervention strategies, but we first wanted to
obtain a better understanding of the role of actors and of the dynamics in the
development of industrial process technologies. After the analyses of the four
technology case studies, the case studies are compared and contrasted in order to
explore possible ways in which government can stimulate the development of
energy-efficient process technologies. In this chapter, we return to our research
interest in government intervention.
In Section 7.2, we compare and contrast the insights gained from the four case
studies with regard to six issues. In Section 7.3, we summarise what our research has
contributed to technology studies and energy analysis. In Section 7.4, some policy-
relevant conclusions are presented. We finish by giving some recommendations to
enhance the effect of government intervention.
7.2. Comparing and contrasting technology case studies
Introduction
Each of the four technology case studies tells its own story about the way in which a
specific energy-efficient process technology developed. Table 1 gives an overview of
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the status of the technology network (in terms of the number of micro-networks) and
the shortest summary of the four stories.
Table 1: Summarising the four technology case studies.
Case study Sector Number
of micro-
networks
Micro-
networks
active in
2000
Process of developing the energy-efficient
process technology
Shoe press
technology
Paper 1 (2) 1 Small network – continuing success
Only one persistent micro-network was needed
for the successful development and innovation
of shoe press technology, which marks a
tremendous departure from the existing
pressing configuration. Competing machine
suppliers had to follow.
Impulse
technology
Paper 2 1 Government R&D support allows the
continuation of R&D
After more than 25 years, the future of impulse
technology is still being debated. Although
government R&D support led to continued
R&D activity and acceleration of the
development, the case study illustrates that
government can become (too) dependent on
research institutes. The history of impulse
technology is a continuing story of stress being
put on different (and changing) ‘promises’.
Strip casting
technology
Iron and
steel
11 62
of which:
3
industrial
scale
Serious efforts at the edge of breakthrough
After more than hundred years when the idea of
strip casting had been known, several micro-
networks recognised and felt the economic
need to pursue the development of this
technology as the next step in steel casting.
Three micro-networks are at the point of
selling/building commercial-scale casters.
Smelting
reduction
technology
Iron and
steel
9 6
of which:
3
pilot
scale
Double perspective
The development of smelting reduction
technology has been undertaken by a variety of
actors. Its application in integrated mills seems
to be ‘locked out’ as a result of continuing
improvements in existing capital assets. An
opportunity is emerging for applying the
technology in mini-mills.
Total number 23
1
 After Beloit introduced the shoe press to the market, two more micro-networks emerged. The micro-
network which developed the shoe press is no longer in business.  2 Two of the eleven micro-networks
merged into one micro-network.
Each of these four case studies had a specific character, although we used the same
framework for analysing the four case studies. In this section, we generalise our
findings; we suggest some plausible insights gained by comparing and contrasting
the four case studies (see Section 1.5 and [Yin, 1989]).
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We selected six issues for this comparison. The first three issues relate directly to the
triangle of technological development which we used to arrive at the framework. We
first consider the actors and networks that were involved in developing the
technologies. Second, the artefacts are analysed. The third issue deals with the
agenda; what guided actors in their R&D activities? The fourth issue is ‘momentum’,
which is introduced to characterise the overall dynamics of a technology network.
Two final issues deal with the possible ways in which governments can stimulate the
development of energy-efficient technologies. The fifth issue concerns the effect of
government R&D support. The final issue concerns the effect of alternative
government intervention strategies. For each of the issues we make a summary of
insights that are relevant for government intervention.
Actors - Size and composition
In this section, we first look at the type of actors that make up the four technology
networks. Second, we discuss what type of actors took the initiative in developing
the innovative technologies. Third, we take a closer look at the changes in the size of
technology networks. Fourth, we focus on the relations between actors within the
micro-networks.
1. Types of actors: different patterns among manufacturing industries
Figure 1 gives an indication of the importance of various types of actors in the four
technology networks.
Figure 1 illustrates the different roles of steel manufacturers and paper manufacturers
in developing energy-efficient technology. The role of paper manufacturers in R&D
was modest and in general quite passive. They waited for other actors to develop the
technologies affecting the core of the paper-making process. Steel manufacturers
(especially integrated steel manufacturers) played an active role in developing both
strip casting technology and smelting reduction technology1. General R&D statistics
also reflect this difference in the role of manufacturing firms in these two industrial
sectors2 (see also Table 2).
                                                
1
 Mini-mill steel firms do not invest in R&D themselves, just like the manufacturers in the paper
industry they wait for others to develop process technologies. Both in the development of strip casting
and smelting reduction technology, mini-mill steel-makers showed interest the moment the
technology could be applied on a scale suitable for their mini-mills.
2
 These patterns of innovation are not static. Machine suppliers took the lead in the development and
introduction of thin slab casting technology (1989). Steel manufacturers, both mini-mills and
integrated steel manufacturers, simply buy thin slab casting technology. Steel experts discuss whether
machine suppliers will increasingly take on the task of developing process technologies. Because
machine builders are becoming larger and larger, it is easier for them to engage in high expenditure
and develop innovative process technologies. Steel manufacturers are still rationalising their corporate
R&D departments [Birat, 1999; Tacke, 1999].
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Figure 1: Type of actors involved in the four technology networks. The role of
each type of actor within a micro-network was evaluated. To compile
these four diagrams, we divided a hundred points over the actors
within each micro-network. The composition of the technology
networks was derived by averaging the scores of the separate micro-
networks.
Table 2: Direct R&D intensity and the indirect R&D intensity of the
manufacturing industries considered.
Sector Direct
R&D intensity1
Indirect
R&D intensity1
Pulp and paper industry 0.31 0.57
Iron and steel industry 0.64 0.46
1
 Direct R&D intensity is the sector’s R&D expenditure as part of the sector’s total production value.
The indirect R&D expenditure is the R&D expenditure embodied in intermediate inputs and capital
goods which are supplied by other industrial sectors. The indirect R&D intensity is the imported R&D
expenditure as part of the sector’s total production value (input-output analysis). Data in table are a
weighted average of the manufacturing sector in ten OECD countries [Hatzichronoglou, 1997].
Shoe press technology Impulse technology
Strip casting technology Smelting reduction technology
Steel manufacturers Steel manufacturers
Paper manufacturersPaper manufacturer
Machine suppliers
Machine suppliers
   and engineers
Machine suppliers
Machine supplier
Other suppliersOther supplier
Research institutes
and universities
National pulp and paper research institutes
and universities
Mining firms
Steel associations
Research institutes
and universities Government
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If the compositions of the two paper technology networks are compared (see Figure
1), we see that in both case studies machine suppliers performed a crucial role by
delivering innovative technology to the paper industry. One machine supplier
dominated the development of shoe press technology. In the case study of impulse
technology, national pulp and paper research institutes played an important part, but
the research institutes typically left the innovation of the technology to the machine
supplier.
There is a larger difference in the compositions of the two steel technology networks
(see Figure 1). In developing strip casting technology, steel firms took the lead.
Although they co-operated with machine suppliers or engineering firms, they
controlled the R&D activities within the micro-networks. In the technology network
of smelting reduction technology, the steel manufacturers played a less dominant role
taking the lead in less than half of the nine micro-networks. Smelting of iron was
clearly also interesting for mining firms because the process could add value to their
raw materials. Furthermore, some engineering firms who had experience in building
and selling smelting technology for other non-ferrous metals were also involved. The
more heterogeneous composition of the smelting reduction technology network is
explained by the specific operational processes involved in that technology.
2. Who took the initiative?
It was primarily firms who developed the energy-efficient technologies. In 19 of the
23 micro-networks, firms initiated R&D activities. In this regard, it is interesting to
note that the firms were aware that the task they were engaging in was a substantial
R&D effort, which would go on for many years and would require substantial
investment.
Not only firms, also research institutes and universities played a role in the
development of specific industrial technologies (see Figure 1). Institutes and
universities were absent in the case of shoe press technology, and played only a
modest role in developing strip casting technology. The largest contribution of
universities and public research institutes occurred in the development of smelting
reduction technology. In various micro-networks, firms looked for co-operation with
research institutes in connection with some more fundamental issues.
In the case of impulse technology there was a major role for national pulp and paper
research institutes3. However, these are private research institutes, not public ones. In
the first place, they are supported by their member firms, which are national paper
manufacturers and machine suppliers. Nevertheless, these major pulp and paper
research institutes have close relations with universities. They are also experienced in
mobilising additional external funds such as government R&D support.
                                                
3
 Such national pulp and paper research institutes are present in major pulp and paper producing
countries like the US, Canada, Sweden and Finland. These countries also have a considerable
university R&D infrastructure for pulp and paper.
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However, we conclude that the direct contribution of knowledge by public research
institutes and universities was only marginal in all four technology case studies4.
3. Size of the technology networks
Figure 2 gives an overview of the changes in the size of the four technology
networks over time.
Figure 2: The changes in the size of the technology networks over time (as
measured by the number of micro-networks). Note that the size of the
four technology networks is scaled between two moments: the
emergence of the technology network and the moment of first
commercial application (that has not yet been achieved in all
technology case studies)5.
Figure 2 illustrates that the two steel technology networks are larger (as regards
number of micro-networks) than the two paper technology networks. The absolute
number of paper machine suppliers and major research institutes that can initiate
such an R&D effort is small. It is at least smaller than the number of actors who have
an adequate financial and knowledge base to develop innovative steel technologies.
However, the total number of micro-networks – also in developing the steel
                                                
4
 It is very difficult to assess the importance of (earlier) more fundamental research in the
development of the four energy-efficient process technologies. We know for instance that the
development of strip casting technology was facilitated by knowledge about ceramic materials and
process control. The development of shoe press technology evolved from a wider systematic approach
and greater understanding of wet pressing.
5
 The micro-network developing the Corex smelting reduction process is not included in the smelting
reduction technology network. Corex is commercially available. It is a first generation process that is
less energy efficient than conventional ironmaking technology and that is not widely applicable.
Time
Size
(number
of 
micro-
networks)
Impulse
Technology network stage Innovation
 Strip
casting
   Smelt
reduction
Shoe
press
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technologies – is quite modest. It ranges from one to eleven micro-networks in the
four technology networks (see Table 1). It is therefore possible to obtain an overview
of the entire technology network.
The size of the technology networks changes over time (see Figure 2). Note that the
two steel technologies show a similar development over time. A large number of
relatively small-scale efforts were undertaken in the early days of the technology
network. A substantial number of these efforts ceased their activities. Once a
relatively stable technology network was in place, about one third to a quarter of the
micro-networks ceased being active. This did not necessarily hamper the
development. The case study of strip casting convincingly illustrates that although
the size of the technology network decreased, the micro-networks that survived
persistently moved in the direction of commercial-scale operation.
This leads to the question of whether there is a minimum size for a technology
network if a technology is to have a reasonable chance of being commercialised. The
case studies illustrate that the size of a technology network is not a straightforward
indicator of the chance for innovation. On the one hand the shoe press case study
shows that one micro-network can be sufficient. On the other hand the case study of
smelting reduction technology shows that a large network is not necessarily
sufficient for success. Nevertheless, we can say that smaller technology networks are
more vulnerable. This is illustrated by the case of impulse technology. If the Swedish
pulp and paper research institute had not managed to initiate a second micro-network
in 1997 the development of impulse technology would already have come to an end.
4. Stable micro-networks
Table 3 gives a more detailed overview of the co-operation between actors within
various micro-networks.
The second and third columns in Table 3 illustrate that it was only in a minority of
the micro-networks that actors did not co-operate. Each of the four case studies
illustrated that actors are generally well aware of their own limitations with regard to
financial resources, specific knowledge, additional technologies, engineering
experience, or specific R&D equipment. It is striking that in more than half of the
micro-networks, co-operating actors came from different countries (see the fourth
column Table 3). National boundaries do not seem to be a barrier to the
establishment of co-operation. In six of the eleven steel multi-national micro-
networks, co-operating actors even came from different continents. This did not
occur in developing paper technologies.
Competitive steel manufacturers co-operated in both technology case studies. The
fifth column in Table 3 indicates that this occurred in seven of the seventeen steel
micro-networks. In three of these seven micro-networks, R&D was organised in a
co-operative R&D project or programme in which a large number of steel
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manufacturers combined their activities. Via financial R&D support, government
supported all three micro-networks. In the other four micro-networks, steel firms co-
operated in order to share costs or gain from each other’s expertise and experience6.
Table 3: Co-operation within micro-networks.
Case study Total
number of
micro-
networks
Co-opera-
tion in ..
micro-
networks
Interna-
tional co-
operation
in ..
micro-
networks
Co-opera-
tion
between
competing
firms in ..
micro-
networks
Co-opera-
tion from
the start
of the
micro-
network
or later?
Shoe press technology 1 1 0 yes: 0
no: 1
start: 0
later: 1
Impulse technology 2 2 2 yes: 0
no: 21
start: 1
later: 1
Strip casting technology 11 9 5 yes: 3
no: 6
start: 3
later: 6
Smelting reduction
technology
9 8 6 yes: 4
no: 4
start: 5
later: 2
change: 1
Total 23 20 13 yes: 7
no: 13
start: 9
later: 10
change: 1
1
 Note that the national pulp and paper research institutes are supported by their members, which are
all competing paper manufacturers.
The last column in Table 3 shows that in about half of the micro-networks, co-
operation was initiated from the start of the micro-network. It is interesting to note
that in nine of the ten micro-networks in which actors initiated co-operation
‘halfway’, this occurred at a moment when actors decided to take the step towards a
larger scale facility. For this, they needed specific expertise or access to equipment or
they simply wanted to share the cost of the more expensive facility. We have no
indication that actors had problems in finding partners. If there were problems, this
occurred typically at the stage when the technology had to be proven on a
commercial scale7.
                                                
6
 Usinor, a French integrated steel-maker, insisted on co-operative financing of large R&D projects
like Myosotis (strip casting) and Jupiter (smelting reduction technology). In both cases, Usinor co-
operated with Thyssen Stahl, a German integrated manufacturer [Birat, 2000; Lassat de Pressigny,
2000]. The Dutch integrated steel-maker Hoogovens co-operated with the UK British Steel and the
Italian Ilva. These firms had also co-operated in earlier R&D activities [Robson, 2000; Meijer, 2000].
7
 We noticed such problems in four micro-networks. In the case study concerning impulse technology,
one micro-network had problems in finding paper manufacturers willing to apply the technology on a
commercial scale. None of the four attempts succeeded. In the case of smelting reduction technology,
three micro-networks encountered problems in finding a co-investor in a near commercial scale
facility. This caused delay in the materialisation of the technology within these micro-networks. In
one of three micro-networks, the search for a partner took so long, that the competitive position of the
technology deteriorated. In the end, this made the actors shelve the R&D effort.
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The micro-networks turned out to be rather stable entities that continued R&D
activities over considerable time periods. Although there was some knowledge
exchange among various micro-networks in the technology network – especially in
the case of smelting reduction technology, but also in the case of strip casting
technology –, most R&D activities were organised in micro-networks. In three of the
four technology case studies, we found evidence that personal contacts were
important for initiating or continuing fruitful R&D activities within the micro-
networks. The micro-networks are usually aware of the existence of other micro-
networks. In three of the four case studies, micro-networks monitored other micro-
networks’ R&D activities, their (claims of) success and their failures.
Finally, it is remarkable that we encountered the same firms in both technology
networks. In the two paper technology networks, we came across all four (by now
only two) major machine suppliers. In both cases, Beloit led the developments. The
role of Weyerhaeuser, a US board manufacturer in both case studies, is explained by
the successful introduction of the shoe press and the involvement of the same
persons. In seven of the eleven micro-networks developing strip casting technology
we came across the same actors that were also active in developing smelting
reduction technology. We conclude that firms differ substantially concerning their
R&D strategy: some are substantially more innovative than others, at least in
developing process technologies.
Summary
We now summarise the insights from this section that need to be taken into account
when exploring possible ways in which government can stimulate the development
of energy-efficient process technologies in Section 7.4:
- Firms initiated the development of the four industrial energy-efficient
technologies. They also dominated the technology networks. The direct role of
universities and public research institutes was marginal.
- The case studies illustrated the differences in the patterns of innovation in
industrial sectors. Paper manufacturers tended to wait for others to develop and
commercialise innovative process technologies, whereas integrated steel
manufacturers or large stainless producers themselves took steps to invest in
R&D.
- Whereas the technology networks that developed paper technologies were even
smaller than the technology networks that developed steel technologies, the total
number of micro-networks was modest. It is therefore possible to obtain an
overview of the actors active in R&D.
- All technology networks were international. Even most micro-networks were
international.
- Actors did not appear to have much difficulty in finding actors with whom to co-
operate. Only in later stages of a technology’s development were there problems
in finding collaborators for co-investment in a (near) commercial (scale) facility.
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Artefacts - Time-frame and up-scaling
The number of years needed for developing specific technologies varies considerably
(for overviews see e.g. [Jewkes et al., 1969; Van Duijn, 1983]). The time-frames for
the development of the four energy-efficient technologies are contrasted in order to
see what can explain the differences. We first see how the four innovative
technologies match with the existing production process. Secondly, we make a
distinction between the exploration stage and the technology network stage. Thirdly,
we look at the steps in up-scaling the technology within the various micro-networks.
1. Innovative technologies always have to match the existing production process
The four innovative technologies are closely linked to the existing production
process. The term ‘existing production process’ refers to the conventional sequence
of process technologies used for manufacturing iron and steel or paper and broad.
Table 4 explains to what extent the innovative technologies match with the existing
production process.
Table 4: The fit between the innovative technologies and the conventional
production process for making iron and steel and paper and board.
Case study Reference production process What does the
technology do to the
existing production
process?
Shoe press technology Replaces part of the
existing wet pressing
section.
Impulse technology
Paper or board machine:
1 forming section
2 wet pressing section
3 drying section Replaces part of the
existing wet pressing
section.
Strip casting
technology
Links casting and rolling
into one process stage.
Makes hot strip mill
superfluous.
Smelting reduction
technology
Integrated steel mill:
1 ironmaking  – ore, cokes, blast furnace
2 steelmaking – basic oxygen furnace
3 casting (conventional continuous casting)
4 rolling (hot strip mill)
Mini-mill:
1 steelmaking – electric arc furnace
2 casting including rolling (thin slab casting)
Replaces blast furnaces.
Makes ore agglomeration
and coke ovens
superfluous.
The sequence of process technologies as indicated in the second column in Table 4,
is found at every existing steel site and in every paper mill. In both industrial sectors,
it is common practice for such major innovative technologies to be implemented first
in existing production facilities before they are incorporated in greenfield steel plants
or in new paper machines. The risk of trying out an unproven technology in an
entirely new production facility is considered to be too high; manufacturers cannot
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afford the considerable capital expenditure and cannot afford to take the risk that the
facility will not be operational from the moment of commissioning.
2. Distinguishing an exploration stage from a technology network stage
When we examined the time-frames for the development of the four technology case
studies, we noticed that in all four cases we could distinguish between an exploration
stage and a stage in which a technology network was established. This distinction is
indicated in Table 5.
Table 5: Time frames for the development of the energy-efficient process
technologies.
Case study Duration of exploration
stage [years]
Duration of technology
network stage [years]
Shoe press technology about 15 131
Impulse technology about 10    more than 202
Strip casting technology about 120  about 20
Smelting reduction technology about 45 103
more than 204
1
 The time that Beloit’s competitors needed for developing the technology is not taken into account
because they only started developing shoe press technology when the technology had been introduced
to the market.  2 Not yet proven. Impulse technology is only operational in pilot paper machines.  3 It
took ten years to introduce the first generation Corex process to the market. This first facility was on a
moderate scale. It took five more years to prove commercial operation at double the scale of the first
facility.  4 Not yet proven. None of the second generation processes is yet operational on a near-
commercial scale.
At the exploration stage the principle or the idea of the innovative technology was
already known. Actors may even have undertaken R&D activities to explore the
possibilities of the technology. Actors may have been aware of others’ actors also
exploring the technology. However, a robust technology network had not yet
emerged. The technology network stage takes off when the idea becomes entrenched:
as R&D activities become anchored in R&D projects, the technology figures
prominently on the actors’ R&D agenda and remains a priority for a substantial
number of years. It is not always easy to make the distinction between the two stages.
In the case of shoe press technology, for instance, one can argue that the technology
network seriously emerged only after the shoe press had been introduced.
When does this shift from the exploration stage to the technology network stage
occur? What factors contribute to this change?
If we analyse the four technology case studies, we find a variety of elements that
contributed to this shift. Table 6 gives an overview of these elements. It turned out
that these elements can be grouped into four aggregate factors. Note that the factors
listed in Table 6 do not explain why specific actors initiated or undertook R&D
activities.
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Table 6: Which elements contributed to the shift from the exploration stage to
the technology network stage in the four technology case studies?
Case study Factors Elements from case study
Economic
need
Improving dryness in wet pressing permits an increased machine
capacity / a reduced capital intensity.
Technical
need/match
The dryness at the exit of the wet pressing was to become a critical
bottleneck for a further increase in machine capacity of board.
Progress in
R&D
Basic studies (started around 1960) showed that the short time for
pressing was a limiting factor.
Shoe press
technology
around 1970
around 1980
Contingen-
cies
Wet pressing was an important issue in Beloit’s R&D agenda;
freedom to look for entirely new ideas + management support.
Beloit persistently initiated and continued R&D; they believed in a
radically new press design whereas other machine suppliers did not.
Economic
need
Improving dryness in wet pressing permits an increased machine
capacity / a reduced capital intensity.
Technical
need/match
Progress in
R&D
Impulse
technology
1980 – 1983
Contingen-
cies
After 10 years the inventor succeeded in anchoring R&D at a pulp
and paper research institute. He had shelved the effort twice before;
no research capacity; did not suit machine supplier’ main market.
President pulp and paper research institute favoured the idea.
Beloit was eager to see how they could further improve wet
pressing performance after the success of the shoe press.
Government R&D support.
Economic
need
Linking casting and rolling leads to more compact process →
cheaper steel.
Technical
need/match
Conventional continuous casting was a first step in making the
advantages of thinner casting tangible. When conventional
continuous casting matured, attempts were made to find
technologies that could further extend the advantages.
Steel crises reinforced the need for more compact technologies.
From the 1950s onwards both small-scale stainless steel production
and small-scale mini-mill steel production had grown.
R&D Majority of R&D focused on conventional continuous casting.
R&D in rapid solidification (60s and 70s) induced interest in strip
casting.
More knowledge of ceramic materials and process control.
Strip casting
technology
1980 – 1985
Contingen-
cies
In the early 1980s, mutually reinforcing factors – amongst others
Allegheny’s claim of success (1984) – strengthened support/interest
in strip casting technology.
Economic
need
More compact process technologies → cheaper iron.
Technical
need/match
The need to replace obsolete conventional coke ovens early 21st
century (huge capital expenditure).
Progress in
R&D
For a long time coke oven/blast furnace dominated the R&D
agenda (gradual up-scaling of capacity during 1950-60s).
Growing experiences with scrap and coal in steel converters.
Smelting
reduction
technology
1975 – 1985
Contingen-
cies
Direct reduction technology did not turn out to be
technically/economically feasible. Actors saw smelting reduction
technology as the only serious challenge to the dominant
conventional coke oven / blast furnace route for ironmaking.
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A first factor is that actors recognise the economic advantage of the innovative
technology. This factor is critical. However, it is no guarantee that a robust
technology network emerges. In the case of strip casting technology, the huge capital
advantages were clear to Bessemer (1857). However, strip casting was too big a step
for the steel industry to take at that moment in time. In the case of the shoe press, the
principle and advantages were recognised, but the majority of the paper machine
suppliers did not foresee an operational solution for extending press time. The
decisive role of the economic advantage of the innovative technology cannot be
evaluated without taking the other factors into account.
A second and very important factor is the technical need or match with the existing
production process. The performance of the existing production process guides
actors’ R&D activities; innovative technologies may improve the competitive
position of these industries, but the existing production process is generally the
starting point in the search for innovative technologies. At a certain moment, specific
pressing bottlenecks may occur which require an alternative solution; an innovative
technology may be recognised as an interesting solution. Alternatively, changes in
the manufacturing industry’s production process or in the industry itself make the
advantages of an innovative technology more visible.
A third factor that can affect the shift from the exploration stage to the technology
network stage is progress in R&D. New insights and R&D results – possibly in
related technical areas – may increase actors’ confidence that an innovative idea will
become an operational technology. Losing interest in other ‘competing’ innovative
technologies or less R&D focus on the conventional technology may also contribute
towards this shift. Only then does innovative technology become the centre of R&D
attention.
Finally, in most cases contingencies played an important role in instigating R&D
activities at a particular moment in time. Elements like for instance personal
contacts, or alertness of a person in picking up a specific idea or suggesting that an
‘old’ idea should be revived may be crucial for getting things started and for showing
other actors that the innovative technology is an interesting route to explore. It helps
if the right people are at the right place at the right time and meet the right people.
The shift typically extends over a few years in which actors acknowledge that the
innovative technology may be an interesting ‘next-step-to-take’ (see first column,
Table 6). We use the term next-step-to-take to indicate that at a certain moment
actors realise that an innovative technology is economically attractive and
technologically feasible improvement. There is no single trigger that explains the
shift to the technology network stage. A combination of factors and mutual
reinforcement are needed for the technology network to emerge.
The four factors that may contribute towards this shift illustrate that merely
evaluating the technology’s technical or economic characteristics is not adequate to
explain why actors initiate the development of a technology at a certain moment.
- 218 -
3. Up-scaling the technology
We go on to discuss the duration of the technology network stage. Table 5 indicates
that the technology network stage takes at least ten and possibly more than 25 years.
Note that the time that micro-networks need for developing a technology can be
shorter than the time indicated in Table 5. Figure 3 gives a schematic presentation of
the various steps in up-scaling the research equipment needed to develop the four
energy-efficient process technologies.
Figure 3 is a simplification of reality. The process of developing the four innovative
technologies was not as linear as the schematic steps shown in Figure 3.
Nevertheless, all case studies illustrate that certain steps have to be taken to prove to
the manufacturing industry that a technology is feasible. Although there can be
differences in the actual size of equipment, we could distinguish regularities and
similarities in the number of steps taken to enlarge the capacity of the R&D
equipment and facilities.
Figure 3: The steps taken in up-scaling R&D equipment. Each rectangle
symbolises a step. The numbers between the square brackets indicate
the ranges in years during which R&D activities in the various micro-
networks took place. The third step in developing smelting reduction
technology has not yet been realised (apart from Corex). The capacity
of the first commercial Corex facility (1989) was comparable to what
is indicated here as demo / near commercial scale.
In the cases of shoe press technology and strip casting technology, micro-networks
brought the technology towards commercialisation in a relatively smooth and fast
process. In the development of shoe press technology, two steps – lab scale facilities
and implementing the press on a pilot paper machine – were taken before it was
applied to a commercial paper machine. The search for a feasible design took about
eight years. Five more years were needed to get a first shoe press installed. In the
Strip casting
Smelt reduction
Impulse technology
Pilot paper machineShoe press technology
[5]
Lab scale presses
[8]
Lab scale presses
[4 - 7]
Hot model
[4 - 8]
Lab scale unit
[3 - 10]
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[4 - 8]
Industrial scale 
[(>)5]
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development of strip casting technology, the three most advanced micro-networks all
took three steps. Each step took roughly five to seven years. The equipment had to be
built, the research had to be done, problems had to be solved, and the next step in
developing the technology had to be prepared (organise financial resources and
initiate co-operation if required).
All in all, the number of years that micro-networks were active is not particularly
large in view of the various steps in up-scaling that have to be taken to prove the
feasibility of the technology. The number of steps is an important determinant of the
minimum pace at which an innovative process technology develops. The empirical
material allows us to derive a rule of thumb for the minimum time; one needs to
multiply the number of steps needed to up-scale the technology by five to seven
years.
The four technology case studies also illustrate that the scale-up can be delayed by
major unexpected difficulties, time-consuming efforts to mobilise research funds,
problems in finding an actor in later stages of a technology’s development, and
uncertainties about a technology’s performance in relation to the capital investment
required. Sometimes actors simply intend to continue R&D on smaller scale
equipment.
Summary
We summarise the insights we have gained concerning the rate at which
technological development occurred:
- The actors involved in developing innovative process technologies aimed firtsly
at implementing the technology in existing paper mills or steel sites.
- It took a while decades to more than a hundred years before the innovative
technologies were supported by a robust technology network. The economic
advantage of the technology was an important impetus. In addition, matching
innovative process technologies with the existing production process played an
important role. Progress in R&D activities and contingent elements that caused a
specific actor to start R&D activities influenced the emergence of the technology
networks. The innovative technology had to become recognised as the ‘next-step-
to-take’.
- The number of steps required for up-scaling a specific technology indicated a sort
of minimum duration for introducing the technology to the market. Each step
took five to seven years.
- Developing the core process technologies took time. For two or three up-scaling
steps, a time period of 10 to 20 years was not exceptional.
Agenda - Which promises orient technological development?
As discussed in Chapter 2, an agenda contains the shared ideas and guidelines that
orient actors in their R&D activities [Van Lente, 1993]. In this section, we first point
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to the ‘promising’ performance characteristics of the four innovative energy-efficient
technologies. We explain why precisely these promising performance characteristics
were shared. Second, we describe how the promising performance characteristics
changed as the technology materialised. Third, the arguments why certain micro-
networks stopped their R&D activities are indicated. Finally, we analyse the
importance of energy efficiency in the development of innovative process
technologies.
1. Promises and constraints of the existing production process
Table 7 summarises the major promises of the four innovative energy-efficient
technologies.
Table 7: What the innovative process technologies promised?
Case study Promise Implications for production process
Existing
mills
Increased paper machine capacityShoe press technology Increased dryness
→ reducing cost per
ton New
mills
Reduced capital intensity (shorter
drying section)
Existing
mills
Increased paper machine capacityImpulse technology Increased dryness
→ reducing cost per
ton New
mills
Reduced capital intensity (shorter
drying section)
Integrated
steel mills
Reduced capital intensityStrip casting technology Compact casting
technology
→ reducing cost per
ton
Mini-mills Reduced capital intensity; access
to new product market
Integrated
steel mills
Reduced capital intensitySmelting reduction
technology
Compact ironmaking
technology
→ reducing cost per
ton
Mini-mills Hot metal supply; access to new
product market
Table 7 shows that in both manufacturing industries, the promised reduction in costs
per ton product was the dominant argument for investing in the technologies’
development. The experts consulted pointed out that the dominant business logic of
the majority of steel- and paper-making firms explained the attention for cost
reduction. The cost price determines whether firms can operate competitively.
Manufacturers are forced to deliver their typical commodity products at the lowest
cost. The market in which manufacturers operate is an important guideline that orient
actors in their R&D
To act according the guideline of reducing costs, all actors were strongly constrained
by the capital investment already made in the existing production process (see also
discussion on Table 4). This constrained the direction in which innovative
technologies in both manufacturing industries were to develop. All four innovative
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technologies had the potential to strengthen the cost performance of the existing
production process.
The paper machine, for instance, had not changed since paper-making became a
continuous operation in the first half of the 19th century. The current production
process still consists of the same three sections. Paper manufacturers have always
tried to improve the production output of paper machines by increasing the width or
speed of a paper machine. The capacity of both existing and new paper machines is
maximised against the lowest cost. Both shoe press and impulse technology aimed to
increase production capacity too.
In the steel industry the existing production processes greatly influenced actors in
their choice of further technological development. Before the steel crisis during the
1970s, the dominant focus was to enlarge the capacity of the conventional process
technologies like blast furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces. Since the steel crisis and
the emergence of the mini-mill steel route, integrated steel manufacturers have
become more interested in innovative technologies that physically shorten the
existing production process. Both strip casting technology and smelting reduction
technology aimed to reduce costs by making the conventional production process
more compact.
In the former section on artefacts we used the term next-step-to-take to indicate that
at a certain moment actors see an innovative technology as an improvement that is
economically attractive and technologically feasible. It is almost paradoxical that
whereas the innovative technology has to be recognised as the next-step-to-take –
implying a certain continuity and incremental change –, the improvements in the
dominant performance characteristic has to be large enough to justify the efforts
needed to develop the technology. In all four innovative technologies a stepwise
improvement in the overall performance of the existing production process was
promised (at the firm level). The four innovative technologies involve major and
complex R&D efforts; unless the potential advantages had been promising a stepwise
improvement, it is very unlikely that any efforts would have been made. The risks
involved would have been too high.
Thus, the desire to produce paper or steel at the lowest cost dominated the R&D
agenda for innovative process technologies. Capital investments already made in the
conventional production process strongly constrain the direction of technological
development.
2. Is the promise of improved performance fulfilled?
When actors invest in R&D, one hopes that the performance of the technology is
reconfirmed when it materialises within the micro-network. Table 8 gives an
overview of how the perceived performance of the original promise changed over
time.
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Table 8: Changes in promising performance characteristics over time.
Promise Change? Explanatory remarks
Shoe press technology
→ commercially
available
Dryness Unchanged
First doubt,
later
acceptance
Board grades: note that strength properties
also improved (1st application 1980).
Light-weight grades: only when
conventional press technology limited
increase production capacity was shoe
press considered (1st application 1994).
Impulse  technology
→ pilot machines
Dryness Worsened Original expectations were not met.
Researchers started to stress ‘other’
performance characteristics.
Strip casting
technology
→ near commercial scale
Compact
process
Unchanged -
Smelting reduction
technology
→ pilot scale
Compact
process
Worsened Existing conventional capital assets were
continuously improved + no need for
additional iron-making capacity.
Note that we can only measure the perceived performance of an innovative
technology through the eyes of the actors’ involved in a technology’s development.
Table 8 therefore reflects the actors’ perception of the promising performance
characteristics as articulated in written materials and expert consultation8.
The introduction of the shoe press to grades other than board grades clearly
illustrates that performance characteristics alone do not explain the investment
behaviour of light-weight paper manufacturers. Since the shoe press was applied for
the first time in board grades (1980), machine suppliers claimed an increase in
dryness for light-weight grades too. Light-weight paper manufacturers feared that
important product characteristics would be lost. It took 14 years to overcome the
inertia of the light-weight paper manufacturers. By then, however, the press impulse
of the conventional wet pressing section had become a major bottleneck preventing a
further increase in machine speed. Shoe press technology was a suitable option to
escape this dilemma.
Table 8 leads us to conclude that the two most smoothly developed technologies,
shoe press technology and strip casting technology, lived up the expectations with
                                                
8
 Written literature or articles did not permit to obtain a quantitative overview of the changes that
occurred over time in specific performance characteristics. Although there are generally a large
number of technical articles covering specific, basic technical details, very few articles give a detailed
account of the improved cost performance or the other improvements. Most statements about the
performance of an innovative technology are found in trade journals. Such articles typically cover the
operation of a technology and its greatest advantages in more general wording. Uncertainties can be
substantial especially with regard to data about cost performance. Data found were based on small-
scale equipment. Uncertainties arise in extrapolating results to commercial scale facilities. Often (cost)
performance data were published in order to interest potential customers, to find a potential partner in
R&D, or to interest external financiers in the research. We found most data on performance
characteristics in micro-networks that were dependent on external support or in micro-networks that
were trying to get other actors interested.
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least uncertainty and discussion. These technologies raised the fewest doubts
regarding the promising performance characteristics.
3. Stopping R&D activities?
Not all micro-networks continued R&D activities. Table 9 gives an overview of the
arguments that were given for ceasing R&D activities.
Table 9: Arguments for stopping R&D activities in micro-networks. For some
micro-networks more than one argument is given, because specific
actors within that micro-networks may have had different arguments.
Total
number
of micro-
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Number
of micro-
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Shoe press technology 1 1 I - -
Impulse  technology1 2 1 I I -
Strip casting technology 11 4 II I II
Smelting reduction technology 9 3 - II III
1 Note that a lack of performance perspective was the reason why two major machine suppliers did not
initiate R&D relating to impulse technology.
The fourth column in Table 9 shows that in some micro-networks strategic business
issues led to the cessation of R&D activities. In some other micro-networks, R&D
activities were terminated in spite of successful R&D; the actors (not only research
institutes but also firms) did not aim at commercialising the technology (fifth
column).
The 6th column in Table 9 shows that in some micro-networks, R&D activities were
stopped because the technology lacked performance perspective. There may have
been more specific reasons for this. Expectations about the technology’s performance
might not have been met. However very often the lack of performance perspective
was affected by for instance improved performance of the conventional technology,
by the fact that the R&D activities may have taken too long already or that the capital
investment required for making the next step may have been too high. There may
have been problems in finding co-investors, there may not have been a need for the
technology at that particular moment in time, actors may have decided to wait for the
results of more advanced micro-networks, or actors may have become involved in
other major capital expenditure.
Once micro-networks started R&D activities in the technology network stage major
technical difficulties were never a decisive argument for ending R&D activities (in
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stead they were used as an argument for continuing R&D). Many factors that are not
directly related to the innovative technology but to the context in which the
technology was being developed thwarted the technology’s development in specific
micro-networks.
4. Is energy efficiency a promising performance characteristic?
Since our research interest is in energy efficiency, an important question is whether
energy efficiency was a promising performance characteristic. How susceptible were
the actors to energy efficiency as a motive for developing innovative technologies?
We conclude that improving energy efficiency was not a major argument in the
development of any of the four industrial process technologies. Reduced energy costs
was not the main argument that persuaded actors to invest in R&D. Only in the case
of smelting reduction technology was reducing coal consumption a design criterion.
However, even in this case study, savings on energy costs did not lead to the
development of smelting reduction technology in the first place. The case of the shoe
press provides empirical evidence that improved energy efficiency was not decisive
in implementing the technology either. The four case studies suggest that innovative
technologies that affect the core of the production process may bring about
improvements in energy efficiency, but these are little more than positive side-
effects.
Actors involved in developing the innovative technologies used the ‘promise’ of
energy efficiency as an argument for mobilising external (government) support. This
happened in all four case studies. This was clearest in the case of impulse
technology. The national pulp and paper research institutes developing impulse
technology were more dependent on external R&D support, and, as elsewhere, their
R&D proposals tended to match government priorities for granting R&D support.
The multiple advantages of the innovative technologies allowed actors to stress a
range of promising performance characteristics, depending on the actor, supporter or
customer whom they approached.
Summary
To conclude this section on promising performance characteristics we summarise our
insights that are relevant for government intervention.
- The market in which manufacturers operate is an important guideline that orient
actors in their R&D. The majority of the manufacturers is forced to deliver their
typical commodity products at the lowest cost. This dominated the R&D agenda
in the development of industrial process technologies.
- The capital investments in the conventional production processes strongly
constrained the direction of technological development; existing manufacturing
production processes led to regularity in the technological development.
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- Once micro-networks had started R&D activities in the technology network
stage, major technical difficulties were never a decisive argument for terminating
R&D activities.
- In the majority of micro-networks, a variety of reasons not connected to the (pure
performance) innovative technology but to the context in which the technology
was being thwarted the technology’s development and led to the cessation of
R&D activities.
- In none of the four case studies was energy efficiency a main argument for actors
to develop the technology. The ‘promise’ of energy efficiency was however
actively used to mobilise external (government) R&D support.
Dynamics - The momentum of technology networks
So far we have discussed actors, artefact and agendas, and we have seen some of the
saw dynamics that operate. How then can we characterise the overall dynamics?
Here it is useful to introduce the concept of momentum.
The concept of ‘momentum’ is well known in technology studies. Hughes (1983)
used it in his study of the electricity system, a large technical system (see also
Chapter 2). A technical system consists of different technical and socio-
organisational components. Hughes claimed that when such a system grows and
consolidates the total ‘mass’ of technical and socio-organisational components has a
direction and a rate of growth, suggesting velocity. The whole system expands at a
certain pace and thus has a ‘momentum’. A high level of momentum causes
observers to assume that a technical system develops autonomously [Hughes, 1983].
We use the concept of momentum as a characteristic of the technology network. It is
a characteristic of the constellation of actors rather than an intrinsic characteristic of
the innovative technology. A technology network has a large momentum when it
causes observers – analysts like us – to assume that the technology is materialising
autonomously. This does not mean that the technology develops autonomously; it
reflects that the actors involved invest steadily and regularly in the development of
the technology.
A technology network with a large momentum is less vulnerable to changes in parts
of the technology network or to obstacles that the actors may bring along. In other
words: a technology network has a large momentum if the socio-technical elements
that make up the technology are continuously and increasingly aligned [Callon,
1987].
Differences in momentum could be detected in the four technology networks (see
Figure 4).
- 226 -
Figure 4: The four technology networks ranked according to their momentum.
In the case of smelting reduction technology and impulse technology,
momentum decreased. The grey symbols indicate these technologies’
former momentum. Note that the application of smelting reduction
technology bifurcated. Integrated steel-makers lost interest.
Application in mini-mills is a likely next step in the commercialisation
of smelting reduction technology.
We describe the momentum of each of the four technology case studies and explain
what empirical evidence is used to indicate a technology network’s momentum.
Shoe press technology
Although the technology network of shoe press technology was small (until the
moment of innovation) it had a substantial momentum from the beginning. In spite of
the various setbacks and the difficulties in achieving an engineering solution, R&D
activities were continued with great dedication. The people at Beloit continued,
although they knew that developing a shoe press was a tremendous engineering step
to take. The technology network of shoe press technology gained further momentum
from the moment when the first shoe press was applied commercially (1980). By
then a larger technology network emerged; the success of the shoe press in
improving the performance of board machines made all major competing machine
suppliers (and fabric suppliers) jump on the bandwagon and develop a shoe press
too. Beloit’s competitors felt they could do nothing but follow, which reinforced the
further materialisation of the technology.
Impulse technology
The momentum of the technology network of impulse technology has never been
high and it decreased over time. A few major pulp and paper research institutes first
initiated R&D activities (financially supported by government). Beloit, the machine
supplier who had recently successfully introduced the shoe press, was also interested.
The technology network grew. There was however a continuous stream of criticism.
When a number of attempts to commercialise the technology failed, interest at Beloit
waned; R&D activities continued, but with a lower priority. Other major machine
suppliers were not interested. The technology network gradually lost momentum.
Efforts to commercialise the technology failed more than once. In 2000, there was
only one micro-network left which was lead by a major pulp and paper research
institute. A major machine supplier was involved in the background, but this firm has
Momentum
Shoe
press
 Strip
castingImpulse
 Smelt
red./ IM
 Smelt
red./MM
   Smelt
reductionImpulse
Low High
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more innovative technologies in its portfolio. Impulse technology’s future is
uncertain. Its momentum is rather low.
Strip casting technology
The technology network of strip casting technology has had a large momentum since
the technology was widely regarded as an appealing next-step-to-take (Table 6). A
large and robust technology network emerged and continued its R&D activities (even
after thin slab casting had been commercialised (1989)). Although some micro-
networks lost interest, momentum was maintained: integrated steel manufacturers
(with a stainless steel division) persistently moved towards industrial scale casters.
Smelting reduction technology
The technology network of smelting reduction emerged only gradually (1975-1990),
although its momentum was considerable. A large number of steel and engineering
firms recognised smelting reduction technology as an interesting alternative
ironmaking process due to the threat that obsolete coke ovens might have to be
replaced at great expense. The technology network was quite heterogeneous. As time
went on most integrated steel manufacturers lost interest. This was due to the
extension of the lifetime of existing iron production facilities. In addition, the
productivity of these facilities had gradually improved. Integrated steel
manufacturers no longer needed to expand iron-making capacity. The development
and commercialisation of an unproved technology became less important and the
technology network lost momentum, at least as far as integrated steel manufacturers
are concerned. Mini-mill steel-makers (or mining firms) might well be the first to
exploit the promising advantages of smelting reduction technology.
To conclude, a technology network preserves its momentum only if actors continue
their R&D activities and persistently bring the technology towards
commercialisation. The momentum of a technology network reflects the confidence
of actors in the development of that particular technology9. Actors must not lose
confidence in the future prospects for the innovative technology, so that the
technology remains the next-step-to-take.
In the former section on the agenda, we concluded that the two most smoothly
developed technologies, shoe press technology and strip casting technology, lived up
the expectations with least uncertainty and discussion. It is crucial for the
maintenance of momentum that the actors involved in the various micro-networks
are re-assured about their expectations; the perceived promising performance
characteristics have to be confirmed or reconfirmed.
The performance characteristics have to be evaluated in its specific context. Actors
decide upon continuing R&D against the backdrop of R&D activities within the
entire technology network; against the backdrop of continuous technological
                                                
9
 It is important to note that often only a rather restricted number of competing innovative
technologies are recognised in industrial sectors like paper and steel. Only a limited number of
technologies are on the R&D agenda as a ‘next-step-to-take’.
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improvements to the conventional process technologies and of the development of
competing innovative technologies; and against the backdrop of eventual trends and
changes in the specific manufacturing industry – and possibly even in the firm itself -
–. The materialisation of the technology, R&D results, claims of success (for instance
by other micro-networks), difficulties (such as delamination), and failures in
commercialising the technology all affect actors’ confidence in the future prospects
of the technology. Therefore, the momentum of a technology network may be
affected10.
We were able to rank the four technology networks with regard to their momentum.
This implies that we were able to ‘measure’ momentum. How can an analyst assess
the momentum of a technology network at a certain moment in time? We can think
of two possible strategies.
The first is simply to ask experts involved in the development of the specific
technology. Experts use the concept of momentum themselves to indicate their
expectations about the technology’s future breakthrough and performance. So, we
can ask experts to assess the technology network’s momentum and try to understand
their reply.
A second strategy is to get answers to the following questions: Are R&D activities
continued (in spite of improvements in conventional process technologies an
competing innovative technologies)? Do actors continue to see the innovative
technology as the obvious next-step-to be developed? Do actors continue to express
confidence in the performance of an innovative technology (or are issues being
debated)? Is the innovative technology being materialised within that technology
network (regular steps in up-scaling)? Affirmative answers mean that the momentum
of the technology network is being maintained. Such pieces of empirical evidence
should be evaluated together in order to assess the momentum of a specific
technology network.
Government intervention - How effective was R&D support?
Government R&D support (subsidies) is the most widely adopted policy instrument
for stimulating technological development. It is also the common means in
stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies. In this
section, we start with an overview of the role of government R&D support in the
total R&D expenditure. The disadvantage of R&D expenditure data is that they say
                                                
10
 Hughes (1983) focused on expanding systems whereas we are interested in mature manufacturing
industries. This is an important difference. In Hughes’ studies, during the growth of a system some
components are under-developed. Reverse salients occur. These are translated into critical problems
that have to be solved in order to continue the growth of the system. We use momentum to
characterise the technology network within a mature system: the innovative technology may further
optimise the conventional production system. Development of innovative technologies occurs within
the confines of the conventional production process and, generally, within a set of business and R&D
linkages among actors who have an established reputation for developing or delivering process
technologies.
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little about what has been achieved; Did government R&D support contribute to
developing the energy-efficient technologies? Before answering this question, we
summarise governments’ arguments for supporting technological development. We
then discuss the effect of government R&D support. We also analyse how the effect
of R&D support is related to the momentum of the four technology networks.
1. R&D expenditure
Table 10 gives an overview of the total R&D expenditure and government R&D
support in developing the four energy-efficient technologies. It shows a difference in
the total R&D expenditure for developing iron and steel technologies and paper
technologies. The difference between the two is at least one order of magnitude11.
In two case studies, impulse technology and smelting reduction technology,
government R&D support has been substantial (more than a quarter of the total
expenditure). In the other two case studies, the share is marginal (though not in
absolute terms).
Table 10: R&D expenditure and government R&D support.
Case study Number
of micro-
networks
Total R&D
expenditure
[M US$]
Government
R&D support
[M US$]
Government
R&D support
[%]
Shoe press technology 1 5 - -
Impulse technology 2 35 – 40  15 40 – 45
Strip casting technology1 11 500 – 700  40  5 – 10
Smelting reduction technology1 9 600 – 700  165  25 – 30
1 Government R&D support includes support from the Research Technology and Demonstration
(RTD) programme of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The budget for the ECSC’s
RTD programme is gathered by a levy on the steel price.
2. Arguments for stimulating R&D
Table 11 gives an overview of the prevailing arguments that were given, for instance
in policy documents or papers, by the various governments for legitimising
government R&D support.
Table 11 makes it clear that most R&D support can be referred to as specific R&D
support; government had certain intentions in directing technological development in
a desired direction. Financial R&D support from the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC) is the exception. We did not find any indications that generic
                                                
11
 There can be a considerable difference in the expenditure of particular micro-networks. In the case
of strip casting technology, the three most advanced micro-networks spent about 65% to 75% of the
total budget. The expenditure for developing an innovative paper technology is slightly flawed.
Machine suppliers usually implement an innovative technology on their existing pilot paper machines.
Building an entirely new pilot paper machine costs about 30 to 40 million US$.
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government R&D support (e.g. generic tax subsidies on R&D personnel) directed
R&D towards improving energy efficiency12.
Table 11: Governments’ arguments for supporting the development of the four
technology case studies.
Case study Country Generic or
specific?
Government argument
Shoe press
technology
US S - energy efficiency
- competitiveness industry
Support never realised
US + Canada S - energy efficiency
- high-risk technology
- competitiveness
Impulse
technology
Sweden S - energy efficiency
- high-risk technology
- competitiveness industry
US S - energy efficiency
- competitiveness industry
Canada n.a.
Strip casting
technology1
ECSC G - R&D
Japan S - clean coal
US - energy efficiency
Australia S - value added economic activity /
employment
- exploitation of state-owned coal
reserves
ECSC G - R&D
Smelting reduction
technology1
Netherlands S - CO2 emission reduction
Support never realised
1
 Note that ECSC support is included.
In all four technology case studies, industrial energy efficiency and related matters
like reducing greenhouse gas emissions were reasons for government to grant R&D
support. When discussing the promising performance characteristics of the four
technologies, we already pointed out that energy efficiency was not an important
argument for firms to develop the technologies. This does not necessarily mean that
government R&D support was ineffective. However, there are risks that may
undermine the effect of R&D support when actors and governments have different
reasons for being interested in a technology. This discussion is continued in the
following section.
                                                
12
 This does not downplay the other effects of generic R&D support. There are a number of
econometric studies that indicate that generic R&D support results in additional R&D spending by
firms (see e.g. [Donselaar and Knoester, 1999; Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000]).
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3. Effect of government intervention?
As indicated in Chapter 2, we distinguish three important terms when evaluating the
effect of government R&D support:
- Additionality - R&D support is additional if actors would not have started or
continued R&D activities without government R&D support. The additionality
does not say anything about the continued effect of R&D support. Nor does it say
anything about the importance of the supported R&D activities in developing the
technology within a specific micro-network.
- Acceleration - R&D support accelerated technological development if it led to an
accelerated materialisation of the technology in the entire technology network.
- Effectiveness - R&D support is effective if it leads to improved industrial energy
efficiency. This is achieved only if in the end the technology is implemented and
the firm-specific specific energy consumption is reduced.
Table 12 gives an assessment of the effect of government R&D support in
developing the four energy-efficient technologies.
Table 12: Effect of government R&D support: additionality, acceleration and
effectiveness.
Effect of R&D supportCase study
Total number of micro-
networks (=# of MN)
R&D
support
in # of
MN
Addi-
tionaliy
in # of
MN
Acce-
leration
Effectiveness
Shoe press
technology
1 - - - Shoe press reduces steam
consumption in drying section.
Amount of energy efficiency
improvement is machine
specific.
Impulse
technology
2 2 2 Yes Whether an improved energy
efficiency will result is
uncertain (and debated).
Strip casting
technology1
11 6 3 No Results in improved energy
efficiency.  Is not likely to
replace entire casting + rolling
stages in integrated steel mills.
Smelting
reduction
technology1
9 9 5
all
process
3
energy-
efficient
process
No
so far
(did
enlarge
network)
Some processes are likely to be
more energy-efficient than blast
furnace plus coke ovens +
agglomeration. If implemented
in mini-mill (and replacing
scrap), specific energy
consumption will increase.
1
 Note that ECSC support is included.
We also discuss the effect of government R&D support case by case.
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Shoe press technology
In the development of shoe press technology, the machine supplier’s attempt to
acquire US government support for covering the risk of innovation was never
realised. Both additionality and acceleration would have been minimal, since the
machine supplier was eager to introduce the shoe press. The momentum was large.
Impulse technology
The R&D support by various national governments accelerated the development of
impulse technology; the emergence of the technology network and the
materialisation of the technology would not have reached the stage it is at today
without government R&D support.
Why did government R&D support accelerate the development of impulse
technology? Government support was granted primarily to the major pulp and paper
research institutes, which are more often depending on external support for initiating
and continuing R&D activities. The close relationships between the major pulp and
paper research institutes and machine suppliers and the support of R&D activities by
the institutes member companies were indicated to government that impulse
technology was an appealing innovative technology. The relations and co-operation
between the actors within the micro-networks were such that actors could benefit
from each others’ capacities and research facilities. The technology network did not
have a very large momentum. This meant that government could support additional
R&D activities.
In spite of all this, the case study of impulse technology illustrates one of the major
risks that a government runs in supporting technological development: financial
support may become the driving force in the R&D efforts. The researchers continued
to attract government financial support by claiming improved energy efficiency.
Government was patient in granting support13.
Finally, whether R&D support was really effective – in terms of leading to improved
energy efficiency – remains to be seen. The commercial feasibility of the current
design is under debate.
Strip casting technology
The three micro-networks which are ahead in developing strip casting technology
received no government R&D support (or it was only of a marginal nature). One of
these three micro-networks did receive ECSC support during the early stages.
However, this support was not additional. The contribution of government R&D
support to a micro-network’s total expenditure - % budget - and the additionality of
                                                
13
 Orloff (2000), who was the leading impulse technology researcher at the US pulp and paper
research institute, wondered whether the research institute’s R&D activities should have continued for
such a long time. The institute’s major lesson is that a thorough economic assessment has to be made
at an earlier stage of R&D activities. Experts’ opinions about the legitimate role of government R&D
support in developing impulse technology differ. Some experts say that it was a waste of tax payers’
money to support people who perform research simply because they have the funds available
[MacGregor, 2000; Wahren, 2001; Woo, 2001]. Others are more temperate in their judgement on the
effect of government R&D support [Boström, 2001].
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government R&D support was largest in micro-networks that were not operating at
the frontier of the technology’s development. The effect of government R&D support
in stimulating the development of strip casting technology has been minimal,
because the technology network had its own strong momentum.
Smelting reduction technology
Government R&D support enlarged the technology network of smelting reduction
technology. The US and Japanese national government and the ECSC support had an
additional effect in three micro-networks that invested in a smelting reduction
process that was likely to be energy-efficient. Roughly 90% of the government R&D
expenditure indicated in Table 10 was spent on these three micro-networks. At this
moment, only one of these three micro-networks – or actually one Japanese steel
firm that participated in the formerly co-operative micro-network and has always
been eager to develop the technology – is still active. Government R&D support did
not accelerate the technology development so far14.
These descriptions illustrate that although government R&D support has been a very
popular policy instrument for stimulating the development of energy-efficient
technologies, it is also a rather weak instrument. Government relies on the actors –
their intentions, their plans, their embeddedness in a network of actors, their own
private R&D investments, their strategic business decisions and their efficiency – to
do something valuable with the financial R&D support.
Figure 5 summarises these descriptions on the effect of government R&D support.
There is a relation between the momentum of a technology network (see Figure 4)
and the effect of R&D support; the four technology case studies are located on the
curve.
The curve helps to explain the effect of R&D support. The momentum of the
technology networks engaged in developing strip casting technology and shoe press
technology was high; R&D support did not have an additional effect. In such
circumstances, it is difficult to intervene effectively since the is a high risk that
government is not abreast of events or that R&D support is not additional. The
momentum of the technology networks engaged in developing smelting reduction
technology and impulse technology was lower; government R&D support led to
additional R&D activities and enlarged the technology networks.
                                                
14
 We write ‘so far’ because one of the firms of the Japanese micro-network is still active. Their R&D
activities have to be compared with another micro-network that achieved a similar degree of
materialisation, although without government R&D support. The future plans of both micro-networks
are still uncertain.
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Figure 5: The effect of government R&D support as a function of momentum.
The four technology networks are located on the curve. In case of
smelting reduction technology and impulse technology momentum
decreased (see also Figure 4). The grey symbols indicate these
technologies’ former momentum. Note that the application of smelting
reduction technology bifurcated.
Summary
We therefore come to the following conclusions about the effect of government
R&D support on the development of industrial process technologies:
- Government R&D support did accelerate the development of specific energy-
efficient technologies.
- If technology networks had a large momentum, it was difficult for government to
stimulate technological development effectively. Additionality is low; actors
themselves are eager. The is also a risk associated with R&D support to the
technology networks that have a low momentum. It was illustrated that financial
support became the driving force in the R&D efforts. It remained uncertain if in
the end the technology was technically or economically viable.
- Additionality of government R&D support was higher if firms were less inclined
to develop and commercialise the technology.
- Actors were skilful in addressing a government’s specific interest for developing
an innovative technology.
- Government did not play a role in the exploration stage of the four technology
case studies. Most often government became involved after the technology
network stage had ‘taken off’. However, in some cases government contributed
to the emergence of technology networks.
Effect of
government
R&D support
Impulse    Smelt
reduction
 Smelt
red./ IM
Impulse
 Smelt
red./MM
Shoe
press
 Strip
casting
MomentumLow High
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Government intervention - Alternative strategies
The notion that technological development is the result of interaction between actors
rather than a linear sequence from science to market opens the way for alternative
intervention strategies. These can take the form of (technology forcing) standards,
voluntary agreements on technological development, facilitating and networking
initiatives, organising co-operation, supply or transfer of information and knowledge,
etc. (see also Section 2.3. and 2.4 in Chapter 2).
In the empirical case studies we did not see many of such alternative government
strategies (see Table 13). In principle, the effect of such strategies can be analysed in
the same way as the effect of R&D support – i.e. according to their additionality,
acceleration and effectiveness –. However, the empirical material is too scarce and
our comments must remain tentative.
Table 13: Other government intervention strategies.
Case study Government intervention strategies
Shoe press
technology
- -
Impulse
technology
Co-operation - International Energy Agency (IEA): Implementing Agreement
Pulp & Paper / Annex on impulse technology.
Strip casting
technology
Co-operation
Co-operation
Co-operation
- ECSC RTD programme:
- formation of a working group on casting (around 1985)
- network of meetings
- two co-operative multi-partner carbon steel projects –  40
to 50% R&D support.
- Co-operative R&D (Canada): Bessemer Consortium –  50%
government R&D support.
- Co-operative R&D (US): recent CMU project – 70%
government R&D support.
Co-operation
Co-operation
Co-operation
- ECSC RTD programme:
- network of meetings
- Steel Initiative / co-operative R&D programme (US / DSM):
public-private effort to formulate priority areas for R&D and to
select and support promising co-operative R&D programmes –
75% government R&D support.
- Co-operative R&D programme (Japan / DIOS): opportunity for
building a demonstration facility – 67% government R&D
support.
Regulation - Environmental regulation in various industrialised countries
Smelting
reduction
technology
Agreement
Agreement
- Voluntary agreement 2000 (CCF / the Netherlands)
- Technology agreement (Hismelt / Australia)
1. Regulation
It was only in the development of smelting reduction technology that regulation
played a role. It did not affect energy use, but it affected environmental emissions in
the conventional iron-making process. The threat of environmental regulations was
one of the cost considerations taken into account by the steel manufacturers.
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Environmental regulations alone would not have generated a large enough incentive
to develop smelting reduction technology. The most important effect of regulations
was that they provided the researchers within firms with an additional argument for
continuing a specific R&D effort; an additional justification for creating firm-internal
support.
2. Agreements
We found two agreements between government and a specific manufacturing firm
with regard to the development of smelting reduction technology. Although these
agreements as such did not lead to any additional R&D activities, the two firms were
well aware of their contract with government. The Dutch steel firm’s voluntary
agreement on energy efficiency meant that the firm did not want to lose its credibility
in dealing with issues like energy efficiency [Meijer, 2000]. In the case of an
Australian mining firm, the agreement with government to look for (innovative)
technologies in order to add value to the firm’s iron ore resources did govern the
firms’ thinking [Innes, 2001]. We have the impression that the firms felt a
commitment to government. It remains to be seen whether agreements on for
instance energy efficiency R&D can stimulate technological development.
3. Facilitating contacts between actors and stimulating co-operation
The other strategies listed in Table 13 deal with facilitating contacts, interaction and
co-operation between actors. Establishing co-operation between actors (especially
between public and private actors) is nowadays seen as an effective strategy for
exploiting knowledge [OECD, 1998; OECD, 1996]. There are three examples of co-
operative R&D in the empirical material. First, the ECSC’s RTD programme
supported (co-operative) R&D projects within specific steel micro-networks. It also
facilitated meetings between steel firms, who were active in specific ECSC-
supported R&D projects. Secondly, in four steel micro-networks15, multi-partner co-
operative R&D programmes were established. Thirdly, the IEA Pulp and Paper
Implementing Agreement tried to enhance co-operation between research institutes
in the case of impulse technology.
The regular meetings within the ECSC network led to some fruitful co-operative
R&D projects, especially in the early stages of developing innovative technologies.
This is due largely to the design of the ECSC RTD programme16. In spite of this
                                                
15
 Strip casting: Bessemer Consortium and CMU project. Smelting reduction: DIOS and DSM.
16
 The value of the ECSC RTD programme is that there is quite a large target group of steel firms that
are all interested in R&D (and in getting their levies back). The steel firms are aware that is valuable
to co-operate in the early stages of an R&D project. The ECSC network meetings facilitate contacts
between researchers and lower the threshold for contacts. Generally ECSC-supported projects are (co-
operative) pre-competitive R&D projects in which actors learn from other experienced researchers and
can share expertise, experience and costs. If R&D activities move towards a strategic phase, steel
firms lose interest in ECSC support. This has to do with the absolute contribution by the ECSC and
with the requirement to exchange R&D results within the ECSC network meetings.
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positive role, the R&D projects supported by the ECSC are not always additional (or
the projects cover only ‘side-lines’ of R&D activities).
In three of the four multi-partner co-operative R&D programmes, which were all
heavily supported financially by various national governments, firms merely aimed
at exploring the possibilities of a technology’s promising potential and at acquiring
an understanding of the technical difficulties. Actors’ primary interest was not to
bring the technology towards commercialisation.
The IEA implementing agreement, which set up a task group for impulse technology,
showed clearly that establishing co-operation between ‘competing’ research
institutes and even formulating pre-competitive R&D tasks can be extremely
difficult17.
To conclude, stimulating co-operative R&D is not an easy way of guaranteeing
effective R&D support. The value of stimulating or insisting on co-operation
depends on the stage of a technology’s development and on the mutual interests and
stakes of the participating actors.
4. Network steering: initiating micro-networks?
Another way in which government can stimulate technological development is to
change the composition of the technology network or to enlarge the technology
network. Figure 1 indicated the dominant role of firms in performing R&D activities.
In none of the four technology case studies did government play an initiating role in
the shift from the exploration stage to the technology network stage. However,
government did play a role in enlarging and strengthening both the smelting
reduction technology network and the impulse technology network. In the case of
strip casting technology, government R&D assistance and some activities and
meetings within the ECSC supported the efforts of those who were exploring the
possibilities of strip casting technology. Exchange of experiences speeded up R&D
activities. A large number of these small-scale efforts came to a halt, but a robust
technology network resulted.
In four of the 23 micro-networks, government played a direct role in initiating R&D
activities18. Two of these micro-networks ceased R&D activities. One of the four
micro-networks was critical for the continued development. If this micro-network
had not emerged, the development of impulse technology would have stopped
completely19.
                                                
17
 The fact that there were no additional financial resources available within the IEA Implementing
Agreement did not make things easier.
18
 Smelting reduction technology: 1) DSM micro-network and 2) Australian AusIron micro-network.
The Romelt micro-network is not included (developed in former USSR). Impulse technology: 3) STFI
micro-network. Strip casting technology: 4) Armco micro-network.
19
 A government official was important in initiating R&D activities in the STFI micro-network. He
promised substantial R&D support if the research institute would come up with a solid proposal for an
R&D programme. It took roughly 6 years before the institute initiated a major R&D programme.
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We conclude that information about the size of a technology network can persuade
government to stimulate new micro-networks. Government R&D support or the
organisation of exchange and meetings may induce a technology network to gain
momentum, particularly if a technology network is just emerging. R&D attention for
an innovative technology may be anchored.
Summary
Our empirical material leads us to the following tentative conclusions:
- The effect of a regulation was to provide researchers within a firm with an
additional reason for creating ‘firm-internal’ support for initiating or continuing
R&D. The incentive, however, was too small to initiate large-scale and complex
R&D efforts needed for developing industrial process technologies.
- Firms that had a direct agreement with government showed a certain
commitment. It remains to be seen whether agreements on for instance energy
efficiency R&D can stimulate technological development. The results merely
suggest that it may be an interesting way for government to intervene.
- Stimulating co-operative R&D was additional in most multi-partner micro-
networks, although it did not accelerate technology development. Actors’
involved in a co-operative R&D project (in most micro-networks competitive
manufacturers) did not intend to commercialise the technology. The value of
stimulating or insisting on co-operation depends on the stage of a technology’s
development and on the mutual interests and stakes of the participating actors.
- Government R&D support contributed to the anchoring of the technology
network and to the enlargement of the technology network.
Note that the empirical evidence is too limited for us to draw strong conclusions.
Additional (case study) research needs to be done on the various types of government
intervention strategies.
7.3. Lessons for technology studies and energy analysis
In this thesis we draw on two disciplines that have a different perception of
technology. Energy analysts see technology primarily as hardware with some
favourable performance characteristics. Scholars in technology studies, on the other
hand, see technology as the outcome of a social process. We have not tried to unify
these two different perspectives. We started from one discipline – energy analysis –
and argued that it would be useful to take a look at the insights generated by
technology studies. In the empirical case studies we were able to weigh up the effect
of government intervention as an element in the social shaping of industrial energy-
efficient technology. In this section, we briefly discuss some findings that are
valuable for technology studies and energy analysis.
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Technology studies
It was not our main purpose to generate theoretical insights for technology studies.
However, we summarise some contributions explicitly.
Slow technology
Our research has given us a better understanding of the dynamics of technological
development in manufacturing industries, which has remained relatively unexplored
in technology studies (see e.g. [Jasanoff, 1995])20. The development of innovative
technologies that affect the core of the manufacturing process is relatively slow
compared to other domains of technology. In this thesis, we have identified a few
interconnected factors that restrict the dynamics in technology development:
- The capital invested in the existing, proven manufacturing production processes
constrains actors in their R&D activities.
- The existing production process is relatively homogeneous. This constrains the
variety sought after in technological development.
- Innovative technologies may be known for a number of decades, yet remain in
the exploration stage.
- Innovative technologies have to be recognised as a next-step-to-take in
improving the performance of the existing production process. Only then does a
technology network emerge. Four (preliminary) factors that may contribute
towards the shift from the exploration stage to the technology network stage were
identified. This is an interesting topic for further research.
- All technology networks are rather small. There are a limited number of players.
The micro-networks developing the technologies are quite stable.
- The number of competing innovative technologies is generally also modest for
such manufacturing industries. There is no business logic in developing a larger
number of competing innovative technologies at the same time. Furthermore, an
innovative technology often leaves considerable space for important
improvements after it has been introduced. The cycles for developing new
process technologies are long i.e. twenty to forty years.
- It takes time, financial resources, continued effort and patience to get an
innovative technology accepted as a proven technology in the manufacturing
industry. A continuous up-scaling, most often two or three steps easily taking
about 10 to 20 years, is required to convince the manufacturing firms. They are
prone to take risks.
- The majority of the manufacturing firms become interested only when the
innovative technology is ‘proven’. Innovative process technologies are typically
first implemented in existing facilities. It can take a considerable time (10 to 15
                                                
20
 Recently Moors (2000) also reported on technological development in mature industrial sectors.
Moors focuses on the conditions that determine whether technology choices lead to incremental or
more radical solution directions (iron and steel, aluminium and zinc production).
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years) before a technology becomes a proven option for the entire range of
products manufactured in a specific industry.
- The number of actors able to develop core process technologies is not too large.
Actors with a ‘proven’ reputation in technology development appear to have a
better chance of getting an innovative technology introduced. This, however, is
an issue requiring further research.
Radical innovation should become incremental
In technology studies, the question of whether an innovation is ‘radical’ or
‘incremental’ is perennial (for a more elaborate account of various distinctions
between more radical or less radical innovation, see Chapter 2, footnote 11).
In the manufacturing industry, however, the radical nature of an innovative
technology is not a static characteristic; each radical technology has to become more
incremental before it is considered seriously for technological development. An
innovative technology that was one day considered as not feasible – ‘an unbelievable
idea’ –, may become the ‘next-step-to-take’ as time goes on. The notions of radical
and incremental are evaluated through the eyes of the actors involved in developing
the technology. A technology becomes ‘more incremental’ if an actor or actors really
recognise it as an economically attractive and technologically feasible improvement
to the existing production process (the sequence of conventional process
technologies).
Distinguishing the exploration stage from the technology network stage
Developing innovative process technologies takes a considerable time. In all four
technology case studies the time-frame between first idea and moment of innovation
could be divided into an exploration stage and a technology network stage.
Innovative technologies may slumber for decades (in spite of the fact that serious
R&D activities occur) before a robust technology network really ‘takes off’. Only
then does the idea become entrenched and the technology remains a priority in R&D
for a substantial number of years (in only one or possibly more micro-networks). The
shift from the exploration stage to the technology network stage is an interesting
topic that requires further research (e.g. testing the four preliminary factors that
affect this shift and researching the possible ways in which government can enhance
this shift).
Stratifying levels of analysis
Several authors (see e.g. [Green et al., 1999; Rip and Kemp, 1998]) have recently
claimed that the meso-level might be an interesting level for government
intervention. Our findings underpin this claim. Our research shows how useful it is to
distinguish micro-networks as elements within a technology network. These micro-
networks turned out to be stable entities over fairly long time periods. R&D activities
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were concentrated within such micro-networks. Often close interaction occurred
between the actors within micro-networks. Micro-networks actively monitored the
R&D activities and successes and failures of other micro-networks. As Green et al.
(1999) also suggested, the value of such a stratification is that it pinpoints the place
where actors are active, it maps the distributed process of technological development,
and places these activities against the background of ongoing technological
development. We think such stratified networks can reveal the points at which
government can intervene to further technological development.
Closure is not necessary
A well known concept in technology studies is the concept of closure [Bijker, 1987].
The idea behind this mechanism is that actors have different interpretations about the
same artefact and that this interpretative flexibility has to be reduced. Our analysis of
developing energy-efficient technologies, however, has illustrated that closure of the
interpretation of a technology may not occur. On the contrary, maintaining a variety
of interpretations and selectively using a specific interpretation can be fruitful in, for
instance, mobilising external R&D support. Each of the actors can stress or recognise
the promising performance characteristics that suit his/her purposes best. Avoiding
closure creates space for strategic behaviour by actors.
Energy Analysis
In energy analysis, one typically compares systems of technologies in order to
evaluate which systems and which technologies may reduce CO2 emissions at what
costs. The discipline of energy analysis is still developing (see e.g. [Blok, 2000]). In
this thesis, we have developed some insights and concepts that are useful for future
energy analysis.
Our analysis makes it very clear that energy analysts, in compiling their system
analyses, have a rather specific way of looking at and dealing with energy-efficient
technology. Although energy analysts are to some extent aware that most innovative
energy-efficient technologies that affect the core of the manufacturing process do
more than improve energy efficiency alone, we saw in our analysis that energy-
efficiency considerations played a minor role. Most of the manufacturing industries
attach importance to other performance characteristics than those stressed by energy
analysts.
Energy analysts should be explicit about the reliability of their energy-efficiency data
and investment cost data. Lab scale efficiency data are sometimes the best data
available for energy-efficiency calculations (see e.g. [Gilbreath at al., 1995; De Beer,
1998]). However, such data are often not at all accurate with regard to energy use on
a commercial scale. Data can also be flawed as a result of optimism; it can be in
researchers’ interest to present certain data in order to mobilise other actors. Often
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data are kept secret. The amount of data available is typically limited. If data are
available one should double check the source in order to evaluate their reliability.
Note too that performance data are not static.
An innovative technology is not often directly applicable in the entire manufacturing
sector. In practice, an energy-efficient technology may at first only be implemented
in a specific part of the total production capacity (i.e. only for specific steel or paper
grades): it takes time before an innovative technology can be applied in the entire
sector. What is considered as a proven technology in one part of the sector is not
necessarily proven for all manufacturing firms21.
A reference technology is not static, nor is the reference technology always clear.
The performance of the conventional production process may improve over time
(due to the implementation of other technologies or other improvements). The
selection of a reference technology by energy analysts shows what they see as the
most logical competing technology. The ‘real’ reference does not always match with
what the energy analysts define as a reference technology. Smelting reduction
technology is for instance not competing with new coke ovens and blast furnaces but
with a continuous upgrading of these facilities. Furthermore, the reference
technology for application of smelting reduction technology in mini-mills is different
from the reference technology in integrated steel mills.
In both manufacturing industries innovative technologies are first implemented in
existing paper mills or existing steel sites. Energy analysts often recognise that
renewing the industrial capital stock is a process in which components are gradually
replaced. The difference between retrofit and replacement, however, is fuzzier than
often assumed. It would be useful to gain more insight into the differences in
investment behaviour of firms with regard to ongoing small capital investments to
improve the existing facilities or major capital investments (such as implementing a
shoe press).
Because data availability is limited and energy analysts typically refer to a limited
number of data, an important strategy for good data gathering in energy analysis is to
maintain a (personal) network with industry experts. Energy analysts are advised to
consult experts and scientists who are actually working in developing (or selling) the
energy-efficient technologies. Maintaining a network will render a lot of tacit
knowledge and understanding about the chances and limitations of the energy-
efficient technologies concerned. Moreover, such contacts and interaction will
provide them with relevant (and recent) additional techno-economic information.
A final suggestion is that energy analysts should look for innovative technologies
that are still at an exploration stage; currently most of their efforts are concentrated
                                                
21
 This happened not only in the case of shoe press technology, but also in the case of conventional
continuous casting technology and thin slab casting technology (both steel industry).
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on innovative energy-efficient technologies that are in the technology network stage.
Energy analysts should try to produce more innovative ideas with regard to the
reduction of energy consumption for manufacturing energy-intensive products. We
realise that it is not easy to make an inventory of radical ideas that are still in the
exploration stage. However, this is a major challenge; there is not only much to gain
in terms of energy efficiency, but if government can enhance the emergence of
technology networks, there is also much to gain in accelerating technological
development. It is not only important to know in what part of the production process
the largest energy savings are possible (use exergy analysis). It is also important to
consult (international) industrial engineers and researchers who have been involved
in process technology R&D for a considerable number of years. Such people
typically have ideas that go beyond the ‘next-step-to-take’.
7.4. Possibilities for government intervention
Our detailed study of four sector-specific innovative process technologies for the
manufacturing industry and the insights generated by comparing them lead us to
draw four policy-relevant conclusions. From these conclusions, we continue our
exploration of how government can improve the effect of its intervention to stimulate
technological development. We finish by giving some recommendations to enhance
the effect of government intervention in the case of major energy-efficient process
technologies for the manufacturing industry.
Policy-relevant conclusions
Our first conclusion regarding technological development in the manufacturing
industry is that actors are strongly constrained by the existing production process.
The innovative process technologies considered in this thesis are major process
innovations. These are only developed if they are recognised as the next-step-to-take
for improving the performance of the existing production process (the conventional
route of manufacturing the product). Thus, the existing production process tends
towards system optimisation rather than to the complete renewal of the production
process. It may happen that an innovative technology induces or reinforces the
emergence of an alternative production route for a specific product. However, such a
bifurcation in production routes appears to be an exception – and also a long-term
process that is not accomplished by one specific innovative technology22 –, rather
than a regular occurrence in mature manufacturing industries.
                                                
22
 Think for instance of the introduction of smelting reduction technology in the steel industry. This
may reinforce the competitive position of mini-mills over the conventional integrated mill route. More
than one innovative technology is often needed to induce a new production route. The alternative
mini-mill steel route has emerged more distinctly over a time-period of twenty years.
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Our second conclusion, closely related to the first, is that technological development
takes a considerable time. Ideas about innovative technologies may slumber for
decades. Subsequently, it takes at least ten to fifteen years (often longer) before the
technology is ‘proven’ on a commercial scale. Acceptance of the technology as the
proven design for all firms in a manufacturing industry may take another ten to
twenty years.
Capital intensity and business pressure are typically referred to as the major factors
that slow down technological development in manufacturing industries. The number
of competing innovative technologies is typically limited. Often there is only one and
there are always fewer than five competing innovative process technologies. Also,
the number of actors developing and commercialising innovative technologies is
usually restricted. Most often (well-known) firms initiate and support the
development of innovative technologies in spite of the long development times.
Our third conclusion is that effective stimulation of the development of industrial
energy-efficient process technologies is not easy.
The desire to implement effective intervention strategies is what makes stimulating
technological development problematic. Although effective intervention is not
impossible. On the one hand, we noticed that firms usually recognised the
advantages of the technology for their business and identified a technology’s
potential to improve the existing production process. Government R&D support was
not always additional, or was only additional in micro-networks that were
(intentionally) not operating at the frontier of the technology’s development. On the
other hand, we also found case studies where government intervention was effective;
R&D support was additional and led to enlargement of technology networks. In a
specific case study it even led to faster technology development.
Our fourth conclusion is that there is considerable variety in the technology networks
that develop the energy-efficient technologies. The general promise of innovative
industrial energy-efficient technologies masks heterogeneity.
Labelling innovative energy-efficient process technologies as energy efficient is
somewhat misleading. Most often, the label does not reflect actors’ real arguments
for developing the industrial process technologies. It also neglects the diversity
between various manufacturing industries. The four technology case studies showed
that the effect of government intervention depended on the characteristics of the
technology network. There was variety in the size of the technology networks, the
type of actors involved, the geographic distribution of R&D activities, and the
momentum of the networks. Therefore, there is no simple recipe for government
intervention that can be applied to all energy-efficient technologies in all the
manufacturing industries. There is no ‘one size fits all’ strategy for accelerating
technological development. Thus, government should take into account the
characteristics of the technology network before deciding if and how it should
intervene.
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Increasing the effect of government intervention?
There are two important dilemmas that need to be mentioned briefly before we
comment further on how the effect of government intervention can be improved.
The first dilemma is whether government should play any role in stimulating the
development of such industrial process technologies. Our research results seem to
indicate that government should not intervene in the case of technologies that affect
the core of the production process. All developments are driven primarily by market
considerations and, thus, developing these innovative technologies is primarily a task
for the firms operating in these markets.
The second dilemma is whether government adopts a generic or specific intervention
strategy. At the moment, the dominant trend in stimulating technological
development (in energy R&D) is that the ‘market’ should decide in selecting
technologies for R&D and commercialisation. The government has a poor record in
picking ‘winning’ technologies. The risk of government failure in implementing
specific intervention strategies is large. Therefore, generic intervention strategies are
favoured.
With regard to these dilemma’s we agree upon the suggestion that firms should play
a dominant role in selecting and investing in the development of such industrial
process technologies. We also recognise the difficulties for government to design
specific intervention strategies. However, in particular cases government intervention
can be crucial to gain momentum or to make the next step in up-scaling equipment.
The societal importance of further improvements in industrial energy efficiency and
the somewhat disappointing effect of government intervention in stimulating the
development of such technologies so far make us wonder how the effect of
government intervention can be improved: if government does decide to intervene,
then its effect should be increased.
The diversity between the manufacturing industries and various technology networks
calls for government intervention strategies that are better tailored to the networks of
a specific industry. As indicated before, there is no standard recipe for government
intervention that can be applied to all energy-efficient technologies in all the
manufacturing industries and that can be implemented successfully by various
national governments. National governments should have a thorough knowledge of
the (international) technology networks and of the role and capacities of actors that
they can address before deciding if and how to intervene.
We do not intend that stimulating technology development can always be effective
(in terms of accelerating technology development or improving energy efficiency).
After all, technology development is uncertain. We do not intend that government
have to select the ‘innovative process technologies that industries need’. We do
suggest that information about patterns of innovation and international technology
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networks can provide (more qualitative) insight that is valuable for improving the
effect of government intervention.
We do not take the view that government intervention is needed in the case of all
energy-efficient technologies. On the basis of information about the technology
networks, governments may also decide not to intervene. In addition, we realise the
importance of generic intervention, which can for instance create favourable
framework conditions for the efficient and dynamic functioning of free markets,
remove market imperfections, lead to investments in fundamental R&D and the
training and education systems, create openness to international flows of goods,
people and ideas, and attract foreign investment in R&D.
We have no intention of formulating concrete policy proposals or of designing
specific policy instruments. In this section, we provide general recommendations and
ideas for improving the effect of government intervention directed at technological
development in manufacturing industries.
1. Access to actors
Developing and commercialising innovative technologies in the manufacturing
industry is an international affair. Business relationships with suppliers and engineers
and the contacts in R&D networks extend beyond national borders. At the same time,
there are usually a limited number of micro-networks in a restricted number of
countries. In the case of small countries, such as the Netherlands, the chance is large
that the majority of the industrial energy-efficient technologies will be developed in
foreign countries. Most governments do not have a direct access to technology
networks. The opportunities for governments to accelerate technology development
or to enlarge or change the structure of the technology network depend on
governments’ access to actors that that can play a crucial role in the international
technology network.
Therefore, it is important for each government to know what specific knowledge and
R&D experience regarding various manufacturing industries and industrial process
technologies are available within a country23. It is also important to know which
(national or international) actors typically deliver innovative process technologies to
specific manufacturing industries. These actors are not necessarily the only ones able
to commercialise technology, although it is likely that these actors are eventually
needed to prove the feasibility of a process technology to the manufacturing industry.
If government has direct access to an actor within a micro-network or to actors that
are capable of initiating a new micro-network (with some impact on the technology
network), government can directly meet these actors in order to see if and how it can
stimulate the technology’s development.
                                                
23
 Government should have a detailed insight into the competitive position of particular research areas
or technology fields in a wider international context.
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If government has no direct access to relevant actors there are two alternative
intervention strategies.
First, national governments always have indirect access to technology networks.
They can always deploy intervention strategies that affect actors who in their turn
may express preferences (on energy efficiency) to the international actors that are
directly involved developing process technologies. Government can for instance
decide to continue a stringent policy regarding voluntary agreements on industrial
energy efficiency for specific manufacturing industries. Such indirect ‘pull’
strategies make use of the economic interdependency of firms. Government
articulates a specific selection requirement by stressing energy efficiency, so that
manufacturing firms convey this R&D criterion to their suppliers. Government can
also try to create contacts and exchanges between international technology
developers and the national manufacturing industry or to ensure that regular
information is made available about the performance of innovative energy-efficient
technologies. In this way, firms are informed about recent achievements and
performance of innovative energy-efficient technologies. National research institutes
may play a role in organising such exchanges and interactions. When applying such
indirect strategies, government has to be realistic about the goals that are achievable;
it is not guaranteed that these intervention strategies accelerate the development of
energy-efficient technologies.
Second, national government may join forces in stimulating the development of
industrial energy-efficient process technology. International R&D programmes
should prove interesting because a larger target group of actors with similar research
interests and capacities for developing process technologies can be addressed. We
are aware that national interests and stakes may hamper the realisation of such an
international approach. However, in such international R&D programmes, it is a
good strategy to enhance co-operation and meetings among actors in pre-competitive
research areas. Actors meet, exchange information and R&D experience and initiate
R&D projects. Government R&D support or the organisation of exchange and
meetings may induce a technology network to gain momentum, particularly if a
technology network is just emerging. A further step would be to compile
international R&D programmes for all stages of R&D activities. Another possible
international strategy is for international bodies to map the international technology
networks of major energy-efficient process technologies. It is not in the interest of
any of the separate countries to perform such an exercise individually. In line with
this suggestion, it should be possible to develop accurate technology network
‘indicators’ that reflect the interactions and decisions of actors in developing
technology and permit the monitoring of changes in technology networks.
2. Momentum and timing
We introduced the concept of momentum in order to capture the dynamics of
technology networks. Momentum is a technology network characteristic, not a
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characteristic of the technology. It is a measure that reflects the confidence actors
have in the development of a particular innovative technology. The momentum of
technology networks gives a first indication whether government should intervene at
all (see Figure 6)24.
Figure 6: Using momentum as an indication about whether government
intervention is likely to have any effect.
If the technology network’s momentum is high, government intervention is not likely
to have much added value. The actors involved are confident that an innovative
technology will continue to be an interesting option. In such circumstances, financial
government R&D support is very likely to support ‘free riders’. If the technology
network’s momentum is low, government intervention is not likely to be effective
either because there is very little chance that a technology will become a proven
technology in the end. The risk of ending up with a ‘white elephant’ is too large.
Momentum is a characteristic of the technology network that may change over time.
This implies that the effect of government intervention will be influenced by the
moment or time at which it occurs. By monitoring how a technology networks’
momentum changes governments may be able to select the best moment for
contributing to the development of an energy-efficient technology.
Note that a government’s decision on how to intervene in a technology network
needs to be based on more than information about momentum. For instance,
information about the size of a technology network and about government’s access to
actors are important for deciding on the way in which government can stimulate most
effectively.
                                                
24
 If momentum is used as an indicator it needs to be measured. We have referred to difficulties and
possible strategies in measuring momentum in Section 7.2.
Effect of
government
intervention Intervention may be considered
Too low momentum
→
 No effect
Too high momentum
→
 No effect
MomentumLow High
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3. Patience and critical attention
As was already indicated, developing industrial energy-efficient process technologies
takes time. Even if a technology was in the technology network stage, a time-frame
of ten to twenty years is no exception.
When the momentum of a technology network is modest and the technology
promises substantial improvements in energy efficiency, long-term government
commitment to innovative process technologies is required. Government has to be
patient. This patience should not be confused with a naïve belief that a commercial
technology will eventually result. Acquiring R&D support should never become the
driving force in R&D efforts. If the development of an energy-efficient technology
has gone on for more than 5 years or if actors keep coming back for R&D support
and have taken no serious step to up-scale the technology, government has to be
cautious about continuing financial R&D support.
If government has financially supported the development of a major energy-efficient
technology for a long time, it must monitor the changes in the international
technology network actively before deciding whether to continue R&D. A
government should not evaluate an innovative technology simply in terms of its
promised energy-efficiency performance only; it should monitor the progress in
R&D, the steps in up-scaling, the (changes) in the momentum of technology
networks and the position and stakes of the actors involved.
4. Government’s own agenda
All four energy-efficient process technologies were developed for reasons other than
the improvement in energy efficiency. The fact that actors’ and governments’
agendas differ is not a reason for failing to stimulate the development of industrial
energy-efficient technologies. Government intervention may still be legitimate and
effective.
However, government has to protect its own agenda in terms of its primary interest,
namely energy-efficiency improvement. Government should have a thorough (and
independent) insight into energy-efficiency improvements and also into the other
(more) promising performance characteristics. It should have insight into the priority
attached to various performance characteristics. Claims about energy-efficiency
improvements have to be evaluated critically. A supply of external independent
information may be important in this regard. In the case of such process
technologies, it is not always easy to find independent experts who know enough
about the technology to make a proper and independent assessment.
In a similar way, it is important to understand what an innovative technology implies
for the existing production process. As pointed out earlier technological development
is severely constrained by the existing production process. In other words, in
developing industrial process technologies it is not easy to avoid a ‘lock-in’ to a
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further optimisation of the conventional energy-intensive production route. The
majority of the innovative technologies optimise the performance of the existing
production process. They tend to ‘system optimisation’ rather than to a complete
renewal of the existing production process. Insight into the consequences of the
innovative technology for the production process – in relation to competing
innovative technologies and improvements in the existing conventional technologies
– should help a government to decide whether it should or should not stimulate the
development of specific technologies.
5. Flexibility
In stimulating technological development via R&D programmes, governments are
usually restricted by a number of conditions, such as the absolute size of a budget,
the eligible target groups, requirements on co-operation in R&D or requirements
regarding co-investment by firms. Often national governments cannot spend more
than a certain percentage on government R&D support. Often, there are good reasons
for these conditions, although in stimulating the development of industrial energy-
efficient technologies governments need a certain degree of flexibility in designing a
tailor-fit strategy.
For instance, it is not always needed to involve or focus on the energy end-users. In
some sectors, manufacturing firms are not likely to be the type of actors that will
bring about technological development or will deepen specific R&D knowledge.
‘Incremental’ improvements may occur if such manufacturing firms have a
(decisive) voice in selecting R&D projects or R&D areas at a national level. The
majority of such market actors may be influenced by short-term goals rather than by
the long-term perspective that is needed for investing in R&D and developing
process technologies.
Government can play a role in supporting a demonstration facility. If a technology
network’s momentum is moderate, if the innovative technology is likely to be
technically feasible, and if it promises substantial energy-efficiency improvements,
government intervention may be an additional factor in proving the performance of
the technology. The gain in terms of accelerating a technology’s development can be
large. At this stage, there is typically a considerable budget at stake. Normally,
however, both budget constraints and limits on a government’s maximum
contribution prevent government from providing finance for a demonstration facility.
If a government considers supporting a demonstration project, it is, of course, a very
cost-effective method for exploring the status of the (international) technology
network first. In this way, the effect of government support in the technology
network can be evaluated in advance. Government should only engage in realising a
demonstration facility if there is a large chance that its commercial introduction is
accelerated considerably.
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6. Beyond R&D support
In Chapter 2 (Section 2.3, Box 1, and Section 2.4), we indicated a number of
alternative policy instruments and strategies that could be used to stimulate
technological development. We found only limited empirical evidence for such
policy instruments. We now suggest some possible ways in which these instruments
could affect the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies.
We have the impression that neither regulatory instruments (standards and voluntary
agreements) nor economic instruments (taxes and fees) are likely to initiate the large
R&D efforts needed to develop process technologies for the manufacturing industry.
In the case of most energy-intensive manufacturing industries, improving energy
efficiency is not a decisive argument for developing a technology that affects the
core of the production process25. However, all these instruments do draw attention to
industrial energy efficiency. They articulate what government finds important and, as
such, may increase interest in industrial energy efficiency (also with regard to
innovative process technologies). It is not likely that implementation of such policy
instruments will accelerate development of energy-efficient process technologies (by
the manufacturing firms themselves or supplying industries). As was indicated
before, policy instruments that affect the demand for technological innovation may
be the best option if a national government cannot directly address the actors who
play a role in the development of a major process technology.
Policy instruments that initiate networks and require co-operation between different
types of actors can be useful, but also have their drawbacks. Stimulating co-operation
in developing industrial process technologies, especially in multi-actor co-operative
R&D projects, does not always accelerate technological development. The actors
involved do not aim at commercialising the technology, they merely learn about the
promising possibilities of an innovative energy-efficient technology so that they are
better informed for making future R&D (or investment) decisions. Insisting on co-
operation appears to be most valuable in pre-competitive R&D activities. At this
stage, actors have a stake in ‘learning through exchange’. The added-value of co-
operation and interaction will depend largely on the stakes of the actors and the
target group of actors addressed.
Other policy instruments available are R&D contracts or R&D agreements with
specific actors that can make a difference in the energy-efficiency performance of
innovative technologies for the manufacturing industry. By using such instruments,
government tries to increase the priority attached to energy efficiency as an
important R&D criteria in ongoing technological development activities. Information
is needed about actors that typically deliver innovative process technologies to the
manufacturing industry. International action and co-ordination are also required. In
                                                
25
 In most of the energy-intensive manufacturing industries, energy costs do not rule day-to-day
operation of the production processes.
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the case of the pulp and paper industry, European governments may for instance try
to commit the European machine suppliers to a certain R&D agreement on energy
efficiency.
To conclude, it is not easy to dispense whereas spending financial R&D support
effectively, nor is there any guarantee that other policy instruments will be successful
in stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies. Although,
these may be better tailored to the networks of a specific industry. Alternative
intervention strategies permit government to articulate the importance they attach to
the energy efficiency of innovative process technologies directly to the actors who
can be addressed.
7. Strategies in the exploration stage
In our analysis of the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies, we
made a distinction between the exploration stage and the technology network stage.
Government has much to gain if it can accelerate the moment that a technology
network arises.
It would be interesting to find a way to activate R&D for technologies that are still at
the exploration stage. In other words, it would be interesting to support the
advancement of technologies that are not yet seen as the ‘next-step-to-take’.
Government may develop strategies so that technology networks gain momentum
earlier. Experienced researchers from commercial or semi-commercial R&D labs
who have successfully contributed to the development of process technologies for a
specific manufacturing industry could perhaps be granted a sabbatical during which
they are expected to come up with new ideas for stimulating industrial energy
efficiency. ‘Radical variation’ in a protected environment can be stimulated by
giving financial support to experienced researchers with a thorough knowledge of the
manufacturing process.
Again, one needs to be aware of the stage that the innovative technology has reached.
If a technology network is just gaining momentum as it has only recently emerged,
an attractive strategy is to provide some firms or research institutes with some ‘seed’
grants in order to reinforce a more robust technology network. This is also the stage
when it is interesting to reinforce the technology in the industry’s ‘R&D agenda’.
The stage that the innovative technologies have reached is also an important
indicator for evaluating the composition of a government’s R&D portfolio.
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Know the technology networks
In spite of the difficulties to stimulate the development of industrial energy-efficient
technology effectively, it remains a major opportunity in mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions. Energy efficiency with regard to innovative process technologies deserves
(and requires) further attention by government. The fact that an innovative
technology is labelled as energy efficient is insufficient to make governments to
decide if and how to intervene. Energy efficiency is possibly the government’s
reason for being interested, but this does not say anything about whether government
can stimulate or accelerate the development of industrial energy-efficient
technologies.
An analysis in terms of technology networks clarifies what governments can do; it
casts a light on their room for manoeuvre and reveals whether if and how
governments can intervene (most) effectively to stimulate the development of
energy-efficient technology.
National governments should have a thorough knowledge of the (international)
technology networks and of the role and capacities of actors that they can address
before deciding if and how to intervene. Depending on the characteristics of the
technology network – its momentum and size – and depending on who can be
approached and what role actors can play in developing energy-efficient process
technologies, governments can decide to support R&D or to influence technological
development by other intervention strategies. Box 1 summarises what a government
should know about a technology network.
To conclude, the analysis in this chapter has shown that government needs thorough
insight into both the technical and the social aspects of technological development if
its intervention strategies are to be successful. It has to look beyond industrial energy
efficiency. It is important to develop strategies that are able to support, strengthen
and affect actors and networks and, thereby, lead technological development in the
manufacturing industry in less energy-intensive directions.
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Box 1: Exploring technology networks - deciding on government intervention strategies
Explore the technology network in order to:
1. assess a technology network’s momentum
2. evaluate government’s access to actors
3. value the importance and impact of an innovative industrial process technology on the
conventional production process
Use the following (preliminary list) of questions:
Actors:
- How many micro-networks (size) are active? Where are they located?
- Which actors are involved: look at the type of actors, the reputation of actors in establishing
innovation in that specific manufacturing industry, and at actors’ capacities and resources?
- Who can be addressed by a national government, what is their (possible) stake in the international
technology network?
- Do actors actively exchange knowledge and information about the technology? How much is
published about the technology? How widely known is the technology within the manufacturing
industry?
Agenda:
- What are the performance characteristics of the innovative technology and how do they compare
with those of the conventional production process: look at both energy-efficiency and other
performance characteristics
- Which promising performance characteristics are driving the technology’s development?
- How do the perceived performance characteristics develop within the technology network? Are
there many data available (this provides information about the secretiveness of a development)?
- Does the innovative technology solve a pressing problem in the existing production process?
Artefact:
- How long has R&D been going on? Has the technology network emerged recently or is the
technology about to be introduced commercially?
- How many steps are needed for up-scaling the technology (be explicit in the measure chosen for
indicating different scales of facilities)?
- What is the impact of the technology on the various stages of the existing production process? Is
the technology a core process technology (how many essential production stages does it replace)
or is it an ‘added-on’ technology?
- Are there competing innovative technologies and how do these and the conventional technology
develop?
Momentum:
- What do experts consulted say about the momentum of the technology network of a specific
technology (compare with conventional technology and competing innovative technologies)?
- Is the technology widely acknowledged as the next-step-to-take?
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Chapter 8
Summary and conclusions
8.1. Introduction
The intensive use of fossil fuels within modern society is an example of the close
linkage between technology and human activity. The exploitation of fossil fuels
within the energy system is causing serious environmental problems such as human-
induced climate change. On the one hand, technology allows the extraction,
exploitation and use of the fossil fuel resources. On the other hand, innovative
technology may facilitate the transformation of the energy system into a more
sustainable practice by reducing CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions. A wide
variety of technology options have been suggested, such as energy-efficient and
material-efficient technologies, renewable energy technologies, and carbon
sequestration. The hope is that in the long run technological development and
innovative technology will bring about tremendous improvements and resolve the
apparent current conflict between environment and economy.
In this thesis we concentrate on industrial energy-efficiency improvement as one of
the promising technological options for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Improving industrial energy efficiency is acknowledged a cost-effective option for
reducing CO2 emissions. It can also lead to lower production costs for the
manufacturing industry. Governments find industrial energy efficiency an attractive
R&D option. Whereas spending on government energy R&D support has generally
fallen off, government R&D support for industrial energy efficiency has been
increasing. This raises the question of how government can contribute towards the
accelerated development of climate friendly innovative technology.
The effect of government intervention on the development of industrial energy-
efficient process technologies is an unexplored area for empirical research. In
stimulating industrial energy efficiency one needs to relate a policy instrument to the
amount of energy saved due to that instrument. This is not an easy thing to
accomplish. First, in evaluations of policy instruments for stimulating the
implementation of proven energy-efficient technologies analysts start from plausible
assumptions or calculations about the behaviour of actors with regard to investment
in such technologies. However, there is no insight into actors’ investment behaviour
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with regard to the development of innovative industrial energy-efficient
technologies. Secondly, in evaluating the effect of government intervention in
stimulating technological development one encounters a problem of attribution.
There is often a considerable time lag between the moment of intervention and final
effect in terms of energy efficiency. Therefore, we need to obtain a better
understanding of the role of actors and of the dynamics in the process by which
energy-efficient process technologies develop. We intend to make a detour. The
analysis of detailed technology case-studies let us examine the link between R&D
activities, government intervention, actors’ decisions and their arguments, and the
actual development and materialisation of the technology.
The aim of the thesis is to gain insight into the process by which innovative energy-
efficient process technologies for the manufacturing industry are developed. The
underlying interest is to explore how government can stimulate the development of
such technologies.
We draw on energy system analysis. This discipline provides us with a list of
innovative energy-efficient technologies suitable for detailed case study analysis.
The way energy analysts perceive technological development and innovation is
unlikely to be sufficient for gaining insight into the process of developing such
technologies. There is focus on R&D and a strong belief that R&D will provide
change for the good. Innovative technology is restricted to a specific piece of
hardware with certain performance characteristics. Therefore, we suggest to take a
look at the insights provided by technology studies for obtaining guidelines for the
performance of the technology case studies.
The thesis has three parts. First, the insights resulting from the various approaches
used in technology studies are summarised. We develop a framework for
characterising the process of developing an industrial process technology in terms of
networks and actors, including the role of government (see Section 8.2). Second, the
framework is used for analysing four technology case studies. An important part of
this thesis consists of detailed empirical analysis of the networks within which
particular process technologies are developed. We selected four industrial energy-
efficient technologies from two manufacturing sectors, the pulp and paper industry
and the iron and steel industry (see Section 8.3 to Section 8.6). Third, we compare
and contrast the insights gained from the technology case studies (Section 8.7) and
we explore possible ways in which government can stimulate the development of
industrial energy-efficient process technologies (Section 8.8).
8.2. Framework
If we want to understand what guides or constrains R&D and technology so that it
develops in certain directions and if we want to evaluate the role of government
intervention, what should we look for in the empirical material? In Chapter 2 we
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developed a framework for analysing the process by which energy-efficient process
technologies developed.
An overview of various policy instruments and recent insights gained from policy
studies, indicated that the effect of policy instruments cannot be explained by the
characteristics of the policy instrument alone. The characteristics of the context in
which government tries to intervene are equally important. In order to realise policy
goals government is dependent on other actors. The role of government needs to be
evaluated as part of the network and compared with the role of other incentives,
decisions and dynamics. The choice for detailed technology case studies allow us to
evaluate the effect of intervention as part of the social shaping of technology. In
evaluating the effect of government intervention, we make a distinction between
three different aspects of  ‘effect’:
- Additionality: Government intervention is additional if actors would not have
started or continued R&D activities without government intervention.
Acceleration: Government intervention accelerates technological development if
the progress of the development – worldwide – was faster than it would have
been without government intervention.
- Effectiveness: Government intervention is effective if it leads to improved
industrial energy efficiency. This is achieved only if the technology is
implemented in the end.
For each of the approaches in technology studies, we introduced the basic concepts.
Each of the approaches was summarised by indicating three key-points of interest:
how is technological development perceived?; what directs technological
development?; and what are the possibilities for government intervention?
Instead of opting for one specific approach, we selected aspects of several
approaches since they are largely complementary. Common to all the approaches is
the idea that technological development can be conceptualised as a social process in
which ‘Artefacts’, ‘Actors’ and ‘Agenda’ are constructed and interact. These triple
As are summarised as the triangle of technological development. It provides us with
a heuristic tool for summarising how scholars engaged in technology studies
understand technological development.
Technological development is seen as a process of a social nature. No results are
achieved unless actors are willing to invest in or undertake R&D activities. Actors
are the vehicles that bring about technological development and innovation. Actors
are interdependent. Networks have become the key-concept that links actors. The
social process in which technologies are shaped is guided by elements that orient
actors by giving priority and direction. Processes of technological development are
embedded in what is believed to be a fruitful direction for progress. Technological
development is directed by preferences and proven routes in earlier R&D
experiences, by the existing production process and by the (business) networks and
markets in which actors operate.
The framework should provide us with a structure for understanding who is involved
and who interacts with whom – Actors –; for realising what guides R&D and
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technological development by understanding actors’ arguments for developing a
specific technology – Agenda –; and for mapping what results from all these R&D
activities and showing how these affect further technological development –
Artefacts –.
Figure 1 shows the framework of micro-networks, the technology network and the
innovation background. The artefact materialises within the micro-networks. A
micro-network consists of one actor or a small group of actors who co-operate in
developing a specific industrial energy-efficient technology. The total set of micro-
networks is defined as the technology network. The actors are embedded in a
context, the innovation background, which influences actors’ ideas and perceptions
of what is believed to be an interesting direction for progress.
Figure 1: The network-oriented framework to analyse the development of
industrial energy-efficient process technologies.
We formulated case study questions about the technology network, the micro-
networks and the materialisation of the technology. These guided us in performing
and analysing the empirical case studies. Finally, the effect of government
intervention is evaluated explicitly in each technology case study.
8.3. Shoe press technology
In Chapter 3, we analysed the development of shoe press technology. Shoe press
technology is a wet pressing technology for the paper industry. It improves
dewatering of the board or paper sheet in the wet pressing section and, therefore,
reduces the need for evaporative drying. Shoe press technology is one of the major
innovations in the paper industry in the 20th century. In the case study of shoe press
technology, we focused on the importance of actor characteristics and external
factors (such as network linkages between actors and their embeddedness in a
Innovation
background
Micro-networks
Technology network
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specific context) with regard to the development and diffusion of shoe press
technology.
The technology network of the shoe press was small; there was just one micro-
network. For a long time, the micro-network consisted of one machine supplier.
The US machine supplier Beloit developed the shoe press between 1967 and 1980. It
was widely known that time limited the dewatering capacity of the conventional roll
presses. However, nobody but the people at Beloit dared to engage in a prolonged
effort to develop a new press design to overcome this limitation. Shoe press
technology was a tremendous departure from the existing wet pressing design.
Beloit’s previous R&D activities and engineering experience were of crucial
importance for the eventual successful introduction of the shoe press. Only late in
1978 and early in 1980 did a board manufacturer and a fabric supplier became
involved. Both were well-known business partners to Beloit. The belt, a crucial
component of shoe press technology, was still not available when Weyerhaeuser, the
board manufacturer, had already decided to invest in the first shoe press (June 1979).
Albany, a fabric supplier, was asked to provide a suitable belt. Albany took on the
job of developing and manufacturing a polyurethane-coated belt. Without the belt,
the successful introduction of the technology in December 1980 would certainly have
been delayed. Developing the technology took about 13 years (1967-1980).
Beloit’s major argument for developing shoe press technology was to increase the
machine capacity of existing board machines and to reduce the capital intensity in
new board machines. Albany perceived the shoe press as an important new
technology that could the change the future of wet pressing substantially. The forces
that drove Weyerhaeuser were speed-up of the board machine and improved strength
properties.
The other international machine suppliers initiated or reinforced R&D activities with
regard to shoe press technology when its introduction had become a matter of time
(around 1980). The growing technology network led to a fruitful spill-over between
machine suppliers and fabric suppliers. Three competing shoe press designs were
introduced to the market in 1984, 1986 and 1990. In 1990 four micro-networks, or
more specifically four machine suppliers, were active. In 2000, only two machine
suppliers were still active in selling shoe press technology.
Beloit’s competitors developed an improved design of the shoe press using a ‘closed
belt’. This closed belt shoe press proved a better performance at higher machine
speeds; a continuous increase of machine speeds is what keeps paper and board
manufacturers in business. Why did Beloit ended up with an open shoe press in the
first place? First, they wanted to introduce shoe press technology as fast as possible.
Second, developing the shoe press and solving the belt problem was simply a huge
step to take.
Machine suppliers and fabric suppliers continued R&D activities in order to improve
the technology and to broaden its application to other paper grades than board.
During the 1980s and early 1990s, shoe press technology was applied to board
grades only. Machine suppliers tried to convince paper manufacturers of the value of
the shoe press for paper grades. Paper manufacturers were risk-averse in adopting
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shoe press technology. Although R&D improved the possibilities for application in
light-weight paper machines, the shoe press was introduced only when conventional
roll presses limited a further increase of the speeds of such paper machines. The first
shoe press in a light-weight paper machine was implemented in 1994.
The US government did not contribute to the development of shoe press technology.
Beloit did address the US government for covering the risk of innovation in 1980.
The energy-efficiency potential of shoe press technology was stressed. The US
government was seriously interested, although they were too slow in fulfilling
Beloit’s request. If government would have covered the risk of innovation its
additionality would have been very marginal: Beloit was anyway eager to introduce
the technology as fast as possible.
A first conclusion is that actor characteristics were decisive for the successful
introduction of the shoe press in the market in 1980. However, Beloit's success was
rooted in a broader understanding of the importance of the factor time in wet
pressing. Beloit had a thorough knowledge of their customers’ needs. And, Beloit
had a proven reputation as one of the world-wide major machine suppliers. A second
conclusion is that external factors were decisive for ongoing improvements in shoe
press technology from 1980 onwards. Further R&D activities and improvements
were driven by the market success of shoe press technology.
8.4. Impulse technology
In Chapter 4, we analysed the development of impulse technology. Impulse
technology is a more recent wet pressing technology for the paper industry than shoe
press technology. In an impulse press nip, an (electrically) heated shoe press is used
to improve dewatering of the paper sheet. In this case study, we evaluated the effect
of government R&D support on the development of impulse technology as part of
the network in which the technology was developed.
The technology network consisted of two micro-networks (1980-2000). By now,
only one micro-network is still active. However, before the technology network
emerged, Douglas Wahren, the inventor of impulse technology and the person who
suggested impulse technology’s special dewatering mechanism, performed R&D
activities (1970-1980). He shelved his idea twice before he succeeded in anchoring
and extending R&D activities at the US national pulp and paper research institute1.
Then the first micro-network emerged in North America. The US institute’s vice-
president was excited about the idea of wet pressing under intense heat and pressure.
Wahren initiated R&D activities. The US institute applied to the US Department of
Energy for financial R&D support. It was claimed that impulse technology was more
energy-efficient than conventional technology. US government R&D support
allowed a continued R&D effort at the US pulp and paper research institute (1985-
                                                
1
 Such pulp and paper research institutes are financed by a system of member dues. Members are
national paper and board companies.
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1999). Wahren also contacted some acquainted people at Beloit, the US machine
supplier. Beloit started R&D activities. Impulse technology was a logical and
interesting step after their successful development and introduction of the shoe press
(see Section 8.3). The Canadian pulp and paper research institute also initiated R&D
activities in 1983. Impulse technology’s dewatering mechanism intrigued the vice-
president of the Canadian institute. The Canadians were supported by the national
government with regard to their pilot paper machine R&D activities. Again, energy
efficiency was as an important argument for obtaining R&D support. Beloit became
involved in the Canadian effort. There was an informal agreement between the
research institutes that Paprican studied light-weight grades and that IPST studied
board grades.
Within this North American micro-network, four attempts to commercialise the
technology failed. In the first attempt (1987-1989), Beloit, the board manufacturer
Weyerhaeuser and the US pulp and paper research institute tried to jump-start
impulse technology. Note that Beloit and Weyerhaeuser successfully introduced shoe
press technology. However, delamination of the paper sheet turned out to be a
stumbling block. The second attempt occurred in 1992-1993. The leading researchers
at the US pulp and paper research institute loudly claimed that they had overcome
the problems of delamination. The US Department of Energy was again asked for
support. They were willing to support commercialisation on the condition that a
machine supplier and a board manufacturer were involved. Beloit became involved
again, though none of the institute’s member firms was willing for running the risk of
being the first in the field. Then, the US Department of Energy agreed to support a
consortium of the institute and Beloit. Soon the actors became aware that
delamination of board were not controlled yet. Ongoing R&D activities were kept
secret. A third attempt for commercialising impulse technology also failed. In 1994,
Beloit and the Canadian pulp and paper research institute searched for a newsprint
manufacturer to commercialise impulse technology. Lack of interest on the part of
newsprint manufacturers was explained by the lack of experience with shoe press
technology; investing in two heated shoe presses was too big a step to take. Since
1998, the US institute and Beloit have been sharing the research data with board
manufacturers in order to commercialise impulse technology. However, the
improvements in paper properties were not large enough to outweigh the increase in
energy – electricity – costs. This fourth attempt ended when Beloit’s mother firm
filed for bankruptcy in 1999 and IPST had realised the research tasks they had
committed themselves too.
During the late 1980s, R&D interest in impulse technology arose in Europe due to
the research results presented by the North American actors and due to the fact that
shoe press technology became a proven technology. A Swedish government
representative had become aware that impulse technology was a high-risk energy-
efficient technology. He offered the Swedish pulp and paper research institute
financial R&D support if they would initiate R&D activities. After six to seven years
of planning, talking and negotiating, the institute initiated a major R&D programme
on impulse technology including a major upgrade of their pilot paper machine (1997-
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now). The Finnish machine supplier Valmet is involved in this micro-network. Two
other major European machine suppliers did not see any commercial future for the
technology.
The major argument to develop impulse technology was to increase the dryness.
Wahren’s claim implied a tremendous increase in dryness; the machine capacity of
existing paper and board machines could be increased and the capital intensity of
new machines could be decreased. The national pulp and paper research institutes
stressed the energy-efficiency potential of impulse technology in their attempts to
obtain government R&D support. Wahren’s original claim of increased dewatering
capacity became less strong over time. Actors’ arguments for investing in impulse
technology, thus, also changed over time. By now, paper properties are increasingly
stressed.
The financial support given by the US, Canadian and Swedish governments to the
three national pulp and paper research institutes has been substantial. Government
granted 60 to 65% of the total expenditure in the US (not taking into account Beloit’s
expenditure between 1981 and 1995); 45% in Canada; and roughly 40% of the major
R&D programme at the Swedish pulp and paper research institute. All government
R&D support came from budgets for industrial energy-efficiency R&D. In addition
impulse technology was seen as a high-risk technology.
However, more than 25 years of R&D and 15 years of government R&D support
have not yet resulted in an economically viable technology. In fact, its prospects are
uncertain. There is still no agreement on the best method for preventing
delamination. The promise with regard to dewatering decreased over time. The
original dewatering mechanism is still not proven, neither is its improvement in
energy efficiency. Its chance for commercialisation – in its present design – is being
debated.
A first conclusion is that the availability of government R&D support undoubtedly
accelerated the development of impulse technology. Without R&D support impulse
technology would not have reached the state it has reached today. The continued
effect of government R&D support depended on the close relationships and co-
operation between the actors in the micro-networks. Actors’ resources, equipment
and capacities were complementary. Regarding the effectiveness of R&D support,
we must conclude that the technology’s energy-efficiency improvement is uncertain.
A second conclusion is that the strategies and decisions of national pulp and paper
research institutes were decisive in the acquisition and utilisation of government
R&D support. Government was dependent on these research institutes. In their turn,
the research institutes depended on government R&D support for continuing their
R&D activities. They stressed the advantages of the technology that government
liked most; the technology’s promising energy-efficiency potential. The institutes’
stakes in performing impulse technology R&D activities were wider than the
technology as such - upgrading research facilities and a high-risk R&D programme
with a positive exposure of the research institute -. R&D activities drove government
R&D support instead of the other way around.
- 265 -
8.5. Strip casting technology
In Chapter 5, we analysed the development of strip casting technology. Strip casting
technology is an innovative casting technology in steel-making that integrates casting
and rolling so that re-heating of steel is avoided. It is the third in a sequence of
innovative casting technologies that allow steel manufacturers to cast liquid steel
closer to its final product requirements. After the introduction of conventional
continuous casting (1952) and the introduction of thin slab casting (1989), strip
casting technology is currently at the edge of breakthrough. In this case study, we
evaluate the effect of R&D support on the development of strip casting technology.
For this purpose, we made a detailed investigation of the networks within which the
energy-efficient technology was developed.
The original roots of strip casting technology go back to the 19th century. Bessemer,
one of the classical inventors of the iron and steel industry, applied for a patent that
covered a twin roll strip caster (1857). Before 1975, there were some localised R&D
activities with regard to strip casting technology. However, only after 1980 a robust
technology network emerged. The technology network of strip casting technology
was quite large and remarkably homogeneous. All eleven micro-networks consisted
of a steel firm (producing stainless steel) and a machine supplier or engineer. In most
micro-networks, the steel manufacturer took the lead. They also controlled the
crucial patents. Six of the eleven micro-networks are still active. Four ceased their
R&D activities. Two micro-networks joined R&D activities due to a business
merger. Three micro-networks currently operate strip casting technology at an
industrial scale (in Japan, Australia and Europe). These three micro-networks needed
about fifteen years to reach operation on an industrial scale. They may prove the
feasibility of strip casting technology within two or three years; the steel industry is
waiting to see how their casters will perform.
The major argument for developing strip casting technology has been the need to
reduce the capital intensity of the hot rolling mill. This is especially attractive for
small-capacity facilities such as mini-mills and stainless steel facilities. Bessemer
already indicated the huge capital advantage of strip casting technology in 1857.
Why did strip casting technology not emerge any earlier? The introduction of
conventional continuous casting, maturing of this conventional technology, the steel
crises during the seventies, the rise of new steel grades as for instance stainless steel
and the rise of mini-mills had to occur before strip casting technology became the
centre of casting R&D activities. In addition, knowledge became available that could
be used to solve some technical problems. Due to the changes technologists and
engineers started looking for more compact, innovative casting technologies between
1975 and 1985. They wanted to extend the advantages of continuous casting
technology. During the early eighties, a process emerged in which a number of
factors – amongst others the claim of success of one of the leading US stainless steel
producers – added momentum to strip casting R&D activities. This strengthened
internal support in steel firms for initiating explorative R&D. A large number of
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small-scale casting efforts were initiated. When thin slab casting technology was
commercialised (1989), a technology network that focused on strip casting
technology remained active.
Various national governments and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
financially supported the development of strip casting technology. Since 1980,
government has supported 5 to 10% of the total expenditure by eleven micro-
networks. Six of the eleven micro-networks received government R&D support. In
three micro-networks, government R&D support was more than 40% of the total
expenditure. However, these three micro-networks stopped their R&D activities or
deliberately continued R&D activities on a pilot scale. The three micro-networks that
are ahead in developing strip casting technology did not get (or only marginal)
external financial R&D support.
The major conclusion of this chapter is that the effect of government R&D support
on the development of strip casting technology has been minimal. The development
of strip casting technology proved to have a strong momentum of its own. Strip
casting affects the core of steel business; its development was only loosely motivated
by energy-efficiency considerations or by the availability of external R&D support.
8.6. Smelting reduction technology
In Chapter 6, we analysed the development of smelting reduction technology.
Smelting reduction technology is the only recent contender to replace the
conventional energy-intensive blast furnace that has been the dominant process
technology for producing iron since centuries. In this case study, we evaluated the
effect of government intervention on the development of smelting reduction
technology based on a thorough analysis of the actors and networks involved.
The theory underlying smelting reduction technology has been known since the late
1930s. Only from 1975 did a technology network emerge. By then, other innovative
ironmaking technologies had proved disappointing and there was a threat that
obsolete coke ovens might have to be replaced at great expense in the beginning of
the 21st century.
The major argument for developing smelting reduction technology has been that the
cost price of a ton of hot metal is likely to be reduced. Lower capital investment
(avoiding coke ovens and agglomeration plants and replacing the capital intensive
blast furnaces) and the use of coal instead of expensive metallurgical coals are two
major factors in this cost price reduction. Energy-efficiency improvements and the
threat of environmental regulations (and the necessity to invest in order to comply
with these requirements) delivered additional cost advantages for integrated steel
manufacturers to be interested in smelting reduction technology. However, these
additional cost advantages would never have been large enough to initiate huge and
technologically complex R&D efforts such as the development of smelting reduction
technology.
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Between 1975 and 1985 a considerable number of efforts were initiated, namely
between 15 to 20. Most of the efforts were limited to pilot scale activities and the
generation of engineering concepts for industrial scale facilities. There was one
exception; the Corex process reached commercial application. This is still the only
smelting reduction process commercially available. Its techno-economic
characteristics limit wide application. Three of these early efforts evolved into micro-
networks that studied so-called ‘second generation’ smelting reduction processes that
deploy a higher degree of post-combustion and reduce the degree of direct reduction.
The technology network consisted of nine micro-networks.
A wide variety of actors played a role. Integrated steel manufacturers dominated four
of these micro-networks. Machine suppliers or engineering companies initiated three
micro-networks, mining firms initiated two micro-networks and research institutes
initiated one micro-network. The technical variety in various smelting reduction
processes is rather large. The preference of various actors for the different processes
can be explained by their earlier (R&D) experiences with (parts) of the smelting
reduction processes.
Six of the nine micro-networks are still active. Three micro-networks stopped; these
were all initiated by integrated steel manufacturers. Most of the integrated steel
manufacturers who played an active role in various micro-networks lost interest.
Existing blast furnaces and coke ovens were continually improved and the lifetimes
of the existing stock was extended. The threat that obsolete coke ovens and blast
furnaces would have to be replaced did not (yet) come true. They did not need an
expansion of their iron production capacity. The cost advantage of smelting
reduction technology decreased over time. Smelting reduction technology was
‘locked out’ by a continuous, incremental improvement of the conventional
production route and the existing capital stock. However, the future of smelting
reduction technology is still undecided; actors like mining firms continue to be
interested and there is a growing interest of mini-mill steel operators. Application of
smelting reduction technology in mini-mills may be a short-term niche for proving
the feasibility of some of the smelting reduction processes. A successful introduction
of smelting reduction technology in mini-mills may enhance the market position of
the mini-mill route. If smelting reduction technology replaces the processing of
scrap, the production of steel in mini-mills will become more energy-intensive.
Various national governments and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)
played an active role in the development of smelting reduction technology. We
estimate that national governments and the ECSC financed 20 to 25% of the total
expenditure by the nine micro-networks. In three micro-networks, R&D support has
been larger than 40% of the total expenditure within these micro-networks. In two
micro-networks, government intended to grant financial support in connection with
the building of two demonstration facilities. The case study also provided some
empirical information on the possibilities for government to increase the effect of
R&D support by stimulating co-operation. Finally, most integrated steel firms were
affected by environmental legislation.
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We conclude that government R&D support enlarged the technology network. In five
of the nine micro-networks, government R&D support definitely underpinned the
performance of additional R&D activities. Three of these five micro-networks
developed a smelting reduction process that is likely to be energy-efficient. However,
R&D support did not accelerate the technology’s development so far. Secondly, the
effect of co-operative R&D programmes depended strongly on actors’ intentions to
participate in such co-operative R&D programmes. Thirdly, we have seen that a
commitment by government to support a demonstration facility can be a factor that
persuades a firm to demonstrate a technology. Steering in this stage of a technology’s
development may be an appealing, though highly complex task. In giving a firm and
a specific technology a preferential treatment, government should carefully assess
whether support may accelerate technological development (in the international
technology network). Finally, environmental regulations were not decisive in
initiating or continuing R&D efforts. However, they provided researchers and
engineers within a firm with an additional argument for continuing R&D.
To conclude, the changes in the technology network reflect the dynamics in the
development of smelting reduction technology. Integrated steel firms tend to
constrain technological development so that it prefers certain – more incremental –
directions. This mechanism considerably limited the effect of government
intervention and R&D support.
8.7. The dynamics of technology networks
What do we know, now, about the role of actors and of the dynamics in the process
by which industrial energy-efficient process technologies develop? We compared the
four technology case studies with regard to six issues that relate directly to the
framework and to our interest in government intervention.
Actors – Size and composition of the networks
Steel manufacturers and paper manufacturers played a different role in developing
energy-efficient technology. The large integrated steel manufacturers invested
actively in R&D, whereas the paper firms ‘waited’ for the international machine
suppliers to deliver technologies affecting the core of the paper-making process. The
two paper technology networks were smaller than the two steel technology networks.
In all four technology networks, there was a dominant role of firms. It was in the
majority of the micro-networks that firms co-operated. Co-operation extended itself
most often beyond national borders. We have no indication that actors had problems
in finding partners. If there were problems, this occurred typically at the stage when
the technology had to be proven on a commercial scale.
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Artefacts – Time-frame
Developing energy-efficient process technologies takes time. We could distinguish
between an exploration stage and a stage in which a technology network was
established. It took a while – decades to more than a hundred years – before the
innovative technologies were supported by a robust technology network. A
combination of factors and mutual reinforcement were needed for the technology
network to emerge. We suggested four factors to explain why a shift occurred at a
certain moment in time. A first factor is that actors recognise the economic
advantage of the innovative technology. This factor is critical, though it is no
guarantee in itself. A second and very important factor is the technical need or match
with the existing production process. All four innovative technologies were closely
linked to the conventional sequence of process technologies. A third factor is
progress in R&D and, finally, contingent elements may play a role. The shift
typically extends over a few years in which actors acknowledge that the innovative
technology may be an interesting ‘next-step-to-take’.
Once a technology network emerged, two or three steps in up-scaling the technology
had to be taken to prove to the manufacturing industry that a technology is feasible.
Each step took at least five years. For two or three up-scaling steps, a time period of
10 to 20 years was not exceptional.
Agenda – Which promises orient technological development?
In both manufacturing industries, the promised reduction in costs per ton product was
the dominant argument for investing in the development of the innovative process
technologies. The dominant business logic of the majority of steel- and paper-making
firms explained the attention for cost reduction. Capital investments already made in
the conventional production process strongly constrain the direction of technological
development. The existing production processes led to regularity in the technological
development; the existing system was further optimised. Note that major innovative
technologies were to be implemented in existing production facilities first. The risk
of trying out an unproven technology in a new production facility is considered to be
too high
Dynamics - Momentum
We introduced the concept of momentum as a characteristic of a technology network.
A technology network has a large momentum when it causes observers – analysts
like us – to assume that the technology is materialising autonomously. Differences in
momentum could be detected in the four technology networks. The momentum of a
technology network reflects the confidence of actors in the development of that
particular technology. Actors must not lose confidence in the future prospects for the
innovative technology. It has to remain the ‘next-step-to-take’ in spite of possible
developments in the conventional production process and in spite of trends and
changes in the manufacturing industry. It is crucial for the maintenance of
momentum that the actors are re-assured about the benefits for being involved in the
first place. The materialisation of the technology, R&D results, claims of success,
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large difficulties and failures all affect actors’ confidence in the future prospects for
the technology.
Government R&D support
The financial contribution of government to the development of impulse technology
and smelting reduction technology has been substantial (more than 25% of the total
R&D expenditure). In the other two case studies, the share is marginal (though not in
absolute terms). Energy-efficiency improvement was a major reason for government
to grant R&D support. In none of the four case studies was energy efficiency a main
argument for actors to develop the technology. Savings in energy costs alone would
not have justified the considerable R&D effort needed to develop the four process
technologies. The ‘promise’ of energy efficiency was however actively used to
mobilise external (government) R&D support.
We related the effect of government R&D support to the momentum of the four
technology networks. The momentum of the technology networks engaged in
developing strip casting technology and shoe press technology was high, so
government R&D support barely had an additional effect. In such circumstances, it is
difficult to intervene effectively. The momentum of the technology networks
engaged in developing smelting reduction technology and impulse technology was
lower, so government R&D support led to additional R&D activities and enlarged the
technology networks.
Government did never play a role in the exploration stage of developing the four
technologies. Government contributed to the emergence of technology networks in
some case studies.
Alternative government intervention strategies
The empirical material with regard to alternative intervention strategies is scarce,
although it leads us to the following tentative conclusions. The effect of a regulation
was too small to initiate large-scale and complex R&D efforts needed for developing
industrial process technologies. However, it provided researchers within a firm with
an additional reason for creating ‘firm-internal’ support. Firms who had a direct
agreement with government showed a certain commitment. Agreements regarding
energy-efficiency R&D may be an interesting way for government to intervene.
Stimulating co-operative R&D was additional in most multi-actor micro-networks,
although it did not accelerate technology development. Actors’ involved in such co-
operative R&D projects (in most micro-networks competitive manufacturers) did not
intend to commercialise the technology. Stimulating co-operation was most effective
in pre-competitive R&D; at this stage, actors’ stake was to learn in interaction with
other competent actors. The value of stimulating or insisting on co-operation
depended on the stage of a technology’s development and on the mutual interests and
stakes of the participating actors.
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8.8. Increasing the effect of government intervention?
The insights generated by comparing the technology case studies lead us to draw four
policy-relevant conclusions.
Our first conclusion regarding technological development in the manufacturing
industry is that actors are strongly constrained by the existing production process.
The existing production process tends towards system optimisation rather than to the
complete renewal of the production process. Second, technological development in
the manufacturing industry takes considerable time; innovative technologies may
slumber for decades; subsequently, it takes at least ten to fifteen years (often longer)
before the technology is ‘proven’ on a commercial scale. Third, effective stimulation
of the development of industrial energy-efficient process technologies is not easy.
Firms were willing and able to develop the technologies themselves. However,
effective intervention occurred too. Our fourth conclusion is that there is
considerable variety in the technology networks that develop the energy-efficient
technologies. The general promise of innovative industrial energy-efficient
technologies masks heterogeneity. There is no ‘one size fits all’ strategy that can be
applied to all energy-efficient process technologies in all manufacturing industries.
These observations link to two important dilemmas regarding the role of government
in stimulating technological development. Should government play any role in
stimulating the development of such industrial process technologies? And, if so,
should government adopt a generic or specific intervention strategy? The societal
importance of further improvements in industrial energy efficiency and the
somewhat disappointing effect of government intervention in stimulating the
development of such technologies so far, make us wonder how the effect of
government intervention can be improved.
The diversity between the manufacturing industries and various technology networks
calls for government intervention strategies that are better tailored to the networks of
a specific industry. National governments should have a thorough knowledge of the
(international) technology networks and of the role and capacities of actors that they
can address before deciding if and how to intervene.
We do not intend that stimulating technology development can always be effective.
We do neither intend that government should select the innovative process
technologies that industries need. However, we do suggest that information about
patterns of innovation and international technology networks can provide
(qualitative) insight that is valuable for improving the effect of government
intervention.
We have the following recommendations and ideas for improving the effect of
government intervention directed at technological development in manufacturing
industries:
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- Government has to consider its access to actors that can play a crucial role in
international technology networks within which industrial energy-efficient
process technologies are developed. It is also important to know what specific
knowledge and R&D experience regarding manufacturing industries and process
technologies are available within a country.
- National governments can increase their access to actors by joining forces at an
international level. A suggestion is to come to R&D contracts or R&D
agreements with actors that can make a difference in the energy-efficiency
performance of innovative technologies for the manufacturing industry. One can
also think of international R&D programmes. Another international strategy is
for international bodies to map the technology networks of major energy-efficient
process technologies.
- If government has no direct access to micro-networks, government may deploy
indirect intervention strategies. Government can for instance decide to a more
stringent policy regarding voluntary agreements on industrial energy efficiency.
It can also ensure that a regular information provision is made available about the
performance of innovative energy-efficient technologies to the national
manufacturing industry (and to themselves).
- The momentum of technology networks gives a first indication whether
government should intervene at all. Momentum should not be to low, neither too
high. By monitoring how a technology networks’ momentum changes
governments may be able to support the development of an energy-efficient
technology when it is needed.
- Long-term government R&D commitment is required for developing energy-
efficient technologies. If the development of an energy-efficient technology has
gone on for more than 5 years or if actors keep coming back for R&D support
and have taken no serious step to up-scale the technology, government has to be
cautious about continuing financial R&D support. Government may monitor the
changes in the international technology network continuously in order to decide
whether to continue R&D support or not.
- The fact that actors’ and governments’ agendas differ is not a reason for failing to
stimulate the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies. However,
government has to protect its own agenda. Government should have a thorough
insight into energy-efficiency improvements and into the other (more) promising
performance characteristics. Claims about energy-efficiency improvements have
to be evaluated critically. A supply of external independent information may be
important in this regard.
- In stimulating the development of industrial energy-efficient technologies
governments need a certain degree of flexibility in designing a tailor-fit strategy.
For instance, is not always needed to involve or focus on the energy end-users. In
specific cases, it should be possible to support (expensive) demonstration
facilities.
- Intervention strategies that affect the demand for technological innovation (such
as for instance regulatory and economic instruments) are not likely to initiate the
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large R&D efforts needed to develop energy-efficient process technologies.
However, such instruments do draw attention to industrial energy efficiency.
- Intervention strategies that initiate networks and require co-operation between
different types of actors can be very useful, but also have their shortcomings. The
added-value of co-operation and interaction will depend largely on the stage of
development, the stakes of the actors and the target group of actors addressed.
- Government has much to gain if it can accelerate the emergence of a robust
technology network. It would be interesting to find a way to activate R&D for
technologies that are still at the exploration stage. A suggestion would be to
stimulate ‘radical variation’ in a protected environment by giving financial
support to experienced researchers with a thorough knowledge of the
manufacturing process and with experience in commercialising technologies.
To conclude, industrial energy-efficient process technology remains a major
opportunity in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. Government needs thorough
insight into both the technical and the social aspects of technological development if
its intervention strategies are to be successful. It has to look beyond industrial energy
efficiency. It is important to develop strategies that are able to support, strengthen
and affect actors and networks and, thereby, lead technological development in the
manufacturing industry in less energy-intensive directions.
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Samenvatting
Introductie
Het intensieve gebruik van fossiele brandstoffen laat een sterke verwevenheid zien
tussen technologie en menselijke activiteit. Het winnen, verwerken en verbranden
van fossiele brandstoffen is mogelijk dankzij technologieën. We gebruiken fossiele
energie onder andere voor de productie van elektriciteit, de warmtevoorziening, en
de industriële productie van allerlei goederen. Dit leidt tot milieuproblemen, zoals
een versterkte uitstoot van broeikasgassen. Om dit probleem op te lossen, zoekt men
naar allerlei innovatieve technologieën. Deze zouden er voor moeten zorgen dat het
gebruik van energie in de toekomst op een duurzame manier gebeurt. De opwekking
van elektriciteit kan duurzamer door gebruik te maken van bijvoorbeeld zonnecellen
en windmolens. Maar ook het eind-gebruik van energie in de industrie kan
duurzamer door innovatieve technologieën toe te passen die energie besparen.
In dit proefschrift kijken we naar de ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte
procestechnologieën voor de industrie. Industriële energiebesparing beperkt de
emissies van CO2, het belangrijkste broeikasgas. Het leidt ook tot kostenbesparing,
omdat minder energie nodig is voor de produktie van een ton papier of een ton staal.
Onderzoek en ontwikkeling (O&O) naar energie-efficiënte technologieën voor de
industrie is een belangrijk aandachtsgebied van verschillende nationale overheden.
Dit alles roept de vraag op hoe de overheid de ontwikkeling van dit soort
technologieën kan versnellen.
Er is nog weinig onderzoek gedaan naar het effect van overheidsinterventie op de
ontwikkeling van industriële procestechnologieën. Overheidsinterventie is effectief
als het daadwerkelijk leidt tot een verlaging van het energiegebruik per ton product.
Het is echter niet gemakkelijk om te bepalen welk deel van de daling in het
energiegebruik toegeschreven mag worden aan een specifiek beleidsinstrument.
Allereerst moet daarvoor inzicht bestaan in het investeringsgedrag van industriële
bedrijven. Als het gaat om de implementatie van bewezen energie-efficiënte
technologieën dan is er inmiddels een redelijk inzicht in de invloed van
beleidsinstrumenten op investeringsgedrag. Wat betreft de ontwikkeling van
innovatieve technologieën is er nauwelijks inzicht in het investeringsgedrag van
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actoren. Ten tweede is de ontwikkeling van innovatieve technologieën een onzeker
proces. Het kost tijd en allerlei (onverwachte) gebeurtenissen kunnen een rol spelen.
Van tevoren is bekend hoe belangrijk een bepaald onderzoek zal zijn en of de
technologie ook echt commercieel toegepast gaat worden.
Gegeven deze moeilijkheden, hebben wij ervoor gekozen om een omweg te maken.
We beginnen niet met de evaluatie van specifieke beleidsinstrumenten, maar we
proberen eerst het inzicht in de ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte
procestechnologieën te vergroten. We kijken naar de rol van actoren en het belang
van dynamiek. De omweg bestaat uit het in detail bestuderen van de
ontwikkelingstrajecten van energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën. We zullen vier
gedetailleerde case-studies uitvoeren.
Het doel van dit proefschrift is het verkrijgen van inzicht in het proces van de
ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën voor de industrie. We doen
dit om te verkennen hoe de overheid de ontwikkeling van dit soort technologieën kan
stimuleren.
Het proefschrift kent drie delen. Ten eerste nemen we kennis van de inzichten uit de
technologiestudies. Op basis hiervan stellen we een kader voor dat gebruikt kan
worden voor de analyse van de vier case-studies. Het kader karakteriseert het
ontwikkelingstraject van een technologie in termen van actoren (waaronder de
overheid) en netwerken. In het tweede deel komen de ontwikkelingstrajecten van
vier specifieke procestechnologieën aan bod. Een belangrijk deel van het proefschrift
bestaat uit deze empirische analyse. We hebben vier – vaak door energie-analisten
genoemde – innovatieve energie-efficiënte technologieën geselecteerd; twee voor de
papierindustrie en twee voor de ijzer- en staalindustrie. Op deze manier hebben we
geprobeerd een balans te vinden in de mate van overeenkomst en variëteit tussen de
vier case-studies. Voor elke case-study evalueren we de rol en het effect van
overheidsinterventie. In het derde deel worden de vier case-studies vergeleken en
wordt verkend wat de mogelijkheden zijn voor de overheid om de ontwikkeling van
dit soort technologieën zo effectief mogelijk te stimuleren.
Kader voor de empirische case-studies
In hoofdstuk 2 is een kader ontwikkeld dat houvast geeft bij het uitvoeren en de
analyse van de vier case-studies. We hebben gekeken naar de verschillende
theoretische benaderingen binnen technologiestudies. Voor elke benadering zijn de
belangrijkste concepten bestudeerd en is een samenvatting gemaakt op basis van drie
aandachtspunten:
- Hoe kijkt de benadering tegen technologie-ontwikkeling aan?
- Wat beïnvloedt de richting van technologie-ontwikkeling?
- Welke mogelijkheden zijn er voor overheidsinterventie?
De benaderingen in technologiestudies verschillen in specifieke uitgangspunten. Ze
leggen verschillende accenten. Toch zijn de inzichten in belangrijke mate
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complementair. Alle benaderingen zien technologische ontwikkeling als een sociaal
proces waarin ‘actoren’, ‘artefacten’ en een ‘agenda’ geconstrueerd worden en
interacteren. Actoren moeten het belang zien van (onzekere) investeringen in O&O.
Technologische verandering en innovatie is het resultaat van hun activiteiten.
Meestal innoveren actoren niet alleen. Andere actoren brengen financiële middelen
in, hebben specifieke kennis of bepaalde onderzoeksapparatuur, of vormen een
toegang tot de markt. De overheid is een van de actoren die een rol kan spelen. Het
concept ‘netwerk’ is een sleutelbegrip geworden. De richting van technologie-
ontwikkeling wordt bepaald door de keuzes van actoren. In het maken van deze
keuzes worden actoren geleid door de omgeving waarin zij opereren. Eerdere O&O
of eerdere (succesvolle) ervaringen met het ontwikkelen van technologie, de wensen
van de toepasser van de technologie, de markt waarin de producent opereert en de
reeds in gebruik zijnde procestechnologieën zorgen ervoor dat actoren in een
bepaalde richting zoeken. Op deze manier wordt de onzekerheid in investeringen in
O&O zo veel mogelijk beperkt.
Figuur 1 visualiseert het kader dat gebruikt wordt voor de analyse van de vier case-
studies. Het kader karakteriseert het ontwikkelingstraject van een technologie in
termen van ‘actoren’ (waaronder de overheid), ‘artefacten’ en ‘agenda’. Het
structureert onze zoektocht naar wie betrokken is, wie met wie samenwerkt en tussen
wie kennis en informatie wordt uitgewisseld – actoren –. Het dwingt ons te begrijpen
waarom actoren voorkeuren hebben voor een bepaalde richting van technologie-
ontwikkeling – agenda –. En tenslotte worden de resultaten en opschalingstappen van
O&O in kaart gebracht en wordt bekeken hoe dit de verdere ontwikkeling van de
technologie heeft beïnvloed – artefact –.
Figuur 1: Het kader dat gebruikt wordt om het ontwikkelingstraject van
innovatieve energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën te analyseren.
Het artefact materialiseert binnen een micro-network, dat vaak bestaat uit een of een
paar actoren. Het technologie-netwerk omvat alle micro-netwerken die dezelfde
procestechnologie ontwikkelen. De actoren liggen ingebed in een context, de
Innovatie
omgeving
Micro-netwerken
Technologie
 
netwerk
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innovatie omgeving. Deze omgeving beïnvloedt de ideeën en voorkeuren van
actoren.
We hebben vragen geformuleerd over de micro-netwerken, het technologie-netwerk
en de materialisatie van de technologie. Deze worden gebruikt bij de uitvoering en
analyse van de vier case-studies. Tenslotte wordt voor elke case-study het effect van
overheidsinterventie geëvalueerd. Op basis van het verkregen inzicht in het netwerk
van actoren, kunnen we aangeven hoe belangrijk overheidsinterventie is geweest.
Het is belangrijk om aan te geven wat we verstaan onder ‘effect’. We onderscheiden
drie deel-aspecten:
- Additionaliteit – Overheidsinterventie is additioneel als het leidt tot activiteiten
binnen een micro-netwerk die niet gestart of gecontinueerd zouden zijn zonder
interventie.
- Versnelling – Overheidsinterventie versnelt technologie-ontwikkeling wanneer
interventie er toe geleidt dat de materialisatie en opschaling van de technologie
binnen het technologie-netwerk sneller is gegaan, dan zonder interventie het
geval zou zijn geweest.
- Effectiviteit – Overheidsinterventie is effectief wanneer een innovatieve
procestechnologie daadwerkelijk tot energiebesparing leidt.
De schoenpers
In hoofdstuk 3 is het ontwikkelingstraject van de schoenpers geanalyseerd. De
schoenpers is een technologie voor de perspartij van een karton- of papiermachine.
De schoenpers vergroot de hoeveelheid water die mechanisch uit het papier wordt
verwijderd. Hierdoor hoeft er in de droogpartij van een karton- of papiermachine
minder water verdampt te worden. Dit bespaart energie. In 1980 is deze technologie
voor de eerste keer op commerciële schaal toegepast. De schoenpers is een van de
belangrijkste innovaties geweest in de papierindustrie in de 20ste eeuw. In deze case-
study is specifiek gekeken naar het belang van kenmerken van de actoren en van
externe factoren op de ontwikkeling en diffusie van de schoenpers.
Het technologie-netwerk van de schoenpers is tijdens de ontwikkeling erg klein
geweest (1967 -1980). Er was slechts één micro-netwerk actief. Voor lange tijd
bestond het micro-netwerk slechts uit één actor, de Amerikaanse machinebouwer
Beloit. Buiten dit micro-netwerk waren er onderzoekers die het belang van het idee
achter de schoenpers inzagen. Vanaf 1960 werd er meer basisonderzoek gedaan naar
het verwijderen van water in de pers. Hierdoor was duidelijk geworden dat de
verblijftijd van het papier in de pers een belangrijke factor is. De schoenpers maakt
hier gebruik van door het contactmoment tussen pers en papier te verlengen. Zo
wordt meer water verwijderd. Ook al erkenden anderen het belang van de factor tijd,
alleen Beloit investeerde in de ontwikkeling van de schoenpers. Alleen de
onderzoekers en technici van Beloit bleven er in geloven dat dit nieuwe type pers
daadwerkelijk gebouwd kon worden. Het ontwerp van de schoenpers was een breuk
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met de tot dan toe gebruikte rolpersen. Een van de twee stalen rollen zou vervangen
worden door een ‘flexibel’ materiaal waardoor het contactoppervlak met de andere
rol en het papier vergroot zou worden. Velen geloofden niet dat het mogelijk was om
zo’n flexibel materiaal te gebruiken.
Ook binnen Beloit liep de ontwikkeling niet altijd even gemakkelijk. Een viertal
mensen is van belang geweest om de ontwikkeling gedurende 13 jaar gaande te
houden. Op basis van hun eerdere ervaringen in O&O en met het naar de markt
brengen van nieuwe technologieën, hun creatieve ideeën om bepaalde problemen op
te lossen, en hun overtuiging dat de schoenpers zeer interessant was voor
kartonproducenten, hield men vertrouwen dat een werkende schoenpers gebouwd
moest kunnen worden. Er zijn talloze ontwerpen voor mogelijke persen gemaakt. Het
aantal patenten van Beloit voor mogelijke schoenpersen is groot.
Pas tegen de tijd dat Beloit een schoenpers op een van de pilot-papiermachines
ingebouwd had, raakten er andere actoren betrokken. Weyerhaeuser, een van
Amerika’s grootste kartonproducenten (en een van Beloit’s belangrijkste klanten)
had reeds in 1973-74 belangstelling getoond voor de schoenpers. In 1978 raakte zij
definitief betrokken. In Juni 1979 besloot Weyerhaeuser om een eerste schoenpers te
kopen. Opvallend genoeg hadden Beloit en Weyerhaeuser op dat moment nog geen
definitieve oplossing voor het flexibele materiaal dat nodig was om de pers
operationeel te krijgen. Beloit benaderde een toeleverancier van machinebekleding,
Albany. Zij moesten het probleem maar definitief oplossen. Albany kwam met de
suggestie een poly-urethaan gecoate belt te gebruiken. In december 1980 werd de
eerste schoenpers bij Weyerhaeuser opgestart. De pers werd ingebouwd op een
bestaande kartonmachine. Mede dankzij de poly-urethaan gecoate belt draaide de
pers vanaf het eerste moment naar grote tevredenheid. Zonder dit materiaal zou de
innovatie van de schoenpers – tenminste – een aantal jaar vertraagd zijn.
Beloit’s belangrijkste drijfveer om de schoenpers te ontwikkelen was dat dit de
ontwatering in de perspartij zou verbeteren. Bij een bestaande kartonmachine kan
dan de productie verhoogd worden. Voor een compleet nieuwe kartonmachine gaan
de investeringskosten omlaag. Weyerhaeuser was ook geïnteresseerd in de
verbeterde sterkte-eigenschappen van het karton (wat weer leidt tot een vermindering
van grondstofkosten).
Andere internationale machinebouwers begonnen pas omstreeks 1980 met de
ontwikkeling van een schoenpers. Niet alleen machinebouwers, maar ook
toeleveranciers van machinebekleding richtten zich op deze groeiende markt. Drie
machinebouwers introduceerden een concurrerend ontwerp. Voith (Duitsland)
introduceerde zijn eerste schoenpers in 1984, Escher Wyss (Duitsland) in 1986 en
Valmet (Finland) in 1990. Er zijn dus in totaal vier machinebouwers geweest die
schoenpersen verkochten. In 2001, zijn er nog twee over. De twee Duitse
machinebouwers zijn gefuseerd en het Amerikaanse Beloit is failliet.
Beloit’s concurrenten slaagden er in een verbeterd ontwerp van de schoenpers op de
markt te brengen. Zij kozen voor een zogenaamde ‘gesloten’-schoenpers in plaats
van de ‘open’-schoenpers van Beloit. In een gesloten-schoenpers is de olie in de pers
geïsoleerd van de papierbaan. De kans op vervuiling van het papier (zeker bij hogere
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snelheden) wordt hierdoor kleiner. Deze keuze bleek van groot belang te zijn. Zowel
karton- als papiermakers streven namelijk naar een voortdurende verhoging van de
snelheid van hun machines. De vraag is waarom Beloit dan toch in eerste instantie
een open-schoenpers op de markt heeft gebracht? Zij kende immers de voorkeur van
de markt voor het verder vergroten van de snelheid (dat was immers de reden om de
pers in eerste instantie te ontwikkelen). Ten eerste wilde Beloit na 13 jaar
ontwikkeling de schoenpers zo snel mogelijk op de markt brengen. Ten tweede hangt
het ontwerp van de schoenpers sterk samen met het flexibele materiaal, de belt. Dit
was tot het laatste moment een probleem voor Beloit. Het was makkelijker om een
belt te produceren voor een open-schoenpers dan voor een gesloten-schoenpers. Nog
los van het feit dat Beloit de tijd niet wilde nemen om een verbeterd productieproces
voor deze belts te ontwikkelen, merkte een van de betrokken experts van Beloit op:
“we moesten nu eenmaal kunnen lopen voordat we konden leren rennen”.
Zowel machinebouwers als toeleveranciers van machinekleding vervolgden hun
onderzoekswerkzaamheden. De pers zelf, maar ook complementaire technologieën
als vilten en belten, werden verbeterd. Ook gebruikten de machinebouwers hun pilot-
papiermachines om andere producenten dan kartonproducenten te overtuigen van het
voordeel van de schoenpers. Gedurende de jaren tachtig werd de schoenpers alleen
toegepast voor de productie van karton. Het duurde tot 1994 voordat Voith de eerste
schoenpers op een (bestaande) papiermachine installeerde. Technologische
verbeteringen waren belangrijk om de schoenpers geïntroduceerd te krijgen (heel
belangrijk was de configuratie van de schoenpers in de totale perspartij). Nog
belangrijker was echter dat de ontwatering in bestaande perspartijen een knelpunt
werd. De snelheid van bestaande papiermachines kon niet verder verhoogd worden
met rolpersen. Pas toen durfden papierproducenten het aan om de stap naar de
schoenpers te maken. Door een schoenpers in te bouwen werd de ontwatering
verbeterd en kon de machinesnelheid weer verder toenemen.
De overheid heeft geen bijdrage geleverd aan de ontwikkeling van de schoenpers.
Toen het moment van innovatie dicht bij kwam, heeft Beloit wel aan de Amerikaanse
overheid gevraagd om het risico van innovatie financieel af te dekken. In deze
poging benadrukte Beloit de energiebesparingsmogelijkheden van de schoenpers. De
Amerikaanse overheid had hier op zich wel oren naar, maar was te traag in het
honoreren van Beloit’s voorstel. De rol van de overheid zou echter weinig effect
gehad hebben. Ook zonder overheidsinterventie slaagde Beloit er in om de
technologie geïntroduceerd te krijgen.
Een belangrijke conclusie van deze case-study is dat actor-kenmerken – Beloit’s
kennis, ervaring en vertrouwen dat een schoenpers echt gebouwd kon worden – van
doorslaggevend belang zijn geweest voor de succesvolle introductie van de
schoenpers in 1980. Hierbij dienen wel wat kanttekeningen gemaakt te worden. Meer
onderzoekers zagen het belang in van de factor tijd in de perspartij. Beloit had een
grondige kennis van de markt en de marktwensen van karton- en papiermakers. En
tenslotte was Beloit een van de internationaal vooraanstaande machinebouwers. Een
tweede conclusie is dat externe factoren – het succes van de schoenpers in de markt
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en de voorkeuren van de toepassers van de technologie – bepalend waren voor de
verdere ontwikkeling van de technologie na 1980.
Impulstechnologie
In hoofdstuk 4 is het ontwikkelingstraject van impulstechnologie geanalyseerd.
Impulstechnologie is net als de schoenpers een perstechnologie voor de productie
van karton en papier. Eigenlijk is impulstechnologie een schoenpers (eerst werden
ook conventionele rolpersen gebruikt), die verwarmd wordt (meestal door
elektriciteit). De combinatie van druk en warmte leidt tot extra ontwatering. In deze
case-study is gekeken naar het effect van financiële bijdrage van de overheid op de
ontwikkeling van de technologie.
Het technologie-netwerk (1980-2000) van impulstechnologie bestond uit twee micro-
netwerken, één in Noord-Amerika en één in Zweden/Finland. Momenteel is alleen
het Scandinavische micro-netwerk nog actief.
Voordat het technologienetwerk echt van de grond kwam voerde de Zweed Douglas
Wahren onderzoek uit naar impulstechnologie. Wahren is de bedenker van de
technologie.  Hij stelde voor om de ontwatering in de pers te intensiveren met behulp
van warmte. Tussen 1970 en 1980 werkte hij op twee verschillende werkplekken aan
zijn idee. Twee keer stopte hij echter met zijn onderzoeksactiviteiten. Eerst was hij
werkzaam bij het Zweedse nationale papieronderzoeksinstituut STFI. Daar had hij
niet de capaciteit om het onderzoek uit te voeren (1972-1973). Als medewerker van
de Zweedse machinebouwer KMW bouwde hij impulstechnologie in op een pilot-
papiermachine (1977). Ook vroeg hij een patent aan. Maar toen bleek dat de
eigenschappen van het papier niet overeenkwamen met de eigenschappen van het
papier dat gemaakt werd op de papiermachines die KMW verkocht stopte hij voor de
tweede keer zijn onderzoek.
Eind jaren zeventig werd Wahren gevraagd om het onderzoek bij het Amerikaanse
papieronderzoeksinstituut IPST te reorganiseren. Bij IPST kreeg hij, met instemming
van de rest van het bestuur, de ruimte om de ontwikkeling van impulstechnologie
opnieuw op te pakken. Op basis van wat eerste metingen claimde Wahren in 1983
een compleet nieuw ontwateringsprincipe door de combinatie van druk en warmte.
Al eerder benaderde Wahren wat oude bekenden bij de Amerikaanse machinebouwer
Beloit. Na hun succes met de schoenpers waren ze geïnteresseerd om de ontwatering
in de pers verder te verbeteren. Beloit startte in 1981 eigen onderzoek. IPST
benaderde ook de Amerikaanse overheid, het ministerie van Energie, en vroeg om
een financiële bijdrage voor het onderzoek. Op basis van de verwachting dat
impulstechnologie de ontwatering in de perspartij zou verbeteren claimde IPST
energiebesparing. De mogelijkheid van energiebesparing, het risicovolle karakter van
de technologie en de mogelijkheid om de concurrentiepositie van de Amerikaanse
papierindustrie te verbeteren waren redenen voor het ministerie van Energie om
gedurende lange tijd het onderzoek bij IPST te steunen (1985-1999). Ook de vice-
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president van het Canadese papieronderzoeksinstituut Paprican was gecharmeerd
door het ontwateringsprincipe van impulstechnologie. Omstreeks 1986 besloten de
Canadezen impulstechnologie op hun pilot-papiermachine in te bouwen. In deze fase
werkten ook de Canadezen samen met Beloit. Net als haar Amerikaanse
zusterinstituut ontving Paprican geld van de nationale overheid. Ook hier was een
verbetering in energie-efficiëntie een belangrijk argument voor het verstrekken van
een bijdrage. De twee onderzoeksinstituten binnen het Noord-Amerikaanse micro-
netwerk verdeelden de taken. De activiteiten bij IPST richtten zich vanaf 1989 op
karton, terwijl Paprican het impulspersen van krantenpapier bestudeerde. Karton is
een belangrijk product voor de Amerikaanse papierindustrie, terwijl krantenpapier
belangrijk is voor de Canadese papierindustrie.
In totaal zijn in dit Noord-Amerikaanse micro-netwerk 4 pogingen ondernomen om
de technologie te commercialiseren. Geen van deze pogingen is geslaagd. Tussen
1987 en 1989 werd de eerste poging ondernomen door IPST, Beloit en het
Amerikaanse Weyerhaeuser, het kartonbedrijf dat ook al de stap waagde om de
eerste schoenpers neer te zetten. De drie actoren hadden het vertrouwen dat ze een
grote stap konden maken in het commercialiseren van impulstechnologie. Er waren
al eerder wat aanwijzingen geweest dat het papier zichtbaar beschadigde door de
combinatie van druk en warmte, maar de testen op de pilot-papiermachine van Beloit
maakten pas echt duidelijk dat delaminatie een groot probleem was. De vezels
raakten zichtbaar beschadigd. De samenwerking tussen IPST en Beloit stopte
formeel. Weyerhaeuser zag af van verdere betrokkenheid.
Vanaf 1992 claimden de onderzoekers van IPST dat het delaminatie-probleem voor
karton opgelost was. De samenwerking met Beloit werd aangehaald, mede omdat
IPST zelf geen pilot-papiermachine had. IPST wilde opnieuw impulstechnologie
commercieel toepassen. Het ministerie van Energie wilde wel betalen, mits er een
machinebouwer en een kartonproducent betrokken werden. Ook Beloit wilde wel,
maar IPST kon geen van de Amerikaanse kartonfabrikanten overtuigen van de
voordelen van impulstechnologie. Niemand wilde de eerste zijn. IPST en Beloit
kregen uiteindelijk toch geld van de overheid om impulstechnologie in te bouwen op
de nieuwe pilot-papiermachine van Beloit. Bij Beloit was de interne steun inmiddels
afgenomen, maar mede door de bijdrage van de overheid kon dit experiment toch
uitgevoerd worden.
Nadat Paprican het onderzoek had afgerond, probeerde Paprican en Beloit omstreeks
1994-95 een krantenproducent te vinden om impulstechnologie commercieel toe te
passen. Op dat moment was de schoenpers nog geen bewezen technologie voor
krantenpapier. De stap naar twee schoenpersen (wat nodig was in verband met
papiereigenschappen), die ook nog eens verwarmd zouden worden, was te onzeker
en te groot.
IPST en Beloit kwamen eind jaren negentig tot een vierde poging. Inmiddels waren
ze er bij IPST achter gekomen dat het delaminatie-probleem voor karton nog niet
was opgelost. Nieuwe oplossingen werden ontwikkeld, gepatenteerd en ingebouwd
op de pilot-papiermachine van Beloit. Weer lukte het niet om een kartonproducent te
vinden voor een eerste commerciële toepassing. De eigenschappen van het karton
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verbeterde wel, maar niet genoeg om het kostennadeel van de dure elektriciteit te
compenseren. IPST stopte het onderzoek. De taken waren afgerond. Ook Beloit
moest stoppen, doordat het moederbedrijf failliet is gegaan.
Toen eind jaren tachtig onderzoeksresultaten uit Noord-Amerika beschikbaar
kwamen raakten ook actoren in Europa geïnteresseerd in impulstechnologie. Een
vertegenwoordiger van de Zweedse overheid bood het papieronderzoeksinstituut
STFI een financiële bijdrage aan wanneer zij onderzoek naar deze ‘energie-efficiënte
en risicovolle’ technologie zouden opstarten. Na zes tot zeven jaar van
onderhandeling, en bespreking, en planvorming en verdere onderhandelingen werd
uiteindelijk de pilot-papiermachine van STFI omgebouwd met twee schoenpersen. In
1997 kon het grootscheeps aangekondigde onderzoeksprogramma naar
impulstechnologie beginnen. De Finse machinebouwer Valmet is betrokken. Pas
nadat het onderzoek bij STFI (2002) is afgerond bepalen de Finnen of ze verder
inzetten op impulstechnologie. De technologie moet concurreren met andere
innovatieve pers- en droogtechnologieën, die Valmet heeft ontwikkeld.
Twee andere papiermachinebouwers hebben onderzoek naar impulstechnologie nooit
op pilot-schaal voortgezet. Impulstechnologie kwam weer even ter sprake toen de
bedrijven fuseerden, maar men ziet geen toekomst voor de technologie.
Wahren’s oorspronkelijke reden om naar een verbeterde ontwatering in de perspartij
te zoeken was dat hij de kapitaalslasten van de papierproductie wilde reduceren. Net
als in het geval van de schoenpers belooft impulstechnologie een verhoging van de
machinesnelheid voor bestaande machines en een lagere investering voor nieuwe
papiermachines. Deze overwegingen waren voor alle actoren de belangrijkste reden
om de technologie te ontwikkelen. De mogelijke verbetering in energie-efficiëntie
was het belangrijkste argument om geld van de overheid te krijgen. Zowel de
Amerikaanse, de Canadese als de Zweedse overheid hebben aanzienlijke financiële
bijdragen verstrekt aan de nationale papieronderzoeksinstituten.
Vijfentwintig jaar onderzoek en vijftien jaar steun door de overheid hebben nog niet
geleid tot commerciële toepassing van de technologie. Wahren claimde in 1983 een
enorme verbetering van de ontwatering. Deze claim is in de loop van de tijd kleiner
geworden. Bovendien is er nog steeds discussie over het door hem voorgestelde
ontwateringsprincipe. De hoeveelheid energie die impulstechnologie mogelijk kan
besparen staat nog niet vast. Verhitting met behulp van elektriciteit is energetisch
niet gunstig. De toekomst van de technologie is al met al onzeker. De kansen voor
commercialisering – in zijn huidige ontwerp met de lengte van de huidige
schoenpersen – wordt door sommigen betwijfeld.
Een eerste conclusie van deze case-study is dat de bijdragen van de overheid de
ontwikkeling van impulstechnologie hebben versneld. Zonder het geld van de
overheid zouden IPST en Paprican geen pilot-papiermachine onderzoek hebben
kunnen doen. Zonder het werk door IPST en Paprican zou het onderzoek bij Beloit
eerder gestopt zijn. Zonder het Zweedse overheidsgeld zou er nu geen Scandinavisch
micro-netwerk zijn. Maar ook al heeft de subsidiëring geleid tot een versnelling van
de ontwikkeling, de technologie is nog altijd niet bewezen en het effect in termen van
energiebesparing is nog onzeker.
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Een tweede conclusie is dat de intenties en strategieën van de onderzoeksinstituten in
grote mate bepalend zijn geweest voor het onderzoek. Dit is op zich niet erg. Deze
actoren hebben immers een goede kennis van de technologie en van de wensen van
de papierindustrie. Maar de instituten zijn afhankelijk van overheidsgeld voor de
continuering van onderzoek en de verbetering van bijvoorbeeld pilot-
papiermachines. Het gevaar dreigt dat het krijgen van geld een doel op zich wordt;
het ontwikkelen van een commercieel toepasbare technologie is dan van
ondergeschikt belang.
Strip-casting technologie
In hoofdstuk 5 is het ontwikkelingstraject van strip casting technologie geanalyseerd.
Strip-casting technologie integreert het gieten en walsen van staal. Hierdoor is
herverhitten van staal tussen deze twee processtappen niet langer nodig en wordt
energie bespaard. Strip-casting is de derde technologie in een serie van innovatieve
giet-technologieën die er voor zorgen dat vloeibaar staal steeds dunner uitgegoten
kan worden. Na de introductie van continu-gieten in 1952 en thin-slab-casting
technologie in 1989 staat strip-casting technologie op het punt om commercieel
toegepast te gaan worden. In deze case-study is met name gekeken naar het effect
van financiële bijdrage van de overheid op de ontwikkeling van de technologie.
Het technologie-netwerk rond strip-casting technologie is pas sinds 1980 echt van de
grond gekomen. Het idee voor strip-casting is al veel ouder. Bessemer, een van de
‘klassieke’ innovatoren binnen de staal industrie, had in 1857 al een patent voor
strip-casting op zijn naam staan. Er is vanaf dat moment door verschillende actoren
onderzoek gedaan naar strip-casting technologie, maar het duurde dus tot 1980
voordat O&O naar strip-casting technologie echt een vlucht nam. Het technologie-
netwerk heeft bestaan uit elf micro-netwerken. Alle micro-netwerken bestonden uit
een staalbedrijf en een machinebouwer of engineering bedrijf. De staalbedrijven
waren of grote geïntegreerde staalbedrijven met een roestvrij staal-divisie, of
gespecialiseerde roestvrij-staalbedrijven. In bijna alle micro-netwerken lag het
initiatief bij de staalproducent. Zij hebben ook bijna altijd de rechten op belangrijke
patenten.
Momenteel zijn nog zes van de elf micro-netwerken actief. Vier micro-netwerken
hebben hun O&O gestopt. Twee micro-netwerken zijn samengegaan door een fusie
van staalbedrijven. Drie van de micro-netwerken die nog actief zijn hebben een strip-
caster operationeel op industriële schaal. Ze hebben alle drie ongeveer 15 jaar nodig
gehad om dit te bereiken. De verwachting is dat deze drie micro-netwerken binnen
twee tot drie jaar de haalbaarheid van de technologie bewijzen; de rest van de
staalindustrie wacht dit af.
De belangrijkste reden om strip-casting technologie te ontwikkelen is de reductie van
de kapitaallasten voor warm-walsen. Een walserij is duur en kan alleen uit bij een
grote capaciteit. Roestvrij-staalproducenten, die relatief klein zijn, besteden het
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warm-walsen van staal dan ook uit. Met het beschikbaar komen van strip-casting
technologie zouden zij echter zelf het staal in de gewenste dikte kunnen gieten.
Doordat een strip-caster het vloeibare staal dunner uitgiet is de warme wals niet
langer nodig.
Bessemer was zich al bewust van het enorme kapitaalvoordeel van strip-casting
technologie. Hij zag dat het geweldig zou zijn om vloeibaar staal in één keer dun uit
te gieten. Toch heeft het meer dan een eeuw geduurd voor dat de ontwikkeling van
strip-casting technologie echt op gang kwam. Verschillende gebeurtenissen en
ontwikkelingen waren nodig om onderzoek naar strip-casting stevig op de O&O
agenda te krijgen. De introductie van continu-gieten (1952) was een eerste stap om
vloeibaar staal uit te gieten. Tijdens de jaren zestig en zeventig werd deze
technologie verder ontwikkeld en breder toegepast. De afgevlakte vraag naar staal na
de jaren zeventig vergrootte de interesse voor technologieën die verschillende
processtappen zouden kunnen integreren. Verder was de basiskennis op het gebied
van solidificatie van staal, ceramische materialen en procesautomatisering
beschikbaar gekomen. Tenslotte groeide de productie van nieuwe staalsoorten zoals
roestvrij staal en zette de opmars van de zogenaamde mini-mill staalbedrijven door.
De productiecapaciteit van deze bedrijven is kleiner en dus hebben zij belang bij
strip-casting technologie. Al met al begonnen staalbedrijven tussen grofweg 1975 en
1985 te zoeken naar compactere giet-processen. Ook het idee van Bessemer om twee
rollen te gebruiken werd weer opgepakt. Allerlei relatief kleinschalige
onderzoeksprojecten werden opgestart. De resultaten stimuleerden ook andere
bedrijven om onderzoek op te pakken. De claim van een Amerikaans roestvrij-
staalproducent, dat zij op pilot-schaal konden strip-casten, speelde een belangrijke
rol. De bedrijven hadden wel geld voor onderzoek. Er was ook wat geld van de
overheid. De aandacht voor deze technologie werd versterkt en het technologie-
netwerk groeide.
Verschillende nationale overheden en de Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en
Staal (EGKS) hebben onderzoek gesubsidieerd. Sinds 1980 hebben zij ongeveer 5 tot
10% van de totale uitgaven door de elf micro-netwerken betaald. Zes van de elf
micro-netwerken hebben extern geld ontvangen. In drie van deze micro-netwerken
bedroeg de externe bijdrage meer dan 40% van de totale uitgaven binnen dat micro-
netwerk. Twee van deze drie micro-netwerken zijn inmiddels gestopt. De derde is
nog altijd actief, maar continueert zijn activiteiten bewust op relatief kleine schaal.
De drie micro-netwerken, die een strip-caster op industriële schaal hebben, hebben
alle drie geen – of bijna geen – externe bijdragen gehad.
De belangrijkste conclusie van deze case-study is dat het effect van externe
subsidiëring van O&O van marginaal belang is geweest. De ontwikkeling van strip-
casting technologie had, nadat deze eenmaal op gang gekomen was, een enorme
vaart van zichzelf. Strip-casting technologie grijpt in op de kern van het proces om
staal te maken. De verbetering van energie-efficiëntie en de beschikbaarheid van
extern geld speelden slechts een beperkte rol in de ontwikkeling van deze
technologie.
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Smeltreductie-technologie
In hoofdstuk 6 is het ontwikkelingstraject van smeltreductie-technologie
geanalyseerd. De eerste stap in het maken van staal is het produceren van ruw ijzer.
Al eeuwen lang worden hoogovens gebruikt om ijzererts met behulp van cokes te
reduceren. Steenkool wordt in coke-ovens voorbewerkt tot cokes. Smeltreductie-
technologie is een van de zeer weinige innovatieve alternatieven voor de hoogoven.
De technologie belooft niet alleen minder energie-intensief te zijn, het integreert ook
verschillende processtappen. Het maken van cokes is niet langer nodig, omdat in
smeltreductie-technologie kolen direct gebruikt kunnen worden. In deze case-study is
gekeken naar het effect van verschillende manieren van overheidsinterventie op de
ontwikkeling van smeltreductie-technologie.
In smeltreductie-technologie wordt steenkool in een bad van vloeibaar ijzer vergast.
De chemische energie in het geproduceerde koolmonoxide wordt gebruikt voor de
reductie van het ijzererts, maar ook voor het smelten van het erts. Dit principe is al
bekend sinds het einde van de dertiger jaren in de twintigste eeuw. Vanaf 1975 is er
langzamerhand een technologie-netwerk van de grond gekomen. Toen werd
allereerst duidelijk dat een andere nieuwe technologie om ijzer te reduceren niet
altijd een economisch haalbaar alternatief was voor de conventionele hoogoven.
Daarbij werd de druk om te zoeken naar nieuwe  processen om ijzer te maken groter.
Vele geïntegreerde staalbedrijven zouden namelijk in het begin van de 21ste eeuw
hun coke-ovens moeten vervangen.
Dit stimuleerde de zoektocht naar een innovatieve technologie. De belangrijkste
drijfveer was het produceren van ijzer tegen lage kosten. Smeltreductie-technologie
zou niet alleen investeringslasten omlaag brengen, ook zou het verwerking van
goedkope, niet-metallurgische kolen mogelijk maken. Deze twee factoren beloofden
een groot kostenvoordeel. Verder zou het proces energie-efficiënter zijn. En zouden
investeringen in milieu-technologieën vermeden kunnen worden, omdat
smeltreductie-technologie veel minder schadelijke emissies geeft dan de
conventionele coke-ovens en hoogovens. Het kostenvoordeel van alleen de laatste
twee factoren zou echter nooit groot genoeg geweest zijn om de ontwikkeling van
smeltreductie-technologie te beginnen.
Omstreeks 1975 zijn er vijftien tot twintig projecten opgestart. In de projecten
probeerden de onderzoekers tot een hoge graad van voor-reductie te komen. De
meeste van deze vroege projecten zijn niet verder gekomen dan onderzoek op pilot-
schaal. Eén van deze vroege projecten is wèl op commerciële schaal geïntroduceerd.
Dit is het Corex proces van de Oostenrijkse machinebouwer Voest Alpine. Dit is
momenteel nog altijd het enige smeltreductie-proces dat commercieel wordt
toegepast. Het bleek echter gunstig te zijn om genoegen te nemen met een lagere
graad van voor-reductie. De zogenoemde tweede-generatie smeltreductie-processen
werden steeds vaker bestudeerd. Sommigen van de vroege projecten evolueerden in
micro-netwerken, die dit soort tweede-generatie smeltreductie-processen
bestudeerden. Dit was bijvoorbeeld het geval in het Japanse micro-netwerk en het
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Nederlands-Britse micro-netwerk. In totaal konden begin jaren negentig negen
micro-netwerken onderscheiden worden (inclusief het micro-netwerk van de
Oostenrijkse machinebouwer Voest Alpine).
Het technologie-netwerk van smeltreductie-technologie is heterogeen in vergelijking
met de drie eerdere technologie-netwerken. Geïntegreerde staalbedrijven namen het
initiatief in vier van de negen micro-netwerken. Machinebouwers of engineering
bedrijven trokken drie micro-netwerken. Mijnbouwbedrijven speelden een
belangrijke rol in twee micro-netwerken. Tenslotte werd het Russische micro-
netwerk geïnitieerd door de Russische overheid en een Russisch kennisinstituut. Er
bestaan technisch aanzienlijke verschillen tussen de smeltreductie-processen van de
verschillende micro-netwerken. De technische voorkeuren hingen sterk samen met
de eerdere onderzoeks- en engineeringervaring van de actoren. Verschillende actoren
hebben het ontwerp van een al bestaand proces geprobeerd geschikt te maken voor
de reductie van ijzer. Met name de geïntegreerde staalbedrijven hebben
voortgeborduurd op de ervaringen met het toevoegen van kolen en schroot in het
proces om staal te maken.
Van de negen micro-netwerken zijn er momenteel nog zes actief. De drie micro-
netwerken die gestopt zijn, werden alle drie gedomineerd door geïntegreerde
staalbedrijven. Deze bedrijven hebben hun directe belangstelling voor smeltreductie-
technologie echter in de loop van de tijd verloren. Ze zijn er tussentijds in geslaagd
om de levensduur van de bestaande coke-ovens te verlengen. De meeste bedrijven
gebruiken inmiddels minder cokes, omdat ze geïnvesteerd hebben in koleninjectie in
de hoogovens. Daarbij hebben ze tevens de productiviteit van de faciliteiten vergroot.
De verbeteringen in de bestaande processen zijn zo groot geweest, dat het
oorspronkelijk verwachte kostenvoordeel van smeltreductie-technologie in de loop
van de tijd is afgenomen. Verder heeft geen van de betrokken geïntegreerde
staalbedrijven op het moment behoefte aan een vergroting van ijzer-productie
capaciteit. De verdere ontwikkeling en introductie van smeltreductie-technologie
door geïntegreerde staalbedrijven is ‘uitgesloten’ (locked-out) door geleidelijke
verbeteringen in de bestaande productieprocessen.
Ondanks het feit dat veel geïntegreerde staalbedrijven hun interesse verloren, is de
toekomst van smeltreductie-technologie nog open. Mijnbouwbedrijven zijn nog altijd
geïnteresseerd. Verder is de rol van mini-mill staalbedrijven in het technologie-
netwerk toegenomen. Mini-mills verwerken normaal gesproken schroot, maar ze
hebben interesse voor hoogwaardigere grondstoffen. Ze kunnen dan namelijk
hoogwaardige staalproducten leveren. De productiecapaciteit van dit soort bedrijven
is kleiner dan van de geïntegreerde staalbedrijven. Smeltreductie-technologie is
echter een relatief kleinschalig proces. Het toepassen van smeltreductie-technologie
voor een mini-mill garandeert een kwalitatief hoogwaardige grondstof. Dit is een
mogelijke ‘niche’ toepassing voor smeltreductie-technologie. Wanneer smeltreductie
de verwerking van schroot verdringt, zal de energie-intensiteit van deze
productieroute toenemen.
Op verschillende manieren hebben nationale overheden geprobeerd de ontwikkeling
van smeltreductie te beïnvloeden. Ten eerste hebben nationale overheden en de
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Europese Gemeenschap voor Kolen en Staal (EGKS) onderzoek naar smeltreductie-
technologie gesubsidieerd. Ongeveer 20 tot 25% van de totale investering in alle
negen micro-netwerken tezamen is verstrekt door externe bronnen. In acht van de
negen micro-netwerken is er sprake geweest van een bijdrage door derden. In drie
micro-netwerken kwam meer dan 40% van het budget van buiten. Het is opvallend
dat 90% van de totale bijdrage door overheden en de EGKS (in totaal ongeveer 165
miljoen dollar) besteed is in deze drie micro-netwerken. Ten tweede hebben de
geldverstrekkers eisen gesteld aan samenwerking in juist deze drie micro-netwerken.
Zowel het Japanse als het Amerikaanse micro-netwerk waren typische multi-actor
micro-netwerken. Ook de EGKS stelde bij het Brits-Nederlandse micro-netwerk
eisen aan uitwisseling en samenwerking. Ten derde zouden nationale overheden
bijdragen aan de plannen om in het Amerikaanse micro-netwerk en het Brits-
Nederlandse micro-netwerk een demonstratie-fabriek te bouwen. Tenslotte, is het
conventionele proces om ijzer te maken in veel geïndustrialiseerde landen
onderhavig aan milieuwetgeving.
Een eerste conclusie is dat de subsidies door de overheid en de EGKS in vijf van de
acht micro-netwerken additioneel waren. Dit heeft geresulteerd in een vergroting van
het technologie-netwerk. Ook is het meeste van het geld besteed aan de ontwikkeling
van smeltreductie-processen die waarschijnlijk uiteindelijk energie-efficiënt zijn.
Toch hebben de financiële bijdragen van de overheden en de EGKS tot nu toe niet
geleid tot een versnelde ontwikkeling van de technologie. Alleen het Corex proces is
commercieel beschikbaar. Van de energie-efficiënte tweede-generatie processen
maken het Japanse proces (ontwikkeld met overheidsgeld) en het Australische proces
(ontwikkeld zonder overheidsgeld) de meeste kans om op industriële schaal
toegepast te worden. Een tweede conclusie is dat de actoren die betrokken zijn in
multi-actor samenwerkingsprojecten meestal ‘willen leren over de technologie’. De
spin-off van samenwerkingsprojecten staat of valt met de betrokkenheid van actoren,
die serieus inzetten op een verdere opschaling van de technologie. Een derde
conclusie is dat het steunen of wegnemen van de risico’s voor een demonstratie-
fabriek een aantrekkelijke strategie kan zijn voor de overheid. Dit is met name het
geval als de bedrijven de technologie weldegelijk van strategische belang vinden,
maar toch aarzelen. Het is echter een complexe taak. Bedrijven zijn zeer voorzichtig
in het toelaten van derden (en zeker de overheid) als het gaat om risicovolle
technologieën die de kern van het productieproces beïnvloeden. Een vierde conclusie
is dat de prikkel die milieuwetgeving gaf niet groot genoeg was om de ontwikkeling
van een complex en volledig nieuw proces als smeltreductie-technologie te beginnen.
De verschuivingen in het technologie-netwerk van smeltreductie-technologie
reflecteren de dynamiek van technologie-ontwikkeling in de staal industrie. De
continue verbetering van de bestaande kapitaalgoederenvoorraad bij geïntegreerde
staalbedrijven vertraagt de introductie van een innovatieve procestechnologie. Dit
heeft het effect van de bijdragen van overheid en EGKS sterk beperkt.
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De dynamiek van ontwikkelingen in technologie-netwerken
In hoofdstuk 7 worden vervolgens eerst de vier case-studies vergeleken op zes
aspecten. Deze zes aspecten hangen nauw samen met het kader dat we hebben
gebruikt en met onze belangstelling voor overheidsinterventie.
Actoren – De grootte en samenstelling van netwerken
Producenten van papier en staal speelden een verschillende rol in de ontwikkeling
van procestechnologieën. Grote geïntegreerde staalbedrijven investeerden zelf,
terwijl papierbedrijven ‘wachtten’ op de toelevering door de internationaal
opererende machinebouwers. De technologie-netwerken voor de papier-
technologieën waren kleiner dan die voor de twee staal-technologieën. Meestal
waren de actoren in bepaalde micro-netwerken op de hoogte van de ontwikkelingen
in andere micro-netwerken. De monitoring, uitwisseling en interactie waren echter
groter in de technologie-netwerken voor staal, dan tussen de mirco-netwerken voor
de papier-technologieën.
In drie van de vier technologie-netwerken namen bedrijven het voortouw. In de
vierde speelden papieronderzoeksinstituten, die gefinancierd worden door de
nationale papierindustrie, een belangrijke rol. Alle bedrijven hadden aanzienlijke
ervaring en een reputatie op het gebied van O&O. De directe rol van kennisinstituten
en universiteiten was beperkt. In de meerderheid van alle micro-netwerken werkten
actoren samen. Meestal kwamen de samenwerkingspartners uit verschillende landen.
De belangrijkste redenen voor samenwerking waren het betrekken van belangrijke,
aanvullende expertise of het delen van de kosten. Actoren hadden niet veel moeite
om samenwerkingspartners te vinden. Wanneer er wel problemen waren, was dit in
de fase dat de technologie op industriële schaal bewezen moest worden. Het was
moeilijk om producenten te vinden die op grote schaal wilden investeren in een
‘onbewezen’ technologie.
Artefacten – Duur en opschaling
De ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën kost tijd. In alle vier de
case-studies konden we een zogenoemde exploratie-fase en technologie-netwerk-fase
onderscheiden. Het idee of principe van een innovatieve technologie was vaak al
langer bekend. Vaak was er al eerder onderzoek uitgevoerd, voordat een robuust
technologie-netwerk van de grond kwam. Op basis van de vier case-studies
suggereren wij vier factoren, die een rol kunnen spelen in de overgang van de
exploratie-fase naar de technologie-netwerk-fase.
Allereerst moet de technologie een economisch voordeel leveren. Deze factor is
kritisch, maar niet afdoende. Een tweede, en erg belangrijke, factor is dat de
innovatieve technologie nauw aansluit bij het reeds bestaande productiesysteem. De
procestechnologie moet in te passen zijn en moet het totale systeem optimaliseren.
Ontwikkelingen in O&O vormen een derde factor. Hierbij kan gedacht worden aan
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nieuwe (fundamentele) kennis en inzichten. Maar wanneer de mogelijkheden van de
conventionele technologie uitgeput raken, of wanneer concurrerende innovatieve
technologieën niet echt van de grond komen, kan er ook ruimte ontstaan voor een
technologie-netwerk. Tenslotte spelen contingente elementen een rol. Het was altijd
een combinatie van factoren die er toe leidde dat actoren op een bepaald moment een
innovatieve technologie (h)erkenden als de ‘beste-volgende-stap’ om het
productieproces te verbeteren.
Op het moment dat een technologie-netwerk van de grond komt, duurt het nog steeds
een flink aantal jaren voordat commercialisering van de technologie (misschien)
plaats vindt. Afhankelijk van de technologie waren er twee of drie opschalingstappen
nodig om de technologie te bewijzen. Elke stap duurde tenminste vijf jaar. Dus zelfs
als een ontwikkelingstraject soepel verloopt, duurt de ontwikkeling van de
technologie nog tien tot twintig jaar. Vaak is de technologie dan nog niet direct toe te
passen voor alle producten van een bepaalde industrie.
Agenda – De beloften die richting geven aan technologie-ontwikkeling
In alle twee de industriële sectoren werden de innovatieve procestechnologieën
ontwikkeld om de kosten per ton product te reduceren. Actoren verwezen naar de
kenmerken van de markt waarin de producenten van papier en staal opereren om
deze voorkeur te verklaren. In de zoektocht naar nieuwe procestechnologieën speelt
het bestaande productieproces (en de omvangrijke kapitaalsinvestering van bedrijven
in deze systemen) een sterk beperkende rol. Deze heeft grote invloed op de keuzen
en beslissingen van actoren. De wereldwijd aanwezige kapitaalgoederenvoorraad
zorgt voor vertraging en regelmaat in de ontwikkeling van procestechnologieën voor
industriële sectoren; het bestaande systeem wordt in sterke mate steeds verder
geoptimaliseerd.
In geen van de vier case-studies waren verbeteringen in energie-efficiëntie een
doorslaggevend motief om de technologie te ontwikkelen. Alle technologieën grijpen
in op de kern van het productieproces. Energiebesparing liftte mee op de
ontwikkeling van belangrijke procestechnologieën.
Dynamiek – Momentum
We hebben het concept momentum geïntroduceerd om de dynamiek van de
verschillende technologie-netwerken te karakteriseren. De case-studies lieten
namelijk een verschil zien in de vaart waarmee verschillende netwerken een
technologie ontwikkelden. Een technologie-netwerk heeft een groot momentum
wanneer het ogenschijnlijk zo is dat de technologie zich autonoom ontwikkelt.
De technologie-netwerken van strip-casting en de schoenpers kenden een groot
momentum. Het momentum van het technologie-netwerk van smeltreductie was
kleiner, die van impulstechnologie nog kleiner. Tevens nam bij deze twee
technologie-netwerken het momentum gedurende de ontwikkeling van de
technologie af.
- 291 -
Momentum is een karakteristiek van het technologie-netwerk. Het is geen kenmerk
van de technologie op zich. Het zegt ook niets over de fase van ontwikkeling van een
technologie. Een verschil in momentum is niet alleen waar te nemen door
buitenstaanders of observatoren, maar wordt ook door de betrokken actoren zelf vaak
zo benoemd. Het momentum van een technologie-netwerk reflecteert het vertrouwen
dat actoren (blijven) hebben in de perspectieven van de technologie. De innovatieve
technologie blijft als het ware de ‘beste-volgende-stap’, ondanks verbeteringen in het
conventionele productieproces en ondanks (structurele) trends en veranderingen in de
industriële sector. Actoren moeten regelmatig bevestigd of herbevestigd worden in
de perspectieven van de technologie.
Overheidsinterventie: Subsidiëring van O&O
De overheid heeft een aanzienlijke bijdrage geleverd aan de ontwikkeling van
impulstechnologie en smeltreductie-technologie. De overheid droeg meer dan 25%
bij van de totale investering in beide netwerken. Bij de ontwikkeling van de andere
twee technologieën was de relatieve bijdrage nihil of zeer beperkt (niet in absolute
termen). In alle vier de case-studies was het energie-efficiënte karakter van de
procestechnologie een belangrijk argument voor de overheid om de ontwikkeling
(eventueel) financieel te ondersteunen. Het verbeteren van de energie-efficiëntie was
echter in geen van de gevallen voor de bedrijven zelf een doorslaggevend argument
voor de ontwikkeling van de technologie. Actoren waren bedreven in het benoemen
van het energie-efficiënte karakter van de technologieën om externe financiering te
mobiliseren.
De subsidiëring door de overheid kan gerelateerd worden aan het momentum van de
vier technologie-netwerken. Het valt dan op dat in de technologie-netwerken met een
groot momentum, het effect van O&O subsidiëring beperkt was (strip-casting
technologie en de schoenpers). In de gevallen waar het momentum van de
technologie-netwerken lager was (smeltreductie en impulstechnologie), was het
effect van de subsidies groter. Subsidies waren dan vaker additioneel en leidden tot
een vergroting van technologie-netwerken. Tegelijkertijd illustreert de case-study
naar impulstechnologie dat wanneer het momentum van een technologie te laag
wordt, het effect van subsidies ook afneemt. In geval van impulstechnologie nam de
twijfel of de technologie wel haalbaar is toe, waardoor de kans dat een van de
actoren de technologie commercialiseert kleiner is geworden. Het vertrouwen is er
niet langer.
Opvallend genoeg speelde de overheid in geen van de case-studies een rol in de
exploratie-fase. Ook in de vroege fase van de technologie-netwerken waren het
veelal de bedrijven zelf die het voortouw namen in het agenderen van de technologie.
Subsidiëring door de overheid speelde in sommige gevallen een rol bij het
verankeren van de technologie-netwerken.
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Overheidsinterventie: Alternatieve strategieën
De overheid kan méér doen dan het subsidieren van O&O alleen om de ontwikkeling
van technologieën te stimuleren. De empirische basis in deze studies voor dit soort
alternatieve strategieën is niet erg groot. Toch is het interessant om een aantal
observaties te vermelden.
Regelgeving zal niet snel een doorslaggevende factor zijn in de ontwikkeling van
industriële procestechnologieën. Het speelde wel een rol. Het voorzag onderzoekers
binnen een onderneming van een extra argument om de onderzoeksactiviteit voort te
zetten. Het signaal van regelgeving werkt dus in de goede richting. Voor innovatieve
technologieën die de kern van het proces raken is het signaal te klein (lees: het
kostenvoordeel te gering) om een ontwikkelingstraject te rechtvaardigen. Bedrijven
die een directe afspraak hadden met de nationale overheid voelden zich
gecommitteerd aan die afspraak. Op deze manier kan een bepaald onderwerp of een
bepaalde gewenste richting onder de aandacht worden gebracht bij ondernemingen.
In verschillende micro-netwerken werkten een groot aantal actoren samen. Vaak
werden deze multi-actor micro-netwerken financieel ondersteund door de overheid.
Deze micro-netwerken hadden veelal niet het primaire doel om de innovatieve
technologie te commercialiseren. Het is niet altijd even effectief om samenwerking te
vereisen. Samenwerking was het meest effectief in een vroege fase van een
ontwikkelingstraject. Dan willen actoren graag leren van elkaar’s ideeën, inzichten
en creativiteit. De spin-off van samenwerkingsprojecten staat of valt met de
betrokkenheid en belangen van specifieke actoren.
Kan het effect van overheidsinterventie vergroot worden?
De vier case-studies leiden tot een aantal beleidsrelevante conclusies. Ten eerste
wordt de ontwikkeling van industriële procestechnologieën sterk beïnvloed door het
bestaande productiesysteem voor industriële goederen. Soms wordt een aantal
processtappen gecombineerd, maar toch optimaliseren de innovatieve
procestechnologieën veelal het bestaande systeem. Ten tweede is de ontwikkeling
van technologie voor industriële sectoren een langzaam proces. Ten derde is het
moeilijk om de ontwikkeling van procestechnologieën effectief te stimuleren.
Bedrijven bleken zelf vaak het voortouw te nemen in een ontwikkelingstraject. Toch
was overheidsinterventie soms weldegelijk effectief en leidde het tot een vergroting
van het technologie-netwerk. Ten vierde waren er – ondanks overeenkomsten in
actoren en patronen in innovatie – aanzienlijke verschillen tussen technologie-
netwerken. Zowel de omvang als het momentum van de technologie-netwerken
verschilden. De betrokken actoren en hun geografische verspreiding verschilden. De
belofte van ‘innovatieve energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën voor de industrie’
versluiert een grote heterogeniteit. Er is geen altijd geldige, standaard aanpak als het
gaat om het stimuleren van technologie-ontwikkeling.
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Op basis van deze conclusies zullen sommigen zich afvragen of de overheid de
ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën moet stimuleren. Daarnaast
komt de vraag boven hoe generiek of specifiek de overheid moet zijn. Het
maatschappelijke belang van industriële energie-efficiëntie is echter groot. Dit is een
reden om te blijven zoeken naar effectieve vormen van stimulering door de overheid.
Het beperkte effect van overheidsingrijpen – zoals dat uit onze case-studies naar
voren komt – is een tweede reden om te zoeken naar mogelijke routes om het effect
van overheidsinterventie in technologie-ontwikkeling te vergroten.
De diversiteit in technologie-ontwikkeling tussen verschillende industriële sectoren
en verschillende technologie-netwerken vraagt om meer maatwerk. De overheid
moet kennis hebben van (internationale) technologie-netwerken voor een bepaalde
sector. Ook moet de overheid kennis hebben van de actoren (hun capaciteiten,
ervaring en reputatie), die de overheid direct kan benaderen of beïnvloeden. Op basis
van deze kennis moet besloten worden of, en zo ja, welke interventiestrategie het
beste aansluit bij het netwerk.
Het stimuleren van technologie-ontwikkeling kan niet altijd even effectief zijn. De
resultaten van technologie-ontwikkeling zijn immers onzeker. Het is vaak moeilijk
(en zeker vooraf) om te komen tot een kwantitatieve maat voor het te verwachte
succes. Deze moeilijkheden bij het stimuleren van technologie-ontwikkeling maken
juist dat andere (ook meer kwalitatieve) informatie gebruikt kan worden om het
effect van interventie te vergroten. Onze analyse geeft hier aanknopingspunten voor.
De inzet zal niet altijd het versnellen van technologie-ontwikkeling zijn. Soms is dit
gewoon niet realistisch. Het is ook niet de bedoeling dat de overheid op de stoel van
de industrie gaat zitten en de keuze maakt voor specifieke procestechnologieën. Maar
kennis van het netwerk van actoren en de dynamiek in technologie-ontwikkeling
levert extra inzicht dat meegewogen kan worden om te komen tot slimmere manieren
van overheidsinterventie.
De volgende suggesties geven een eerste aanzet voor de verbetering van het effect
van overheidsinterventie voor de ontwikkeling van industriële procestechnologieën:
- Een nationale overheid moet zich beraden op de actoren die zij kan beïnvloeden.
Zij moet zich ook beraden op de rol die deze actoren kunnen spelen in
internationale technologie-netwerken. Het is belangrijk om de kennisvelden te
kennen waar actoren internationaal een reputatie hebben.
- Overheden kunnen het aantal actoren dat ze kunnen beïnvloeden vergroten door
internationaal de krachten te bundelen. Er kan gedacht worden aan internationale
O&O afspraken met een groep actoren (bedrijven) die een directe rol spelen in de
O&O naar procestechnologieën. Op die manier kan het belang van energie-
efficiëntie beter verankerd worden bij actoren die direct innovatieve
procestechnologieën ontwikkelen. Er kan ook gedacht worden aan internationale
O&O programma’s. Een derde optie is om op internationaal niveau de
technologie-netwerken continue te monitoren. Alle overheden kunnen hun
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voordeel doen met de kennis die zo gegenereerd wordt (niet alleen actor-kennis,
maar ook technische kennis).
- Soms heeft een overheid niet direct toegang tot actoren die een rol spelen in de
ontwikkeling van belangrijke procestechnologieën. Op basis daarvan kan de
overheid de voorkeur geven aan indirecte interventiestrategieën. De overheid kan
dan bijvoorbeeld komen tot ambitieuze meerjarenafspraken of stevige normen
om het belang van energie-efficiëntie te articuleren. Ook kan men proberen om
kennis over internationale technologische ontwikkelingen te ontsluiten (zowel ten
behoeve van de industrie als voor de eigen kennis). In dit proces kunnen
nationale kennisinstituten een rol spelen.
- Het is belangrijk om zicht te hebben op het momentum van technologie-
netwerken voor specifieke procestechnologieën. Op basis daarvan kan ingeschat
worden of overheidsinterventie überhaupt zin heeft. Het effect van interventie
hangt af van het momentum van het technologie-netwerk. Het momentum moet
niet te laag en niet te hoog zijn. Momentum kan in de loop van de tijd toe- of
afnemen.
- Wat betreft keuze voor interventiestrategieën moet de overheid ook rekening
houden met de fase waarin het technologie-netwerk zich bevindt. Wanneer een
technologie-netwerk net van de grond lijkt te gaan komen kan de overheid een
andere rol spelen dan wanneer het gaat om het op industriële schaal demonstreren
van een innovatieve procestechnologie. In dat geval moet de overheid op basis
van een grondige analyse van het internationale technologie-netwerk inschatten
of het bouwen van een demonstratiefabriek de introductie van de technologie
daadwerkelijk versnelt.
- Kennis van het netwerk van actoren en de dynamiek in technologie-ontwikkeling
kan dus meegewogen worden om te komen tot slimmere manieren van
overheidsinterventie. Wanneer dit gebeurt, is het van belang om dit soort kennis
zo expliciet mogelijk te monitoren (om belangenverstrengeling en beïnvloeding
te voorkomen). Het benutten van dit soort minder kwantitatieve kennis vereist
een zorgvuldige afweging en onderbouwing.
- De overheid moet zich realiseren dat een lange-termijn commitment nodig is
voor de ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte technologieën. Technologie-
ontwikkeling kost tijd. Wanneer de overheid zich langere tijd committeert aan
een technologie, dan moet het internationale technologie-netwerk actief
gemonitored worden. De ogen moeten niet gesloten moeten worden voor
verbeteringen in de conventionele technologie en de opkomst van andere
innovatieve procestechnologieën. Monitoren is noodzakelijk om te beslissen of,
en wanneer, steun stop gezet kan worden.
- Het feit dat heel veel van de energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën meer doen
dan energie besparen is geen reden om ontwikkeling van deze technologieën niet
te stimuleren. De overheid moet de eigen agenda echter in de gaten houden. Het
is belangrijk om grondige kennis te hebben van andere voordelen van
procestechnologieën, maar ook van de mogelijke verbetering in energie-
efficiëntie. Claims met betrekking tot energie-efficiëntie moeten kritisch bekeken
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worden. Informatie over energie-efficiëntie alleen is niet genoeg om te komen tot
zo effectief mogelijke interventiestrategieën.
- Wanneer de overheid de ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte proces
technologieën wil stimuleren moet zij enige flexibiliteit hebben om zo goed
mogelijke bij het netwerk aan te sluiten. Zo is het bijvoorbeeld lang niet altijd
nodig om de producenten te betrekken in onderzoeksprojecten.
- Interventiestrategieën die aangrijpen bij de vraagkant van technologie-
ontwikkeling zullen voor veel energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën niet direct
leiden tot een versnelling van de ontwikkeling. Zij geven echter wel een signaal
af dat energie-efficiëntie belangrijk is.
- Het stimuleren van samenwerking in O&O kan een waardevolle strategie zijn,
maar is geen garantie voor een versnelde technologie-ontwikkeling. De belangen
en motivaties van de actoren geven informatie of het wel of niet zinvol is om
samenwerking te vereisen.
- Als het gaat om het versnellen van technologie-ontwikkeling voor
procestechnologieën voor de energie-intensieve industrie is er veel te winnen als
de technologie-netwerken voor technologieën, die zich nog in een exploratie-fase
bevinden, eerder versterkt kunnen worden. Een suggestie is om exploratieve
ideeën te generen in een ‘beschermde’ omgeving door bijvoorbeeld
onderzoekers, die een reputatie hebben als het gaat om de ontwikkeling en
commercialisering van procestechnologie voor de industrie, financieel te
ondersteunen om ideeën uit te werken.
De ontwikkeling van energie-efficiënte procestechnologieën is een aantrekkelijke
optie om te komen tot een toekomstige reductie van broeikasgas. Het blijft een
belangrijke taak voor de overheid om het belang van energie-efficiëntie, juist ook
voor innovatieve procestechnologieën, te articuleren. Deze studie laat zien dat het
labellen van een technologie als energie-efficiënt niet genoeg is om te komen tot
effectieve vormen van overheidsinterventie. Het is van groot belang om interventie-
strategieën te ontwikkelen die rekening houden met de opbouw van netwerken en
met de dynamiek van technologie-ontwikkeling in industriële sectoren.
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naam van deze opleiding gewijzigd in Natuurwetenschappen en
Innovatiemanagement.) Na een jaar extra onderwijs bij de vakgroep Communicatie
en Innovatiestudies aan de Landbouwuniversiteit Wageningen studeerde ik in
augustus 1996 af. Mijn afstudeeronderzoek heb ik uitgevoerd bij de sectie
Natuurwetenschap & Samenleving, Universiteit Utrecht. Ik heb mij bezig gehouden
met de mogelijkheden voor de Nederlandse overheid om de introductie van
duurzame energie-technologieën te stimuleren.
Mijn interesse voor het proces van technologie-ontwikkeling heb ik verder kunnen
verdiepen in mijn promotieonderzoek, dat ik eveneens heb uitgevoerd bij de sectie
Natuurwetenschap & Samenleving aan de Universiteit Utrecht. Vanaf september
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Het laatste woord
Na de vele eerdere woorden is ook dit laatste woord aan mij. Eigenlijk is het genoeg
om in één zin alle mensen te bedanken, die er de afgelopen paar jaar zo op zijn tijd
voor hebben gezorgd dat ik een glimlach op mijn gezicht had.
Iedereen – vriendinnen & vrienden en natuurlijk mijn familie (papa, mama, Arjan:
dikke kus!) – weet wel hoe ik de momenten van afleiding en relativering, het geklets
aan de telefoon, de wandelpartijen en het schaatsen, de aan mij gestuurde kaartjes, en
het kopje thee / koffie of de heerlijke maaltijd heb gewaardeerd.
Maar toch even:
Beste Kornelis,
Ik heb heel veel van je geleerd. Je bent kritisch en ik bewonder je vermogen om in
zeer beperkte tijd haarfijn de zwakke plekken uit een stuk tekst te halen. Uiteindelijk
zijn onze posities (qua kennis en interesses) denk ik dichter bij elkaar gekomen dan
ik tussentijds vaak gedacht heb! En verder ben ik er natuurlijk trots op dat je tevreden
bent over het minst-kwantitatieve proefschrift, dat waarschijnlijk ooit onder jouw
begeleiding geschreven zal worden.
Beste Harro,
Je was bereid het laatste jaar een snel-cursus te doen in technologie-ontwikkeling
voor en door trage, energie-intensieve sectoren. Ik heb je inbreng om op basis
daarvan mee te denken over mijn proefschrift zeer gewaardeerd. Het was plezierig en
nuttig om er een derde iemand bij te hebben die meedacht vanuit een ander
gedachtengoed.
Dear experts on the-cover-of-my-thesis (and also the experts who are missing there),
You have all been subject to my ongoing questions regarding the development of
particular industrial technologies. For me it was a valuable experience to approach
such a variety of people from a large number of countries in order to get what I was
looking for. I admire and appreciate the patience you had in helping me. The lists of
questions appeared endlessly sometimes! I hope you appreciate what I did with the
insights and stories you provided.
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A special thank you for Mr. Schuwerk (Voith Paper, Ravensburg) and Mr. Schmidt
(Sappi Ehingen, Ehingen) for facilitating and delivering the paper for printing this
thesis!
Beste Leopold, Frauke, Arjan en Michiel,
Ik heb het erg leuk gevonden om als OiO ‘samen te werken’ met studenten.
Tenminste zo zie ik het intensieve contact dat ik met jullie heb gehad. Ik hoop dat
jullie er net zo veel plezier aan hebben beleefd als ik!
Beste (ex-)collegae – en (ex-)collegae die vrienden geworden zijn –
Jullie waren niet alleen de ‘sociale omgeving’ van de hoogleraar, maar voor lange
tijd ook die van mij. Ik heb inmiddels bijna 5 jaar gezwommen in de vijver NW&S
en heb een groot aantal collegae gekend (en verschillende kamergenoten). Sommige
dingen lijken nooit te veranderen op een universiteit. Een van die dingen is dat het
‘associatieve vermogen’ van de medewerkers bij NW&S, ondanks de personele
verschuivingen, op de een of andere manier altijd op peil blijft! Ik heb me vaak
verbaasd over de wilde en uitgelaten, maar ook serieuze en fundamentele wendingen,
die gesprekken in de koffiehoek konden nemen. Ik zal het plezier dat jullie gegeven
hebben, niet alleen tijdens mijn werk, maar ook daar buiten (!), altijd geweldig
blijven vinden!
Lieve Robert, beste paranimf, beste vriend
Ik heb de samenwerking en de momenten dat ik gewoon even bij je aan kon kloppen
– om even te zeuren, om nieuwe inspiratie op te doen, om blij te vertellen over leuke
anecdotes uit mijn onderzoek of om te luisteren naar die van jou – gemist na de
afronding van jouw eigen proefschrift. Ik vind het erg fijn dat je nu ook voor mij
paranimf kan zijn. Ik hoop je nog vaak tegen te komen!
Lieve Linda, beste paranimf, lieve zus
Zonder zo’n zus als jij zou de wereld een stuk minder leuk zijn. Het is fijn om af en
toe met je te kletsen, want ondanks grote verschillen lijken we veel op elkaar.
Daarom ben ik blij dat je mijn paranimf bent.
Liefste JW
Ik ben blij met jou.
Utrecht, juni 2001
